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
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DICTATORSHIP ON ITS TRIAL

BENITO MUSSOLINI

Fr.

DICTATORSHIP ON ITS TRIAL

BY EMINENT LEADERS OF MODERN THOUGHT

EDITED BY
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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
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Freedom: The freedom of which democrats prate is merely a verbal illusion for simple-minded folk; for beyond the Alps voices are already making themselves heard which deny the formula of 1789, as the Fascist régime has brought a new formula into existence—Authority, Order, and Justice!

MUSSOLINI

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INTRODUCTION

THE RIGHT HON. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, C.H.

THIS volume displays to us the chasm which the Great War has riven between the twentieth and nineteenth centuries. In the Victorian era dictatorship was at once a monstrosity and an anachronism. Those were the days of British predominance and splendour. The triumphant islanders, having fought all the world in relays and nearly all the world at once, had beaten Napoleon on the field of battle and had shamed his system at the bar of public opinion. Lords of a fifth of the globe, unchallenged rulers of the seas, with their matchless coal and iron, armed with steam and invention, " the proud Aristocracy," who had hitherto guided England through three centuries of jeopardy and hazard, saw their country first—indeed without a rival—in wealth, in power, in influence, and in fame. The eyes of all peoples were turned to London. And with reason ; for London was not only the largest city in the world and the capital of the most prosperous and victorious State, it was also the centre and fountain-head of a definite and distinctive conception and practice of human government. The laurels of Trafalgar and Waterloo might fade with the generation that had gained them ; but the famous British Constitution and English system of Parliamentary government carried its perennial message to all peoples. Here then were institutions in harmony alike with the finest periods of Greece and Rome and with the ever-springing desires of men and nations for responsible self-government. Here were institutions patiently and resolutely wrought upon the battlefields, the scaffolds, and the hustings of three hundred years. Here were institutions which had stood the test of time and the test of war ; which combined kingship with popular government ; which had asserted and seemed

to have reconciled the rights of liberty and of property; which had shown an inherent faculty of growth and adaptation; for which the future seemed to hold no terrors; and across which Time had never written the word 'Decay.'

Was it surprising that constitutions on the British model became the achievement, the aim, or the dream of almost every living race? Certainly not Utopia; but apparently a practical, salutary, well-tried method of making continuous progress toward it! Moreover, these institutions were evidently capable of transplantation. Not only could they follow the flag of Britain across the oceans; they had multiplied and thriven throughout the United States. The nineteenth century became the age of Parliament-making. To live under an elective Parliamentary system was to be civilized and fortunate; to live under any other system was to be barbarous and miserable. Measureless rewards, it was thought, awaited those who applied British principles with courage and fidelity. Catastrophe dogged the footprints of the laggards. No one had any doubts. Rarely has a consensus of reason established so overriding a dominance. The end of all despotic or even arbitrary forms of government, and the rise in their place of ever more voluble and more powerful Parliaments, elected on ever-widening franchises, were assumed as part of the immutable destiny of mankind.

This volume shows us how far these anticipations have been proved false. How different is the scene which confronts a cool and detached observer of to-day! Many of the Parliaments erected so hopefully throughout Europe in the nineteenth century have already been openly demolished or covertly set aside. The British oak, it appears, will not grow on Latin or Slavonic soil. Though planted with high hopes and watered with tears of thankfulness and joy, the sapling could make no solid growth or root in unprepared fields or adverse climates. The first really great gale—and after all it was a world typhoon—uprooted these feeble sproutings. With what disillusionment would the comfortable Gladstonian who closed his eyes at the end of the nineteenth century survey the Europe of to-day! With

what pangs of bewilderment would he contemplate a Russia which freed itself from the civilizing despotism of the Romanovs only to fall into the steel-wire trammels of the Lenins! Could he acclaim a Poland which had resigned her dearly repurchased liberties to Marshal Pilsudski? How would an ardent champion of Italian freedom and unity measure the monumental work of Mussolini? With what perplexity would he realize that the best years which Spain has known have been those lived under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera!

If he looked across the ocean to the gigantic new republic erected in the United States upon the traditional British foundations—all done in accordance with the old prescription—there he would see that strangest of all spectacles, the Rule of the Machine. Limited liability dictatorship! Dictatorship in small packets in states and cities; functionaries installed for brief, fixed terms, with no need to argue with constituents who will certainly make haste at the first opportunity to choose some other nonentity, and with neither time nor training to carry through long policies! There he would see the government of large communities carried on even in the teeth of public opinion, and sometimes in circumstances causing flagrant scandal, until some violent recoil produces inconveniences of the opposite kind equally removed from the popular wish: while all the time in scores of legislatures hundreds of orators declaim to indifferent or inattentive assemblies, and thousands of professional 'spell-binders' compete successfully, at election-times at least, with the cinema. Nowhere among the dictatorships of the Old World would our Victorian Liberal find any respect for the basic rights, comprehensions, and tolerances of England under Gladstone or Disraeli. Nowhere in the New World, where the highest developments of party organization have been reached, would he find that national family council with its long continuity of purpose that was the foundation of the British Parliamentary system and of British survival and success.

Where do we stand in Britain? Some are afraid of change. Many think change must be good because it is

different. Vast transformations have taken place in our island government. They have been unhasting, but unresting. Democracy has invaded the Council Chamber. It has liquidated the prestige of the House of Commons. The vote given to every one has been regarded as a trifle by many, and as a nuisance by many more. There is no guarantee that universal suffrage will understand, cherish, or even protect the venerable instrument to which it owes its birth. The House of Commons is at this moment assimilating the products of an enormous new electorate. It is gorged and almost gasping. We can, however, feel that the process of digestion is continuous. Were we only concerned with freedom, with clean administration, with control of the Executive, with foreign policy and world policy, with gas and water, with morals and humanities, there would be no doubt that the House of Commons would remain the citadel as it was the cradle of Parliamentary institutions throughout the world.

But politics nowadays are merged in economics. Enfranchised millions demand a larger share of life. Science, massed capital, commanding direction at the summit, comprehending service and goodwill around it, may well be capable of complying with the demand. But these indispensables are not mechanisms or structures which can be built up piece by piece or brick by brick, they are plants which can only be cultivated and grown. Will Parliamentary institutions confided to the haphazard, uninstructed, and wire-pulled guidance of universal suffrage be found equal to the task, or will the masses in their quest for material well-being break their ancient shield and with blind instinct create new crude agencies of folly or preservation?

Dr Otto Forst de Battaglia, in assembling for us compendiously and dispassionately the opinions of so many competent authorities upon the expedient of dictatorship throughout the ages, has discharged a timely work and he leaves us all the debtors for his labours.

EDITOR'S PREFACE

DICTATORSHIP is the most important political problem of the day. The question whether democracy, that heritage of the nineteenth century, founded as it is upon the doctrine of the *contrat social*, and the belief that all men are born equal and are naturally entitled to freedom, is still to be the political system of civilized European countries is here thrown open to discussion, and the most varied replies from particular countries, nations, and parties have been set down. Like every close student of political life, we hold our own views regarding dictatorship. But, instead of providing an answer based upon our own convictions, which would make but a limited appeal, we thought it advisable to treat the matter more objectively, and to collect a number of views, each of which would be certain of getting a good hearing. Leading contemporary figures, representing the most diverse political parties, religious denominations, and countries, have contributed their views to this volume and have expressed their opinions both in regard to dictatorship in general and its concrete manifestations in the various important States where it has become a reality. We trust that we have succeeded in presenting a fairly exhaustive study of the subject. It only remains for us to make two points clear. The inclusion of Hungary among the examples of present-day dictatorships, despite the fact that a legal form of government has now been restored there, is due to our endeavour to recall the conditions and the atmosphere out of which the late Hungarian dictatorship sprang. The absence of any authoritative presentation of the ideas of Bolshevism is due, not to any unwillingness on our part to publish such a contribution, but to the persistent refusal of competent experts on this

subject to make any contribution to this book. Thus the task of describing conditions in Russia was perforce entrusted to an outside though impartial observer of the situation.

It is with great pleasure that we avail ourselves of this opportunity to thank the many friends who have given us their valuable help. At the same time we would emphasize the fact that the idea of this book and its realization lie solely with us and owe nothing whatsoever to any outside influence. The motto we had in mind when we conceived the plan of it was the medieval legal saw: "One man's say is no man's say; both sides must be fairly and squarely heard."

OTTO FORST DE BATTAGLIA

CONTENTS

PART I

	PAGE
Dictatorship in Ancient Rome *Guglielmo Ferrero*	19
Dictatorship in the Middle Ages and in Modern Times *Georg Mehlis*	34
Dictatorship and Christianity *Friedrich Muckermann, S.J.*	67
Dictatorship and the Liberal Outlook *Wickham Steed*	82
Dictatorship or Democracy *Paul Löbe*	89
The Socialists and Dictatorship *Émile Vandervelde*	91
Dictatorship and the Problem of the Great Man *André Maurois*	100
Science and Dictatorship *Albert Einstein*	107
The Dictator and Political Economy *Ludwig Bernhard*	108
Dictatorship and Foreign Policy *Jules Sauerwein*	119
Dictatorship and the German Mind *Walter von Molo*	129
The Problem of the Leader *Anatole de Monzie*	142

PAGE

LOVE AND DICTATORSHIP 152
Maurice Bedel

DICTATORSHIP AND THE DICTATOR 163
Robert de Traz

PART II

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT 169
Ferdynand Ossendowski

INFLUENCE OF POST-WAR THOUGHT ON HUNGARY 208
Baron Julius Wlassics

MUSSOLINI AND THE DICTATORSHIP IN ITALY 218
Emilio Bodrero

THE DICTATORSHIP IN SPAIN 256
Count de Romanones

THE PROBLEM OF DICTATORSHIP AND TURKEY TO-DAY 275
Kurt Koehler

JOSEF PILSUDSKI 296
Juljusz Kaden-Bandrowski

DICTATORSHIP IN YUGO-SLAVIA 323
Hermann Wendel

PART III

THE NATURE OF DICTATORSHIP 359
Otto Forst de Battaglia

ILLUSTRATIONS

	PAGE
Benito Mussolini	*Frontispiece*
Julius Cæsar	26
Cardinal Richelieu	52
Vladimir Ilitch Lenin	186
Lenin's Death-mask	198
Nikolaus Horthy	212
Mussolini delivers a Speech	230
Mussolini on Parade	248
Cardinal Gasparri and Mussolini	254
General Primo de Rivera	262
President Mustapha Kemal Pasha	284
President Kemal Pasha with the National Assembly	290
Marshal Josef Pilsudski	300
Marshal Pilsudski and his Daughter	312
King Alexander of Yugo-Slavia	324
General Živković	346

PART I

DICTATORSHIP IN ANCIENT ROME

GUGLIELMO FERRERO

(Italian historian noted for his important works on ancient Rome. In politics a moderate socialist and a vigorous opponent of Fascism.)

I

DICTATORSHIP IN THE FIRST CENTURIES OF THE REPUBLIC

THE Roman Republic, during the first centuries of its existence, was a mixture of what we call direct democracy and the representative system. The people had the power of legislation which they exercised through the medium of their assemblies, or *comitia*. All the civil and military offices were elective, and the candidates chosen by the people to hold them were given definite powers which they exercised for a prescribed period laid down by law. At the head was the Senate—an assembly which ruled the whole state. The senators were chosen by the censors from the ranks of those who had held high elective offices. Thus the Senate too was indirectly based on the popular vote; it might be defined as an elective assembly in the second degree.

This mixture of direct democracy and of the representative system had its advantages and its disadvantages. Among its disadvantages must be reckoned a certain sluggishness at those critical moments which demanded swift action. The chief magistrates, the prætors and the consuls, were elected only for one year, and at the end of their term of office any citizen had the right to summon them before the tribunals to answer for what they had done during that time. Like all politicians under a democratic system, they were backed by friends and interests that they were bound to nurse. But officials, elected and functioning in these

circumstances, were not, as a rule, inclined to shoulder too heavy a responsibility. Furthermore, all the offices were 'collegiate'—that is to say, they were filled by two or more officials elected at the same time and endowed with the same powers. The consuls, who in a sense might be called the Presidents of the Republic, were two in number, each exercising equal power, an arrangement which inevitably gave rise to disputes throughout the hierarchy and resulted in the paralysis of the state.

It can readily be understood that the defects of such a constitution became particularly apparent in times of tumult and when it was urgent to ward off some imminent danger. And it was for this reason that the Roman political mind, which was extremely supple and sensitive, created the dictatorship—a special and exceptional office, to be utilized in extraordinary circumstances of this description.

The dictatorship, like all the Roman offices, was also gradually fashioned in the crucible of experience. The historical documents at our disposal do not provide us with a detailed history of the dictatorship in all its successive phases, and we must therefore be content with giving an outline of what it was during the centuries of the Republic in which it existed in full maturity.

When the Senate was convinced that the state was in great danger and that the ordinary officials were incompetent to secure its safety it could authorize the consuls to appoint a dictator. It seems that the consuls could also take this step on their own initiative without the authorization of the Senate. The man chosen to be dictator had to be of consular rank; that is to say, he must already have been consul—in fact, an important personage. The appointment was made after the auspices had been taken, and no protest against it was allowed on the part of the tribunes of the plebs. At the same time as the appointment was made the object of it was also defined. Sometimes the reason given was quite general—*rei gerendæ causa*—in which case the dictator was appointed with full powers for the administration of the Republic. But occasionally a further specification was made, assigning a particular reason for the

appointment, such as *seditionis sedandæ causa*. Immediately after the nomination by the consuls a *Lex Curiata* conferred the *imperium* upon the dictator, whereupon the latter came into office.

Chosen in this way, the dictator became the sole head of the Republic; he had no colleagues, and enjoyed absolute power. He could pass sentences against which there was no appeal, and it was for this reason that his lictors carried the axe even when they were marching through the streets of Rome. He was not accountable for his actions to the Senate and could give orders to all the officials, including the consuls, whom he could summon to appear before him without their lictors. He could take any measure he regarded as necessary for the safety of the state, the tribunes of the plebs not being allowed to interpose their veto.

In short, the dictator enjoyed the power of an absolute monarch, and when his dictatorship was over he could not be arraigned before the tribunes and made to answer for his actions, unless he had clearly gone beyond the powers conferred upon him on receiving his appointment. In fact, he was protected by an inviolability which was retrospective in its action. Nevertheless, he was not allowed to take money from the Treasury without the consent of the Senate. Lastly, he was appointed for a fixed period of time—namely, six months—which he was not allowed to exceed. If, at the end of that period, he had not already abdicated his power automatically ended. Indeed, it very frequently came to an end before the termination of the legal period of six months, when the object for which he had been appointed dictator had been gained; if, for instance, the riot or sedition, to deal with which a dictatorship had been necessary, had ceased to exist. A dictator who tried to remain in office after the fulfilment of his mission could be forced by the tribunes of the plebs to abdicate, and after his abdication might even be prosecuted on a charge of having illegally prolonged his tenure of office.

The dictator had the right to choose his own lieutenant or adjutant, with the title of *magister equitum*. It is not difficult to grasp the ingenious idea behind the office of

dictator—it was the legal organization of an absolute power rigorously limited to a specified period of time. The dictator did not hold office by virtue of his own absolute power, but received it at the hands of the legitimate authorities, appointed directly or indirectly by the people. The will of the people was still the direct or indirect source of his formidable power. He was placed in a position superior to all the other officials and almost entirely independent of the Senate; but all his powers were conferred upon him only for the time strictly necessary for the accomplishment of his extraordinary mission, a period which, in any case, could not exceed six months. At the end of six months, and if possible even before, the normal constitution had to be restored.

It was a wise, vital, and well-balanced idea, and it is not astonishing that the dictatorship rendered good service to a turbulent republic like that of Rome, especially during what may be called the period of preparation for the hegemony of the world. And, indeed, up to the time of the Second Punic War dictators appeared fairly often in the history of Rome and rendered important services. To be made dictator during this period was the highest honour a man could attain, the glorious crown of a distinguished career. But after the Second Punic War there were no more dictators, although, especially during the second century B.C., the Roman State had to face some exceedingly grave crises. For over a hundred years there had been no mention of dictators when in the year 82 B.C. the office was suddenly revived in the person of Sulla.

II

DICTATORSHIP AND TYRANNY

In the year 82 B.C. Sulla was appointed by the *comitia*, *dictator legibus scribundis reipublicæ constituendæ*. As the title shows, an important innovation was introduced on this occasion. It was no longer a case of appointing a dictator *rei gerendæ* or *seditionis sedandæ causa*; he was appointed to make laws and reform the Republic. This meant that the legislative power, which, according to the Republican Consti-

tution, had hitherto been vested in the people and partly also in the Senate, was transferred to the hands of this dictator.

And, indeed, Sulla did not restrict his activities to the restoration of order, as so many of his predecessors in the office had done in times of trouble. He radically altered the constitution. Aiming, as he did, at making it once again aristocratic, as it had been in the past, there was scarcely an office or a power—tribunes, consuls, prætors, censors, Senate, *comitia*, and law-courts—that his reforms did not touch.

It is clear that no dictator of the classic period could have carried out reforms of such magnitude, for he had not the power of making laws instead of the people. The dictatorship of Sulla also differed from its predecessors in the length of its duration. As we have seen, a dictatorship before his time lasted only until its particular task had been accomplished, and in any case not longer than six months. But as Sulla could not have carried out such far-reaching reforms in six months, he remained dictator for over three years. Elected in 82 B.C., he abdicated in 79 B.C.

What was the nature of this dictatorship which was suddenly revived, though with such important differences, after an eclipse of over a hundred years? As a matter of fact, under the old name a new power lay hid. Sulla was dictator in name only; in reality he was what the ancients used to call a 'tyrant'—that is to say, a man who, having seized the reins of absolute power in the State thanks to favourable circumstances, tries to give it a legal sanction by connecting it with the old tradition of the dictatorship.

Sulla's history is a matter of common knowledge. He appeared at a moment when the Republic had long suffered from serious political discord. Since the time of the Gracchi the aristocracy had been split into two parties which every year grew more and more hostile to each other, both trying to win over the middle classes and the proletariat in order to rule the Republic. In the end this political conflict degenerated into regular civil war. The army was also divided, one side under Caius Marius, the famous conqueror of the Cimbri and Teutons, supporting one of the two parties,

and the other rallying under Sulla to the side of the rival party. After a prolonged and stubborn conflict Sulla's efforts were crowned with success. He found himself at the head of his army, the absolute master of the state, and in a position to impose his will on the constitutional authorities, the magistrates, the Senate, and the popular assemblies.

Sulla, then, was a classic example of what the ancients called a 'tyrant'—that is to say, a man who, with the army behind him, can do as he pleases in the state, without being responsible to anybody and without being hampered by any constitutional or judicial restrictions. Aristotle, who in his *Politics* enters into a lengthy discussion of this form of government, regards it as a degenerate form of true monarchy, and is of opinion that of all forms of government it is the worst, since the tyrant is inevitably inclined to abuse his power, and to do so not in the public interest, but in his own.

Nevertheless, it must be confessed that the Aristotelian definition is only partially applicable to Sulla. In spite of all his faults, Sulla was a great man, and, although he found himself in possession of absolute power in Rome, he did not exercise it solely in his own interests. While it is true that he enriched both himself and his followers, and that he tried to secure himself and his party in a permanent position of power in the state, he also endeavoured to reform the constitution in such a way as to meet the public interest. His endeavour to hide his absolute power under the legal formulas of the old dictatorship also proves that he tried, to a certain extent at least, to legitimize his authority by giving it a legal form acceptable to the people. This is proved by his abdication, which shows that he regarded the unlimited power he had exercised in the Republic as temporary and exceptional.

In short, Sulla was a tyrant in the ancient acceptation of the term, but a tyrant who did not wish to be recognized as such. He tried to pass himself off as a dictator, and sought, in the tradition of dictatorship, a legal justification for his new power.

Nevertheless, he had been a tyrant, and the Romans agreed with Aristotle in regarding this absolute and uncon-

trolled power of one man as the worst form of government. In spite of the services he had rendered to Rome and the Republic both before his dictatorship and during part of his tenure of that office, public opinion turned against him when he died a few months after his abdication. The generation born during his tenure of power grew up hating dictatorship as a damnable scourge. His work was almost entirely demolished during the ten years following his death, and the vanquished party, which he had tried to exclude for ever from power, was reorganized and, adapting itself to the changed state of affairs, regained its old influence.

Thirty extremely troublous years followed upon the death of Sulla, during which the Republic was in such a dangerous state of disorder that extraordinary remedies became necessary. The year 52 B.C. was a case in point. The Roman army had suffered a grave disaster in Persia in the catastrophic defeat of Crassus; the finances were completely disorganized; and the whole of Gaul, which Cæsar had declared subdued in 58, was in revolt. Rome had been troubled by serious disturbances following the assassination of the tribune Clodius, and the parties were at loggerheads. Anarchy threatened to sweep all before it. In fact, the situation was one for which the political wisdom of the ancient Romans had created the office of dictator. But the mixture of dictatorship and tyranny or personal power, which Sulla had exercised, had brought dictatorship into such evil odour that the idea of appointing a dictator was not entertained. Instead Pompey was made sole consul—that is to say, consul without colleague. The dictatorship in the old acceptation of the term had been revived, but the word which had become too unpopular was avoided.

Five years later, in 47 B.C., a dictator was once more appointed, this time in the person of Julius Cæsar. In the year 49 the discord between the political parties had again resulted in civil war, and the army had once more been split between the two rival parties, commanded respectively by Cæsar and Pompey. After eighteen months of fighting in Italy and Spain Cæsar succeeded in defeating Pompey's

main army at Pharsalia on August 9, and hardly had the news of his victory reached Rome when he was appointed dictator for the whole of the year 47. It was not, however, the old classic dictatorship that had been resuscitated, but the dictatorship of Sulla—that is to say, tyranny, or the personal rule of a military leader who had most of the army at his back. Moreover, it was revived in the person of Cæsar, who was the nephew of Marius, Sulla's unfortunate adversary.

There can be no doubt that this revival of an office that had become so odious was in a sense an act of revenge carried out by the party that had been defeated by Sulla. It was the party of Marius that had always been loudest in their denunciation of Sulla's dictatorship, because they had been the victims of his persecution. When, thirty years after his death, they came into power they set up a dictatorship as a protest, so to speak, against their old enemies: "It is our turn now! Thirty years ago we were subjected to the personal rule of your leader; now you must submit to the personal rule of ours." Yet the constitutional principle was still so strong in Rome that Cæsar was appointed dictator only for the year 47, and this respect for the old tradition meant that the exercise of personal rule was regarded as merely temporary. All that had been done was to make the extreme limit of six months allowed for a dictatorship in the old days a little more than twice as long.

Unfortunately, Cæsar's position when he was made dictator, toward the end of 48 B.C., was not as strong as Sulla's had been in the year 82. When Sulla had been appointed *dictator legibus scribundis* he had completely annihilated his adversaries and acquired such prestige that no one any longer dared to contest either his success or his power. In three years he had been able to introduce radical changes into the constitution and return to private life without having to fear the vengeance of the vanquished.

Cæsar, on the other hand, in spite of his great victory at Pharsalia, had not annihilated his foe, who tried to reorganize armies in Spain and Africa to carry on the struggle.



JULIUS CÆSAR

Although his authority and prestige had been considerably enhanced by his victory, they were not uncontested, even after Pharsalia, and a profound discontent with the civil war and with the tyranny or personal rule of Cæsar in which it had resulted reigned in Italy. So uncertain was the situation that in the year 46, when the dictatorship granted in 48 for the whole of the year 47 had come to an end, his supporters in Rome suggested, after the Battle of Thapsus, that he should be made dictator for ten years. The veil had been torn aside; no constitutional fiction could any longer hide the truth; a dictatorship lasting ten years was a tyranny, which the ancients regarded as the worst form of government. This proposal produced such a bad impression that Cæsar gave way and refused a dictatorship for ten years. But a fresh insurrection was being prepared by Pompey's supporters in Spain; the general situation went from bad to worse; a terrible economic crisis was convulsing the Empire as the result of the civil war, and discontent was everywhere rife. It was imperative for Cæsar to retain absolute power if he wished to avoid being swept away by a general revolt on the part of all the interests he had wounded during his political career. He accordingly tried by various expedients to keep his plenary powers without having recourse to the detested dictatorship; he had himself appointed sole consul and had the consulship conferred upon him for ten years. But the reality was so striking that all these fictions served no purpose. In the situation in which he was placed Cæsar could no longer maintain himself in power except as a tyrant, disposing of absolute authority and free of all control or legal limitations. In February of the year 44 he crossed the Rubicon for the second time, and forced the Senate and the Assembly of the People to pass a law making him dictator for life.

From the point of view of formality, the sanction of the law may not have been all that could be desired, but a dictator for life was an avowed tyrant, and tyranny was a form of government that the Roman regarded as intolerable for free men. Moreover, the legal act by which the Senate and the people had conferred the dictatorship on

Cæsar was quite invalid since it had been extorted by force. It was after the passing of this law regarding the dictatorship, and as a consequence of it, that the conspiracy was organized which compassed the death of Cæsar a month later on the Ides of March, in the year 44. We know that this conspiracy, in which the highest of the old Roman nobility took part, was organized by a coalition between the old enemies and the old friends of Cæsar. The best elements in his party took a share in the conspiracy, because, with their old-fashioned Roman ideas, they could not bring themselves to acquiesce in a dictatorship for life. They had tolerated a dictatorship for the whole of the year 47 and all the other exceptional powers which Cæsar had arrogated to himself, but on the understanding that, being exceptional, they would be temporary. But when once Cæsar declared himself dictator for life he also declared himself a tyrant, and it became necessary to do away with him.

With the Ides of March, 44, the office of dictator, that old and glorious institution of the Republic, disappeared from Roman history. It had been too deeply compromised by association with tyranny, and public opinion would not hear of it, although the necessity for an exceptional supreme power then became an organic necessity for the republican constitution.

III

DICTATORSHIP AND TYRANNY UNDER THE EMPIRE

After the death of Cæsar a curious confusion pervades Roman history regarding exceptional and ordinary powers, which complicates the situation and makes it extremely difficult for us to understand the history of the Empire.

Owing to the universal tendency to explain past events by our own experience, we have always regarded the Roman Emperors as monarchs of the kind that the heads of European dynasties have been for the last few centuries. The comparison seemed at first sight to be justified. The Roman Emperor was the sole head of the army and of the

state, like the European kings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and from the distance of so many hundreds of years, and guided by the meagre documents we possess concerning their activities, he seemed to be the absolute ruler of the Empire. But, in reality, if we examine the matter more closely we see that there were great differences. The Roman Emperor was the sole head of the army, but he was very far from being the absolute master of the state. He had to render an account to the Senate, which possessed its own authority, privileges, and rights, and in which all the conspiracies were organized which led to the deaths of Emperors who had shown scant respect for the old principles of republican constitutionalism. Furthermore, the Imperial office, during the first three centuries of the Empire, was never hereditary by right. The dynastic principle was not established in Roman history until the time of Constantine.

As a matter of fact, it is the mixture of dictatorship regarded as a constitutional power and of tyranny regarded as personal rule, which we find for the first time in the case of Sulla, that explains the nature of the Imperial authority. The Roman Empire had been founded by a military aristocracy which considered the right of commanding armies as its most noble duty and its most important privilege. As long as this aristocracy had been united and disciplined the army had recognized the supreme authority of the Senate, which was the body representing the aristocracy. But when this aristocracy had been split up into parties and factions the army also became divided, and terrible civil wars followed, with the result that, first in the person of Sulla and afterward in that of Cæsar, the leader of the victorious troops had found himself in the position of tyrant—that is to say, the absolute master of the Government and of the state.

But this was a formidable innovation. The ancient world had seen many a tyrant, but they had been petty tyrants, who, with a few thousands of Scythian archers in their pay, had seized a town or a small state. But the tyrant who made his appearance in Rome in the last century

of the Republic under the appellation of dictator was the head of the most powerful army that antiquity had ever known, and he ruled a huge empire which embraced almost the whole of the Mediterranean basin. The lack of proportion between this one-man rule and the task he had to accomplish was obvious. One man, who was answerable to nobody, could not possibly govern such a colossal empire single-handed. And thus the Roman aristocracy after Sulla were faced with a terrific problem —how could they prevent the army from destroying the empire that it had created by degenerating into the docile instrument of a personal ruler who was at once violent and powerless?

After the death of Sulla, as well as after the murder of Cæsar, the most enlightened party among the Roman nobility made a serious effort to restore the sovereign power over all the legions and all the generals which the Senate had enjoyed during the glorious days of the Republic. But the effort failed. And after the last civil war, which followed upon the death of Cæsar, when Augustus, the most recent victor, had concentrated all the powers of the State in his own person and wanted to become reconciled with the aristocracy and the Senate, it was agreed to try a new experiment, and the office of sole commander of the armies was created, carrying with it sufficient prestige to guarantee the obedience of the legions and respect for the fundamental laws of the Roman constitution. There was no intention whatever of setting up a king in the modern sense, or of installing what the ancients regarded as a tyranny. The new commander was to be a republican magistrate appointed by the Senate and the people, for whom, in the interests of the public peace, the extraordinary post of commander of all the armies was created. But so great was the anxiety not to make his authority of too exceptional a nature that no new name was conferred upon him. From the legal point of view Augustus was not even dictator; he was only a consul when he held that office, or a proconsul. Even his right to command the armies, which was part of his proconsular power, was conferred on him for a

definite period only—five or ten years—in accordance with successive decrees.

Such was the essence of the republican restoration attempted by Augustus after the battle of Actium in agreement with the old Roman nobility.

But in spite of every effort to make the authority of this sole head of the army constitutional, in accordance with old Roman ideas, it was inevitable that, like the kernel in a peach, the tyrant should lie hidden within this constitutional power. Although at the beginning the office was conferred for a given period, it became by force of circumstances an appointment for life. During the long life of Augustus it was impossible even to think of replacing him, although on more than one occasion he showed that he was tired of the responsibility. The legions were in a constant state of ferment, because, among other reasons, they were irregularly paid, and who but Augustus had the requisite authority to keep them quiet? When he died his place had to be filled by Tiberius, although a large party in the Senate would have liked to abolish this sole supreme command and return to the purely republican system. But it would have been too risky; Tiberius was the only general who possessed the necessary prestige and popularity with the legions. By giving the armies a single head the respect and affection of the soldiers were crystallized about the person of that leader, and when once this crystallization of respect and affection had taken place it was impossible, or at all events extremely dangerous, to change him.

But as soon as the *imperator* became the sole head of the armies, holding his appointment for life, he also became inviolable and irresponsible. Although all Roman officials were inviolable and could not be called upon to answer for their actions while they were in office, as long as their appointments were temporary and generally lasted less than a year this principle did not infringe republican equality. But the situation was completely altered with the creation of a life appointment in Rome. This meant that as long as he lived a particular official would be placed in an

exceptional and privileged position as compared with the other members of the aristocracy.. Furthermore, as sole head of the army, the Emperor necessarily possessed a ruling voice in all matters of finance and foreign policy, and indirectly became the arbiter of the destinies of all the nobility, since the political and the military careers were at that time closely connected with one another.

In short, the imperial authority was essentially the personal and absolute rule of one man, though he was not allowed to appear in this light and was always obliged to bear in mind the forces opposed to him—the old constitutional powers of the Republic and the impossibility for one man to govern the huge Empire single-handed. The secret of the history of the Roman Empire, which is so obscure and almost incomprehensible to the modern mind, lies in this hidden contradiction, which, although it was a continual source of trouble in the Empire, was also its salvation up to the moment when it burst bounds and destroyed everything.

The Emperors of the Julio-Claudian house may be divided into two categories. On the one hand we have Augustus, Tiberius, and Claudius, who were constantly struggling with all the forces at their command against the trend of affairs, and against the interests and very essence of their authority, which should have urged them to increase and make a public display of their power. These three Emperors might be described as republican officials who, willy-nilly, were forced in self-defence to turn tyrant. But the two others, Caligula and Nero, tried to do away with the contradiction by declaring themselves absolute rulers at the expense of their office, which so much effort had been made to preserve. Caligula, however, was murdered by a conspiracy, while Nero was overthrown by a rebellion on the part of the armies which resulted in a colossal civil war.

This civil war restored the equilibrium between the two opposing forces—personal rule and the constitutional spirit. From the time of Vespasian to that of Marcus Aurelius, with the exception of a short interval under Domitian, the Emperor, for over a century, was no longer either the dictator of the old Republic or the tyrant of the civil wars, but

a harmonious mixture of the two. He showed great moderation in the exercise of his personal discretional authority, respecting the rights of the Senate and the fundamental principles of the old Roman constitution. But this state of equilibrium, to which the Empire owed its most brilliant century, was once more upset in the reign of Commodus. Then strife broke out again with the civil war that began after the death of that Emperor and proved the profound wisdom of the unremitting efforts made throughout two centuries to give the tyranny inseparable from the Emperor's personal rule that constitutional character which was alone capable of limiting it and making it legitimate.

Septimus Severus was the victor in the civil war which broke out after the death of Commodus. After his success he was at the head of the armies, and, like Sulla and Cæsar, was the tyrant and absolute master of the State; but he was a tyrant who had no need to hide behind constitutional principles. The authority of the Senate was shattered and the old constitutional and republican tradition a thing of the past, and Septimus Severus legitimized his rule by means of force and the prestige of victory. But what did this lead to? As long as he lived he succeeded in imposing his authority on the legions by means of his personal glamour and power, and thus safeguarded the unity of the State. But as soon as he was dead his feeble successors were no longer able to do so. The rule of force—that is to say, of pure tyranny, devoid of all trace of legality—crumbled to bits; in every province some general had himself proclaimed Emperor and tried to seize the reins of power by means of arms. This meant military anarchy, which, but for occasional intervals of respite and peace, was to end only with the downfall of the Empire and of ancient civilization.

What force had created force destroyed. The child of the armies, the Roman Empire, was destroyed by the armies that had given it birth. And ancient civilization perished with the Empire when the latter found that its Government had become one of force alone, unsupported by any legal right.

DICTATORSHIP IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND IN MODERN TIMES

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THE forms of spiritual life and particularly of political communities come and go. They undergo a period of preparation, take root, slowly attain to full development, only to grow feeble, and apparently to pass away. But in this changing current of events nothing passes away completely, and in the lives of nations the essential character of a people's spirit, once formed, is constantly rising to the surface again. Frequently it is far from easy to recognize it, owing to the radical changes undergone in the bearing, looks, and dress of a particular community. Nevertheless, if we dispassionately observe and try to understand what has taken place we shall be able to discover the common factor beneath the multifarious external manifestations.

As a recognized form of government, dictatorship has of late years once more openly come to the forefront of politics, with a force and vigour which, it must be admitted, is somewhat surprising. For the signal victory of liberal ideas and their universal acceptance by the great civilized nations of the world naturally led to the conclusion that dictatorship had had its day. Where could dictatorship find a place in an age apparently convinced that the great mass of the people are fit to rule, and basing the idea of the sovereignty of the people on the doctrine of equality and the claim of political freedom? In the light of this ideology it must appear a gross injustice to exercise or to submit to any force with the object of placing the supreme power and control in the hands of a single individual.

Superficially it would seem that it was the unsettled state of affairs after the World War that proved the direct incentive for the revival of dictatorship. But it will be our endeavour to show that the ground had long since been prepared for this form of political power, to trace its gradual recovery of vital vigour from the day when in early medieval times it had almost entirely disappeared, and to prove that it could not fail to reach its maturity as a counterpoise to other forces which were becoming dangerous and threatening the foundations of the State. For, after all, the principle of dictatorship is the exercise of the highest possible amount of political power, and it is thus best suited to the combating of anarchy and political chaos. It is the embodiment of the idea of unlimited sovereign power, as opposed to the levelling demands of the many too many.

As we are more concerned with dictatorship as a practical form of government than with its appearance in the realm of thought as a theory of power and of unlimited sovereignty, let us follow its evolution from the Middle Ages until modern times by examining certain conspicuous cases of its practical application to political life. Before following this evolution in different countries, however, we must draw certain important distinctions.

We would call attention to four different concepts of government, all of which have this in common, that they involve the unlimited sovereignty of a single individual and absolute power. I refer to despotism, tyranny, dictatorship, and absolutism. Of these four tyranny and dictatorship on the one hand, and despotism and absolutism on the other, seem to fall into pairs. Probably the main difference between them lies in their system of law. However strictly the law may have been observed by individual rulers who practised it, tyranny in the ancient state was essentially a reign of violence. And it was for this reason that the ancient world, which held law and custom as sacrosanct, rebelled against it. The tyrant was the illegal usurper of political power. Plato painted the picture of this form of government in the gloomiest colours. The tyrant, in his opinion, was the scum of humanity. Moreover, Hellenic

poetry extolled tyrannicide to the skies, and this despite the incontestible fact that the tyrants conferred great benefits on the city-states of antiquity. Modern dictatorship may be distinguished from tyranny by the show of legality it makes. To rule without law is regarded by Western civilization, which sets such great store by form and organization, almost as an impossibility. But incidentally let it at once be said that the nature of this law is a matter of complete indifference. No matter how much it may favour particular classes or persons, the main consideration is that law of a kind is actually established. Dictatorship as distinguished from tyranny is, therefore, a form of government which relies not merely upon violence, but on organized power or authority—that is to say, power or authority which is legally established. Naturally, one case differs from another in detail, but, generally speaking, it may be said that in modern dictatorships law and order play a more important part than they did in the ancient world.

Similarly modern absolutism is distinguished from the great Oriental despotisms which existed before classical antiquity by the fact that its forms are more civilized. Despotism recognizes no system of law, while modern absolutism lays great emphasis upon it. In his *Fundamental Characteristics of the Modern Age* [1] Fichte gave examples of exceedingly interesting variations in the development of the sense of legality. In the great despotisms of the East the only person who has any legal rights is the ruler. He is legally protected and can extend the protection of the law arbitrarily to his favourites. Legal rights for all may subsequently come into existence, and this principle may ultimately lead to the legal recognition of *equal rights for all.* But in spite of these equal rights the actual rights of each individual subject remain very different. Equal rights for all is a highly problematic and unjustifiable claim. Modern absolutism, which has also been described as enlightened despotism, can probably be reconciled with equal rights for all, emphatically though it may reject the doctrine of equal rights as a principle. In contradistinction to the tyranny of

[1] *Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters.*

Oriental despotism, modern absolutism is legally organized tyranny, or rule by might.

The subject of our essay is dictatorship, the earlier form of which was tyranny. Despotism and absolutism, which stand in the same relation to each other as tyranny and dictatorship, do not come within the limits of our discussion. The main difference between them lies in the fact that while despotism and absolutism are usually founded on a monarchy already established, dictatorship and tyranny generally depend on some politician who has frequently struggled up from the lower strata of society. They are therefore based on the will-power of men who, to judge from their origin, had no prospect of ever exercising influence in the State. Thus, in contradistinction to absolute royal power, a dictatorship is foisted on a people suddenly and unexpectedly, more often than not as the result of a revolutionary upheaval, and is almost always associated with the aspirations to power of a certain highly gifted personality. It would seem as though the untamed forces of omnipotent life wished to avenge themselves on that other form of life, which becomes petrified in tradition, and all too often continues to exercise power over the minds of men through custom and ancient association alone, without producing any great personality.

A characteristic of dictatorship is the unexpected and evanescent nature of its power; it springs suddenly into being, monopolizes and shackles every available force, and continues to rise to ever greater heights of power. It generally makes its appearance where great upheavals have undermined the basis of social life and led to disorder and anarchy. Whereupon the longing arises for unity, order, and stability, and the dictator is the strong personality who satisfies this craving. He may rule either in conjunction with a monarchy or without one. If he leaves the monarchy in existence it becomes a mere figurehead. The motives guiding and inspiring him are ambition and a desire for fame, though they may also be a sense of social responsibility and the idea that he has a mission to fulfil. Times of war are particularly favourable for giving rise to the demand for a dictator, and for his production. When

social order is disturbed, when a weak ruler and a weak Government let the reins drop from their hands, and the masses with blind unbridled fury threaten the fabric of the State, the hour of the dictator has come. His rise to power is frequently promoted by the very masses whom he ultimately rules with a rod of iron. His meteoric appearance is a sign that his country has reached a fatal turning-point in its history, and not infrequently his assumption of power paves the way to the greatness of his state or nation.

The rule of a dictator is frequently lacking in permanence and stability, being closely bound up with his own intrinsic merits. Thus the dictator usually fails to find a worthy successor endowed with the capacity for shouldering the full dignity of the ruler. The dictator's work accordingly often falls to pieces, because his successor cannot bear the heavy burden, though, on the other hand, the innovations and valuable changes he has introduced are frequently absorbed into the fabric of the State, infusing into it a vitality most important for its continuance. In almost all cases the influence and work of the dictator lead to the development and garnering of valuable forces in the country in which he appears.

The new forces which rose up against the ancient order of society and ultimately, after a stubborn and prolonged struggle, destroyed the world of antiquity were Christianity and the Germanic peoples. In his *Philosophy of Art* Schelling gives a stirring description of the downfall of the ancient world of beauty, and no thinking man can fail to feel some pangs of regret at the passing of a life so wondrously ordered. The great founders of the medieval world were at first radically opposed to all that characterized the rule of antiquity. Christianity, it is true, supported the idea of internationalism in common with the Roman Empire, and may to some extent be regarded as the latter's successor. But the Church maintained that her kingdom was not of this world, and did much to loosen the bonds of strict political discipline and order. The Catholic Church founded a hierarchy whose orientation was toward the spiritual, and

at the height of her power put forward the claim that the temporal sword should be subject to the spiritual. Even if the religious consecration of life imparted stability to society it cannot be denied that the transcendental nature of the religious promises, and the emphasis which Christianity laid on the international brotherhood of man, did much to destroy national bonds and weaken the power of temporal rulers.

The Germanic peoples, with their innate love of freedom and particularism, found it difficult, after the fall of the Roman Empire, to accustom themselves to a stable form of government. It is true they were compelled to concede to the civilized peoples whose country they had conquered a certain measure of state organization, but they endeavoured to keep the state bonds as loose and pliable as possible. Thus they were opposed above all to the prerequisites of a politically organized system of government—a hierarchy of officials, a fiscal system and taxation, the establishment of a standing army and a recognized system of law. With them everything was based on the principle of vassalage, voluntary service, and traditional rights. The inherent weaknesses of this system were brought to light in the Holy Roman Empire, in which political demands and privileges of the highest order were never supported by adequate powers of organization, legal institutions, money, and military force. Accordingly this empire, which was never a corporate whole in anything but name, was inevitably doomed to suffer defeat at the hands of the Papacy, which was much more capably organized, and possessed a fully developed legal system. Thus the hour for a theocracy under the direction of the powerful Popes seemed to have come for the Western world, when suddenly with the Renaissance those new forces made themselves felt which, as soon as they reached maturity, led to the overthrow of the temporal power of the Papacy. Among these new forces we may mention individualism, the principle of nationality, dictatorship, humanism, and Protestantism.

We shall make no attempt to trace the connexion between these various forces, but content ourselves with pointing

out that even the idea of dictatorship owes its origin to the study of ancient examples and to the revival of the spirit of Greece and Rome. In those states which were created and reached the height of their power owing to the influence of dictators the latter adapted their new political ideas and aims to the ancient view of statesmanship.

The system of dictatorship demanded the production of great personalities for the realization of lofty political aims. And the Renaissance, with its awakening and strengthening of individuality, let loose an avalanche of forces calculated to produce and train men of strong character. Such men were required to wield and exercise power and be in a position to overthrow everything claiming authority on the grounds of antiquated rights alone without the support of a virile and resolute will. But this age whose orientation was toward individualism, and which hymned the praises of the man of many parts, also provided scope for active reforms. Not only had international bonds been loosened, but the internal cohesion of the nations had been seriously threatened by the conflict of classes and parties. Spoliation, dissension, and schism began to appear in all directions, and in addition to these disturbances religious conflicts broke out which acted as a still further disintegrating force on the life and philosophy of the Western world. Against these elements in an insecure and menacing state of affairs, and these disputes and conflicts, which prevented or complicated all successful and productive achievement, there arose the figure of the dictator, who exploited them for his own glorification.

To all intents and purposes the revival of dictatorship is intimately bound up with the revival of the idea of nationality. When the nations freed themselves from their international bonds, and fought for and asserted their own sovereignty and independence, dictatorship did much to weld the various peoples into national entities, and thus successfully paved the way for their rise to greatness. This was the case both in France and in England, while the dictatorships in Italy, Spain, and Poland strove to achieve a similar end. It may even be said that, in this respect,

dictatorship has accomplished more than absolute monarchy, and is bound by a closer and stronger association to the mass of the people.

As for the values which influenced the Renaissance—the insistence on love, beauty, wisdom, and power—here again the movement aimed entirely at concentrating attention on life upon this earth, and to fostering the desire and longing so to order it as to impose some grand design and order upon the transient and disorderly features of existence. The tendency toward transcendentalism, the struggle against that sinful duenna the World, was supplanted by a passionate acceptance of life on this earth. Wisdom and beauty were not loved for their own sakes; the former was revered in the belief that it would make man master of the world, and the latter in conjunction with art as a means of delight for the ruler and a proof of his power and magnificence. But, first and foremost, power was necessary for the building up of a great kingdom on earth, and for securing to humanity the enjoyment of love and beauty. This power, however, could be won only through the strength of the passions, through unscrupulous courage, through hate and love, hope, longing, aspiration, desire, lust, and suffering. No age has ever been so deeply concerned with the emotions as was the Renaissance, which rightly regarded them as providing the great motive force of life. Even the call to the contemplative life and to scientific research was regarded as a mighty passion.

The unbridled preoccupation with the earthly aims of power, and with the pleasures of life, in conjunction with the idea of human greatness, naturally led to the growth of vice and crime on a scale previously unknown and unheard of in Western civilization. A new attitude toward life had been called into being, the old values were tottering to their fall, and a demonetization of all values and moral ideas took place, which slowly and laboriously led to stable conventions and a loftier point of view.

The doctrines of Boccaccio and Machiavelli may have appeared just as odious to the men of the Middle Ages as the cruelties and vices of the Borgias, and even the moral

consciousness of the present day feels bound to condemn those powerful leading figures who regarded every means as justifiable which placed them in possession of the objects they desired. In the eyes of a stern and strongly developed moral sense the kindly tolerant smile accorded to dissipation and the gratification of sensual lust must surely seem quite as deserving of censure as Machiavelli's *Prince*, which recommends the breaking of treaties, infidelity, and even perjury on the part of the ruler of a state, provided these crimes are calculated to advance his cause and make it prosper. But, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten that any such private action on the part of a ruler in support of his own cause was always regarded as redounding to the advantage of his people and his country, whose weal and woe depended on the political successes of their leader and ruler, and that in this doctrine the independent action and mature working of a new form of culture and the inauguration of clear political thinking are proclaimed, whereby the welfare of the people was established as the highest law.

How complex and varied is the picture presented to our view when we contemplate the political life of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries! The power of the Empire had been shattered, although its ancient claims may still have been upheld. Italy was left to her own devices. The Popes were endeavouring to establish their power on a world-wide basis, though it is true they were also interested, as was the great Pope Julius II, in the nationalist aims of Italy, for, in spite of being an international power, the Papacy actually made concessions to the national idea. Rome, through her great Popes, and Florence, through the Medici family, became the centres of the scientific and artistic life of Europe. Southern Italy fell a prey to the foreigner, while Central and Northern Italy were split up into innumerable city-states, resembling the Greek πόλεις, and were constantly at war with one another. The constitutional life of these states was variegated and complex, and through the trade carried on by the Italian merchants, particularly in Genoa and Venice, with the Levant their wealth was enormous. Some of these states remained true

to their traditions, and were ruled by their aristocratic families and noble houses—that is to say, by their hereditary princes. Thus Venice and Genoa were ruled by their Doges, and Ferrara by the princely family of Este. In other states, however, such as Florence and Milan, a new species of will came into being, which paved the way to new kinds of political institutions.

The new system of government—the dictatorship—did not owe its origin to the power of the princes. On the contrary, it was a form of power which usurped the place of princely rule, and made its weakness manifest. These men whose vigorous strength, genial instincts, courage, and energy raised them to power hailed from the most varied ranks of society. Among those who succeeded in wielding dictatorial powers were peasants, soldiers, merchants, petty clergy, knights, as distinguished from princes, great barons, and representatives of the higher clergy and the old aristocratic families. In addition to the qualities already mentioned, the gifts that equipped these men for their task consisted of great political dexterity, winning personality, unscrupulous severity, liberality, grandeur and kindliness of disposition, candour, and a sense of justice—a varied list indeed of endowments and capacities each of which was calculated in its own way to make its possessor worthy of the dignity and power of a ruler.

In the city-states of Italy during the period of the Renaissance we find two different forms of dictatorship—the one represented by the Medici in Florence, and the other by the Sforzas in Milan. The former is an example of the dictatorship of the *popolani*, as opposed to the *grandi* and *nobili*; the latter of the dictatorship of the *condottieri*, who gradually arrogated to themselves the power of princes. In both cases a power which was in its origin illegitimate rose to the dignity of an hereditary dukedom, and in both cases the dictatorship coincided with a period of great prosperity in the state.

It is open to doubt whether the rule of the Medici in Florence may justly be termed a dictatorship, as in this case revolutionary violence as a condition of the dictator's rise to

power is totally eclipsed by the fact that the first famous member of the house came of *bourgeois* family and was raised to his lofty position by the favour of the masses, and owed his advancement to the charm of his personality, the great public services he had rendered, and his munificent liberality. Nevertheless, the rule of the Medici must be regarded as a dictatorship, for it is an example of the exercise of unlimited and illegitimate power by men who were called into prominence because they represented in a unique form the character of a highly civilized city, passionately devoted to beauty, science, and the joys of the senses. And, after all, the qualities which make men capable of exercising great power over the minds of their fellows are, in a sense, a matter of indifference, whether they be hardness and severity, magnificence and liberality, or personal charm. Power in itself fetters, binds, and casts its omnipotent spell upon the minds of men. Where the fate of a state is bound up in a single individual we certainly have a dictatorship.

The struggles between the nobility and the *bourgeoisie* led to the rise of the family which laid the foundation of the undying fame of Florence, and their name immediately occurs to the mind whenever the patronage and endowment of artistic and scientific genius is mentioned. The State policy of the Medici, an old and noble patrician family, which had attained to a position of great wealth through successful commercial enterprise, proved in every respect superior to the policy of the nobility. Cosimo de' Medici (born in 1389) first attained to the position of ruler not through having held any office or by force of arms, but through the power of his personality. His kindliness and noble liberality won the hearts of the people and paved the way for the exercise of high spiritual power. He was the absolute ruler of Florence, although he held no extraneous title or recognized political position to sanction his paramount authority and influence. He organized and carried on the government of the city with the consummate success and brilliance which won for him the title of *Pater patriæ*. The classical ideal of life was resuscitated in this family, and inspired it to a lofty exaltation of the arts and sciences, and

the honour and support vouchsafed to artists and scholars in Florence is reminiscent of Athens in the heyday of her glory, and of the great statesmen who during that period controlled the destinies of the most spiritual of all peoples.

Under Cosimo's grandson, Lorenzo de' Medici, Florence attained to that pre-eminence as the city of art and beauty which won for her the position of incomparable brilliance she enjoys in the history of the Western world. The love of splendour and the fine æsthetic sense of the great Medici attracted the first artists of Italy to his Court, and won for Florence the reputation of being the supreme arbiter regarding things of the spirit. Something of the life and atmosphere of Athens in the days of Pericles seemed to be revived in her. As opposed to the religio-ethical power of a Savonarola, who aimed at destroying the beauty of life and leading the minds of men through contempt of this world to contemplation of the world to come, Lorenzo de' Medici, in the dignity of his rule, manifested the powers of the spirit in all their charm. Like Pericles, he thought that beauty and culture have the right to demand both sacrifice and self-denial, and he founded a dictatorship of the spirit, which constitutes the Augustan Age in the history of the city-states of Italy. Concentrating all the power and influence in his own hands, he was the lofty figure in whom the spiritual gifts of the city of Florence and all that stirred her soul found its complete expression. The members of the Council of Seventy, which he called into being, were entirely subject to his influence. They disposed of all honours and emoluments, and were called upon to make the most important decisions. Thus he succeeded in making a show of preserving the liberty and privileges of the city, although they had long since been sacrificed to his overpowering personality. For what is generally known as political freedom was eclipsed like a dim, unsteady light in the presence of his brilliant humanity, while he himself lived the life of beauty which was in keeping with his dignity and his intellectual attainments. Under Cosimo I (born 1519) the dictatorship of the Medici was converted into a hereditary dukedom, and this last great member of his house placed

the coping-stone on the work of his predecessors, aiming, more particularly by the foundation of the new Platonic Academy in Florence, at giving visible expression to the admiration for antiquity felt by the Western world, and to its kinship with the classical spirit. This led to that extraordinary efflorescence of the spiritual life, in the plastic arts, philosophy, poetry, and natural science, which even to this day arouses enthusiasm and reverent astonishment.

Something in the nature of a dictatorship of the spirit was also established by Cola di Rienzi, if only in view of the fact that by the fire and power of his speeches he succeeded in exercising a spell over the people, and that his soul was so deeply stirred and affected by the thought of Republican Rome that he consecrated his whole life to the task of resuscitating this ancient form of the State. His aim was to be an advocate and tribune of the people from whose ranks he hailed. (He was born in 1313 and was the son of a publican.) His mind was full of the Gracchi, who defended the rights of the plebeians against the patricians in ancient Rome. Filled with a bitter hatred of the nobility, who had been responsible for his brother's death, he concentrated his whole strength upon wiping out the detested aristocracy and establishing a popular government, of which he felt it his mission to be the head.

The history of his rise to power is strange and astonishing. Sent as ambassador to Avignon, with the mission of informing the Pope that a change had been made in the constitution, he succeeded, through his political dexterity, his charm, and his exceptional gifts, in winning the favour of Pope Clement VI, who under the spell of his personality appointed him notary to the Roman Chamber and invested him with plenary powers. Whereupon he turned his position to account to incite the people against the hated nobility. At last a successful conspiracy was hatched against the aristocratic party, and Cola di Rienzi proclaimed the foundation of the new Popular State from the Capitol. He took the title of Tribune of the People, in memory of ancient Rome, and seized all the power as the representative of the downtrodden masses. He put the hostile aristocracy to flight,

and, as a means of gaining influence, revived the memories associated with the idea of Rome a thousand years before his time. He contrived to give this idea a concrete meaning and real vitality, and in speeches full of fire and eloquence made the past live once more before the eyes of his listeners. His was a remarkable and powerful personality, filled with a passionate longing for social justice. And, indeed, his administration of justice in the high judicial office he held was, in the early days of his power, characterized by great goodwill, and he abolished many abuses which had been a disgrace to the life of the State. His aim was to restore Rome to her former position of power. He invited the princes and representatives of the Italian cities to Rome to discuss the political situation, and endeavoured to vindicate the claim of Rome to take the lead in the affairs of the world. Thus it came about that his pretensions were quite out of proportion to his actual power. He regarded ancient Rome, of which his mind had formed a vivid picture, as having actually been resuscitated, and in his infatuation proposed to found a new Roman Empire, whereby he forfeited the favour and protection of the Pope. He tried to conceal his lack of real power by surrounding himself with as much pomp and ceremony as possible, squandering vast sums of money, and through his harsh taxation forfeiting the favour of the people who had worshipped him for his sense of justice and the courage he displayed in the protection of the downtrodden, particularly as these valuable qualities had been supported by an impressive presence and stirring eloquence. Forced to take flight, he lived for some time with the hermits in the Abruzzi, and when he subsequently returned to Rome he had lost his sense of justice and forgotten his plans for the amelioration of the lot of the people. In fact, he was convinced that all he had done had been rewarded by disgraceful ingratitude, and, proceeding to rule with tyrannical arbitrariness, he was murdered in a popular uprising.

In addition to the dictatorship of the spirit there was the military dictatorship instituted by the *condottieri*, the leaders of the mercenary troops, who played such an important

part in the Italian Renaissance. They offered their services to the chiefs of the various city-states and fought their wars for them on receipt of suitable remuneration. They waged these wars in such a way as to spare their troops as much as possible, for the latter were not only a source of gain to them, but also of prestige. The *condottieri* were, as a rule, of lowly origin; Carmagnola, for instance, being the son of a peasant. And even the famous Sforza ("Compeller") sprang from humble stock. But through their energy and skill in the art of war they contrived to make themselves indispensable to the cities, and thus gradually gained a preponderating influence and won unlimited power. With the advent of the *condottieri* the figure of the former chief of the city faded into oblivion, and the bold warrior, rejoicing in battle, stepped into his place.

Of these famous military leaders Carmagnola and Sforza are the greatest. Both these men—on a small scale, it is true—were possessed of that daring spirit of military leadership which secures the devotion of troops and which, owing to the love and trust it inspires, wins them power and influence. Carmagnola (born 1390) served under the Duke of Milan and subdued a large territory, including the city of Genoa, on his behalf. His qualities as leader won him absolute power in the states whose boundaries he had so gloriously extended by his victories, and it is justifiable to regard his rule as a sort of dictatorship. When the Duke, concerned about his own position, began to contest his power and withdrew his favour, Carmagnola went over to Venice, the enemy of Milan, and as the *condottiere* of the Queen of the Adriatic took back from the Duke of Milan the cities he had originally won for him. But owing to subsequent unsuccessful campaigns, he forfeited the favour of the City of the Doges. Unproved and fantastic charges were brought against him, and he was condemned to death and executed in Venice.

The greatest and most powerful of the *condottieri* who attained to power and rulership were members of the Sforza family in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They gave six dukes to the city of Milan. The rise of this family began

with Muzio, the first " Compeller," who was born in 1369. He served the King of Naples with glory and success, winning considerable political influence, and eventually becoming the indispensable right hand of Queen Johanna II of Naples. After an adventurous life he met his end by drowning in the river Pescana.

With his son Francesco the family reached the zenith of its power. Francesco had originally served in his father's *condotta* and had studied his brilliant tactics. He used to proffer the service of his sword wherever there was money and glory to be won, and life was sufficiently disturbed and dislocated to offer him opportunities of making his iron will and daring energy and determination felt. Thus he entered the service of Milan, Florence, and Venice in turn, until he finally became permanently attached to the dukedom of Milan and Filippo Maria Visconti, Duke of Milan, gave him his daughter in marriage. He was made heir to the dukedom, and laid the foundations of a powerful state, which was subsequently further extended and strengthened by the conquest of Genoa. The wisdom of his political measures so ordered the political and social life of his city that he won a position of unique importance in Northern Italy.

The dictatorship of the *condottieri* was founded upon military prowess. But time and again it may be observed that these men, who won distinction in practising the art of war, possessed a genius for the solution of political problems, and that, far from setting up one-sided military autocracies, they were deeply concerned about developing the life of the state along sound lines. Thus their strong and clear-sighted rule was on the whole a blessing for the states they governed, though when once these states became subjected to their political and military organization they were naturally doomed to all the alarms and vicissitudes of a life of war. The dictatorships of the *condottieri* were never intimately bound up with the life of the people they ruled. The *condottiere* went wherever fortune and martial glory lured him, and conditions were such as to provide scope for his spirit of adventure. He built up nothing of his own,

but set to work where he found favourable opportunities for making his influence felt.

It was only natural that the political forms which provided a new frame for the ancient ideas of the state should first reach maturity in Latin countries and hold out hopeful prospects for the future; for here the feeling for ancient culture and for political discipline and order was much more strongly developed than among the Germanic peoples. All that was required was the advent of a man possessed of the constructive and administrative power to direct the energies of the people along orderly channels.

In addition to Italy, France, more than any other country, derived peculiar advantage from the system of dictatorship, which endowed her with the strength to become one of the great nations of the modern world. And this new power developed, as it were, out of the idea of nationality, by opposing everything which, either from without or within, made any attempt to shackle the country or to threaten her independence. The forces which stood opposed to the national development of France were, on the one hand, the international power of the Papacy and the Empire, who arrogated to themselves the position of supreme arbiters in all ecclesiastical and political matters, and, on the other, the great barons, who, by their individual aspirations to power, handicapped France in her efforts to develop into a strong political entity and realize the dignity and grandeur of a great state. The dictators we have in mind, as having paved the way to the greatness of France and having exercised power during the period of the Renaissance, are men like Jacques Cœur, Richelieu, and Mazarin, while men of similar stamp in more recent times are the leading figures of the French Revolution and, above all, Napoleon Bonaparte.

Jacques Cœur, Richelieu, and Mazarin were French statesmen who, while they did not actually control their nation's destinies either as the acknowledged heads of the State or the holders of any particular office, were nevertheless the *de facto* rulers of their day, exercising unlimited power and shouldering full responsibility for the political affairs of their country. Thus, with such men as their

leading statesmen, we are confronted by the strange spectacle of a line of French kings who, too weak and incompetent to direct the fate of a great nation themselves, had their weakness and mediocrity powerfully reinforced and endowed with a greatness and dignity which in reality they were far from possessing. For there can be no doubt that the weakness and mediocrity of these kings would have led to national impotence and decay had they not been spurred on and inspired by the leadership of these men and by the strength that radiated from them.

Like the Medici, Jacques Cœur was a member of one of those great merchant houses whose ability, high gifts, and unflagging energy in trading with the Levant had brought them vast wealth and thereby raised them to a position of social and political power. He placed his funds at the disposal of King Charles VII in the war against England, and thus warded off the threatened invasion, while it may unhesitatingly be said that with him began the rise of the national monarchy of France. England was the most dangerous enemy of France at that time, and for a while threatened to secure supremacy over the whole country. But through Jacques Cœur this danger was appreciably reduced, while the other serious menace threatening France —the victory of the centrifugal over the centripetal forces in her system—was also overcome through his agency. By founding a standing army he made the monarchy independent of the armed support of the great vassals, and created a powerful weapon against foes both at home and abroad. He gradually curtailed the power and influence of the nobility and endeavoured to convert them into a tractable instrument in the hands of the Crown, paving the way for the ultimate victory of the monarchy over the forces of feudalism, and thus for the ultimate consummation—absolute monarchy. As Ambassador he improved the diplomatic position of France, and as Finance Minister he ordered and supplemented the country's sources of income, using the vast sums of money at his disposal for making the powerful men of France ever more and more dependent upon the will of the central authority. He himself was the incarnation of

this central authority, and there can be no doubt that all his endeavours were dictated first and foremost purely by a sense of his country's needs and a lofty patriotism. Greed and envy brought about his downfall. Accused of having poisoned Agnes Sorel and debased the coinage, he was deprived of his wealth and banished. Thus his great work was rewarded by disgraceful ingratitude. On his deathbed he commended his children to the care of the feeble occupant of the throne.

Later on, at the height of the Renaissance, we are confronted in France by two rulers with unlimited power in the absolute State—two men, Richelieu (*b.* 1585) and Mazarin (*b.* 1602), who raised France to the position of a first-class Power. In both great statesmanlike gifts were combined with lofty spiritual dignity, the outward and visible sign in each case being the red robe of the cardinal.

Richelieu hailed from a noble family. Quite early in life he showed signs of extraordinary political capacity, and quickly rose to the top of the tree. Having won the confidence of the Queen-Mother, Marie de' Medici, he soon acquired complete control over her. His brilliant diplomatic gifts qualified him for the post of Foreign Minister, while his grasp of military organization made him an ideal Minister of War. Thus he undertook the control of both the army and the fleet, and in the conflict over the Mantuan Succession he actually commanded an army himself. He directed the fate of France for eighteen years, the weak King submitting himself entirely to his guidance. He was the absolute ruler of an absolute monarchy. His foreign policy was successfully aimed against the Hapsburgs, who represented the strongest political power of the age. In his domestic policy he strove to concentrate all the power in the French Crown, but though he won for it brilliance, prestige, and dignity he kept the real power firmly in his own hands. The King was quite incapable of resisting Richelieu's overpowering personality, the indefatigable energy of his character, and the cogency of his arguments, and degenerated into the weak, will-less instrument of this great man.

CARDINAL RICHELIEU

Richelieu waged hard and pitiless war against all who made any attempt to dispute his authority. Thus he attacked the Huguenots, whose separate government he destroyed, and whose power he completely annihilated by the capture of La Rochelle. His struggle with the feudal nobility was particularly violent and heated. They hatched numerous conspiracies and plots against him, which were supported even by members of the royal family, and he had many of the notabilities of the land condemned to death by the courts of commissioners he appointed. Marie de' Medici and the Duke of Orleans were forced to flee the country, while Louis XIII had to submit to the banishment of his mother, and even sacrificed his favourite Cinq-Mars to the all-powerful Cardinal, who handed him over to the executioner. Thus he not only controlled Louis the king, but also Louis the man.

By means of much bloodshed Richelieu raised France to the rank of a first-class European Power, weakened and overcame her enemies both at home and abroad, and laid the foundation-stone of her great colonial empire in America and Africa. He converted the entire organization of the country into a centralized and unified monarchical system, the Parliament and the nobility being largely deprived of their rights, and the clergy turned into a pliant instrument for the execution of his statesmanlike schemes. Thus Richelieu accomplished what Henry IV had long striven for—himself a great and powerful man, he made France a great and powerful nation. While it is true that his political achievements were marred by certain acts of cruelty, he never lacked the qualities of greatness. As a lover of spiritual pursuits, he favoured the development of the arts and sciences, and founded the French Academy.

On his deathbed Richelieu nominated Mazarin his successor, whereby the dictatorship in France acquired a certain continuity, and there is no doubt that the country was greatly strengthened by it. But how rarely does a dictator find such a worthy successor! For the very essence of dictatorship lies in suddenness and unexpectedness

and the uniqueness of a great personality, who appears when the hour of his destiny has come and the life of a people stands in need of his guidance.

Mazarin, like Richelieu, was of aristocratic descent, being the son of an Italian nobleman. He was born in the Abruzzi, and was first a soldier, then a priest, and subsequently became an ambassador and diplomat. Richelieu first met him as a Papal nuncio in Paris. Attracted by his personality, and feeling that in him he had met a kindred spirit, he contrived to secure him for France. Like Richelieu, Mazarin was given the cardinal's ring. He succeeded in winning the favour of Anne of Austria, who, bound to him by close ties, appointed him her Prime Minister. He carried on Richelieu's policy. Shrewd, unscrupulous, and crafty, he fought the nobles with all the weapons at his command, and provoked the implacable hatred of the aristocratic party, led by the powerful Prince de Condé. He even aroused the hostility of the Fronde (the Paris Parliament) through his financial policy. The King, who clung to him through thick and thin, was repeatedly obliged to fly from Paris with him. At last his enemies gained the upper hand, and Mazarin was banished. But he continued to work unremittingly for France, and even in exile concentrated all his efforts upon promoting his country's greatness. He never for a moment doubted that his day would come once more and that he had a great mission to fulfil. Thus in 1651, supported by a body of 7000 men which he himself had raised, he attempted to win back his lost position. But France, tired of his rule, struggled against him with all the forces, both spiritual and material, at her command, having recourse to arms, trickery, intrigue, mockery, and ridicule. The King was forced to banish the statesman a second time, and Mazarin went to Liége and bided his time. Undaunted by defeat and adversity, he kept his great aim firmly in view, and his faith and daring expectations did not prove vain. In 1653 everything changed in his favour, and he was able to enter Paris once more to the cheers of the populace. From that day he was in a better position than ever to play the part

of dictator in France. If the power he had wielded before had been extraordinary, it was now unlimited. He was the absolute ruler of France, the monarchy being a mere shadow and symbol. His rule was not devoid of selfish motives. The heavy taxation he imposed on the country also filled his own pockets while the services he rendered to society, commerce, and industry were mediocre. For in these matters he lacked not only understanding, but also goodwill. His foreign policy may be credited with two outstanding successes—the Treaty of Westphalia, by which Alsace was annexed to France, and which won for the latter a powerful political position on the Rhine, leading in 1659 to the formation of the League of the Rhine, and the marriage of Louis XIV with the Spanish Infanta.

The absolute monarchy of Louis XIV stood in no need of a dictator. It might even be said that the political power of Richelieu and Mazarin was carried a step farther in the form of this legitimate rule of the sovereign. But the greatness and power of France were sapped and undermined by his weak successors, and France lacked the leading statesmen who would have been strong enough to check the new democratic tendencies, the champions of which were Voltaire and Rousseau, whose moral and political criticism assailed the fundamental principles of the social edifice of the day. The belief in the supernatural lost its strength, and with it perished the divine right of kings. Liberty and equality became the ideals of the age. The privileged position of the nobility and clergy was condemned. The Faith of the Church was regarded as sacerdotal trickery. Reason was held to be the only sure guide in life, a corrupt and artificial civilization was to be simplified and forced to make way for a return to nature, and a new order of society, worthy of the dignity of man, was to be founded. Behind these claims, which arose partly from a sense of social justice, and partly from a sentimental ideology, anarchy and nihilism raised their distorted features.

The French Revolution produced three men who, inasmuch as they exercised absolute power, occupied for a while the position of dictator in France—Danton, Marat, and

Robespierre. They were not rulers in the sense that they possessed creative minds, or founded an orderly system which was established throughout the country and developed into a powerful State organization. Directly after the Revolution the Girondists tried to impose an organized constitutional *régime* upon the French people. But the dark motive forces and the savage passions that had been let loose could not be dammed so quickly, and with menacing violence opposed any attempt at being directed into orderly channels. Gloomy and confused instincts of a bestial nature conjured up the chaos of unbridled desires and lusts in which the people of France no longer constituted a united, clear-sighted, and law-abiding nation, but were only an inchoate mass. And this people as a mass, this 'sovereign people,' proceeded to be incited and whipped up, cajoled and flattered by leaders sprung from their own loins. Scions of the populace, they acquired for a brief spell the power of leaders, only to be annihilated by the very forces which had raised them to the heights. The Revolution swallowed up its own children, and the nation remained in a state of revolt as long as there stood at its head men who were no more than revolutionaries—that is to say, able to excite passion and rule by violence and terror, but incapable of constructing a system and a new order of society. They were certainly able to destroy the old, but unable to put anything new in its place. While religious belief, the power of morality and convention, marriage and the family, were dissolved and destroyed, the new ideas of human rights, democratic citizenship, the sovereignty of the people, liberty and equality, and the rule of reason, proved incapable of building up a new social order. Possibly Danton's rule made an appeal to the nobler instincts of the people and his belief in freedom and reason was not lacking in a certain lofty idealism. But he was unable to win the favour of the masses to the same extent as Marat, whose wild and robust sensuality was more in harmony with the primitive instincts of the mob.

Far above them both, however, there towered to the ghastly dignity of one governing by a rigid rule of terror,

the ascetic figure of the pale Robespierre, who from about 1793 to 1794 controlled the fate of France as an absolute dictator—France, which, at that moment, more than ever before or since, consisted of the city of Paris. The leader of the Jacobin party, a member of the National Convention, and President of the Committee of Public Safety, he destroyed the constitution that had been recently drawn up, and instituted a lawless reign of violence and terror, hoping thereby to realize the ideas which animated him—the rebirth of human society and the ideal of virtue and justice. Convinced that he was, as it were, a blend of Brutus and Mucius Scævola, the stern incorruptible virtue of ancient Rome was the pattern he set before his eyes. Being possessed of a cold and gloomy pride of virtue and a passionate fanaticism devoid of all greatness and heroism, he firmly believed that the old and corrupt generation which had so long conducted the affairs of France with immoral and criminal levity, and which was still active in the various party movements, must be exterminated and annihilated if a new era for the human race was ever to dawn. He felt himself to be the high priest of an unknown god, who was hard and loveless like himself, and he revived, with much theatrical pomp and ceremony, the cult of the Highest Being, who had been forced to make way for the Goddess of Reason. Weary of his insensate cruelty, the people rose up against him, and his head fell on the scaffold amid the cheers of the very mob whose idol he had once been.

The annals of dictatorship in France contain the name of one supremely great man—Napoleon Bonaparte—a hero and a genius, who, springing from an impoverished noble family, attained to absolute power. In him were united all those forces calculated to raise a nation and lead it to greatness. The victorious commander-in-chief of the two Italian campaigns—in themselves a glorious page in the history of war—as well as the hero of the adventurous Egyptian campaign, he succeeded, through the power of his personality and the charm of his eloquence, in inspiring his army. Although made up of raw, badly trained, and badly equipped recruits, with it he contrived to perform

amazing feats against veteran troops, and he ultimately became the creator and organizer of the Grand Army. No less gifted as a statesman and a diplomat, with an indefatigable will for work, he was possessed of unbounded ambition, and had implicit faith and trust in Fate and the star of his destiny. By the colossal power of his personality he bent the will of others to his own and compelled them to obey, thus at once securing his own success and guiding his people along the path of glory.

What was it that paved the way to his dictatorship? Wherein lay the secret of his unbounded success? What secured for the *coup d'état* of the 18th Brumaire the stability and security of lasting power? Did Napoleon owe his triumph to his own superlative genius, to the courage and determination of his lieutenants, or to the fact that the people of France, weary of anarchy and violence, and yearning for order, wished to place themselves under the guidance of a strong will? The combination of all these factors certainly offered a guarantee of success, and the logic of facts undoubtedly conspired to place the supreme power in the hands of the victorious general. But he possessed this power before it was actually conferred upon him. That the *coup d'état* did not miscarry, however, but led to lasting and unprecedented success, that the Parliament and the *anciens* were taken by surprise, the Directory overthrown, and the troops led out against the Government, depended on a certain circumstance which deserves the most serious attention.

A decisive factor in the success of the *coup d'état* of the 18th Brumaire was that Napoleon invariably acted with a semblance of legality, being firmly convinced that anything achieved by means of violence must inevitably be destroyed by violence, while that which is founded upon law and order can alone lead to the establishment of lasting peace and stability. He managed by constitutional means to become appointed commander-in-chief of the Paris garrison, and used his position to bring about the resignation of the old Government, while it was by dint of negotiation that he converted the Directory into the Triumvirate, reminiscent

of ancient Rome. He did his best to win over the *anciens* and the Council of Five Hundred by the exercise of persuasion, and forced them to dissolve only when these peaceful methods had failed. Having won the position of First Consul, without either bloodshed or acts of violence, he set to work as dictator to restore law and order, and in an astonishingly short space of time built up the edifice of the new State, by reviving such time-honoured social institutions as marriage, the family, and the religious life of the Church, as well as drawing up the famous legal code inspired by Roman law known as the Code Napoléon.

His ordering and creative spirit permeated the whole fabric of the State by means of salutary forms and institutions. He raised the currency, improved the system of taxation, put the finances of the country in order, and encouraged commerce and industry. He stabilized political life in France, as well as in the daughter republics dependent upon her, and entered into friendly diplomatic relations with the Papacy, whose high social prestige he thoroughly appreciated. He also organized the Grand Army, which was later to win such unparalleled triumphs under his leadership. His colossal and indefatigable will was everywhere present and active, while the might of his genial power radiated even beyond the frontiers of his own country. He welded the various parties together, and, after depriving the Parliamentary institutions of their political importance, he retained them for the sole purpose of serving as a playground for ambition and vanity. Everything he created was new; he allowed of no reaction to old and superannuated forms. His work constituted a reconciliation of democratic ideas with the historically necessary forces of tradition and authority. He created *la carrière au talent* independent of rank and origin—that is to say, he laid open the highest posts to all possessed of ability and promise for the future. Thus he rejuvenated the ancient structure of France by the introduction of fresh life and power.

The annals of dictatorship in England contain the names of two men who contributed a great deal toward making England a mighty and powerful nation—Oliver Cromwell

and the younger Pitt. Both men were endowed with colossal energy and will. Cromwell was a soldier and a religious fanatic, while Pitt, the great financial reformer, diplomatist, and statesman, was the only man who possessed the strength, stubborn energy, and daring to wage war with Napoleon Bonaparte, the genius of his age, and to prove his most dangerous and successful foe.

Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) was born in humble circumstances. His deep religious feeling was clothed in a garb of rigid Puritanism. In 1628 he entered Parliament, which at that time was in the throes of a violent conflict with the Stuart King, Charles I. Cromwell's passionate Puritanism adopted the form of a religious fanaticism, which frequently rose to the heights of ecstasy. He felt an inward call to free his country from the idolatry of Catholicism, and to fight the battle of the true doctrine of God. In the Civil War he was in command of a troop of horse of whom he formed a model company. The stern morality, ascetic discipline, and self-sacrificing zeal of these men won them the nickname of "the Saints." Thanks to their wonderful discipline, they succeeded in winning decisive victories over the royal cavalry, which before their advent had been invincible. This more than anything else reveals the means whereby Cromwell contrived to conquer and to rule, and the source of the great moral power that emanated from him.

Charles I, who had fled to Scotland, was delivered up to the Parliamentary forces and thenceforward kept a prisoner in England. Meanwhile Cromwell had become the most powerful man in the State, and the deciding factor in the fate of the King. At first he had the intention of coming to terms with Charles Stuart, and of persuading him to abdicate. But the King's downfall was compassed by the zeal of his own Scottish friends. Seeing his country threatened by Scottish troops, bent on reinstating the rule of the Catholic Stuarts, Cromwell regarded the King's acquiescence in the proceeding as high treason against the will and faith of the people of England. He defeated the Scottish army which was trying to liberate Charles, but

saw only too clearly that the imprisoned monarch would represent a perpetual menace to the peace and security of the realm. By excluding the Presbyterian members from Parliament he turned the latter into a pliant instrument of his will, and, bringing a charge of high treason against the King, he had him beheaded in 1649. He was actuated throughout not by ambition and blind fanaticism, but by patriotism and honest moral conviction. Nevertheless his power was almost absolute. He controlled the Council of State, and made it bow to his will. Charles II was defeated both in Scotland and England, and the danger threatening from the quarter of the Stuarts successfully warded off. Having restored peace and order at home, Cromwell began to extend his power over Great Britain and to the Continent. Blake, his friend and co-religionist, defeated the powerful Dutch fleet. After these successes he dissolved the remains of the Long Parliament, known as the "Rump," which had owed its existence entirely to a political emergency. England was given a new constitution, drawn up by a Council of Generals, and Cromwell, as Lord Protector, obtained absolute power in the State, supported by a Parliament elected by the people. In the realm of foreign policy his Government scored many triumphs, particularly in dealing with the Netherlands and Spain and over the question of the Vaudois in Savoy, with the result that England was able to make her weight felt as one of the Great Powers of Europe.

Regarded superficially, Cromwell's government bore the stamp of a military dictatorship, for he relied chiefly upon his faithful and devoted generals, who reverenced him as their guiding light. Nevertheless we must not misunderstand the fundamental basis of his power, which lay in his moral integrity and fanatical honesty, in the inspiring ardour of his religious conviction, and in the purity of his patriotism. He provides a striking example of the fact that a great and effective dictatorship cannot be established on material means of power alone, but is also dependent upon spiritual ideals. He was a benefactor of his people; under his rule commerce and industry prospered; and

every citizen of England was allowed free expression of his religious convictions. Compared with him, the representatives of the people enjoyed an extremely limited power, and as they jealously guarded their rights it was impossible for serious conflicts to be avoided. Cromwell dissolved his first Parliament for insubordination and bent the second to his will by excluding from it one hundred members on the ground that they lacked certain moral qualifications. This second "Rump" Parliament offered him the crown. After a severe conflict with himself he eventually remained true to his republican convictions and declined the offer, a refusal which, owing to the influence brought to bear by the senior officers of the army, who possessed the greatest political power in the State, led to a strengthening of his position in relation to Parliament. He was given the right to appoint his own successor, and to organize an Upper House as a counterpoise to the Commons, a task which was rendered all the more difficult owing to the fact that members of the nobility who were regarded as suitable members for this assembly were extremely reluctant to come forward, and the Commons refused to recognize any such change in the constitution. Before his death Cromwell appointed his son Richard his successor. But the latter, since he lacked the great statesmanlike qualities of his father, was unable to keep his position.

It was a piece of great good fortune for England that at the time when Napoleon Bonaparte was making himself master of Europe she possessed, in the younger Pitt, a statesman who, while he may not have been a hero and a genius, like his adversary, was nevertheless endowed with a statesmanship and stubborn energy which made him the most dangerous opponent of the great Corsican and the only man capable of offering him a successful resistance. Pitt was one of the few statesmen who, thanks to exceptional gifts and the confidence they inspired, won for themselves a leading position in early life. At the age of twenty-four he was already Prime Minister, and was ruling the country with the support of a Parliament in which the extension of the franchise had secured an over-

whelming majority for himself and the Whig party. Pitt's first great feat was the organization of the public finances. The long years of war with America had raised the National Debt to about £240,000,000, which meant that the national income was swallowed up in paying the interest on the deficits. Pitt succeeded in improving the exchange and raised the credit of the country. With iron severity he reduced the expenses of administration, abolished sinecures, simplified the machinery of government, and suppressed smuggling, which had reached alarming proportions. He also imposed appropriate taxes on the community, which while they spared the poor were not burdensome to the rest of the population. All this he accomplished in accordance with his motto, "What can be done must be done." And, indeed, in a comparatively short space of time he succeeded in reducing the annual deficit of £12,000,000 to a minimum.

After the French Revolution his domestic policy underwent a marked change, in so far as he gradually revealed himself as a professed enemy of democracy. He suppressed the Irish rebellion at the cost of much bloodshed, and employed all the means in his power to check the revolutionary danger emanating from France. So much so, indeed, that the Convention dubbed him "the enemy of mankind." Many great political successes stand to his credit. By means of diplomacy he succeeded in bringing about the union of England and Ireland, and in 1804 contrived to form the third coalition against France. Nelson's victory at Trafalgar was a great triumph for Pitt, since he had incited and organized this war.

It may be said that, in her hour of need, England has always found the right man, able to steer the vessel of State safely to port. For what would the weak King of England have been able to accomplish without his all-powerful minister? Before Pitt's elevation to power England had been politically and economically exhausted by a seventeen years' war with America, while after his death she was the leading nation of the world. A proof of his lofty moral probity is to be found in the fact that, although he was

Prime Minister of England, he died in poverty. The news of Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz is said to have proved the deathblow to his sick and fragile frame.

Dictatorship in two other countries—Poland and Spain—which are at present ruled by a similar form of government, remains to be discussed. The former, owing to the laxity of her social bonds and her separatist and individualistic spirit, has but rarely, and then only temporarily, presented a united front; while, in the case of Spain, her general structure and her history of centuries of foreign rule under the Moors, followed by the absolutism of the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons, made her much more prone to acquiesce in a national dictatorship for the mustering of all the valuable forces in the country, particularly at times when the weakness and incapacity of her legitimate rulers threatened to undermine and destroy the edifice of the State.

It is noticeable that in certain countries the traditional and consecrated form of absolute rule is more acceptable than the dictatorship of a usurper who seizes the reins of power in a moment of crisis; while others, though opposed to absolutism, are ready to acquiesce in the necessity for a dictator in moments of great national stress. In Germany, for instance—about which country we may have something to say at the end of this essay—all attempts at welding the nation into a stable and comprehensive whole have hitherto resulted in failure.

The dictatorship of Tadeusz Kościuszko (1746–1817) depended as much on his great military gifts as on his conspicuous moral qualities, his sense of justice, and his loyalty. He was the last commander-in-chief of the Polish Republic. He had fought for years in the service of the young republic of America, where he had been raised to the rank of general. After his return to his own country, he conducted a victorious campaign under Josef Poniatowski against the Russians, and the successes he won as early as 1792 against the overwhelming superiority of the Czarist forces are deserving of the highest praise. After the second partition of Poland he was in Leipzig, when his

country's call reached his ears and the revolutionary party entrusted him with the command of an insurrection. He was proclaimed dictator in Cracow, the old royal residence of Poland, and it may well be said that he filled the position with astounding courage. He won a brilliant victory over the Russians at Raclawice, which gave the signal for a general uprising in Poland, and then carried on a stubborn fight against the Russo-Prussian army which was threatening Warsaw. He endeavoured to kindle the national pride of Poland, and to strengthen the country's powers of resistance. He abolished serfdom, and restored the people to their position of power in the Supreme Council. Finally he succumbed to the onslaughts of his enemies, who were superior in point of strength. And even if the cry of "*Finis Poloniæ!*" is untrue, it nevertheless accurately describes the desperate condition of his country, for when its heroic leader was taken prisoner the Polish rebellion was suppressed.

The dictatorship of the Spanish military tyrants in the nineteenth century may be regarded as a reaction against the bad government of Spanish absolutism. The world-hegemony founded by Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castille was soon lost owing to the incapacity of their successors. Under Charles V the interests of Spain did not always coincide with the policy and prestige of the house of Hapsburg and the claims of the German Empire. Under Philip, his successor, the Inquisition destroyed the vitality of the State, enfeebled the spiritual powers and the will of the country, and delivered up a large number of her gifted sons to the scaffold. Threatened by the ambitious designs of Holland and England, and governed by weak rulers, the Spanish hegemony of the world soon crumbled to bits. The efforts of the Spanish military tyrants, such as Riego, Espartero, Navarez, O'Donnell, and Serrano, may be regarded as having been concentrated upon salving from the ruins of the old world-hegemony of Spain those fragments which were necessary for her national existence. Although during their short tenure of office as dictators they may have appeared more in the light of party leaders

than of rulers by nature, we are nevertheless bound to acknowledge that they did a great deal for the welfare and prestige of their country. In any case, they possessed that strength of will which the weak rulers, both male and female, of Spain had entirely lost.

To turn to Germany, it may be said with more or less truth that throughout her history she has lacked a strong comprehensive will. No strong national monarchy or co-ordinated state organization ever developed out of the idea of the Holy Roman Empire. In the struggle between the monarchy and the great feudal lords the king never succeeded, as he did in France and England, in carrying off the victory. In fact the centrifugal forces triumphed over the centripetal. The factors which made it impossible for Germany to become a nation were primarily her ill-omened particularism and religious dissensions. It may well be said that Germany has only begun to dwell on the idea of nationalism during the last hundred years, and that even now this conception is threatened with annihilation owing to cosmopolitanism and internationalism on the one hand and particularism and individualism on the other.

Dictatorship may be regarded as the positive expression of a strong national will which, in times of trouble, unites the valuable forces of a people, and in times of growth and expansion leads the way to national greatness.

DICTATORSHIP AND CHRISTIANITY

FRIEDRICH MUCKERMANN, S.J.
(Outstanding German Catholic critic and famous preacher.)

IN his book on free will St Augustine writes:

> A nation that possesses moral self-discipline and is the zealous guardian of the all-important commonweal, in which every citizen places the public interest above his own, may justly and lawfully be allowed to choose the authorities to administer its affairs—that is to say, the State. . . . But should such a nation so deteriorate as to place private before public interest, to traffic in votes and allow itself to be bribed by ambitious persons, and place the reins of power in the hands of knaves, then it is only right that a strong and worthy man should deprive it of the power to bestow office and place the government in the hands of a few good men, or even of one alone.

While the tone of authority in this lucid statement has a classic ring about it, its association of politics and ethics, so characteristic of Aristotle and Plato, is even more eloquent of antiquity. That which Plato, the genius of nature, constructed after his own fashion in his work the *Politicus* the last of the Romans realized and perfected along Christian lines, and gradually Christianity, the religion of a state that is not of this world, adjusted its position theoretically and practically to the ancient conception of the State. At the zenith of its development stands St Augustine, on a height which allows a view backward to antiquity and forward into the future—a height which has been an inspiration both powerful and venerable for centuries. What St Augustine describes in his devotional work the *Civitas Dei* is a sort of vision of that godly state into which the ancient view of the State had become transformed, and it constituted an ideal which illuminated the Middle Ages. To this day it remains alive in the heart and spirit of the Christian world.

Edgar Salin has endeavoured to describe this process in his work *Civitas Dei*.

Let us imagine St Augustine and his Greek friends wandering like Dante and Virgil through the Inferno of the present political world, and, in keeping with the words of wisdom he has written, intent solely upon finding the best form of government for the present day. The first question he would have to answer would be whether the citizens of Europe were possessed of the virtue justifying the democratic demand for the immediate exercise of sovereignty by the people. And the three philosophers, their Catonic austerity of spirit softened by Attic grace and gently illumined by the divine meekness of the Gospel, would in time visit all the most famous cities of Europe to study their manners and customs. They would wander through Parliaments and churches, through universities and schools, through stock exchanges, cinemas, and theatres. They would listen in to the wireless and read every European newspaper, from the Society journals of the great capitals to the most insignificant rag of a provincial gazette. They would allow themselves patiently to be led through Locarno, Geneva, Paris, Moscow, Rome, Warsaw, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Madrid, taking as deep an interest in the problems of a Reparations Bank as in international conferences on economics. They would see the plays and also go behind the scenes. Armies and navies would claim their attention as much as the negotiations for the limitation of armaments. They would also investigate the methods of commerce, while the probity of the political representatives of a nation would form the subject of their severest scrutiny. When they had made a sufficiently comprehensive survey of externals they would proceed to investigate the measure of virtue possessed by the modern European, in this connexion using, as their standard, the principles laid down by St Augustine in discussing the shows and games of Imperial Rome, wherein he reveals himself as most nearly akin to Plato, and not those preached by certain leaders of the modern world, who place artistic freedom and prurient rubbish in the same category.

The form of government that St Augustine would probably recommend as being in keeping with his principles might possibly be divined, were it not for the fact that all thinking people, and particularly those who are conscious of responsibility, are likely to maintain that a theory should be judged not on its intrinsic merits alone, but on the facilities it affords of realization in practice. In this connexion all the famous schoolmen draw meticulous distinctions, maintaining that where dictatorship is under consideration it should first be discovered whether a dictator can be found, while if it is a question of virtue the contingency must be faced of having to produce a political solution when five just men can no longer be found in the Israel of modern Europe. . . .

Let us not disturb the silent meditations of the three philosophers, but plunge meanwhile into that world of thought from which St Augustine drew his wisdom. The words with which he answers our question are like the flowers whose shape and colour are determined by the plant of which they are the expression and adornment.

To return to the fundamental views of Christianity in regard to politics, let us at once briefly state that in all that follows Christianity and Catholicism are regarded as synonymous.

By this I do not mean to deny to the other denominations of Christendom the right to call themselves Christian, but it is clear that the fundamental view of Christianity can be derived only from a Church which embodies the cultural evolution of centuries. Five hundred years are comparatively insignificant beside such a record, more particularly as the leading representatives of all that has been achieved in this last half-millennium are seriously considering whether the time has not come to ascribe to the traditional heiress of every culture—the Catholic Church—all those achievements which constitute a fresh accretion to culture, fearing that failure to do so may lead to the final ruin of the whole fabric. But even apart from this it cannot be denied that the sociological form of Christianity reaches a singularly perfect expression in Catholicism. Starting

with fundamentals, we must make our way as far as possible to the very forefront of actual facts.[1] »

But to return to the subject of our inquiry, we must first rid our mind of the idea that the sociological form of the Church, as a legally organized society, can be transferred without further ado to the State, for the simple reason that the material to be organized is something totally different. But, above all, the Christian regards his Church as a mystery of a supernatural order, whereas the State and all that appertains to it belong to the order of nature, and although he may live quite singlemindedly in his world of mystery, he is nevertheless perfectly well aware that from the logical point of view the supernatural and the natural are subject each to its own laws. Even where the mysteries manifest themselves to natural reason in visible form, and in this shape take their place among the other sociological factors, the peculiarities of the one are not to be transferred bodily to the other. For, according to its own teaching, the constitution of the Church was established down to the smallest detail by her Founder, which is not the case with the State. The latter, as Aristotle has already shown, is much more in the nature of a human necessity, the formation of which has largely been left to human effort. It does not follow that the State must have an emperor because the Church has a Pope. It is not necessary that every monarchy should hold out to the simple shepherd-boy the prospect of one day ascending the most exalted throne. Nor does every State require to be modelled on aristocratic lines, with a hierarchy corresponding to that of the Church's bishops and cardinals. For while all this organization derived partly from Christ Himself, and partly from the further development of His Church in the hands of the servants He appointed, it was by no means ordained by Him for temporal societies.

But all this certainly does not prevent the Church, as the pattern of a perfect social order, sufficient unto itself and

[1] In addition to the well-known writers Cathrein Mausbach, T. Meyer, and Heinrich Pesch, my chief authorities in this matter are Tischleder, Rommen, and Carl Schmitt.

complete in itself, from serving as an example in all important essentials to that other perfect order of society, the state. For does she not contain all the elements of a monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic order, in a form on which it would be impossible to improve? Discussing her succession of Popes, Schiller was forced to acknowledge that no other dynasty on earth could be compared with the Church. The aristocratic claim that higher culture should entail the obligation to leadership, and that the physical attributes of the leaders should not be ignored, is realized in the Church by her insistence on a highly cultivated clergy, whose bodily equipment must reach a certain standard. Thus mob-rule is impossible in this Church, and throughout the world there is not a single Catholic village in which the priest at least is not an educated man.

As to the flock itself, not only have the ardent spirits in it a clear path, but the Church, as the liturgy of ordination and the history of the Papal elections prove, has always insisted on the voice of the people being heard in the choice of her ministers, and has valued their verdict. In this Church not only are all the prerequisites of an ordered community revealed doctrinally, but they are constantly presented in tangible form. Nobody who is an established member of this ecclesiastical community can at the same time be an anarchist in the temporal state. The Church has laid down the fundamental rules regarding the duty which a perfect society, concerned with religion, owes to that other society which constitutes the pivot of secular life. She has always upheld the ideal of empire—that is to say, the idea of an all-embracing power, stretching its glorious arch over Church and State. We find this idea in St Augustine and in Dante, always in the form of a marvellous vision, and the banner of Christ's Kingdom, which His Viceroy raises for Him on earth to-day, revives this view by means of an impressive symbol. And that is why, even if all else on earth should one day be hopelessly lost and all social order be destroyed, it would be possible to derive from the Church, which would certainly survive, just as she survived the Great Migration of the Peoples in the fifth and

sixth centuries, all the laws required for every kind of communal life.

If a formula were needed to give conceptual shape to the temporal community modelled on the pattern of the Church, nothing could be more striking than Suarez' description of the state as a *corpus politicum mysticum*. Just as we speak of the mystical body of Christ, so, to use an analogy which will not be misunderstood by believers, we may speak of the mystical body politic. The word 'mystical,' in this connexion, points to the origin of it all, which lies in a mysterious world—that is to say, in God, Who so formed human society that it was compelled by nature to assume the form of a state. This extends to such a dim and distant past that the first act of creation brought not only an individual into being, but also the individual as the germ of human society. Both the gifts and the weaknesses of the first man descended like heirlooms to humanity. Nor could it have been otherwise with a Creator Who made man in His own image—that is to say, not in the image of one individual, but in the image of a Being Who was Three Persons in One, a community present in the Divine Nature, which far transcends our understanding. Thus man is impelled to form communities not merely because of external exigencies—that is to say, in order to turn to account the manifold interests of life—but from an inner necessity, due to the mystery of his nature, as having emanated from the breath of God.

This human community must not, of course, be conceived on too bestial a plane; its bonds must be of a spiritual kind, for the Creator of all things is pure Spirit. These bonds of society must be regarded as a means of keeping men together, as creatures who are marching together in body and soul toward some spiritual goal. This order of march is, however, never a mere end in itself, but always something much more vast, made up of all life's elements, and therefore instinct with the full mystery of life. Thus, according to the Christian conception, the breath of God also permeates the state, which is not only a creation of law, but always a piece of life, *corpus politicum mysticum*.

Now just as the mystical body of the Church has various functions, which are needful to organic life, the mystical body politic also has a head and limbs. But here again the analogy has its limits, seeing that the limbs of the body politic never cease to be persons on whom the responsibility for the whole body rests, and that the head performs only the functions of leader and director, which, in the State, amount to power and authority. Whether this be wielded by a king, a directorate, a Parliament, or a dictator does not alter the fact that it is a form of leadership dependent on the organic whole. The Church's view has always been that the forms which authority happens to take are of secondary importance, and her great teachers, when discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a particular form of government, have always endeavoured, whatever their personal bias may happen to have been, to show that this form was really a matter of complete indifference. But this did not prevent them from laying all the greater stress on the fact that power could come from God alone, thus endowing it with a divine right and inviolable dignity and beauty. But they did not conceive of rulers and subjects as facing each other on two opposing fronts, but as remaining united in the oneness of existence. Both are subject to the law that the good of the whole is the *suprema lex*. Both are united by the bloodstream of their common existence, which flows through the limbs as well as through the head. In such a state there is no such thing as the 'masses'; there is only one people, and the Government servant is never a mere official, but a living member of the whole. Any code of law it may possess is never made up of hard and fast rules and cut and dried clauses. Control there may be, but the main control is to be found in the conscience of the people. Rules and regulations are necessary, but only when inspired by a regard for natural law, which must be free from human interference. Even if this state retains unlimited power over its own domain, yet in the fundamental matters of life it still remains bound to the Church—that other community necessary to mankind—and thus the two continue to exist, each in its different sphere, drawing their strength from God,

and coming together in that higher harmony which regards the All as the universal Kingdom of God.

But enough! Is all this not suspiciously like Utopianism? Does it not amount to retailing medieval fairy-tales to a generation which in the realm of figures created by its statisticians, in its majority votes and its economic organizations, has long since replaced this mystical organic whole by the artificial apparatus of its civilized state? And even if we were to allow our ideal to weigh with us, could we draw any conclusions from it with regard to the present discussion on democracy and dictatorship? Has not this important question already been whittled down to a secondary one? And when it comes to deeds, does not Catholic morality escape the difficulty by silence? Ready as the Catholic Church is to hail the laurel-crowned victor, and skilful though she may be in turning to account all events favourable to herself, does she not still remain the anti-revolutionary power, even when right happens to be on the side of the revolution? While she readily summons the wisdom and goodness to give her *post facto* adherence to a *coup d'état*, and to forgive the successful dictator, she never seems to have had the courage to promote a *coup d'état* herself, however necessary it may have become, or to produce the determined hero. Or is there some other interpretation of her attitude?

To meet the last charge first, it is obvious that insurrections, revolutions, and *coups d'état* are not ecclesiastical concerns, but belong to the sphere of the State. Their ethical justification alone has to be brought before the tribunal of religion and morality.

Fortunately for our discussion the editors of the periodical called *Les Études* undertook a valuable investigation into this question in the year 1927. They invited a number of well-known scholars to express their views regarding the right of resisting the power of the State. The replies were ultimately published in one volume, and were introduced, with exhaustive comments, to the German public by no less an authority than Luigi Sturzo in *Abendland*. Two passages from St Thomas serve as a basis for the replies of these Catholic thinkers to the question that was put to them.

First, " as the written law does not create the natural right, it can neither weaken that right nor suppress it, for the will of man cannot alter nature in any way. Consequently a written law which runs counter to a natural right is unjust and imposes no obligation." Secondly, " in the case of a free people who possess the right to pass laws, the unanimity of the whole people, which finds its expression in their customs (in resistance), has more weight than an authority which possesses the right of passing laws only as the representative of the people."

This is clearly not the view of one speaking from the standpoint of an inflexible despotism, but of one who, inspired by conservatism, wishes to preserve the living law. From these quotations from St Thomas, as well as from the works of all the leading schoolmen, it will be seen that these thinkers could only have been represented as pure intellectualists by those who no longer had the sensitiveness or the alertness to perceive the spring of mysticism that surges beneath their arguments. He who calls the state a *corpus politicum mysticum* imposes upon every living member of that body the duty of being responsible for the whole, either by active support, should the commonweal demand it—and this is what usually occurs—or by active resistance, if, without that resistance, the community, while obeying the immanent laws of its being, would fail to survive. Don Sturzo has not the slightest hesitation in upholding the Irish Rebellion, thus opening the way on grounds of conscience to the advent of the dictator, not by legal methods alone, but also by illegal, provided that the *suprema lex* of the State demands violent measures. Morality must, of course, leave the practical application of this drastic view to the conscience of the politician.

But let no one imagine that this morality is merely a comfortable refuge for weaklings, cowards, and men of excessive scrupulosity; on the contrary, it lends to the action of the hero strength, confidence, an ideal, and everything which makes the personalities of leaders irresistible. There is no such thing as a dual morality, one for the ordinary mortal and one for the political genius; but there is a living morality

which, even in unforeseen circumstances, does not lose the stability of its fundamental principles, just as life in the vortex of catastrophes and cataracts retains the material continuity which in the cycle of birth and death merely fulfils its earthly destiny.

Although, therefore, Christianity does not present any obstacle to changes in the form of a state, it does seem to regard such changes as of minor importance. But does it, on that account, withdraw from the discussion? No; all it does is to lay the accent where it is needed, and that is surely to its credit. Nothing is more dangerous in politics than a slogan, and the demand for a dictator may degenerate into a slogan which conceals the truth. For what, after all, have the demands for a stronger centralized power, for placing political before economic considerations, for a more active development of personal powers, and God knows what else, to do with the cry for a dictator? Surely all this can be realized by a democratic state! Thus we are compelled to acknowledge that even to-day the specific form of government in a country is a matter of secondary importance, and to publish this abroad amounts to liberating the world from the tyranny of a slogan.

Thus this negative wisdom serves a very positive purpose. Moreover, the contention that the form of government is of secondary importance is based on exceedingly cogent considerations. The case might arise when the maintenance of a monarchical order would menace the existence of a state. Indeed, many held this view in Germany when they substituted a republic for the Imperial Government. In a crisis of this kind the question, which is usually secondary, becomes of primary importance, since the fundamental principle, *salus reipublicæ suprema lex*, comes into play. And cases of this kind are by no means rare. Both the Bolshevik and Fascist dictatorships are, in the opinion of their supporters, indispensable for the attainment of the political ideals of those supporters, while in Germany there are many groups of people who hold the view that a monarchical *régime* can alone meet the requirements of the German state. All who support a democracy, by which they really

mean an economic dictatorship, also belong to this category. Possibly their part is larger than many imagine. Nor must we forget those who are in favour of a particular form of government because they hold a particular view of human nature.

In discussing how men should be governed it cannot be a matter of indifference whether we consider human nature as being radically bad, as Luther did, or as being radically good, as Rousseau maintained. Donoso Cortes, for instance, became the ardent champion of dictatorship only because he was firmly convinced that mankind was morally weak. "If God had not taken on the form of man the reptile I crush with my foot would seem to me less contemptible than humanity." This brings us to the consideration of the influence of philosophical conviction upon the formation of political ideals. Ernst Michel has recently made a searching study of this question, and, using it as a basis, has divided European history into three great periods. We find a similar line of thought in Eugen Rosenstock, and above all in Carl Schmitt, in his work *Political Theology*. Even if it may still be somewhat hazardous to follow in Max Weber's footsteps in this matter, the fact remains that there is apparently something in it. To give but one very striking example, let me quote the following extract from Donoso Cortes:

> According to him [Max Weber] it is in the very nature of middle-class Liberalism never to come to a decision, but only to inaugurate debates. . . . He actually defines the middle classes as the debating classes. . . . A class which turns all political activity into talk, whether in the Press or in Parliament, is not equal to a spell of social war. The lack of certainty and the half-measures of this Liberal middle class of the July Monarchy are everywhere apparent. Their Liberal constitutionalism endeavours to paralyse the King through Parliament, but leaves him on the throne notwithstanding—displaying a lack of logic similar to that of the deists when they banish God from the world, and yet cling to a belief in His existence. . . . The Liberal middle classes therefore want a god, but he must not be a busy one; they want a monarch, but he must be powerless; and they want freedom and equality, although they insist on

> limiting the franchise to the possessing classes. . . . They do away with hereditary aristocracy and yet tolerate the insolent rule of a plutocracy, the most stupid and most vulgar form of aristocracy. They want neither the sovereignty of the King nor that of the people. What then do they want? . . .

But, from the standpoint of Christianity, no matter how political convictions may have been formed, freedom exists as long as it keeps within the limits which ensure the existence of the living state.

At this point only one more step remains to be taken, an important and decisive step, and that is to reply to the question whether, as a Christian and a Catholic, a man can rationally declare himself in favour of a dictatorship. It goes without saying that in answering this question we must not forget the principle of freedom of thought, and in our reply we shall refer, in the first place, not to our consciences, but solely to our reason, and in so doing we can consider conditions only in Germany, or, rather, in Central Europe. For, at the present moment, the development of every other European country is proceeding along such individual lines and in conditions so peculiar to each alone that it is impossible for the time being to solve the problem for Europe as a whole.

In the German state conditions are such that a dictatorship, whether of the Left or the Right, could come into being only by means of armed insurrection. In any case, such is the opinion of Herr Held, the Prime Minister of Bavaria. A little while ago, when making a speech at Regensburg, he said:

> Can anybody in Germany be so foolish as to believe that the German people can be in any way benefited by a fresh revolution? . . . A revolution always means an overthrow of certain values. And how many values are there left in Germany to be overthrown? It is a sign of crass irresponsibility to go about to-day prating about dictatorship. We are a conquered people. Do you imagine that our enemies in other countries would silently and calmly acquiesce in a German dictatorship, of whatever category? . . . Is there anybody among you who has an idea of the terrible confusion of views and opinions, or the utter lack

of aim in the majority of the German people, and do you really wish to see a change of dictatorship in this country once a fortnight? . . . Anybody who is instrumental not in increasing the unity and strength of the German people, but in destroying the last vestiges of the German soul and the wealth of the German people by fresh revolutions is a criminal enemy of our nation.

Dr Seipel, the eminent Catholic statesman and former Chancellor of the German Confederation, in a speech he made in the Auditorium Maximum of the University of Munich on January 22, 1929, went even farther in his unconditional advocacy of democracy, when, although he indulged in sharp criticism of the modern examples of this form of government, he nevertheless added:

In Europe, Central Europe, and in the present age, everybody seems to think it incumbent upon him not only to criticize democracy, but also to know why he must do so. But I do not believe that this will always be so even among us in Central Europe. I am of opinion that a time may come—and it will come—when no one will attempt to criticize democracy as such. I can well imagine that even at this moment in the other countries of Western Europe anybody confronted by a criticism of democracy would inquire in astonishment, "But what would you have instead?" I myself confess that I know of no better form of government, nor do I believe that there can be a better form for the government of a country than democracy, *properly understood.* And in making this confession I have no wish whatever to throw stones either at any past age or at those people who may have lived under the sway of various other ideals of State in the past. But I cannot help regarding the problem of humanity in its earthly pilgrimage as a *great educational problem.* God leads humanity, and wishes mankind to advance to a state of perfect freedom even in national organizations.

Later on in the same speech Seipel gives a clearer definition of what he means by democracy "properly understood," and in this connexion it is curious to see how closely his words coincide with what St Augustine said long before him. Seipel insists upon a sense of responsibility and a consciousness of responsibility, particularly in the chosen leaders. And he is courageous enough to ask whether

responsibility before a Parliament or before a national court of justice suffices, and to reply "No!" unless responsibility to conscience be added, and even this responsibility only achieves the desired result

> if one is conscious of being responsible to a power which has absolute authority to enforce the responsibility of one man, no matter in what circumstances. Whether or not a Parliament has to pass judgment on a question of ministerial responsibility, and whether or not history concerns itself with the actions of one man, the fate of peoples is best safeguarded if it is in the hands of men *who hold themselves responsible before God.*

Thus does the wisdom of antiquity, which regarded the fate of a state, and particularly of a democratic state, as dependent upon the virtue of its citizens, once more come into its own. And if to-day we insist on modern democrats again recognizing those powers which are called upon to foster not only religion, but also virtue, we do so from a deep insight into the fundamental principles of politics in general, as well as from an intimate knowledge of present-day conditions. Hence our demand that Europe should abandon that policy toward the Church which is identified with the period of enlightened Liberalism, and reinstate in its old rights that European spiritual power which has been the mother of civilization in this quarter of the globe. And if there are signs of this policy being adopted in France, where the laws resulting from the struggle between Church and State are already being rescinded, if in England the *Times* described the celebrations in honour of Catholic Emancipation in a series of sympathetic articles, and if in Italy the Lateran Treaties have been signed, why does Central Europe alone stand out—Central Europe, in which the tradition still survives of that historical period when Church and State formed one indivisible whole, and thus incorporated a political idea the like of which the world has never seen before or since? . . .

And now where are the three wise men whom, at the beginning of our discussion, we left wandering through Europe? Our parable might run that after much travelling they at last decided to confer quietly together regarding

their experiences, that they cast votes on the question of the virtue at present to be found in Europe, and that all three dropped a blank into the ballot-box. Or the legend might read that Plato went to Moscow and deposited his *Politicus* at the Kremlin, that Aristotle made a present of his *Callimachean Ethics* to Geneva, while St Augustine ascended the topmost pinnacle of the new Vatican city and far away on the horizon of the future discerned once again the vision of his City of God. . . . But all of them crept back into their caves again when suddenly there appeared in the heavens the sinister giant form of Genseric the Vandal.

DICTATORSHIP AND THE LIBERAL OUTLOOK

WICKHAM STEED

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THE ideal of liberalism is a dynamic equipoise between well-defined relativities. The ideal of dictatorship is the permanent preponderance of absolute doctrines or power.

Liberalism depends upon conscious acceptance of relativity as the main law of life and thought, albeit of a relativity which, in given spheres and circumstances, may possess absolute validity. Unlike scepticism on the one hand and anarchism on the other the liberal conception of relativity postulates some form of discipline, internal or external. I think it was Hamerling, the Austrian poet, who expressed this postulate in the lines:

> Freiheit, aber vereint mit der Freiheit, immer der edle
> Ernst, und die Strenge des Lebens, die heilige Sitte.

In his view liberalism needs to be sustained by a subjective, inner *Sitte* or discipline. But liberalism is not only subjective. It is also objective. It implies conduct and action. The problem of liberal action has rarely been more frankly stated than in the famous exclamation of Louis Veuillot, the French clerical: "Nous vous demandons la liberté au nom de vos principes; nous vous la nions au nom des nôtres."

Veuillot's principles were absolute. They were derived from the claim of the Roman Church to be the possessor of the absolute and exclusive truth, and therefore of the sole right to liberty. Hence the unconditional right of that Church to exercise a dictatorship over human souls and

bodies, to be cruelly intolerant in the name of a pitiful Saviour. Liberalism propounded the doctrines of tolerance, of freedom of thought, and freedom of lawful action. Some of its theoretical exponents advocated also entire freedom for all forms of belief, and placed their faith in the efficacy of tolerance to neutralize fanaticism. In practice, however, liberals opposed the unlimited toleration of intolerance. They questioned the wisdom of granting unconditional freedom to the opponents of freedom. Among some of them an intolerant anti-clericalism grew up in opposition to intolerant clericalism. In many countries anti-clericalism came, indeed, to be regarded as a necessary ingredient of a truly liberal outlook.

Thus liberalism was, to some extent, vitiated by absolute resistance to the very evil it proposed to combat. It overlooked, moreover, the temperamental desire of the majority of human beings for some form of belief superseding thought and inquiry, something to lull their minds and to give them a sense of inner security. Most people dislike the constant adjustment of relativities which liberalism demands, and tend to seek repose in the absolute.

The main disadvantage of liberalism, as a method of thought and life, lies in its difficulty. It is not easy to establish and to maintain 'dynamic equipoise'; and mankind is always looking for easy solutions of its problems. This is why organized, institutional religion, providing the absolute authority of a Church or creed which claims a monopoly of truth, attracts so many minds. It offers them an 'easy way out.' It relieves them of the exercise of private judgment. It requires of them only obedience. This, too, is why, in periods of political or social disintegration, dictatorships spring up and establish themselves. They seem to offer the easiest way out for the majority.

The dictatorships which have arisen in Europe since the War are, in the main, results of the 'war psychosis' which it engendered. War is essentially intolerant and absolutist. A 'liberal' war is unthinkable. The whole purpose of war is to attain, by organized violence, an absolute predominance over enemies. For this purpose everything is

subordinated to the smooth working of a military 'machine,' the machine 'parts' being co-ordinated by strict discipline, from top to bottom. In a machine there is no such thing as freedom, no autonomy of its parts. By the suppression of individual wills and liberties great results may be achieved under the dictation of capable commanders endowed with absolute power. Soldiers, by training or temperament, enjoy this regimentation, this subordination to a hierarchical dictatorship. It gives them freedom from thought, freedom from material cares, and offers them the luxury of devoted and willing obedience.

After years of subjection to military discipline, and of experience of the efficiency that can be attained by a purposeful supreme command, millions of men were naturally disposed to favour some political analogy to military absolutism. In the chaos which followed the disbandment of armies revolutionary doctrines spread. The excesses to which the practice of these doctrines gave rise set up a reaction in favour of an absolute political discipline, or dictatorship. But a distinction should be made between the various forms actually chosen. Only two of these forms are types of dictatorship proper—that is to say, absolutist systems conceived as ends in themselves, not as means for the attainment of an end separate and distinct from themselves. Neither in Spain, Poland, nor Yugo-Slavia have the dictatorial systems been represented as the ideal form of government. Ostensibly, and to some extent really, their justification lay in the existence of abuses which they undertook to correct; and the implication was that if and when these abuses had been corrected a return would be made to some constitutional or democratic system. The two types of dictatorship proper are those of Soviet Russia and of Fascist Italy; for in both these cases the suppression of individual freedom and the establishment of absolute rule were, or have become, the expression of an absolute and infallible doctrine—that of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in Russia, and that of a 'totalitarian' and semi-divine Fascist State in Italy. The similarity between Bolshevism and Fascism in method and technique is remarkable, as is also

the intensity of their hatred of every form of liberalism. They are as absolute and as intolerant as the Roman Church itself would be were it untrammelled. Mussolini's boast some years ago that Fascism is " trampling on the rotting corpse of liberty " was as significant of Fascist tendencies as is the theory since put forward by Professor Gentile and other Fascist ' philosophers ' that the Fascist State possesses the same quality of divine authority as the Roman Church, though it exercises this authority in the temporal as distinguished from the spiritual sphere. Like Bolshevism, Fascism is consciously, deliberately, and logically anti-liberal in thought and method, no less than in social and economic practice.

One of the reasons for the decline of political liberalism in Europe may perhaps be found in its long association with a special form of economic activity—the form of individual capitalism and of private competition free from State control. The economics and the ethics of the Manchester School were too often regarded by liberals as bound up with their conception of social life. But with the rise of socialism on the one hand, of State socialism on the other, and, even more, with the development of trusts and cartels, liberal economics of the type prevalent during a large part of the nineteenth century gradually became obsolete. Were liberalism necessarily identical with any particular economic system it might have been permanently discredited. I am, however, convinced that the association of liberal thought with a special phase of industrial and economic evolution was merely episodical, and that a truly liberal outlook is not limited by circumstance, time, or place.

In truth, liberalism is identical with humanism. It strives to vindicate the rights of the human personality and to secure for human beings those opportunities of free development which are indispensable to the culture of the human spirit. Consequently it protests and rebels against unnecessary restrictions. Necessary restrictions, or aspects of the individual and social discipline with which no well-knit community can dispense, liberalism recognizes and

accepts as useful and reasonable. In this liberals differ from anarchists or the partisans of unqualified freedom. They differ also from the theorists who ascribe to the State quasi-mystical attributes and an inherent authority transcending the authority which members of a community bestow upon their executive organization. Liberalism does not deify the State in itself, but seeks rather to safeguard the community against abuses of bureaucratic or other delegated authority by framing constitutions and watching vigilantly over their observance.

This is why political liberalism has always advocated constitutional systems of government. In most countries constitutions were originally conceived as limitations upon the power of absolute monarchs and as guarantees of the rights of their subjects. Constitutionalism and liberalism are almost interchangeable terms. But liberals have not always remembered that a constitution is a contract. If it limits the absolute power of a monarchy or of a State, it presupposes that citizens shall spontaneously do their public duty toward the State as the executive organ of the community. A dynamic equipoise between the functions and rights of the State and those of individual members of the community is a fundamental postulate of any liberal system.

In ethics and philosophy the same principle holds good. Liberalism is a constitutional refuge from the absolutism of religious dogma and from the anarchy of complete scepticism. In the dogmas of an absolute creed there can be no place for liberal freedom of thought. But if every religious, ethical, or philosophical principle is open to doubt, and is not recognized to possess any authority, no matter how limited, there can be no consistency of thought or certainty of conduct. Liberalism escapes alike from absolute affirmation and absolute negation by limiting and defining the area within which ethical, philosophical, and social principles shall apply. Within that limited area the validity of those principles is absolute. Outside it they may be open to question. The area is determined relatively to the requirements of upright, constructive thought, good citizenship, and social health. The truly liberal remedy for the

evils of intellectual absolutism on the one hand and of scepticism on the other is the adoption of a mental or ethical constitution to limit the arbitrariness of individual thought and deed.

From this angle of vision it is easier to answer Louis Veuillot's claim to freedom for intolerance in the name of liberal principles and his denial of freedom to liberal principles in the name of ecclesiastical intolerance. Those who would see how an Austrian liberal dealt with this question in March 1870 may read with profit Ferdinand Kürnberger's satirical essay, "The Liberty that *I* mean," in his volume *Siegelringe*. Referring to Cavour's principle "A free Church in a free State," which a Hungarian statesman, Baron Eötvös, had embodied in a Bill, Kürnberger compared a free Roman Church to "the free fox in the free hen-run," and to "the free pike in the free carp-pond." Clearly, freedom for religious intolerance must be as relative as any other freedom; and liberalism must lay down, as a principle of absolute validity within the area of social and political freedom, that no institution claiming possession of the absolute truth shall be permitted to circumscribe the spiritual and intellectual development of individuals. The method of liberty is not a method of unconditional laxity. If freedom of thought and belief be a boon, as liberals are convinced that it is, they cannot suffer it to be undermined by unlimited tolerance of its opponents. Even the enemies of liberalism must be subject to a liberal discipline.

The main cause of the decline of liberalism has been the gradual weakening of its inner discipline, of the spontaneous observance by liberals of those liberal principles which are "relatively absolute." While some liberals looked upon freedom as so obvious a good as not to need constant vindication and defence, others treated liberal institutions as opportunities for personal profit or aggrandizement. Upon the body of liberty thus neglected or discredited dictators could trample triumphantly. The only freedom worth preserving is "freedom combined with nobility of purpose and austerity of living." Whatever may have been healthy in Bolshevism and Fascism has been due to the self-devotion,

the discipline, the earnestness, which they have been able to inspire in their adherents. The masses which have submitted to them because submission was an 'easier way out' than resistance would have been may have needed the scourge of absolutism to teach them, or to remind them of, the value of liberty. Liberalism will rise again, and dictatorships will fall, when the peoples of Europe, or an active minority among them, comprehend once more that in political, economic, social, and intellectual life there is no 'easy way out,' save along the road to slavery. Freedom, like peace, must be a constant *Errungenschaft*. If it be treated as a birthright, a natural inheritance, it will wither and decay. Of it, as of every human attainment, the old wisdom holds good:

> Was Du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast,
> Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen.

DICTATORSHIP OR DEMOCRACY

PAUL LÖBE

(President of the Reichstag and a leader of the German Social Democrats.)

IT is quite possible that, in certain circumstances, a dictatorship may, for a limited period, ensure a more powerful concentration of a nation's will than a decadent democracy, particularly in a country with an intolerable excess of different political parties. But what do the members of such a nation get by the exchange? Proscription, oppression, the stifling of every other political opinion, and the exclusion of the masses from all co-operation and responsibility in the administration of the State.

And it is precisely this that raises democracy above every form of dictatorship, for it makes an appeal to the whole nation, it enlists every citizen in the service of the State, even its opponents. Its very critics, its opposition, are able to contribute their share to the general work of construction. Their vigilance purges the machinery of State of all impurities and imperfections, while their existence compels the Government constantly to examine and improve its methods. Dictatorship, on the other hand, concentrates all power and the right to make decisions in the hands of one man, or at most of a few. Democracy relies on the increasing maturity of the whole nation, for, in the long run, modern States can be carried on only by means of the co-operation and responsibility of the whole body of citizens. Dictatorship demands obedience—it is a regimen for children and immature peoples; whereas democracy educates and persuades—it is a regimen for comrades and fellow-citizens. Dictatorship strikes down the free man and makes him a thrall, while democracy raises him to the level of a self-conscious co-operator in the work of the State. This it does not always succeed in doing at the first attempt, particularly

in those countries where education and political rights have for ages stood at a low level. But when once these days are over democracy can rely on its own people. We now have dictatorships in Europe. But how do they maintain their rule? By banishing, exiling, imprisoning, or killing their political opponents, and even their own friends, if they should not happen to do what the dictator wishes; an intolerable state of affairs for a free people.

Democracy elevates the individual; dictatorship suppresses him. Democracy, in the long run, tries to benefit the State; but dictatorship sets it entirely upon one column, the collapse of which would leave it without support, and exposed to the greatest perils. After all, it was by the methods of dictatorship that even Amanullah tried to enforce his modern reforms, and he came to grief; for nothing but the democratic education of a whole people can in the end supply a solid foundation to a State. It was no accident that secured to the democratic nations the victory in the World War, and brought about the defeat of the autocratic nations, the irrevocability of whose fall was commensurate with the autocratic nature of their government.

In short, the age of dictatorships is fast waning, and the star of democracy is in the ascendant.

THE SOCIALISTS AND DICTATORSHIP

ÉMILE VANDERVELDE

(Formerly Foreign Minister of Belgium. Leader of the Belgian Social Democrats and of the Second International. Author of many books on the political and economic theories of socialism.)

FASCISM or Bolshevism; Rome or Moscow; a minority dictatorship, whether *bourgeois* or communist—such, according to some thinkers, is the only alternative open to civilization. And, indeed, at first sight, this seems to be true.

Throughout the major portion of the late Russian Empire, from Kiev to Vladivostok, the oligarchy represented by the Czar has been replaced by an oligarchy, quite as limited in number, which supports Stalin.

On the other hand, every year sees an increase in the number of countries which, having learned, after centuries of serfdom, to know the blessings of universal suffrage, at least in appearance, have to-day returned to the government, or rather to the tyranny, of a single individual or group of men. This is the case not only in Europe, but also in a large part of America—in Venezuela, for instance, and in Chile and Peru.

It must be borne in mind, however, that up to the present the epidemic of dictatorships has raged only in countries whose economic development has been more or less retarded, and where the representative system has not as yet taken very deep root. The countries with old Parliamentary traditions have remained immune.

Somebody once said to us: "Disregarding political frontiers, draw an imaginary line across Europe from Kovno to Bilbao, *via* Cracow and Florence, and you will see that in one half the *living horse* and dictators have the upper hand, and in the other the *steam horse* and democracies."

I am fully aware that in these "democracies," or so-called democracies, anybody who expected to find

government by the people would discover only government by one class. To-day, as in the time of Marx, ministerial councils are more often than not merely in some shape or form administrative councils drawn from the *bourgeois* class.

Nevertheless, in the most advanced capitalist countries—in France, England, and Germany, and the majority of small nations in Western and Northern Europe—the proletariat, at the cost of heavy sacrifices, has succeeded in winning what Lassalle picturesquely called "some fragments of a constitution."

In order to carry on their class warfare the proletariat in these countries possesses certain liberties and political rights. Thanks to universal suffrage, the liberty of the Press, and freedom to hold meetings and form associations, it is represented in Parliament by something frequently approaching a majority; it has newspapers which are more or less in a position to fight the heavy artillery of the capitalist Press, and above all it has political, syndicalist, and co-operative organizations which, to some extent, counterbalance the forces of the *bourgeoisie* and which, more than anything else, constitute the "fragments of a constitution" with which the ruling classes are bound to reckon.

Moreover, in those countries where, owing to a prolonged struggle, the workers have won a certain position for themselves they are as a rule optimistic regarding the future of democracy. Relying on their experiences in the past, they are inclined to admit that in the normal course of events and by legal means, after struggles which no doubt will be extremely hard and determined, but which need not necessarily result in sanguinary conflicts and revolutionary upheavals, they will succeed in securing political power, and by means of this political power reach their ultimate goal—the socialization of the principal means of production and exchange.

This was the opinion expressed by Friedrich Engels in one of the last things he ever wrote:

> The day of sudden upheavals and revolutions engineered by small minorities dragging unconscious masses in their train—that day is over. Now, when it is a question of a total and complete

transformation, the masses must belong to the party, they must understand the issues involved and why it is their duty to carry on the struggle. Such is the lesson to be learned from the history of the last fifty years. But for the masses to understand what they ought to do a long and patient initiation is necessary. And this is the task which we are carrying out with a success that is the despair of our enemies. The irony of history turns things topsy-turvy. We, the "revolutionaries," the "Vandals," are succeeding much better than if we had had recourse to illegal methods and upheavals. The partisans of law and order, as they call themselves, are being defeated by the situation they have themselves created, and, like Odilon Barrot, cry out in despair, "Legality will be the death of me!" while this same legality endows us with strong muscles and rosy cheeks : we look as though we wanted to live for ever.

As a matter of fact, it appears that this quotation, so often used in support of the 'legalitarian' tactics of the socialist parties, was mutilated *ad usum delphini*. Riasanov, at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International, declared in a report on the editing of the works of Marx and Engels that the German Social Democrats had, for propaganda purposes, suppressed the following passage in Engels' original manuscript:

Does this mean that in future street-fighting is to play no part? Certainly not! It only means that since 1848 conditions have become more disadvantageous for insurgents and more favourable for the military. In future street-fighting can be crowned with success only if this inferiority of position is remedied by other considerations. It will occur more rarely at the beginning of a great revolution, as well as during its subsequent stages, and should be undertaken with larger forces than has hitherto been the case. Such forces, as happened throughout the French Revolution, whether on September 4 or October 31 in Paris, prefer direct attack to the passive tactics of the barricades.

This addition is certainly not lacking in interest. Nevertheless it in no way alters what Engels and Marx often repeated toward the end of their lives, on the subject of the immaturity of the revolutionary movement of '48, the ineffectiveness of the Blanquist tactics, and the possibility,

for certain countries at least, of seeing socialism triumphant without having had recourse to bloody revolution.

But I am quite ready to agree with communists of the type of Riasanov that anybody who wholeheartedly and unreservedly maintains that the transition from a capitalist to a socialist system can be carried out without the violence and bloodshed hitherto inseparable from every great revolution is afflicted with ' reforming mania.'

One might just as well say that, because peace is highly desirable, war, owing to the Kellogg Pact, has actually been placed beyond the pale of international law.

On the contrary, there are the weightiest reasons for believing and fearing that on the day the plutocracies of Western and Central Europe feel themselves in imminent danger of seeing the socialists seize the reins of power by means of the legal victory of obtaining a majority they will be ready to have recourse to any measures—the appointment of a dictator, for instance—in order to maintain their supremacy. And this is quite sufficient reason for the workers, who form the bulk of the population and of the armies, to take immediate precautions to prevent, whether in the street or in the barracks, might—the might of the baton and of weapons of war—being on the other side. From this point of view the tragic experiences of Italian socialism will not have been in vain. The creation of a proletarian militia for purposes of defence in every country where socialism is seriously organized bears witness to this.

Moreover, even if we suppose that the *beati possidentes* do not forestall the action of the revolutionaries and that the socialists' advent to power does not lead to any greater disturbances than those which characterized the outbreak of the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution, we should still have to reckon with the possibility of offensive retaliation on the part of the *ancien régime*, against which the victorious proletariat would have to take measures of self-defence.

It was this that led Marx and Engels to suggest, for the period of revolutionary transition, the establishment of an

impersonal dictatorship, a class dictatorship—*the dictatorship of the proletariat.*

It might certainly be objected that another expression would have been preferable, that it was a gross misuse of the word dictatorship to employ it to designate an exceptional state of affairs, a sort of state of siege, proclaimed for defensive purposes only. But those who, in the name of liberal principles, are likely to wax indignant, not at the word, but at the reality, would do well to refresh their memories by referring to precedents and reading the interesting parallels drawn by Mathiez between the French Revolution and the Soviet Revolution, and to study in Taine, for instance, what the Third Estate did in the first French Revolution in order to resist both invasions and internal insurrections on the part of the expropriated and dispossessed classes.

"In creating the revolutionary committees," said Danton, "the object was to establish a *sort of dictatorship* of those citizens who were most wholeheartedly devoted to liberty for the purpose of keeping in subjection those who had become suspect."

Similarly Saint-Just—whose thesis is quoted and summed up by Taine—used the following arguments in justification of postponing the practical application of the democratic constitution until peace was established.

"In the plight in which the Republic at present finds itself," he said, "the constitution cannot be established, for to do so would be a sure guarantee of attacks upon liberty, because the force required to suppress them would be lacking." It was no longer a question of governing "in accordance with the principles of peace and natural justice. Such principles hold good only between the friends of liberty." But between patriots and their foes they were inapplicable: ". . . between the people and their enemies there is nothing in common except the sword; those who cannot be ruled by justice must be ruled with a rod of iron."

Such a system was obviously a dictatorship, but a dictatorship to which the Convention, representing as it did the majority in the country, had given its consent. And

similarly the "dictatorship of the proletariat" conceived by Marx and Engels was, to use their own words, the dictatorship of the majority—of "the great majority."

But what socialist, however desirous of reform, and however anxious and eager to see progress made in future with the least possible expenditure of blood and tears, would dare to maintain that henceforward dictatorship, *as such*, might not be as indispensable for the cause of the workers as was the Committee of Public Safety in the case of the French Revolution?

On the other hand, it is clear that such a dictatorship of "the great majority" would have nothing in common with the *minority dictatorships* set up, for political ends that have nothing in common, by the Fascists and the Bolsheviks.

Engels, even in the introduction to Marx's book on the Paris Commune, in speaking of the dictatorship of the proletariat and relying above all on the masses, sets against the tactics of socialist democracy those Blanquist methods by the use of which the Bolsheviks of to-day have obviously revived the tradition:

> Brought up in the school of conspiracy, held together by the discipline proper to their party, they set out with the idea that a minority of resolute and well-organized men was in a position, if circumstances were propitious, not only to seize the reins of power, but also, by the exercise of fearless determination and energy, to keep them long enough to succeed in dragging the mass of the people into the Revolution and grouping them round the small ruling minority.

But even at a time when circumstances seemed propitious the Blanquists did not put their theories into practice. As Engels points out, those among them who belonged to the Paris Commune took precisely the opposite course of action by trying to found a Free Federation of French Communes. The Russian Bolsheviks, on the other hand, have been completely successful in establishing a minority dictatorship. They seized the reins of power by means of a *coup de main*, and have even succeeded in maintaining their position through terrorization and the suppression of political liberty. But what has been the result? And who

would dare to assert that they have been equally successful in dragging the masses into the paths of revolution and grouping them round a ruling minority—in fact, laying down before its time, in an economically backward country, the foundation of a communistic State?

In this connexion there is no more crushing testimony against their methods than that provided by Rosa Luxemburg. Although she was in complete sympathy with them and had acclaimed the *coup d'état* of October 1918, remaining resolutely hostile to the Mensheviks and the revolutionary socialists, nevertheless, a few weeks before her death, she wrote *A Criticism of the Russian Revolution*, in which the noble breath of democracy and liberty plays freely from beginning to end.

I will quote only one passage:

> In the place of the representative bodies chosen by the vote of the people throughout the country Lenin and Trotski have made the Soviets the only real representatives of the working masses. But the inevitable result of stifling the political life of the whole nation is that life in the Soviets themselves becomes gradually paralysed. Without general elections, the unhampered freedom of the Press and liberty of speech, the life of every public institution is extinguished; it degenerates into a mere appearance of life, in which the bureaucracy is the only active element. This is a law from which there is no escape. Little by little public life becomes somnolent; a score or so of party leaders, endowed with inexhaustible energy and unlimited idealism, direct the government; and even among them the guidance of affairs is really in the hands of a round dozen men of outstanding intellect, and a few chosen members of the working classes are from time to time summoned to a meeting in order to applaud the speeches of the leaders and pass a unanimous vote in favour of the resolutions put before them. Thus it is at bottom a government by a clique—a dictatorship, it is true, but not the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the dictatorship of a handful of politicians—that is to say, a dictatorship in the *bourgeois* acceptance of the term, similar to the rule of the Jacobins. . . . And, furthermore, such a state of affairs necessarily leads to a growth of brutality in public life, to assassinations, the shooting of hostages, etc.

These words were written during the first few months of

Bolshevik rule. Since then a description, which in some respects partook of the nature of prophecy, has become a reality, and a reality worse than anything Rosa Luxemburg ever foresaw. The leaders endowed with "unlimited idealism," the men of "outstanding intellect," are dead or exiled to distant provinces. Political life has been gradually stifled. The "State capitalism" of Lenin has given birth to an onerous and heavy-handed bureaucracy which has turned the Soviet rule into a compromising caricature of the most autocratic forms of State socialism. In short, from the point of view of political liberty and the right of the people to govern themselves, revolutionary Bolshevism has, in the end, led to results strangely similar to those of reactionary Fascism.

Does this mean that socialist democracy, which condemns them both, should be content to place them in the same category? Certainly not! It is impossible for it not to draw a distinction; the one is an effort to push the Russian Revolution beyond what it can really accomplish, to put the State in the hands of the most militant section of the proletariat, and to develop, as best it can, a few germs of socialism; while the other is an enterprise undertaken on behalf of the most reactionary elements among the *bourgeoisie*, with the sole object of making the normal development of democracy and socialism impossible owing to the destruction of the most elementary rights and privileges.

With regard to Fascism, the International cannot possibly hold any other opinion than that expressed by Voltaire in a letter to Frederick II in connexion with the petty princes who, as Machiavelli declared, could not rise to power without the help of crime:

> This art, which may be compared with that of the Locustas and the Brinvilliers, may have placed temporary power in the hands of a few tyrants, just as poison may win a heritage, but it has never produced either great men or happy men—that is quite certain.

As for Bolshevism, on the other hand, though its excesses are to be condemned and its methods repudiated, it must be

admitted that it is a lesser evil than any counter-revolutionary system that might be established in Russia.

And this was the attitude adopted at the Congress held in Brussels, in August 1923, by the Labour and Socialist International against what it was agreed to describe as dictatorships.

A resolution was unanimously passed condemning both Bolshevism and Fascism, and inviting the workers to rise up against "the dictatorship of a clique or a single individual, whatever form it might adopt." It also emphasized "the necessity of defending democracy wherever it was menaced, of restoring it wherever it had been overthrown, and of making it one of the means for emancipating the working classes."

It is obvious that these formulas, the terms of which were carefully weighed, do not exclude the hypothesis of a dictatorship of the proletariat in the sense in which Marx and Engels used the expression. But they point out that though force may be, and often has acted as, the midwife of equity, systematic and premature recourse to violence, and a policy of brute force lead only to abortive results. They proclaim that while democracy may not be an end in itself, it is indisputably the system which provides the workers with the most efficacious means of fighting for enfranchisement. And to the upholders of dictatorships, whether of the Right or of the Left, they retort in the words used by Matteotti a few weeks before his assassination, when, speaking at the People's Palace in Brussels, he said: "Liberty is like the air and the sun. One has to be deprived of them before one knows that one cannot live without them."

DICTATORSHIP AND THE PROBLEM OF THE GREAT MAN

André Maurois

(Perhaps the most widely read French writer of to-day, and author of the well-known vies romancées of Shelley, Disraeli, and Byron. In politics a moderate Conservative.)

SOLON, on being asked whether he had given the Athenians the best possible laws, replied: "The best for them and for the present time." No constitution is perfect in itself, apart from time and circumstances. No thinking person could maintain that a dictatorship is always the enemy of the people. In times of danger and anarchy, when the first essential is to avoid dispersing the forces of a nation and to guide it toward a single definite goal, it may be useful for it to have a single chief. Bonaparte, as First Consul, reconstructed the France which the Assemblies had exhausted. In times of happiness and peace, on the other hand, for the head of the State to be too strong and too active, may lead to folly. Like a powerful engine seeking an outlet for its energy, he is impelled to create desires in the hearts of his people merely for the sake of gratifying them. And in this case democracy, in spite of its jealousies and long-windedness, becomes desirable, and the true patriot, who ten years previously had supported the dictatorship, finds himself led to oppose it.

None the less it remains true that in the history of every people there are moments when they feel reasonable grounds for placing a great man at their head. The existence of such moments being admitted, we shall now proceed to ask ourselves the following questions. In such a case can the peoples find that great man? Are there minds and spirits whose endowments make them so obviously superior to the rest of the population that the masses would consent to sub-

mit to their absolute authority? And if such men exist, what are the qualities that fit them for dictatorship?

Three preliminary remarks:

(*a*) *However great men may be, they are nothing if they are not helped by circumstances.* We have only to examine a list of those who have exercised absolute power over their country and to ask ourselves how they won that power. We shall find several types of career.

In the first place there are those whom the accident of birth placed in possession of a limited power, and who, little by little, succeeded in making it absolute. Louis XIV is a good example of this. He was the son of a king, but of a feeble king; Louis XIII was far less powerful than the President of the United States or the British Prime Minister. Louis XIV, with his capricious intellect and stronger will, soon became a crowned dictator, but he would never have done so but for the *circumstance* that he was the son of a king.

Secondly, there are those whom military success forced upon a country during a period of struggle, and who subsequently gave proof of civil gifts, and thus managed to keep their power. The victorious general is a very common type of dictator. Napoleon and Cæsar are the classic examples, but in more recent times we may mention Pilsudski and Mustapha Kemal. For the Turks Mustapha Kemal is the head of the State because he is the Ghazi, the Victorious One. Under the Athenian democracy military success or failure more often than not decided the rise or fall of a dictator. Cleon owed his strength to his victory. When people have been terrified the man who reassures and saves them retains his prestige for a very long time. (Since the great European Powers have been in possession of colonial empires, we have witnessed the phenomenon of 'proconsul dictators' who were also conquerors. Marshal Lyautey, who was theoretically a servant of the French Republic, was really for several years the absolute ruler of Morocco and moulded that country more fundamentally than any native dictator had ever been able to do. The same may be said of certain great English colonial officials.)

Lastly, certain men become all-powerful because at the

psychological moment they have acted as the interpreters of the wishes and beliefs of a people. I mean that their success is due not so much perhaps to the absolute value of their ideas as to their opportune appearance at a time when the country is suffering from lack of guidance. Such dictators are demagogues and revolutionaries when the sufferings of a nation have been due to the degeneracy of the ruling classes. (Thus Lenin was hailed as a saviour after the government of the Czar. And Cromwell was a religious dictator who satisfied the puritanism of the people.) But, on the other hand, when a nation has been deceived and terrified by demagogues dictators may be aristocratic. Mussolini owes the success of his march on Rome to the scandalous tyranny which the Communists tried to set up in Italy after the War. Napoleon was hailed as a saviour because the Directory was impotent and for ten years people had been seeking in vain for a stable form of government. It is true that Napoleon was a genius, but supposing he had tried to seize the reins of power in 1790, at a time when the full consequences of the Revolution had not yet been felt, he would have failed, because *a dictator is made as much by circumstances as by the man.*

(*b*) *A dictator must always have brute force at his disposal.* He could not keep his power if he had the army against him. During the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution the army passed into the hands of the people. Mussolini was supported not only by a strong Fascist militia, but also by the army, which was tired of being insulted. Mustapha Kemal was able to introduce the most astonishing reforms because his soldiers were everywhere. Is the existence of a dictatorship founded upon moral superiority utterly out of the question then? It is extremely difficult to say. The most perfect of men will always be confronted by opponents. The leaders of the old parties will fight him; fresh aspirants to power will arise. He may rely upon a popular force which has become an armed force, but, in any case, *he must prove that he is capable of manipulating armed bodies.* It is very important to remember this, because it proves how the problem of the great man becomes obscured in the case of the dictator. The latter must first and foremost possess

the capacity to create and employ armed force. This stipulation eliminates the majority of great men. Plato, Dante, Newton, and Goethe were undoubtedly greater geniuses than Napoleon. But Napoleon knew how to handle troops, as did Sulla and Cæsar before him.

(*c*) *The great specialist is not the great man.* In common parlance the two tend to be confounded. We say, for instance, that Lamartine and Chateaubriand were great men. But it would be better to say that they were great writers, which is not the same thing. This was amply proved when people tried to turn them into statesmen. They were endowed with the highest intellectual qualities, but they failed because they were not made to command. It is impossible to imagine Anatole France, or Einstein, or Sir J. J. Thomson as the head of a State. Even political theorists have failed in practical politics—Machiavelli and Retz are examples. When during the War an attempt was made to turn great business men into dictators they proved incapable. Even generals are usually specialists, excellent in command of a great army, but unfit for ruling a State. The soldier is almost invariably a man accustomed to discipline, and consequently ill at ease when he has not got either a superior officer or a Government above him. If a certain goal is pointed out to him he will reach it, but he would not care to choose it himself. Foch had a horror of politics. Hindenburg makes a good president of a republic, because his soul is not the soul of a dictator. But the great man of Napoleon's type, who is at once head of the army and head of the State, is something very different from a specialist. We will try to define the qualities that distinguish him from other men.

The quality required first and foremost in a dictator is *will*. It is the rarest of endowments. There are numberless men who possess intellect, but few indeed who possess character. But what is the use of knowing what ought to be done if one has not got the courage to put it into practice? The most obvious reforms, if undertaken by men devoid of character, are bound to fail. Humanity in the mass is singularly inert. In order to galvanize it into

activity a continuous exercise of will is necessary and a determination to overcome every obstacle whatever it may be. But a man possessed of character obtains pretty well anything he wants from his fellow-creatures in the end. If, ten years ago, a historian had predicted that a man could uproot Islam in Turkey, empty the mosques, free the women, and change the alphabet, he would have been regarded as a madman. But Mustapha Kemal accomplished all this because his will was merciless and because the Turks knew that to gain his end he would not hesitate to sweep aside everything that stood in his way. At the command of Pericles the Athenian people abandoned their fields, took refuge in the city, and when the need arose even in their fleet, rather than confess themselves beaten. Monsieur Venizelos, the Parliamentary dictator, told the Greek refugees the most painful truths and was greeted with applause. Men delight in the manifestation of a strong will, and there is very little they would not do, provided they feel themselves well led.

Second in importance to will, but certainly second, comes intellect. The intellect of the dictator should be simple and capable of recognizing great problems. If his intellect is too fine and analytical it will make him perceive obstacles too clearly and thus paralyse his will. The details of every plan conceived by a great man are open to objections that are only too well founded. And a mind over-anxious about precision and intellectual honesty allows itself to be conquered by details. The true leader does not see details; he is not a specialist in anything. He takes an interest in every question (Napoleon on the Council of State was admirable whether it was military matters, public works, or civil legislation that was being discussed), but he is interested only because he wishes to guide the effort made. He is surrounded by specialists to see to practical details. When Lyautey was questioned by one of the Ministers about his artillery he replied: "I have my technicians." "And what do you do?" was the next question. "I?" he answered. "I am the technician of general ideas."

But a dictator can free himself in this way from sub-

servience to details on one condition only. He must have full confidence in his lieutenants. And he must therefore know how to surround himself with a team of supporters at once faithful and competent. Never has there been a great man of action who has failed to surround himself with a staff of lieutenants who were faithful to his ideas and never betrayed them. This gift for choosing colleagues is, perhaps, together with will, the essential quality of the great dictator. It presupposes the possession of several qualities —a knowledge of men, a radiation of sympathy, which inspires affection and the desire to serve, and lastly a generous spirit which makes him incapable of jealousy and quick to reward. Just as Napoleon succeeded in inspiring the devotion of Berthier and his Marshals, so Lyautey subdued Morocco with the help of his lieutenants. And Mussolini certainly owes the duration of his rule to the energy with which he introduces fresh blood into his *entourage* when he discovers men of ability. Certain great dictators have possessed an almost feminine capacity for securing the devotion of men by pure caprice, but firm and friendly justice and love of working with their men perhaps secure this end even better.

While the combination of all the qualities just enumerated will certainly constitute a great man, it is quite possible that he may not be a man of action. It is necessary that the man thus endowed should also have the will to turn his gifts to account. He must have the lust for power; he must be ambitious. It is useless to protest that every man has the lust for power. Nothing could be farther from the truth. On the contrary, in the great majority of men laziness is far stronger than ambition. This is obvious in the lower ranks of the social hierarchy. The majority of working men refuse to become foremen, soldiers are not anxious to be promoted corporal. They fear responsibility and are afraid of losing that egalitarian friendship which binds them to their comrades. Above all, they have a horror of doing anything more than is necessary. The real man of action is nearly always a melancholy creature who rushes into action out of boredom. When the motives of certain great

dictators are examined it is astonishing to find how often, side by side with an extremely sincere idealism, there is a certain romanticism, a desire for self-forgetfulness, or some unfortunate love affair. In the life of the dictator action plays the same part as the masterpiece in the life of the artist. It diverts his attention from himself.

SCIENCE AND DICTATORSHIP

ALBERT EINSTEIN

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A DICTATORSHIP means muzzles all round, and consequently stultification.

Science can flourish only in an atmosphere of free speech.

THE DICTATOR AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

LUDWIG BERNHARD

(Professor of Economics in Berlin, a well-known writer on Poland, and adviser in economics to the moderate German Right Wing.)

I

IT is impossible to consume more than actually exists. That is the nightmare of every dictator. So long as he is supported by armed force he can play with politics, enter into diplomatic negotiations with the Church, and put a gloss on civilization. All those about him will applaud, smile, or hold their peace.

But the science of economics says to him and his followers, "You cannot consume more than actually exists." He is master, but he must obey the law of economic compromise. The national balance of trade is more powerful than the dictator, and hence, when the economic situation grows ominous, the dictator must come to terms with it. He does this by seeking to postpone a settlement. "The five years' plan, the *Pjatiletka*, is the basis of all Soviet policy. Work is to be definitely carried out on this basis, without criticism, until October 1, 1933." Thus spake Stalin. And Mussolini: "In from five to ten years' time Italy will be economically independent of other countries. Until then we must wage the battle of the grain, and for the rest hold our peace!" That is how a pact is made with the national trade balance. The economic crisis of the political dictator is postponed; the promissory note is extended.

From this alone the significance of political economy for the dictator is clearly seen, although modern—not to say fashionable—dictators have in no case arisen directly out of economic causes, but out of political post-War conditions,

out of chaos, out of an exaggerated sense of nationalism and too intense an antagonism between political parties. They owe their existence to negatives, to the incapacity of the social organization to cope with a state of disintegration. In the place of this social organization, torn by party politics and consequently powerless, there has arisen a man who, however dazzling his personality may be, can never succeed in creating the illusion that he is immortal. He has safeguarded the present, but endangered the future. History records but one dictator who, at the height of his power, relinquished his dictatorship in order to ensure the future of his country. That man was Sulla.

Any man who acts otherwise may be a saviour indeed, but he is destined to become a menace. With every day that passes the question of the time when the promissory note will fall due becomes more urgent.

II

To the fashionable dictators the economic fluctuations of our time constitute both an asset and a liability. The transition of the economic conditions of the world from a state of liberty to one of subjection constitutes an asset in their hands. Even the jargon of the economists indicates this transition. J. P. Morgan 'controls' the steel industry, railways, steamship companies, and insurance companies. Vögler, negotiating with French, English, Polish, and Czecho-Slovakian industrialists, 'regulates' the European steel market. The director of the Federal Reserve Board 'manipulates' American currency in order to bring about a lowering of the world's prices. Controlling, regulating, manipulating—all these are conceptions which would have been incomprehensible to our fathers. It is only the most recent developments which, by forcing certain elements to amalgamate, have made 'economic liberty' an illusion.

Modern dictators have profited by these changes; in their small states, often far removed from the centres of international trade, they have devised a 'systematic economic policy.' A century ago, if a dictator wished to keep his

followers docile and to dominate the people, he had to conduct military campaigns. Nowadays this is unnecessary, for the peoples are impressed not so much by war as by the systematic economic policy of the dictator, which consists in the construction of houses and railways, and in forming connexions with foreign banks and American Trust magnates, thus bringing life, movement, work, and profits into the country. The more detached the state is from international trade centres, the greater will be the impression produced by the connexions formed in realizing this systematic economic policy. Hence we find the dictators not only of Italy and Russia, but also of Spain, Poland, Yugo-Slavia, Turkey, and Persia, endeavouring to profit by the recent turn of events; they 'control,' 'regulate,' 'manipulate,' and 'centralize' their national economic resources, however small, and, by consolidating them, succeed in presenting a negotiable whole which tempts speculating capitalists to interest themselves in the dictator and his country by the floating of loans, the acquiring of concessions, and the conclusion of delivery contracts for years ahead.

On the exchanges of New York, London, and Amsterdam —the principal centres for all the great financial houses— the names of Mussolini, Pilsudski, Stalin, Mustapha Kemal, and their imitators are no longer greeted with derision. On the contrary, the greatest admiration is expressed for their achievements—for Mussolini's economic reforms, which have resulted in lucrative contracts with American manufacturers of machinery; for the Polish loan launched so successfully in New York and Amsterdam, which inspired confidence because it was believed that the dictator Pilsudski would maintain law and order; for the concessions—treaties made by American financiers with the Soviet dictatorship; for Mustapha Kemal's efforts to construct, with the help of the Belgian statistician Camille Jaquard, the foundations of a practicable economic policy; for the agreement arrived at by the Persian dictator, Resa Pahlavi, with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. America, England, and Holland have indeed no desire to set up a dictatorship for themselves,

but they recognize that there may be sound economic reasons for government by a dictator in *other* countries. The managing director of a great foreign financial house—a remarkably democratic and liberal-minded capitalist with international connexions—wrote to me recently: "It would be very nice if Vienna could be governed by a dictator!"

III

The systematic economic policy which has followed in the train of international economic developments is of equal political importance to the dictator both at home and abroad. For an economic policy which regulates from a central point not only the credits of the great banks, industrial contracts, and conditions of freightage by land and water, but also questions relating to labour and market prices, and which endeavours to limit trade to firm orders—an economic organization with such wide scope and influence is a magnificent substitute in home politics for the old, absolute, police-governed state. Far more adaptable and rigorous than the police-controlled state, the systematic economic organization has the advantage of being regarded as a symbol of the higher civilization and vital progress of the world, so that no dictator need blush for this modern instrument of slavery. One of the most impressive examples of this fact is Mussolini's fundamental law of April 3, 1925, which builds up the 'corporate State' on the basis of political economy. The elements of this political economy fall into two groups, embracing on the one hand the organization of industry, of landed estates, commerce, banks, and transport by sea and land, and on the other hand the syndicates of industrial and agricultural workers and employees in commercial, banking, mercantile, and transport concerns. To these twelve organizations must be added a thirteenth—the *intelligentzia*.

Since this edifice is founded on local Fascist organizations and culminates in the central control of the dictator, the latter may be said to hold the people in the hollow of his hand. He 'controls' and 'regulates' and 'manipulates'

the people by means of economic measures, thus following international economic policy, which is passing from a state of liberty into a state of subjection.

IV

The relation between dictatorship and modern economic tendencies does not, however, go far. It is no more than the occasional converging of two curves which, in obedience to their natural law, are destined to diverge. The curve of economic tendencies necessarily turns toward internationalism; the curve of dictatorship must follow the trend of national development. This antagonism is less in evidence at the present time, because international cartels are still only at an early stage and consist of no more than the co-ordination of national industrial cartels. National cartels consist almost everywhere of groups interested in maintaining rigid political boundaries. They are in reality akin to dictatorship. As soon, however, as industrial concerns and the amalgamated banks have developed their organization so as to give expression to the tendency toward internationalism and the exploitation of the markets of the world, as soon, that is to say, as the international cartels have become so strong that they need no longer fear the national 'outsider,' they will be able to define their markets themselves without State help and without any regard for national limitations. I need only mention the way in which the International Steel Cartel first came into being. A few weeks before it did so the question of duty on iron was the subject of serious negotiations between the French and German Governments, for it was essential to the existence of the iron-works in Lorraine, which had been assigned to France, to find a market in the neighbouring German territories. The German Government was therefore in a position to demand concessions from the French Government. This political situation was, however, completely nullified by an agreement between the heads of the industry themselves. The national political delimitations may be said to have melted

away before an international cartel of business men. The commercial policy of the State was superseded by a private trade agreement.

The significance of this is understood by Mussolini, for at the conversations that took place in Geneva on the development of international cartels the Italian delegate showed so plainly that he was acting under compulsion that the heavy hand of the dictator was almost visible. "Italy," he said, "is a country possessing no coal. What will become of the Balance of Power if a day should dawn when a European or possibly even a world coal syndicate should regulate production, distribution, and prices from London, Brussels, or Essen?"

Dictators, who are still riding on the wave of popular emotion, are confronted with visions of the future compared with which a State ruled by a dictator is no more than a business department, a 'section,' visions involving sums of money which make State Exchequers seem like the budget of a small tradesman, and presupposing a power, quite beyond national diplomacy, to influence current events.

The problem of economic expansion is driving us in this direction. There is more logic in circumstances than in men!

V

The prevailing mania for dictators is, however, continually being encouraged by the fact that economic conditions, and particularly financial difficulties of State, have necessitated the institution of *temporary* dictators (controlling trade, currency, finance, bills of exchange). By means of 'emergency decrees' and 'authorizations' examples of personal rule in detailed spheres have been established which have beguiled the people into imagining that from this collection of half-measures the 'whole man' must eventually arise.

Economic dictatorships, therefore, if only by reason of the consequences they suggest, deserve far more consideration than is generally accorded them. Their dependence on contemporary economic tendencies and the nature of their

political organization have never been sufficiently elucidated. The frivolous manner in which they are handled in public debate makes it all the more necessary to draw sharp distinctions in this matter and to combat the demagogues' deliberate confusion of ideas on the subject.

Whilst absolute dictatorship is the negation of democracy, limited constitutional dictatorship, especially in the sphere of economics, is an *instrument* of democracy. Absolute dictatorship arises when the combined instruments of democracy break down ; constitutional dictatorship is established when the combined instruments of democracy recognize their limitations. These limitations exist because a democratic collective will can find expression in a well-ordered State only through the medium of a complicated machinery; decisions by majority vote within the groups, negotiations between co-ordinated groups, appeals by subordinate groups—these are the three essentials of the machinery of democratic government. They are not always and in all circumstances capable of dealing with the pressing emergencies which the logical development of economic factors brings in its train. Thus conflict may arise between what is economically necessary and what is politically possible. In certain circumstances it may be impossible for the machinery of democratic government to reject a people's demands, although they are economically disastrous—such as, for example, demands for control of prices, which will endanger the currency, the demands of bureaucracy, which will put the organization of the State out of gear, and wage demands, which may jeopardize the capacity of industry to compete with the foreigner. Or, again, the complicated machinery of democratic government may not be sufficiently mobile to cope with economic dangers, such as the withdrawal of capital ; or, weighed down with the number of its members with their conflicting personalities, it may not possess the 'pupillary power' to throw off the insidious influence of private economic groups, as, for instance, by taking action against the formation of trusts.

Thus political, technical, and moral considerations may so hamper the machinery of a democratic Government,

with its dependence on the popular vote, its complicated organization, and its heavy burden of *personnel*, that the representatives of democratic thought may be compelled to introduce the element of personal power into the democratic machinery.

VI

It may therefore be safely assumed that the influences making for constitutional dictatorships of this nature are likely to increase in the near future. The general tendency of development is toward a merging of the economic and political spheres. The growing concentration of capital on the one hand and the increasing concentration of trade unions and co-operative bodies on the other have given economic organizations such a strong political position, making political bodies so dependent on economic considerations, and have so ruthlessly forced the State to take part in the economic life of the nation, that the old cry for the "division of power" has acquired a new significance. Montesquieu's demand for the "division of power" was aimed against absolute monarchy; in the eighteenth century it seemed to be the means of protecting the people against a concentration of power in the royal houses. Modern democratic development has now arrived at the same stage. What is called to-day the "crisis of Parliamentarianism" is the necessity, perceived half emotionally, half consciously, for a fresh distribution of power. If the distribution of royal power sets up a collective instrument of power (Parliament) beside the personal power of the sovereign, the distribution of democratic power sets up a personal power beside the elective body.

The question is how this is to be accomplished. The two great Anglo-Saxon democracies, which are fortunate in possessing a highly developed political sense, allow a remarkable latitude to personal power. The English House of Commons, the most experienced and mightiest of all Parliaments, has, despite the sanctity and sacredness of Parliamentary supremacy, virtually placed the question of

money grants in the hands of a single man, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, so that a supply Bill cannot even be discussed in Parliament without *his* consent. A clause in the famous decree known as the Self-denying Ordinance laid it down that the House could entertain no proposal for the granting of moneys for any department of the public service, or deal with a proposal involving the expenditure of public funds or any claim on the credit of the State, unless the proposal had been put forward by the Government. Since all demands of the people on the State involve expenditure of money, a degree of personal power was ensured by this modest clause which fundamentally affects political acts of commission and omission. If Great Britain possesses a State organization firmly established on a sound financial basis, Englishmen owe this to the lofty political insight which, in a crisis, places more confidence in the far-sighted energy of one man than in an 'assembly.'

In the United States the same political acumen has given the President the personal authority to name the Ministers as he chooses, and to keep them in office even against the will of Congress. More than once the President of the United States has replied to a vote of lack of confidence on the part of Congress, "Whether or not the Minister is deserving of confidence I alone can decide!" And far from blaming a President who thus opposes the will of Congress, the American people, on the contrary, applaud him loudly for having ideas of his own and the courage to carry them through.

Both the English and the American institutions possess the advantage of being at the disposal of one man throughout his tenure of office, and it is impossible for the Governments of either of these countries to delimit the range of these powers at critical moments; this can be done only by lengthy Parliamentary procedure. The practical mind of the Englishman has ascertained the point at which a single man can not only effectually protect the finances of the country and the exchange, but also indirectly exercise constant control over every State transaction, while the pioneer spirit of America has established a condition of affairs in which a

single man is able to exert a powerful influence over the mighty collective organization of democracy.

This division of power has helped England and America to recover from dangerous crises, and has proved in both countries the surest safeguard against dictatorial aspirations on the part of individuals and against the mania for dictatorships among the masses.

In the democracies of Continental Europe, on the other hand, there is no such effective system. In them the power of the president of the country is carefully circumscribed and the financial power of Parliament is unlimited, while no individual can by the exercise of foresight avert any danger that threatens. Personal power can intervene only when the trouble has actually occurred, and even then only when, after a severe struggle, 'emergency measures' and 'special acts of authorization' have been passed bestowing peculiar personal powers. When Germany's paper currency was abolished, at a time when the dollar was worth 1,000,000,000,000 marks and the well-to-do middle classes were reduced to penury, it was only after tedious negotiations carried on under a hail of petitions and threats that the German Government, in contravention of the constitution, was granted the power to take such measures as they might deem fit and necessary for setting the country on a firm financial, economic, and social basis. And even then the Reichstag imposed four restrictions on this economic dictatorship so laboriously wrested from it. Thus it was only after an intolerable situation had arisen through financial, political, and general economic distress and hardship connected with the exchange that the collective organ of democracy felt itself reluctantly and grudgingly compelled to grant the inevitable. Hence the mistrust in Germany of the measures taken by the State and the anxious cry throughout the country that "the constitution must be safeguarded!"

In France after the War certain personalities stood out so prominently that for a while they appeared almost in the light of dictators. Questions of life and death in the economic sphere, and particularly the necessity of balancing

the Budget and stabilizing the franc, brought the necessary pressure to bear. But the time will come when the power will be allowed to drop from the hands of these men and become vested in cliques, and then the kind of crises threatening every democracy which does not allow a certain latitude to personal power will again occur in France also.

It is readily admitted that the French thoroughly understand how to deal with critical situations. The Germans, on the other hand, always stand helpless before their own fundamental principles. Entirely lacking in political genius, they possess neither the swift opportunism of the Anglo-Saxon nor the supple irony of the Latin races. And that is why the Germans never succeed in perfecting anything except through the rigorous method of almost consummating their doom in the attempt.

DICTATORSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY

JULES SAUERWEIN

(Foreign editor of "Le Matin." The mouthpiece of France on the subject of foreign politics. Briand's greatest friend.)

THE question I have to discuss may be put as follows: What effect has a dictatorial system on the foreign policy of a country? But before discussing the felicitous or disastrous results of such a system upon international political relations it is, of course, necessary to distinguish carefully between the various systems to which the name of dictatorship is indiscriminately applied.

Even more than the past, we must examine the present. In fact, it is not a question of finding out whether in ancient monarchies or the empires of antiquity foreign policy was more or less successfully conducted, or to what extent the absolute and uninterrupted rule of a Julius Cæsar, a Louis XIV, or a Frederick II allowed of great achievements, whereas the instability of democratic systems would have failed to do so. It is to what is going on about us that we must turn our eyes, for political comparisons between one period and another are of no very great value.

In the Europe of to-day there are various forms of dictatorship which have very little in common. There is the dictatorship exercised by Mustapha Kemal Pasha, which, as a matter of fact, has very little influence in the continent of Europe. In his case we are dealing with a man who, having saved his country from invasion and transformed defeat into victory, enjoys tremendous prestige, and imposes an iron discipline upon his fellow-countrymen on pain of the gallows. In Poland a dictatorship has been established by a military man who, purely on his own initiative, has appointed himself the censor of the morals of a whole nation. In Spain there is a dictatorship consisting

of a group of generals who have practically suppressed the Parliamentary system and party conflict. In these three countries, in spite of fundamental differences, the dictatorships have this much in common, that they are based upon the prestige of a man or of a successful *coup d'état*, though in none of these three instances has the dictator supplied a complete doctrine. What they have established is a system suitable either to Turkey, to Poland, or to Spain alone, as the case may be. Nothing is either written or said with the object of proving that the system of government established by Kemal, Pilsudski, or Primo de Rivera should be applied to other countries, or that it represents for every nation under the sun a step forward to better things. This has had one important result—the relations between these various States and the foreigner have not been essentially modified by the fact that the Parliamentary system has been replaced by an autocracy.

There is yet another point to be noticed, which is equally applicable to these three countries. The dictatorship has been established either by a single man, as in Poland and Turkey, or by a small band of military officials, as in Spain. But it has not tried to extend to the whole nation the doctrines and methods of a single party. Kemal had his army, but it was the national army. Pilsudski made himself master of Warsaw thanks to the devotion of certain regiments, but they were regiments belonging to the national army. Primo de Rivera installed himself in Madrid, but it was with the support of several generals on the active list whose men obeyed their orders. Thus in each case they have laid their hand on a certain section of the national forces and used it as an instrument for obtaining obedience from the rest of the population. They are not the leaders of a party, they have no need to worry about the approval or the eventual criticism of their own supporters, they have created nothing new, and they are accountable for their actions only to themselves and, in the case of Spain, to the king.

It is as well to bear these two points in mind—three of the European dictatorships have been established without

creating a doctrine or a special armed force. But does not the question of prestige play a great part in foreign policy? Certainly! Nevertheless it cannot be denied that it plays an even greater part in the case of a dictator, whoever he may be, than with a Parliamentary Government. Let us examine the matter in detail.

Mustapha Kemal has adopted a firm and consistent foreign policy. The instructions he gave to Ismet Pasha, his plenipotentiary at Lausanne, were forcible and determined, but the Turkish delegates adopted the usual manœuvres of diplomacy and dragged out their negotiations interminably, pretending to break them off, and, at one point, returning to their own country. Thus they wore down the resistance of France and, above all, of England, both of whom were desperately anxious for the restoration of peace in the East. And in this way they succeeded in securing the maximum advantages and concessions in their treaties. But what would have happened if, instead of having a dictator at Angora, they had been responsible to a Government liable to be turned out by every change of mood in the Grand Assembly? Everything seems to point to the fact that the game would in that case have been much easier for their opponents, who would have been able to intrigue, to frighten the Turks, and to turn against them the weapon of blackmail they were using against others, getting what they wanted as they had done in the old days in Constantinople—by means of corruption. But the presence of a determined and remarkable man made all these manœuvres impossible. In the face of the Grand Assembly he shouldered the responsibility himself, constantly infusing fresh courage into his advisers. Thanks to him Turkey did not give way. And when one remembers that she had just emerged from a war in which she had lost four-fifths of her territory, and that she was faced by victorious Powers with formidable armies at their backs, it must be confessed that the dictatorship, in spite of the brutality of its methods at home, has rendered an immense service to that country. Foreign policy has not been changed as regards its aims, but in practice it has gained a power and

continuity of which the dictator has every right to feel proud.

During the period that followed this little country has perhaps erred on the side of exaggerated nationalism. It might have secured material prosperity more quickly if it had allowed foreign capital to be invested more freely. It might have continued to allow religious educational institutions to flourish instead of restricting their activities. And, from the point of view of the foreigner, and especially of the Frenchman, the Turkish dictator may be held to blame for having adopted somewhat too uncompromising a policy. Yet, if we honestly place ourselves in the position of the Turks and regard the matter, as we should, from the strictly objective point of view, we are bound to admit that Mustapha Kemal has succeeded in securing the slow but sure progress of his country while preserving her complete independence. And the problem with which he was faced was by no means easy of solution.

To turn to Poland: it must be confessed, to Marshal Pilsudski's credit, that the energy he showed in hounding down Parliamentary abuses was counterbalanced by a certain wise moderation in his foreign policy. This veteran soldier, who in his early days lived a life of incredible adventure, has shown no signs of a foolhardy spirit with regard to his foreign policy. Monsieur Zaleski, the Minister for Foreign Affairs chosen and kept in office by Pilsudski, has won all sympathies at Geneva by the moderation of his attitude. But this is not all. After a time the Marshal himself paid a personal visit to the League of Nations, and took his seat at the conference table opposite Monsieur Voldemaras, the Prime Minister of Lithuania. His attitude was determined, and his speeches did not possess the convincing suavity of Monsieur Briand. Nevertheless, when all is said and done, he did not give offence or break up the negotiations. At every session, over a period, the Poles have had to face the Lithuanians, and have displayed considerable patience. But patience is not generally regarded as a dictatorial virtue. After various serious encounters with the Soviets, and in spite of his long-

standing hatred of Russia, Marshal Pilsudski, in answer to the demands of Monsieur Tchitcherin, agreed to come to an amicable arrangement, always keeping his temper, and, in short, providing a further example of a dictator whose presence has been in no way deleterious to the foreign policy of his country. Thanks to him, a continuity of outlook and action has taken the place of the upheavals and vicissitudes which would undoubtedly have characterized the attitude of Poland toward other countries if one Government had succeeded another to the accompaniment of political strife and intrigue, and these few years of stability have been a precious asset for a nation which has just been born anew, and in the past had been ruined by internal dissensions.

Nor would it be fair to say that Marshal Primo de Rivera has been guilty of many mistakes. Whenever he has been wrong he has had the good sense not to persist in his error. At one time he made Spain retire from the League of Nations on the plea that she had not been given the permanent seat to which she was entitled and that the question of Tangiers had not been settled as she wished. His mistake was obviously due to an exaggerated estimate of Spanish prestige, but he recognized that he was wrong, and set matters right. Thanks to skilful diplomacy the question of Tangiers was settled in a manner altogether honourable to Spain, and the latter returned to the League of Nations with the privilege of possessing a semi-permanent seat. Her relations with France, which had not been satisfactory, have since become excellent. Thus, as regards international relations, it cannot be maintained that the dictatorship has been in any way deleterious.

After this rapid survey we must turn to a fourth country, Italy, and examine the effects of the dictatorship on her foreign policy.

In this case there is a very different tale to tell. In the first place, the Italian dictatorship has meant the introduction of a general system known as Fascism; it has founded a doctrine. Fascism has accomplished something that neither Turkey, Poland, nor Spain has done. It has completely

altered the relations between the individual and the State, as well as between the various classes; it has also changed the economic system; but its most fundamental innovation is in the relationship between the powers which in a democracy share the burden of government—that is to say, between Parliament on the one hand and the Executive on the other. It has recruited hosts of supporters sometimes by means of propaganda and sometimes by the use of force. Everybody in Italy who has to work for a living has become Fascist. I have myself paid six visits to Italy since the march on Rome, and have examined the state of affairs. I have had many interviews with Mussolini, some of which have been published, while others have remained confidential. I think I may say that in a large number of articles I have paid just tribute to the great work done at home to transform Italy into a well-disciplined country. And I have recorded the success of this undertaking. Exception may perhaps be taken to the methods employed, but that does not come within the scope of the present article. The chief point to be remembered is that the continuous powerful pressure brought to bear on the citizens of Italy by the great organization represented by Fascism has set two levers in action—the first being authority, and the second the idea of glory.

From the very beginning of his rule Mussolini, in order to rekindle in the breast of this somewhat anarchically inclined nation the full fervour of patriotic feeling, has talked of the great mission devolving upon her. He has repeated in every shape and form, and his disciples have echoed ever more emphatically, the assertion that Italy is a Great Power, in the first place, because she has a constantly growing population; secondly, because she is situated in the middle of the Mediterranean and is summoned by destiny to rule that sea; thirdly, because, tracing her ancestry to the Roman Empire, she is the heir to the greatest civilization and the greatest Power known to history; fourthly, because, in the face of corrupt Parliamentary systems, she is the repository of the one true political, social, and economic doctrine—that which goes by the name of Fascism. Such

are the daily lessons dinned into the ears of a country too long divided against itself, and whose recent unification is only of about fifty years' standing. The Press, possibly owing to the demands of the system, but in any case forbidden to discuss home policy, set to work day after day to enlarge upon these grandiose and flattering topics. At home all that was apparent to the people was that severe measures were applied in every town and every village by a formidable military organization. Small wonder, then, that the great idea of Italy's glory abroad should have been welcomed and celebrated with all the ardour of the Southern soul. It requires time for a country to climb the steps which lead it to the heights of power when its prestige becomes, so to speak, the natural complement to its name. The Fascist doctrine allied with the Italian imagination has tried to leap at one bound the stages which the nation thus happily endowed would in the normal course of events surmount only in the process of time. This feeling of common exaltation was quickly followed by another—that of contempt or aversion for those neighbouring countries whose political systems or the position they had won in the world seemed to clip the wings of Italy's greatness. Even directly after the War and before the advent of Fascism Italy thought she had been sacrificed, or at all events badly treated, and this grievance, which was perhaps justified, changed under the Fascist *régime* to impatient irritation. We shall not go into the question of the extent to which these diverse sentiments are shared by the whole of the Italian people. It is sufficient to know that they are held by everybody in Italy who has the right to act, write, or speak as a politician.

Now, what has been the consequence of this growing interest in foreign policy on the part of the people? It has resulted in the necessity of providing, by fair means or by foul, a regular supply of provender for the national enthusiasm—that is to say, real successes, or, if these are not to be had, apparent successes. When a sort of syndicate of three statesmen—Mr Austen Chamberlain, Monsieur Briand, and Herr Stresemann—was formed in Europe to

frame the policy of Locarno Mussolini stood aloof. It is true that his representatives continued to participate at Geneva or elsewhere in the settlement of great international questions; but he himself took no personal part in the deliberations and gave but little assistance in the task of stabilizing Europe, while his Press was not sparing of its sarcasms at the expense of the League of Nations and of the politicians who were doing their best to liquidate the War and lay the foundations of a lasting peace upon friendly contracts.

Had Mussolini himself worked regularly and patiently with the representatives of the three great European Powers he would have succeeded in playing a prominent part in their deliberations. His youth, his courage, and his wonderful intellect, placed at the service of Europe, would have won for him a position from which he might have derived innumerable advantages for his country. Instead of which, his policy of isolation and his exaggeration of the doctrine of prestige and power shut Italy out from all real contact with the great forces of public opinion in Europe which are largely guided by considerations of peace. She became suspect, and subsequently a source of anxiety, though not of terror, with the result that she did not enjoy the advantage of inspiring either confidence or awe.

Indeed, it is not derogatory to this wonderful country to say that she does not possess the power to stand opposed to the concert of the other great European Powers. Why has Mussolini chosen to adopt this attitude, and why, in the case of Italy, has the dictatorship obviously upset the principles of a healthy foreign policy? I have already explained the psychological reasons in a word; it is because to act otherwise would not have been sufficiently glorious. To expect these overheated imaginations to limit themselves to collaborating with others in reaching international decisions, and thus to confess that the part Italy was playing, though highly honourable, was by no means a leading one, was to offer them far too insignificant a sphere of action.

Thus in the everyday life of international politics Fascist Italy has tried with varying success to discover means of

proving to Italy herself that she could on her own account and independently of every other country pursue an active policy regardless of all the other elements in Europe. Italian diplomacy has endeavoured to excite, to maintain, and to utilize discontent. Italy has succeeded in laying a hand on Albania, but the future alone will show whether this encroachment on Balkan territory, which ruined Austria-Hungary, will really prove of advantage in her case. She has tried, but without success, to drag Russia into the orbit of her ambitions. She has succeeded in upsetting Bulgaria, and has thus made this country suspect in the eyes of her neighbours. She has done all she can to encourage irredentism in Hungary, and the Hungarians themselves have now realized that they allowed themselves to be lured too far. She tried to find a following in Spain by inciting the dictator in Madrid to leave the League of Nations and to insist upon a complete alteration of the settlement regarding Tangiers. But Spain has pulled herself together, and is not at all grateful to Italy for the advice she gave.

Last, but not least, she has embarked upon violent polemics against Germany and France in turn. Although any *rapprochement* between these two countries is by no means easy of accomplishment, they have been gradually drawn together by a common feeling of mistrust toward Italy, which has been extremely detrimental to Fascist policy. We are here presented with a case in which, despite the stability which should be the most precious asset of dictatorship, the latter has forced upon a country a policy of prestige which up to the present has brought no advantage.

Thus it is equally untrue to say that the principle of dictatorship is either favourable or unfavourable to the foreign policy of a nation. Everything depends on the doctrine and the attitude that characterize such a system. The Parliamentary system labours under innumerable disadvantages, and for it to be able consistently to pursue a given aim in foreign policy it must enjoy the exceptional advantages of having men like Delcassé, Briand, Chamberlain, or Stresemann in power for a considerable number of

years. And even then it is true that such men are frequently hampered by political differences. However, the Parliamentary system has at least the advantage that, owing to freedom of criticism and discussion, an adventurous policy founded solely on prestige is automatically corrected and amended.

DICTATORSHIP AND THE GERMAN MIND

WALTER VON MOLO

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THE confusion of voices for and against dictatorship is due, as in the case of every debate, chiefly to misunderstanding. For the disputants are not even agreed as to the meaning of dictatorship, and each of them means something different by the word.

When I embark upon a discussion on the subject of the German mind and dictatorship I am met with the difficulty of explaining what is meant by the German mind. Here too there is great diversity of opinion.

Let us, therefore, first try to discover what we mean by German. As I understand it, a national character consists in the possession, by a certain human group, of qualities which are influenced by the particular locality in which the group happens to live, and by the fact that well-nigh from time immemorial all its members have shared the same history.

Whether nationalities will ever die out either in the near or distant future, whether this will take place first in Europe, or the ideal be realized only in the form of a more or less perfect spiritual harmony, seem to me idle questions—just as idle as to ask whether all the various languages will ever become woven together and survive in one universal tongue. For nationalities are with us here and now; they have come into being, they exist and are a fact, and for the present we are bound to take them into account.

It is characteristically German that I should discuss this matter so exhaustively. Very few nations give as much

thought as we do to what constitutes the essential character of the various nations.

The German is prone to exaggerate; he overrates either the national or the super-national factor. He frequently takes the second step before the first, and takes the first step afterward, when the rest of the world are already engaged in taking the third. And that is why it is necessary constantly to remind the German that he must attend to the demands and circumstances of his age, and that only by so doing can he hope to do his duty by eternity and the universe.

It has always been difficult to distinguish sharply between national characteristics, and now that the nations have drawn so much closer together and their culture and economic conditions are so inextricably interwoven it is more difficult than ever. My attempt at definition, therefore, can hope to be true only in a very wide and approximate sense.

The German mind is deeply concerned with eternity—that is to say, wherever we assume a political or philosophical attitude we are prone to regard our lives as a portion of eternity, as a journey toward eternity. That is why we often gaze up at the sky when our eyes should be turned to the ground, and why we frequently drop them to earth precisely when everybody else wishes to look up to heaven. The German is a sentimentalist, and to steel himself against this weakness he thinks a great deal, often too much. To judge by their general attitude, the German people should be regarded as a thinking rather than a poetical race. Our greatest poetical works are almost all educational or philosophical in tone—*Faust*, *Wilhelm Meister*, *Grüner Heinrich*, for instance, to mention only three examples. This explains the speculatively philosophical and ethical basis to be found in all our literature, as also our lust for educating, which is sometimes obtrusive.

Countless Germans have longed, and many still long, to alter and improve the world in keeping with the German pattern; and they do so not from conscious arrogance, but owing to a deeply rooted conviction. The German wishes to educate because he feels he has a real vocation

to teach; he believes it is his mission. Because he is conscious of the world within him, he imagines his world should be everybody's world. The German is the typical epitome of human drama. All the tragedy and farce of humanity is concentrated in us. Hence the fantastic eagerness shown by all our best men to try to force the stars down from heaven. That is why Luther appeared in Germany; that is why we possess Kant; that is why Marx and Lassalle both exercised their influence in Germany, and why German socialism is the most comprehensive socialism in the world.

The counterpart to this peculiarity of our minds is music. Perhaps the most vivid way of portraying the German mind is to say that the Germans are a race of thinkers and musicians.

Thought and music, despite the fact that they seem to be mutually exclusive, are our two most distinct and opposite poles. Nowhere is the separation of mind and heart, reason and temperament, understanding and feeling, more strongly marked than it is in Germany. Hence the deep fissures in the nation, and our eternal struggle between mind and matter. These two opposite poles cause friction, but they also continuously generate fresh warmth; they keep the German people young. But they are and always have been the cause of much unhappiness both to ourselves and other nations, who find it hard to understand us.

The best and most sympathetic of other nations find it difficult to grasp our mentality, and they do so only very imperfectly. They often regard us as 'false' and 'underhand,' because in us word and deed so frequently appear to be contradictory. This is due to the fact that our opposite poles are so heavily charged. We often say something which we are unable subsequently to carry out in practice, and we often do things for which we are unable to give a rational explanation. And owing to the fact that we are painfully aware of our temperamental difficulties, which are like spikes constantly pointing in different directions, we are inclined to force one pole into the sphere of the other, with the result that we often feel when we ought to be thinking, and think when we ought to be feeling.

The average man of other nations is very much more of one piece than we are. In most other nations the individual reveals a greater harmony of body and mind, of heart and brain, thought and feeling, word and deed, than is to be found among us, and this harmony is revealed more distinctly in action than it is with us. It is to be hoped that the rising generation, whose brains are no longer being overloaded as they used to be, and whom sport is making more conscious of their bodies, will reveal a change in this respect.

In order to be able to sum up the German character in a single word, it would be necessary, while carefully bearing in mind what has been said above, in the first place to study those men in Germany who have brought our most firmly rooted characteristics—I might even say the German temperament—to a sort of synthesis in their own being. Our spiritual leaders, both of yesterday and to-day, have been men of this type, and in every case they have proved that the mainspring of our nature is a yearning for universality.

Music and philosophy both aim at universality; they constitute universality. The inner core of the German nature has always been apparent, and to-day is even more so than ever before. It is universality. The high-minded German has always been, and still is, more deeply concerned with spiritual than with material things. Hence the sharp and dangerous contrasts between the so-called cultivated class and the so-called masses. In caricature this is represented by depicting the intellectual man, the 'German professor,' as a person of colossal conceit, while the masses have long regarded themselves as irrevocably excluded from spiritual things. This state of affairs is entirely due to the forms of government we have had for centuries. But since 1918 things have been changing with surprising rapidity, and the Germans are now in process of becoming *one* people.

The above observations are confirmed by our total inability to rise to certain situations, and by our repeated and unexpected recovery after apparently total annihilation. In all political factions, however imperfect they may be—and they are very imperfect indeed, as might be expected after the chaos caused by our collapse in the War—there is

nevertheless one ideal trait—namely, our sense of unity. Naturally one must discount the aberrations of one or two groups which, with us as with other nations, seem to conceal this. The word 'world-literature' (*Weltliteratur*) is of German origin; it was born in Germany.

Many things which seemed quite inexplicable to the foreigner in the World War are also to be explained by reference to our yearning for universality. Grotesque as it may appear to ascribe to this yearning the fact that half the world became involved in the War, it is, after all, what actually happened. Years ago I used to say that the German was so firmly convinced in his own mind of his personal salvation that he wished to make the whole world happy after his own style. This was the pious object of our masses as they gathered together at the beginning of the World War. To understand this fully we must bear in mind that it was characteristically German to be quite indifferent to the political factors involved. The German really did not know what it was all about; he did not perceive the background of the War. That is why it is so bitterly unjust to speak of the "guilt of the German people," as many still do.

When the masses perceived and understood the background of the War they at first refused to believe it could be true, fearing lest their falsely directed idealism would crash in ruins, and with it the greatest treasures of their heart. That is why the War lasted such a long time, why the revulsion of feeling among the masses was so sudden and so violent; and why almost all Germans were, for a while, 'socialists,' the Socialist party at that time reverting to its pristine character more quickly and more radically than the socialists of other countries. This explains why communism became so strong in Germany, and why it is still so strong to-day. It would have conquered Germany, and from Germany have spread over the whole of Europe, if it had had its origin there instead of in Russia.

To many people at that time we seemed to be devoid of character, because we rejected and trampled underfoot almost everything which we had hitherto held sacred and

exalted. But this was only the reaction of disillusioned German idealism, which, though noble in itself, had been abused for generations and debased into self-complacent vanity. That is why, although the façade of the Empire collapsed, its internal structure did not go to pieces, but revealed an inner cohesion and a spiritual uniformity such as it has never before shown in our history.

Such, then, in broad outline, are the obvious features of the German character. What, then, is dictatorship?

Dictatorship is the concentration of extraordinary powers in the hands of one man or of a few. A dictatorship arises in times of danger, whether from foreign enemies or domestic sedition, to take the place of the former Government with the object of presenting a stronger front to the enemy within or beyond the frontier.

At that period of our evolution when princes ruled with absolute power many a prince and many a statesman was a dictator without being actually called so. The word 'dictator' is not indigenous to Germany, and it was only after the establishment of dictatorships in Italy, Spain, and Russia that it came into general use in our country. It suggests to the German mind unlimited power and rule by might. We had no knowledge of the word 'dictatorship.' Up to the very end of the War the majority of Germans certainly fancied they were ruled by a Parliamentary system.

In every war the commander-in-chief is a sort of temporary dictator.

A dictatorship implies the setting aside of the regular constitutional government of a country. I believe that in ancient Rome the rule of a dictator was limited to a definite period. But to-day when we speak of a dictatorship we mean a form of government whose champions maintain that it ought to endure and could do so, although when it is first established precisely the reverse is proclaimed and believed.

The moment dictatorship is mentioned in Germany everybody jumps to the conclusion that either a national or a communistic dictatorship is meant. And here again we are confronted by the two sharply antagonistic poles con-

sisting of temperament and brain respectively, while thinking and feeling become hopelessly confused.

Both kinds of dictatorship, the national as well as the communistic, I am firmly convinced, would prove impossible as permanent institutions in Germany.

A dictatorship is alien to the German character. Those who are disposed to favour a national dictatorship forget that the German nation could never be induced either to evolve or to adopt a retrograde course by force; it feels too deeply for that, and much as the German may be inclined to do homage to mere words, the moment he recognizes that they are mere words he ruthlessly rejects them, because he has had some experience of their hollowness (exhortations during the War, Wilson's speeches, and the League of Nations). Our ten years of bitter experiences have made us extremely sensitive to words, even to the word 'dictatorship.'

Seeing that it has taken centuries for our various provinces and their peoples to develop into a single whole, and in view of the diversity which characterizes the German nature, it is clear that the German spirit, however much it may be disposed willingly to subject itself to authority, insists upon freedom in all things. This subjection, which in the past has been slavish, and which still survives as such in the shape of a yearning in a few servile souls, can, in the present state of German intelligence, exist, in the long run, only as a voluntary attitude assumed in complete freedom.

Kant was still concerned about a "categorical imperative." Kleist, who was more interested in the tender emotions and endeavoured to emphasize their importance, foundered on the rock of Kant's categorical demands. Schiller was one of the first to oppose them in his creations. Like a true Swabian, who was not altogether unsympathetic to the ideas of the French Revolution, although he condemned it utterly in its later stages, he too came into conflict with Kant, and through this conflict arrived at his theory of the æsthetic education of mankind. Prompted by his thoroughly German sensibilities, he argued that men should be encouraged to perform cheerfully and of their

own free will the duties that are demanded of them, without any of that feeling of compulsion which is intolerable to a free spirit. Thanks to Schiller, this view became universal in Germany, and in the powerful influence that Schiller's ideas have exercised over the rising generation in Germany is to be found the best proof of the truth of my contention that the modern German will not consent to be coerced. In this respect other nations will have to modify their view of our character if their ignorance of the change that has occurred is not to lead to fresh disasters.

What, after all, was the mainspring of Luther's action? He did not want man to stand in fear and trembling beneath the dictatorship of God or beneath the alien dictatorship of the Pope in Rome. He wanted him to submit himself to his Maker of his own free will, from desire and as a voluntary act of love. This is German to the core, and it can be traced even in German Catholicism. Lessing himself, one of the greatest representatives of the German spirit, was insisting, before either Schiller or Kant, that man should find more noble and more worthy motives for his moral actions than temporary rewards and punishments. This is thoroughly German, and it is a characteristically national trait not to allow ourselves to be ordered about or forcibly compelled to perform any action. It evolved very gradually, till at last it blossomed forth gloriously in freedom. It is intolerant of all brutal handling.

And this reminds one of Bismarck's words—"We Germans fear God, but nothing else on earth." This was not a vainglorious boast on Bismarck's part; it was and still is the conviction of all Germans. The interposition of an earthly dictatorship between God and the Germans would in the long run be impossible.

A communistic dictatorship is contrary to the spirit of the German because it would mean that his heart would not be free. But a national commonalty, a product of German thought and feeling, directed by the nation as a whole, would be a different matter. The first steps in that direction have frequently been taken in the course of history, as, for instance, in the Peasant Wars and the Wars

of Liberation. But they were always frustrated by the diplomats.

The National Socialists, our latest political party—which, by the by, is for the moment behaving in somewhat too youthful a manner—embodies in its title two fundamental aspirations, which, particularly to-day, strike the German as most important. But this party is, for the present, wavering too hopelessly between old-fashioned strike methods and a policy of brute force, and is making no attempt to think things out thoroughly. If one might be allowed to prophesy, one might predict that, if we are oppressed very much longer both economically and spiritually, as we are to-day, the age might express itself in a coalition of the two extreme groups of the Right and Left, the National Socialists and the Communists. We should then have a sort of German communism, though not in the form of a dictatorship, but supported and conducted by an overwhelming majority of the German people. It would be a modern republic, a kind of chastened realization of the radical reforms that have been effected in Russia, just as the French Revolution, although it did not lead to a similar upheaval with us, certainly paved the way for the first conscious beginnings of democracy in Germany.

How little a dictatorship can accomplish in modern Germany, even in times of complete helplessness, was shown in the struggle in the Ruhr district and the Separatist movements. Both were in a way redolent of dictatorship. The struggle in the Ruhr was met by the large mass of the people by unarmed passive resistance and a hostile and disdainful humility which was disarming because it shattered the nerves of the dictatorial forces.

In the Separatist movements a minority tried to impose its rule by force, but also failed. On the one hand it was defeated by passive resistance, and on the other by determined open insurrection. It is quite wrong to suppose that the struggles in the Ruhr and against the Separatist movements were led by German Nationalists. The Nationalists were an absurd minority. It was precisely the great mass of our working classes, the 'people' in fact, who, standing,

as it were, between the two nations, ultimately triumphed. They did not turn against these attempts at dictatorship on nationalist grounds, but because they felt that dictatorial methods were not in keeping with human dignity and were opposed to human principles. But that is the German spirit; it is not nationalism. It was the German spirit that triumphed, not a mere group of agitators.

All great national upheavals in Germany, though ultimately the majority of them may have drifted into other hands, have owed their strongest impetus to the sense of outraged humanity. In this connexion the period of the Wars of Liberation is very instructive. Let me recall what Goethe said at the time when Germany was being oppressed by Napoleon's tyranny. He pointed out that although he was undoubtedly inclined by nature to regard everything with calm composure, yet he could not tolerate the sight of a man being made to do more than his strength allowed. Did the French really imagine that their young empire was already fixed on such solid foundations that all fear of a change in Fortune's wheel was at an end? "Let them scoff at the law to their hearts' content [the preceding law is meant here], it will prove their undoing in the end." *Only in the realm of the spirit, and nowhere else, could the German be made a devoted adherent; but when his feelings were trampled underfoot he was almost certain to trip you up.* Thus spake Goethe, who was certainly no nationalist, but the concentrated essence of German character.

To all who are familiar with human idiosyncrasies it comes as no surprise that people should be eagerly clamouring for dictatorships just at the present juncture, for the War and the years that followed turned the whole of the spiritual and economic life of Germany into chaos, created all kinds of strife and confusion, and installed bureaucracy almost at the head of affairs. But this bureaucracy and its clumsy methods frequently lead not only to serious friction in all departments of life, but also to many very necessary reforms being either delayed or only imperfectly carried out. One authority obstructs another, everybody tries to shift responsibility on to some one else's shoulders—devices

which necessarily lead to incessant bargaining between the political parties. Moreover, the country is doing its best, slowly but surely, to secure a centralized Government, though this is made all the more difficult owing to the fact that while many minor states have already disappeared, those that remain are all the more jealous of their so-called separate rights. These separate rights either consist in differences in culture, which no one can destroy, or they are founded on self-interest, which, in turn, is based on conventions not yet overcome. A centralized control of universities, schools, and art institutions is for the moment impossible in Germany. We also have no centralized administration of justice, but separate provincial administrations. In many circles it is thought that the easiest way of overcoming the difficulties to which this gives rise would be by means of a dictatorship.

There are certainly in our history many examples of great men who have ruled dictatorially, and at the time they appeared they often proved a great boon. But it should be remembered that Germany was not then a country of sixty million inhabitants. There can be no doubt that the dictatorship of an exalted and exceptional man, of a genius capable of shouldering responsibility and thoroughly mastering his business, would be the best form of government. But we must look ahead. A hereditary dictatorship would be madness, for the lofty gifts required of a dictator are to be found in one man perhaps only once in a hundred years; they cannot be hereditary.

Moreover, in this world nothing is absolute; every light has its shadow. A dictatorship depending on one man, or on a few who would be most unlikely to work harmoniously together, produces no lieutenants, but only minions. As soon as the great leading personality is changed, or the rare group of exceptionally capable men suffers depletion, a sinister shadow begins to loom on the wall of life. There is no body of officials ready to hand, trained to think for themselves, and capable of keeping the machine of the State going. It is then that the harm the system has done becomes apparent, and much more is destroyed than

the dictator of genius or the group of gifted substitutes can ever have created. The history of every people proves that this result is without exception the outcome of an inevitable natural process.

A permanent dictatorship, as this world goes, is an impossibility.

Dictatorships lead to disaffection and acts of oppression which in the case of nations standing on a low level of culture may certainly be rendered more or less innocuous, unnoticeable, or even negligible for years at a time; but in the case of a nation like the Germans, particularly latter-day Germans, who are on the point of attaining a higher level of culture than any they have reached hitherto, this system of government is not to be contemplated.

We have, moreover, to take into account that human infirmity which makes it impossible for a man willingly to relinquish powers he has once possessed. Even a dictator who has seized power only for a limited period will almost always—one might even say always—let the hour go by when he should terminate his dictatorship and try to merge it into a more or less constitutional form of government.

Like every kind of extreme, dictatorships are doomed to come to grief sooner or later, for they are contrary to the fundamental principle of life.

Life consists of action and reaction, of obstacles and the surmounting of obstacles, of the recurrence of obstacles and their repeated overthrow, and of change and compromise. Humanity's dream of creating an absolute ideal and securing it for ever may be natural enough, but it can never be realized. And it is for this reason that, despite all the difficulties of party politics and bureaucracy, it is wiser to do the best along constitutional lines than to insist upon aiming at the impossible.

Necessary as the different provincial cultures are to Germany as a whole, there are nevertheless signs of an ever increasing uniformity in German feeling and outlook, which do much toward illumining the darker side of the picture, while both the Government and the Press are now in a position to be apprised of all that the nation wishes. But

dictatorship imposes silence on its opponents. The leader of the nation thus loses his power, for as he can learn nothing from the views of his adversaries he is deprived of his chief source of nourishment, with the result that he becomes sterile and perishes.

In the limited space at my disposal I think I have shown that a dictatorship, no matter of what kind, is neither desirable for Germany nor capable of establishment in that country as it is constituted to-day. If such a phenomenon should make its appearance it would vanish extraordinarily quickly after having done untold harm.

The German mind and a dictatorship are mutually exclusive.

THE PROBLEM OF THE LEADER

ANATOLE DE MONZIE

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IT was the French Revolution which, in suppressing hereditary monarchy, raised the problem of the leader. The principle of the sovereignty of the people having been accepted, it remained to decide how and by whom the power of command should be exercised on behalf of this sovereign people. The chaos arising out of the events of the Revolution was almost entirely due to the rule of the division of power which our predecessors had learnt from Montesquieu, and which, whatever might be the demands of circumstances, they endeavoured to obey. Moreover, anxious lest the mutual independence of the three Government departments—the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial—which had formed Kant's famous political trinity should fail to be observed, the founders of modern democracy declined to face the difficulty of reaching any clear and practical conception of what should constitute the supreme power upon which the life of a popular commonwealth must depend.

During the last hundred and fifty years Bolshevism and Fascism have constituted the only two revolts on the part of the European mind against the tyranny of an illusive abstraction. But before that, though the rule was frequently broken, it was never denied; in the time of the Terror the extenuating circumstances of public safety were pleaded, while under the Empire military glory was made the excuse. I can find no attack on this principle of the division of power except in a proposal made by the phlegmatic Calbacérès

and in Marat's brutal speeches. Everybody else without exception confessed more or less frankly their faith in the doctrine that "assemblies legislate, the Government governs," whereas assemblies invariably try to exercise control instead of legislating, whilst Parliamentary Governments are always more inclined to initiate legislation than to put their authority into action.

Mr Woodrow Wilson, an illustrious democrat whose claim to the title was upheld by the most momentous events in the history of the world, drew up in 1890 a list of the errors and misconceptions which sheltered under cover of this venerable though mistaken idea of the division of power. But since 1890 events have proved even more severe than the verdict of Woodrow Wilson. For the number of dictatorships that have recently been established was really due to the splitting up of authority and its inability to proclaim its existence and regulate the conflict between the rival powers established by modern political rights.

Mirkine-Guetzevitch, in his survey of the eighteen new constitutions established in Europe since the War, has endeavoured in a synthetic essay to discern the common tendencies underlying these various dissimilar attempts. The conclusion he reaches is that their fundamental tendency is the *rationalization of power*, whereby the ideal of democracy—"the ideal of the legal State"—would gradually be realized in spite of the diversity of constitutional texts. But an examination of the texts of these post-War constitutions has, on the contrary, convinced me that the point that has not been brought out is the function that should be assigned to improvised action dictated by the exigencies of the moment, the emergency measures (*Notverordnungen*) of the German, Lett, and Czecho-Slovakian laws. The Polish Constitution of 1926, for instance, which allows the Diet and the Senate a certain limit of time after which the Executive becomes entitled to intervene to make good the failure of the Legislature, sheds a glaring light on the idea of expediting business, which was naturally overlooked by the first Republican legislators.

Concentration upon forms has been supplanted or

modified, as the case may be, by a regard for results. It is no longer sufficient to prevent abuse of power; its collapse must also be guarded against. The lesson of 1914 has corrected the antiquated doctrine of Montesquieu. Without actually denying the political philosophy of the eighteenth century and the succinct gospel we borrowed from it, the most recently established republics show an inclination to adapt our creed to the requirements of the crises which may eventually arise and may demand, as similar events in the past have done, a maximum of deeds for a minimum of discussion.

The proximity of the following two articles in the Turkish Constitution of April 30, 1924, is indeed significant. Article 86: the state of siege. Article 87: compulsory free elementary education. In his constructive foresight the Ghazi has associated force and science, the right to command and the rights of the people.

But neither Turkey, Italy, nor Spain could offer any clue to the discovery of a formula of universal application. In this domain it is the exception that is paramount. For ever since Machiavelli dictatorship has been and still remains the exception, since it is the exceptional man and exceptional events that are responsible for its establishment. There are no theoretical difficulties under the rule of expediency. Order is summed up in the order for the day.

But how can an office be indefinitely protracted which, being entirely dependent upon the nature of the leader, is essentially untransmissible? It is impossible for a dictatorship to be handed down from father to son; still less can it be bequeathed. Jacques Bainville suggests that the ministry of a Richelieu should be passed on to a Mazarin through the medium of the Crown. But the example of Mussolini shows that in the case of modern dictatorship the task of arranging for its continuance devolves entirely upon itself.

To judge from the efforts of Italy and the confessions of Spain—a by no means easy task!—*mutatis mutandis* this would amount to making the miracle an everyday phenomenon or the prodigy middle-class. In any case, the violent antithesis between accepted and systematic dictatorship and

democracy makes it impossible to regard the problem of rulership, with which all civilized nations are more or less seriously confronted, only from the point of view of the arbitrary simplifications which we find in practice at the present moment.

Nor would I accept the bastard solution of committees subjecting legislation to the referendum in default of sovereign assemblies. This merely amounts to queering the pitch for rulership by a method which can be compared only to the settlement of disputes by the plural vote based upon the holding of shares as laid down in the statutes of joint-stock companies. A conjuring trick for the benefit of an oligarchy of old party associates or of political friends! A caricature of the great committees which the urgency of the danger conjured into full power in 1793!

The people refuse to place their trust in these anonymous rulers whose activities do not extend beyond the settlement of current affairs. Except in heroic days a conclave of men produces nothing but compromise. And compromise between *pros* and *cons* means, as a rule, delay and evasion. Action proceeds from the individual, and not from a body of persons, however small or well chosen it may be.

In the domain of psychology revolutionaries have always been the most gifted of experts, doubtless because, being obliged to rely not on the automatic power of precedents, but on the brilliance or shrewdness of their propaganda, they have learned to know the worth of individual character and the value of personal initiative. And revolutionaries are not content with active minorities; they seek among these minorities for those who but yesterday they dubbed "men of trust."

These men of trust have nothing in common with professional demagogues—the mass-charmers. They are fighters rarely distinguished by any gift of eloquence, but rather by a special aptitude for a particular task. They are endowed with supreme power for the attainment of a special object and for a strictly limited duration of time. Dismissal spies upon them at the first sign of failure. But, as a matter of fact, the two careers in which reputations last

longest are those of an actor who has a leading part to play and a revolutionary who has a mission to fulfil. Tchitcherin, by the length of his tenure of office, defies all rivalry on the part of his *bourgeois* colleagues. But it would be a mistake to imagine that the system of delegating power to individuals is of recent or Bolshevik origin. The Bolsheviks owed a great deal to the French Revolution, the majority of them having made a more profound study of it during years of exile than the most learned of our own politicians.

They are well aware that the Montagnards, though they did not confess it, upheld the doctrine of "the one responsible man." Why did they not confess it? From false shame as Republicans, and in order not to lay themselves open to the criticism of their Girondist adversaries, who were the representatives of a crusty and suspicious legality, uncertain of everything and everybody.

The conflict between the Girondists and the Montagnards not only disturbed the history of the first French Revolution; it also disturbed the century that modelled itself on the pattern of that revolution. It is a symbol of the perpetual conflict between the abstract and the real, between the academic and the peremptory necessity for action, between framing regulations and coming to a decision. The Girondists occasionally gave way to the pressure of circumstances. It was Isnard, a Girondist, who, in March 1793, introduced the Bill for creating the Committee of Public Safety; it was Monsieur Poincaré, the heir of the Girondist tradition, who in 1924 demanded, and in 1926 obtained, the right to govern by means of legal decrees. But the Girondist apologizes for acting in haste. Haste constitutes a sin in his philosophic religion.

I have said that the existence of the Girondists and the Montagnards as parties was prolonged by the exigencies of the quarrel between them. But, better still, let us turn to the two survivors of the Montagne and the Gironde to be found in contemporary history—Georges Clemenceau and Raymond Poincaré—the one completely at home in the exercise of absolute though temporary power (the Montagnard), the other stealing away from the well-deserved

popularity his success has won him, and by every device dictated by modesty endeavouring to credit his own virtues to the account of the deliberative Assembly (the Girondist). Is the latter more of a Republican than the former? I leave that for the casuistry of the clubs to debate. For my own part I refuse to measure my most distinguished contemporaries. Suffice it that I have my preferences in the realm of history, and place Robespierre in a very different category from Roland.

But the fact remains that the only way of escaping the rule of one man is to accept the rule of many. Democracy being a collective undertaking conducted on co-operative lines must make the best of specialists in their own line.

What? objects the confirmed Girondist. Camouflaged Fascism! Piecemeal dictatorship! Is that all a Frenchman who is by way of veering to the Left has to suggest? An inevitable objection, to which Barère replied in the National Convention with words the prophetic value of which subsequent events have not reduced: "Fear of tyranny brings tyranny itself in its train. . . ."

Fear of tyranny! Fear of the victorious soldier! Fear of the successful financier! Our civic virtue battens on terror like a sick man on fever. Nevertheless it has been proved that tyranny never advances along the same paths. It has also been proved that a few weeks of successful opposition will overthrow the highest popularity; ingratitude, or perhaps merely oblivion, obviates all danger. And in the case of achievement in a circumscribed sphere there is no danger. For example, Marshal Lyautey, taking advantage of the full authority he had been given, carried out in the Protectorate of Morocco a stupendous achievement of civil genius, which in the eyes of posterity will rank as one of the miracles of French enterprise. Nevertheless, although certain eulogistic outbursts connected with his name may have been injudicious from the political point of view, Lyautey's success never for a single moment jeopardized the peaceful working of our regular institutions. The people are more prone to underestimate than to exaggerate the value of particular services rendered within the

confines of the scientific or territorial spheres allotted to the depositories of portions of their sovereign power. The Institut! A bust! These are the usual rewards. And even then it is necessary to beat the big drum of publicity! Those responsible for the stabilization of the currency in Germany, Belgium, and France were merely thanked for their efficiency in guiding the vessel into port; Monsieur Franqui left the deck without expecting or waiting for thanks. Nevertheless, the success of the work was due entirely to the liberty of action allowed to the qualified leaders in each of the countries concerned. The experience of France is perhaps the most conclusive. As long as the task of establishing sound conditions and of stabilizing the franc was confided to the care of a body of men—*nil*! But as soon as Monsieur Poincaré referred the matter to Monsieur Moreau, the Governor of the Bank of France—success!

Thus there comes a moment of sanity when, in spite of theoretic objections, the demand for a leader arises. So what is the good of being annoyed by the chatter preceding this demand for a leader? There is no alternative but, like a traveller duly informed, to resign oneself to all the delays and restrictions imposed by the slow train of democracy, since, after all, if the engine-driver speeds ahead and stokes up the engine the train will reach its destination without being too much behind scheduled time. "Everything will be all right," Alfred Capus, a Parisian humorist, once remarked, and he ended by being regarded as a statesman for having given utterance to this optimistic apophthegm. And indeed everything is all right, because, if occasion arises and too many mistakes have been piled up owing to excess of routine, extra help is enlisted and the situation is saved!

Against having recourse to this extra help at the seat of power all the logic of the democrat in me rises up in revolt. I cannot bring myself to admit that the rulership of the people should be confined to days when all goes well, only to be resigned when matters are going awry, that our lives should be subjected to these alternations of pride and ser-

vility, and that we should find ourselves incapable of making habitual use of practices to which it is really dangerous for us to have recourse on occasion only.

That there should be leaders both in the Red Army and the White is only natural. It is inevitable; it is impossible otherwise! And that the autonomous departments of the Civil Service should also have independent leaders at their head is no less natural and inevitable, no less in keeping with the demands of necessity.

But the people regard the attributes of a military leader very differently from the amenities enjoyed by a civilian leader. They do not understand that, in the hard sphere of industrial competition, circumstances and events that cannot possibly be foreseen make it just as necessary for the civilian as for the soldier to be able to change his plans. Our republican ideology stands in need of revision.

When its most redoubtable foe, Charles Maurras, some twenty years ago talked about the Merovingian chariot of democracy he gave utterance to a sentiment that I cannot help regarding as a sort of challenge. I hope the challenge will be accepted; and since the democratic system plumes itself on the fact that it is capable of attaining perfection, and since it bears within itself and in its capacity for constant development the possibility of continual progress, the challenge can and should be taken up.

Technical progress demands initiative on the part of the leaders. Conclusion: it behoves us to set these forces of initiative free, and in the first place, in order to produce leaders, to liberate their choice from the rigid rule of seniority. The principle of seniority supplies the *personnel* of cadres, but it does not necessarily produce picked men. While the man who can be entrusted with a great task must be selected without regard for the ordinary scheme of promotion, he ought at the same time to be deprived of the benefit of those regulations which protect the mass of workers; thus he should be subject to dismissal *ad nutum* for failure alone. But our democracy has had the folly to raise to the position of farmers-general, not to say actual possessors of their offices, the dullest and most docile of her

servants and those who have the longest record of service, and to create bureaucratic royalties, in favour of officials whom the exercise of years of patience and good behaviour has raised to the pinnacle of a hierarchy that has become a laughing-stock.

But is it not merely a question of domestic policy or ethics? No! In spite of the vogue for coquetting with particularism which has raged all over Europe, the laws of imitation still exercise their power. The Geneva Conferences secure a regular exchange of ideas, and are paving the way to the long-delayed standardization of conceptions of right and wrong. However rigorous the standards they may adopt in their ordinary domestic affairs, the representatives of the nations are conforming ever more and more to those rules of decent society in which it is considered good taste to avoid the scandal of going to law.

Furthermore, it is probable that the conditions of Government activity will tend to become more and more uniform, as has happened in the case of every other form of labour, if only for the sake of avoiding the handicap of disorder. Net cost influences production; in the near future it will influence the administration of affairs and the government of men. Already a change has taken place which can be explained only by this desire for economy. The campaign of ex-Chancellor Luther for administrative reform in Germany was inspired by a synthetic spirit of organization, which in America as well as in France is manifesting itself with unexpected clarity. The problem of the leader, or of the leaders, presents itself in a similar form almost everywhere, if not at the same moment at all events in the same guise, as soon as the democrats feel the spur of realism in their flanks.

Our obvious duty is to rouse a healthy impatience in men's hearts. Certainly not a mystic impatience—that is provided for elsewhere! It is a matter of putting *swift accomplishment* on a pedestal. At the present moment we do not say, or do not say sufficiently often: "We have accomplished in so many months what our neighbours or our competitors have been unable to accomplish in as many

years." As soon as such a spirit of emulation exists the promotion of desirable leaders will come of itself.

The leader will have the features of Keyserling's portrait of him—he will be the kind of guide who tears through stations, reaches the terminus before the others, and accomplishes his task with the minimum of expense in the minimum of time. As for negotiating the corners, we have nothing to learn from the future; we have our quiverful of ruses; the records of trickery are even richer than the records of science. Our civilization having reached a degree of material and moral complexity which can hardly be surpassed, it will succumb to the brute force of the simplicist masses unless it makes up its mind to employ simple taskmasters to direct the workshops of power. Masters or taskmasters? The dilemma is now confronting us.

LOVE AND DICTATORSHIP

MAURICE BEDEL

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THE highest test of power is for a dictator to be able to encroach upon the liberty of love. But is it possible for a dictator to put love in fetters?

Love itself behaves like a dictator—it is a case of dictator against dictator. Which of the two will win? Love aims at the exercise of power by one individual over another. We know that it is capable of any frenzy, any rage, of patience and waiting without end. It exploits all the resources of life; it scoffs at death. It breaks the chains of morality and the shackles of religion. It defies the dignity of man, and if it does not make him a conqueror it makes him a slave. In its eyes the end justifies the means—falsehood, trickery, violence, and murder. It builds up its power on anarchy; it commands, it conquers. The creature upon whom it swoops down is the prey of a spirit which turns everything within it topsy-turvy—it is deaf to reason, blind to evidence. The man who is in love obeys without a murmur the sentiment that exalts or abases him; he abandons himself to a guiding will from which he asks for no account. Does he improve under its influence, or deteriorate? He cares not a straw! He accepts the decrees of the master before he knows what they are. Love, the dictator, defies civilization and progress. The violent usurpation of power is its daily game. Once installed, it issues its fiats. It makes the rich man poor, the worker a sluggard, the general a subaltern. It makes Antony grovel at the feet of Cleopatra and Bonaparte play the suppliant to Josephine. It shatters thrones and flings a Queen of Saxony into the arms of a violinist. It makes a fool of genius and delivers over an Aristotle to a courtesan who puts

him in bit and bridle. It insists upon human sacrifice; hundreds of thousands of men have died for it—by the rope, the dagger, poison, drowning, and shooting. They were in the flower of their youth, walking gaily along life's way. Suddenly they met love; love laid down the law, and they obeyed and died. Thus, as they stood on the very threshold of life the Tristans, the Isoldes, the Romeos, and the Juliets entered the portals of death. Thus too, in this very year of grace, thousands and thousands of young men and girls—in Italy, Germany, France, Austria, and Japan; workers, shopkeepers, and princes; rich and poor; the beautiful and the homely alike—have perished. This international dictator has dominion over the whole world, whereby he becomes a menace to the dictators who hold but one country in subjection, as much by the personal risk he forces them to run as by the power he wields over those whom they would like to enslave.

A political party can be destroyed, a religious sect exterminated; they can be reached through their leaders and their works; their orators, their priests, and their devotees can be struck down. Parliaments can be suppressed and temples closed. But how can a sentiment, whose sphere of action is the heart of man, be touched, and what weapon can reach it? Nevertheless the attempt has been made, not in the guise of a crusade of the religious spirit against an impure element in human nature, but in the name of the very principle of authority, and for reasons of State.

We have seen Lenin declare the bankruptcy of this remnant of the *bourgeois* ideology, and, himself caught in the trap of a cynical ideology, reduce love to the mere act of mating. We have seen Mussolini, in the name of a sort of State Puritanism, persecute a sentiment that might divert his people from the Spartan ideal he has set before Italy. Thus we are presented with a twofold result of dictatorship—in Russia the almost entire suppression of lovers, in Italy their subordination to purposes of State; while in both countries the State has secured a grip on the child.

The Russian dictator gave instinct its head, the Italian dictator has put it in chains. We shall not waste time over

the action of the former, which, when all is said and done, was negative, but shall turn our attention to the positive attitude of the latter, seeking its causes, studying its methods, and noting its results.

Every dictator relies upon military power—whether represented by regular or irregular troops—upon armed fanaticism and the courage of a phalanx of citizens. He expects his troops to die for him and his ideas. He inflames them by his speeches and proclamations. The magic formulas of his rhetoric transform the cobbler, the grocer's assistant, and the student into heroes. Caught up in the vortex of his words, they abandon the bench, the scales, and the laboratory to race the streets brandishing arms. They sacrifice the peaceful routine of their work to the glorious risks of battle. They are filled with an intoxication which drives them to excesses entirely out of keeping with their natural tastes. Their mothers' tears, their future interests, the risk of death—nothing can stop them. They are delivered over to a power which directs them as it pleases, hurling them onward to a victory difficult to win and worthy of every sacrifice, even to the laying down of their own lives. The final aim is to possess something—a fragment of power and authority. To hold at their mercy beings who are trying to escape and who refuse to submit is the stake for which they are playing. And they pursue their aim with frenzy, forgetting meat and drink and burning with fever. Time enough for sleep when their opponents lie beneath the sod!

It is revolution!

A master has revealed himself, a leader has commanded, panic has seized hold of the town, and anarchy runs riot through the streets. It is upon this anarchy that he will build up his power. He will destroy the customs of the masses, the daily habits of every man. He too will make a fool of human dignity; if he does not make it a victor he will make it a slave. For him too the end justifies the means—falsehood, trickery, violence, and murder. Those of his followers who do not fall on the road will have a share in the booty; those who slink away will pay the price, for

he is stronger than they are since he is promising something new, and not defending something old. He will have youth on his side, for the young joyfully obey the man who leads them to victory over opposition.

But have we not seen all this fever, violence, and lust for possession in those who are under the heel of another dictator—love? And it is here that the incompatibility of these two forms of dictatorship becomes apparent; it is here that we touch the Achilles' heel of the anti-erotic policy of a Mussolini.

A man cannot serve two masters, and a leader like Mussolini finds a certain pleasure in regarding love as an adversary and treating it as such. They both dispute possession of the same empire—the heart of man; the leader for constructive ends productive of energy, love apparently for the creative purposes of life. But the latter's real aim is moral dislocation and physical disorder—the exact opposite of the ideals upheld by the former.

The Italian dictator lays down Hegel's formula as an axiom: *Non è uome chi è padre.* His speeches are full of it; it is placarded in the booksellers' shops. He makes it the basis of any favours he has to grant, reserving various public offices for the fathers of large families. He himself has set the example, and is still adding to his family.

In a country where the spirit of romance used to dominate affairs of the heart to an extraordinary degree, the birthplace of lovers whose names will live for ever, the country of Romeo and Juliet, where the very air one breathes seems to incline the heart to love, Hegel's formula has a hard, imperious ring that strikes a discordant note in the landscape. Before the advent of Fascism the Italian sought the laws that should guide him in affairs of the heart in the pages of a d'Annunzio rather than in those of the German philosopher. But the day for romance in life is done, and the time has come to pour cold water upon the passions, to encase the heart in triple steel and place it at the disposal of those who are carrying out the task of the moral regeneration of the country. Anything that tends to weaken it and distract it from the ends fixed by the leader is placed

beyond the pale of the law, prosecuted, and hounded down. In the service of the dictator the heart may beat only to one tune, the tune that moves it to worship the *man of destiny* and obey his orders without demur.

Love, in the light of an all-conquering passion, has no place in the Fascist State, which leaves it the right of practical expression only in giving birth to young citizens destined to swell the ranks of those who support the party. In a country where it is the aim of the Government to produce a surplus population things must be arranged as though men and women belonged to a State stud. The woman, kept out of office and deprived of political power, must remain at home to bring children into the world and suckle them. The man, prevented by his paternal responsibilities from entering upon romantic ventures, must reserve all his energies and powers of conquest for the State, the moral protector of his children, and personified in the dictator. This means the standardization of love. The example set by the chief must be followed in every rank of society. It is extremely simple, and is reduced to the elements supplied by Nature—the embrace, gestation, the child. This is the absolute minimum possible for this passion which is capable of such colossal complexity.

The reserves of vitality set free by this destruction of sentiment are centralized by the dictator; it is toward him and his work that the passionate impulses of a whole nation turn. Love is egocentric; it draws everything toward itself; it is exacting, greedy, and never satisfied with what it is given. But henceforward it will receive but little; the dictator will monopolize everything. And thus there will be so much energy saved and placed to the credit of the dictatorship. The armed force upon which the latter relies will gain courage thereby, and the spirit of sacrifice will be strengthened. The citizen, turned away from the adventurous paths of love, will acquire that moral austerity so dear to the heart of the great revolutionary. Willy-nilly he will become virtuous—of his own accord if he is a fanatic, by force through the methods we shall now proceed to examine.

The dictator in his conflict with love has not the weapons

of morality and religion at his disposal. He must rely perforce on the police.

The external manifestations of passion which dominate literature, music, the cinema, and the stage find great difficulty in getting a footing in places of amusement, and are categorically forbidden in the streets. The cinema, *par excellence* the popular form of entertainment, finds its doors closed to films dealing with the tender passions, however simple and silly. No kissing is shown on the screen; the censor sees to that! Kissing in the kindly darkness of the hall is also forbidden; the police and the militiamen see to that. The charming features of a Mary Pickford and the velvet eyes of a Valentino give way to the determined head of the leader. Away with romance; reality must now hold the boards! There are no more elopements on horseback or by car, no more moonlight meetings. But processions of troops are shown, football finals, the opening of motor-tracks, and the laying of foundation-stones. And always, strongly magnified and dominating the scene and giving it its symbolic value, there is the frowning face and stern features of the leader. He obtrudes himself everywhere, knowing what an obsession the screen can be; he has banished Douglas Fairbanks and taken his place. It is he who in future will fill the minds of the young girls of Rome who have not yet been entirely cured of sentiment.

With love thus banished from fiction, is it possible to discover it elsewhere than in the theatre and the cinema? No! Public gardens, the corners of deserted streets, and railway carriages are forbidden to lovers. A couple holding hands on a seat in the Pincio are fined. The young wife who, in a compartment of the *direttissimo* between Rome and Naples, allows her tired head to fall on her husband's shoulder is fined. Romeo tearing himself away from the arms of Juliet on the balcony of Verona is fined. Such spectacles are calculated to enervate the heart of the Fascist and divert him from his sole duty, which is to serve the leader. This policing of the streets, the public gardens, and the railways is carried out by the dictator's own troops. They are young men—some of them mere children—who

hound down love in this way. Are their hearts made of steel that their twenty summers do not spontaneously side with the lovers against the man who imposes upon his people the laws of a far from disinterested Puritanism?

They act as they do because they have been brought up in the dictator's school, where the disciples are moulded on the pattern of the master. In each one of them there is a dictator in the making. Such is the infection of example. They have been subjected to the discipline of the schools (the *balilla*), after which they have become *avanguardisti*. Their souls have been tempered and their hearts hardened by contact with Stoic principles, stern morality, and the inculcation of civic and military virtue. They have been taught to despise sentiment, that *bête noire* of Fascism, to regard it as a disgrace for that heart which is consecrated to the service of the country to show any sign of weakness. They have been led to exercise dictatorship over themselves, commanding their own instincts as a general commands his troops. Their severity toward others is a kind of proselytism. These young apostles are the pioneers of the new god. In levying the fine for a forbidden kiss they feel not that they are acting as police, but that they are fulfilling their mission.

Nevertheless the struggle between love and the dictatorship remains an unequal contest. Love has its mysteries, its wiles, its secret conspiracies, which no police force, no body of apostles, can frustrate. To reach its external manifestations when the field of battle is the street or the public garden is mere child's play. But in the bosom of the home and the darkness of the alcove, how can it be sought out and watched? As we have already seen, a couple are encouraged to perpetuate the species by means of large families; Malthusianism is combated by every possible means, and measures to procure abortion are condemned with the utmost severity. All birth-control propaganda is regarded as a direct attack upon the very existence of the State. The woman is taught to feel proud of being a mother many times over, whilst conception is surrounded with a mystic halo—the child being regarded as having

been begotten both by the father and by the State. This ancestry confers upon the child a certain sanctity; the leader will envelop him with lovingkindness and take him from his family as soon as he is old enough to dress himself.

The child of the State is handed over to the *balilla*, the national schools, where, by means of a suitable military training, he is taught the knowledge of his own power and of his creative energy, both being the offspring of the power and creative energy of the leader. There is no education better calculated to divert the child from sentimental preoccupations than that provided in the *balilla*, which form part of the general campaign against love. There the young citizen learns to surpass himself, while at the same time he adapts his own gifts to the Fascist hierarchy, and renders obedience to those who are his natural superiors, more highly gifted and stronger than he is, and in the end to the dictator himself.

And thus the spirit of romance is for ever banished from the moral equipment of the child. Torn from the tender arms of his mother, cut off from the anxious preoccupations of his family life, the young pupil in the *balilla* embarks upon the sea of life, rigged out to weather the storm and not to abandon himself to the enervating whispers of the Lake of Romance. It would be impossible to imagine a more perfect system of male education. The gifts and tendencies of each child are passed through the sieve and subjected to a scientific analysis. The result of these investigations determines his career. In every case it is the State that decides. One boy is to be a sailor, another an architect, an aviator, or an engineer. One will be a builder, another a soldier, and another a conqueror. But the State never says to the child, "Thou shalt dream dreams; a sensitive genius, with sorrow and much travail shalt thou bring forth works that will never die." It is not teachers of gymnastics and hygiene that fashion the heart, but life itself. But what an attack on sentiment is made by education in self-mastery, in implacable self-control! The State will be provided with soldiers, but the country will lose the shining lights of poetry and art.

And lo! the struggle has been begun. And for the time being the dictator seems to have gained the upper hand. Search the country he governs, nowhere will you find those great creations of the emotions by which the geniuses of love are made manifest. In the land of Dante no lyric breath is heard. The Petrarchs, the Manzonis, the Carduccis, are dumb. A d'Annunzio shuts himself up in a makeshift retreat. The seed of Italian letters is not on the point of bursting into flower; it is stifled in the space reserved for it on the third page of the newspapers. Neither the victorious war nor the regenerating revolution has found its bard. Even if they had, his voice would not have been raised very high. Lyric poetry requires a very different atmosphere from that of an idol's chapel in which to spread its wings. Who knows whether some poetic genius is not being suffocated because it cannot express itself in a country where the subjects of inspiration are limited to the exaltation of the *régime* and its chief? For the reasons given above, however, this is not likely. "Ah, knock at thine own heart, for there lies the genius," says the poet.

But let them knock at their own hearts—these young men who have been encouraged to harden them and make them tough as steel, shutting them against every appeal of love! What will come forth? A cry, a cheer! There is nothing there from which a long poem can draw its sustenance.

There is a whole romantic literature of love which cannot be destroyed without destroying with it the source of the folklore which is, as it were, the perfume of a nation's soul. A country in which love is held suspect and regarded as unpatriotic has lost one of the vital elements constituting the great whole which a man calls his native land. It is true to maintain that a country gains fresh energy through the death of sentiment and the strengthening of the warrior spirit. We know, especially since the last war, that the martial spirit and the needs of the heart are in conflict when a man's country is in danger. War means self-sacrifice in face of death; love means stretching out toward life. And one remembers how the courage of combatants was sapped

by home leaves, contact with family life, and the idylls of the rest camp.

But does the country's gain in this respect make up for the loss in other directions? The greatness of a nation depends far more upon the scientific, literary, and artistic genius of its children than upon their military talents. To turn only to modern times, a d'Annunzio or a Marconi is far greater than a Diaz or a Thaon di Revel. Who are the chosen spirits that will emerge from these *balilla* in which two million children receive an education most of which is supplied by officers?

The heart of a people cannot be dried up with impunity. There is no idea, no cause, however lofty or noble, that can feed the desire for love implanted in the breast of each one of us. The dictator shows that he is well aware of this when he diverts toward himself the spring of sentiment that flows naturally between one human being and another. In these rationalistic days he plays the part of idol, frequently exaggerating the *rôle* beyond his real wishes. He is the object of the acclamations, the adoration, and the prayers of the people. His portrait adorns the walls of every home; it is ubiquitous—in banks, in bakers', confectioners', and antique-dealers' shops; in public places, on the table of the scientist, in the halls of hotels. This man of destiny is enveloped in the incense of hero-worship. A unanimous Press pays him a daily tribute of adulation. Through the cinema and the photographs in the great weekly papers even the actions of his private life are made public. He knows that it is necessary for the masses to be given repeated proofs of his existence on earth. He appears on the balcony of his palace and speaks a few words that nobody can hear, but which are greeted with cheers. He is in evidence in any place where, by reminding people of what he has done, his personality shines with added lustre—in the building-yards of popular palaces in the making, the future temples of the new idol; on review grounds, where, with arms raised as though they were taking the oath of allegiance, his disciples and supporters, who are also his bodyguard, file past him. And on these occasions, when he is exposed to

the scrutiny of a thousand eyes, he assumes a masklike expression that reflects those characteristics of his personality that make him at once an object of love and of fear. It is a hard, determined, stormy mask; but when it is lighted up by a smile the crowd suddenly melts and hurls itself toward him in a frenzy of adoration.

But what will become of this need for love; toward whom and what will these hearts that have been diverted from their natural paths turn when the idol is no more? It is then that we shall know how ephemeral is the victory of man over love. Just as the storm that has been lulled for a while will not slumber for ever, so love, that elemental force, will never allow itself to be subdued for all time.

And then there will be an efflorescence of that sentiment which is the glory of instinct. On the seats of the shady gardens lovers will once more be seen in each other's arms, and in the pale rays of the moon we shall hear the sighs of souls overflowing with tenderness. Young girls who have been betrayed will defy the wires put up to frustrate their fell design, and throw themselves from the top of the Pincio terraces on to the hard pavement of the Viale del Muro Torto. Jealous lovers will stab their lucky rivals, and poets will recover their lost inspiration.

And then men will once more bow beneath the yoke of their real master—the God of Love!

DICTATORSHIP AND THE DICTATOR

ROBERT DE TRAZ

(Swiss writer belonging to one of the old families of Geneva. Editor of the "Revue de Genève," and an excellent critic and essayist. One of the early pioneers in the formation of the League of Nations.)

I OBJECT to dictatorship on the ground that it provides too facile a solution. In the silence of universal acquiescence, whether voluntary or forced, to make decisions single-handed, to follow one's own plan without listening to criticism, to believe in oneself for reasons of State, is too simple a method. The suppression of obstacles is not the same thing as their removal.

In a democracy a statesman has to win the support of multifarious and frequently contradictory bodies of opinion, to wage unremitting war upon backstairs intrigues, and to resist innumerable Press attacks in order to carry out his policy. Like the mariner, he is forced to rest upon the bosom of the waves and make use of the wind even when it is against him. Misunderstanding, incompetence, and jealousy conspire to ruin his work, and from his very impotence he has to draw the strength to accomplish it. He wears himself out to secure the smallest reform. And more often than not, at the most critical moment of his enterprise, he is overwhelmed with abuse and delivered up to the odium of a purblind people.

Such is the tragedy of the politician who is called upon to obey as well as to command, and to serve the State despite its citizens. With a dictatorship this tragedy vanishes. It is true that society is ruled better by a good tyrant than by an assembly, but it loses all sense of risk, love of ideas, respect for persons, and delight in contrasts. A dictatorship destroys heroism, and forces a whole people into a state of conformity devoid of real virtue. It gives the force of

law to an official orthodoxy, destroys the critical and even the creative spirit, makes a habit of hypocrisy, and degrades and fetters the soul of the people.

The only great feature of a dictatorship, as far as I can see, is the dictator himself and one or two of his most fanatical opponents, if any survive. His apparent enemies are bound together by a sympathy they dare not reveal and by similarity of outlook. For any man who opposes the master would doubtless like to be master himself, resembling the latter in his eagerness to oppose him, and filled with regret for having failed to forestall him. But how could he fail to bear a grudge against the man who, by seizing the reins of power, leaves him no alternative but to be a rebel or a coward? And does not the tyrant, for his part, envy the oppressed, who are prosecuted, thrown into prison, and despoiled of all they possess, but enjoy the unspeakable bliss of confronting all the powers of the State with the stubborn resistance of proud souls? Every dictator is a successful revolutionary, and his secret sorrow is that in the unsuccessful he envies the man he has ceased to be.

Does the man whom determination and a miraculous concatenation of circumstances have raised to the pinnacle of the State really enjoy his power as much as we imagine? A will that no longer meets with opposition loses its verve and all desire to renew its strength. The stakes have been played, the game won, and all that remains is to fall. About the dictator all men are liars or tongue-tied. It is impossible for him to tell whether their eyes are shining with devotion or the desire to please. He despises his fellow-men for their exaggerated adulation and dislikes them because they expect from him not goodness, but money and office, and he is well aware that, with a turn of Fortune's wheel, they will be ready to abandon and betray him.

In the isolation and silence of the heights the dictator suddenly feels strangely weak. And it is for this reason that he creates a companion for himself—the State, which he raises to the rank of a divinity. The exercise of personal power he calls obeisance to the idol which justifies all he does. And it is only in kneeling before it that he forgives

himself for having forced the multitude to prostrate themselves. The dictator of modern times dare not embark upon a purely personal venture—he has to make the nation his excuse. Glory, power, military victories, and social reforms he cannot call his own—he lays them at the foot of the altar. The tyrant of to-day does not plead that he is fulfilling his destiny, but that he is aiming at the happiness of all, and he frequently seeks popular sanction—that is to say, he denies himself.

The nation and the State, however, are abstractions. Men are lacking. The dictator himself has reduced them to silence, so how can he turn to them for support? While maintaining that his object is the aggrandizement of the country, he has reduced its inhabitants to nothingness. He must necessarily deny them the possession of the energy and gifts with which he himself is endowed. For if he were of opinion that some among them were as good as himself, by what right could he keep them beneath the yoke? And thus he is forced not to recognize himself in anybody. He becomes isolated, denying himself most of the Christian virtues, and even some of the lay virtues as well. He is against renunciation, fraternity, and clemency, as well as against equality and justice, and furthermore against stoicism and against irony, so that he has no language in common with either philosophers or humble folk, with poets or with women. It is true that he accomplishes a task, and that alone is a title to glory, for so many others are mere *dilettanti*. But could he not have accomplished this by other means at once more human and more difficult? And does not the empire he has founded or extended seem to him, in the very hour of his triumph, a desert peopled by phantoms?

PART II

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

FERDYNAND OSSENDOWSKI

(Polish writer, whose "Beasts, Men, and Gods" was widely read. A bitter enemy of the Bolsheviks, from whom he escaped when he was a member of Kolchak's anti-revolutionary Government.)

I

I KNOW the whole of Russia in all its vast expanse, and have made an exhaustive study of Russian conditions and of the soul of this sphinx among the nations. I have spent the greater part of my life among Russians, and made common cause with the champions of Russian freedom in the revolution of 1905, with the result that I was a political prisoner for two years. I know every class of the community in this gigantic country, from the Imperial family and the pseudo-monk Rasputin to the lowest dregs of society, with whom I came in contact during my tragic wanderings through the prisons of Siberia and on that island of the damned, Saghalien. I have with my own eyes witnessed the gradual swelling of the revolutionary wave and seen it raise the bloody communism of Russia aloft upon its crest. For a while I refrained from taking flight from its horrors. From being a silent spectator I soon became an active opponent, and finally observed the effects and influence of political communism in Asia, America, Africa, and Europe. I may therefore be permitted to claim that I know something about the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia.

Be this as it may, I admit that I have very seldom come across a sound, accurate, unadulterated, or unbiased criticism of this historical phenomenon, either in the Press or in the literature of Europe. One becomes quite confused by the contradictory opinions one reads concerning the state,

significance, and consequences of conditions in Russia, and the events which have completely transformed the social and political aspect of that country and exercised an important influence over the mind of Western European society.

When I read the pamphlets of authors friendly to the Soviet administration I meet with nothing but uninterrupted praise of the communism established strictly along the lines laid down by Lenin—an enthusiasm which is based upon utterly uncorroborated demagogic statements packed with misleading highfalutin nonsense.

These consist either of 'elaborations' prepared by the priests of the party, seated on the apex of the Red hierarchy —by "adulterers both in word and thought," as a well-known Russian writer has called them (and it should not be forgotten that all these excessively prolific publicists drown their readers in a flood of pamphlets, books, and articles describing current events)—or else of articles written by men whom the Soviet priesthood have bribed, and whom the pyrotechnic glory of the Bolshevik solution of social problems has blinded, or by simple, uncritical minds, staunch supporters of their party, who "know not what they do."

In their descriptions the Union of Socialist Republics in Russia soars to the altitude of a "social Paradise," although it has for a long time been quite obvious that Russian communism has nothing in common with socialism, but is, on the contrary, the flat negation of every socialistic principle. The American and, after them, the English socialists, in so far as they belong to the Anglo-Saxon race and are not of foreign blood, have already grasped this fact. The others—the Sovietophobes—on the other hand, depict this 'Paradise' in such dark and depressing colours that they completely obscure the scene in which this most tragic fairy-tale of human history is being enacted.

I am convinced that here as elsewhere the truth lies between the two extremes, and that the period that has already elapsed affords us ample scope for examining Bolshevism with a view to valuing it impartially and determining what are its negative aspects and in what depart-

ments of social life it has left positive traces that can never be effaced.

Certain historians maintain that there are many facts in the history of mankind which have faded away and vanished like a mirage, leaving not a trace behind.

I am in emphatic disagreement with this point of view. No fact of any importance to history vanishes without leaving a prolonged echo behind.

To give a few examples:

I would first beg to call to mind the rigorously severe policy of Egypt and Babylon toward the Israelites.

Mighty states have vanished, but the Jewish people, who have spread through all the countries of the world, have preserved their religion, their character, and their national organization unchanged since the days of their captivity in Egypt and in Babylon.

The echo of the secret bloody cult of the Phœnician goddess Isis-Astarte seems to all intents and purposes to have died away altogether; nevertheless, in Algeria and among the negroes of Central Africa there is to this day a reverberation of something which, from time to time, ghastly though it may seem to our eyes, is yet consistent with the logic of history and repeats the full horror of the original celebrations.

The close proximity between the Knights Templars and the Saracens in Palestine led to the defenders of the Holy Sepulchre favouring Gnostic doctrines and allying themselves with the Albigenses, with the result that King Philip le Bel disbanded the order in the fourteenth century, and with the approval of Pope Clement V burned the Grand Master, Jacques de Molay, at the stake.

Everything seemed to be at an end and forgotten.

But a few hundred years later the Illuminati and the Jacobins appeared as the heirs and avengers of the Knights Templars, and 'Spartacus' Weishaupt played an important part, if only behind the scenes, at the outbreak of the French Revolution. Now investigators are seeking for some connexion between these 'Illuminati' and the various orders of modern freemasonry. But Lenin actually

succeeded in exhuming from the ruins of history descendants both moral and spiritual of Adam Weishaupt, "the inventor of the world-revolution." And it was the German Spartacists who, under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, hurled the incendiary torch of a revolutionary conflagration at Berlin in the year 1919.

I have cited examples buried deep beneath the dust of oblivion. But it would be easy to quote such examples as the Crusades, the struggles of the Reformation, and the promulgation of the dazzling slogan "*Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*," which in their political consequences are identical.

And that is why the dictatorship of the proletariat on the lines of Lenin's programme must undoubtedly leave ineffaceable traces behind it. And when the last surviving member of the Communist Party is dead, although today he may still be a *Komsomolec*, or pupil of the Bolshevk schools, the bloody seed of the Soviets will bring forth its luxuriant harvest, which is just as much a necessity for the peasant masses as for the physical and spiritual workers and the capitalist *bourgeoisie*.

The abuses of the old superannuated beliefs and the abuses of Leninism will, like a ring of beaters in a tiger-hunt, link up together in one unbreakable chain, and their glorious prey will be *Truth*.

II

Many historians and sociologists regard communism as essentially characteristic of modern man, and some among them are at pains to prove that there are traces of it in the mental attitude of modern society. The French revolutions created several varieties of communism which were fundamentally different from Russian communism. But while it is true they were unlike in their origin, these differences were mainly due to the fact that the French communists were realists who studied practical possibilities little likely to end in the hazy ramifications of a world-revolution.

The Russian Revolution, however, concerned itself from

the very beginning with the fate of the world, incidentally a Russian peculiarity, accentuated by such Russian revolutionaries as Bakunin, Herzen, Peter Kropotkin, and Lenin.

One of my American friends, the well-known advocate Hiram Barney, once declared that if, instead of Lenin, Trotski or Zinoviev had been at the head of Russian communism Soviet policy would never have gone beyond the frontiers of Russia. It was only Lenin and Tchitcherin, with their Russian *psyche* and their capacity for indulging in paradoxical dreams, who made the Russian upheaval one of world-wide significance.

One more remark before we proceed: in the whole of the civilized world, from time immemorial, a clamour has always been raised at times of social unrest for State ownership of industry, land, and the wealth of the land. And many a writer, fondly imagining these ends to have been gained, has woven dreams of a paradise on earth.

Apparently this is the outcome of certain atavistic tendencies to communism, which in the dim past must for a considerable length of time have been the established order of society. Nowhere, at all events, were the remains of the communistic scheme of life more easily to be found than in Russia, where, only a year or two before the outbreak of the Revolution, Peter Stolypin, the President of the Ministerial Council, engaged in a struggle with the communists, which ended in his death by the bullet of an assassin.

Nor is there anything astonishing in the fact that here too the communistic bias was deeply rooted in the souls of the people and survived for centuries. There is no need to go back to prehistoric times; it is only necessary to point to the thirteenth century, when the system of Jenghiz Khan spread Mongolian communism throughout the whole of Russian territory.

After the disastrous battle on the Kalka in 1224 the principalities constituting the Russia of that day fell beneath the yoke of the Mongolian (Tartar) Khan, and were obliged to submit to the law of the steppes promulgated by Jenghiz and his descendants.

This law laid down that all the land belonged to the

State, or to those chosen by the State to hold it. The people were expected to till and farm the soil on a communal basis, sharing the fruits of the harvest after a tithe had been paid to the State or the ground landlord. And this system, with but slight modifications, lasted for centuries, surviving the downfall of the Mongol dynasty, and still prevailed under Nicholas II and his Minister Stolypin.

The fact that Russian people had long been familiar with communism can alone explain their dislike and mistrust of the government of Moscow and St Petersburg, both in the days of the White Czars and at the present juncture under the Reds, as well as their suspicion when confronted by Alexander II's manifesto putting an end to serfdom in Russia. It also accounts for the innumerable peasant insurrections which, for the most varied reasons, were constantly convulsing the empire of the Romanovs, and are even now a perpetual menace to the Red authorities in the Kremlin. Only thus could the Russian masses keep alive their hatred of the intellectuals who, as believers in anti-communistic values, had cut themselves adrift from the hopes and aspirations of the people. This, and this alone, was the real cause of the violent outbreak of the communistic proletarian revolution, when Lenin, the brave and cynical demagogue, thundered forth the slogan, "Down with war! The land to the peasants, and the means of production to the workers!"

I can well remember the profoundly sympathetic attention vouchsafed to the speeches of communist agitators during the first and second revolutions (of the Duma and of Kerenski) by members of highly intellectual circles in Leningrad who were exhausted by the War and the uncertainty of the times.

When they came to their senses it was too late; blood had already been shed in the streets of the towns and in the dungeons of the Cherezwychajka (the Cheka), chiefly at the instigation of the demagogues anxious to gratify the wild barbaric instincts of the untutored masses.

Quite by accident I even happened to be a witness of innumerable instances when the whole populace gave

expression to a sinister joy over the revolution. Even reactionaries and conservatives were longing for it—men like the contributors to the *Novoe Vremja* (*The New Age*), Menzikov, Burenin, and Engelhardt, who could not possibly be suspected of pro-Bolshevik sympathies.

I remember being astounded by something Engelhardt said to the effect that this was not a genuine Russian revolution:

> There is still too little bloodshed, much too little bloodshed. Only when they begin killing people in the open street and throwing them into the river will the true spirit of the Russian Revolution be manifested, the spirit of indignation.

I do not know whether Engelhardt and Burenin lived through this phase of the revolution, but I do know that Menzikov was killed in the open street and torn to bits.

The fact that the revolution would be bloody and devastating was foreseen by Bakunin, Herzen, Solovev, and many other Russian thinkers, whose idealism led them to exalt the Russian people to the heights of an inspired martyrdom, as Tolstoi and other poets of the nineteenth century had done.

But these vaticinations are no proof of the clearsightedness of those who made them, for one need only turn over the gloomy pages of Russian history to realize the naked truth, that in Russia almost everything has sprung from blood.

Ivan the Terrible covered his realm with stakes and gallows, and choked every form of freedom and greatness under the Boyars. Michael, the first of the Romanovs, rose from the bloody fumes of a civil war to ascend with bloodstained soles a throne which the last Czar of the dynasty, Nicholas II, lost in the October revolution.

Peter I watered the road to European culture with blood, and then proceeded to introduce it with the help of the knout, the gallows, and chains.

The bloody insurrection of Stenka Razin in the second half of the seventeenth century, the equally ghastly rising of the Cossacks under Pugachev's leadership, the days of Catherine, Elizabeth, Paul, Alexander I, and Nicholas I,

and so on until the reign of Nicholas II, constitute an unbroken chain of bloody revolutionary acts, and no less bloody efforts to suppress them.

The reign of Alexander III was the only period which was perhaps less turbulent, for he alone of the whole Romanov dynasty possessed the qualities indispensable for an autocrat—courage and will-power—in which respect he bears a spiritual resemblance to Lenin. And we may well ask ourselves whether this does not account for the fact that the colossal powerful statue, like a great mass of rock, of this Czar, who was an object of peculiar hatred to the revolutionaries he subdued, has survived the Bolshevik storm, and is still left standing, like a *memento mori*, in the square in front of the Nikolai railway station in Leningrad.

In my opinion the most striking example of the bloodlust which overtakes the Russian people in its insurrections is a proclamation of the year 1862, now almost forgotten, made by the "Young Russia" Party, from the terms of which even such convinced revolutionaries as Bakunin, Chernychevski, Herzen, and others turned away in horror.

Pokrovski, the Russian Soviet historian, has written a good deal about the author of this proclamation, the revolutionary Zajetchnevski, and actually regards it as an act of prophecy and as the first manifesto of Bolshevism.

In this proclamation we read:

> Russia is entering the revolutionary period of her existence. Examine the life of the nation in all the different classes, and you will see that society now falls into two diametrically opposite halves, facing each other to-day like enemies in the field. On one side are the lower orders, the party oppressed and proscribed by all—the People. On the other, standing high above the former, is a small group of contented and happy people. To this group belong the landowners, who either in their own persons or in those of their ancestors possess property given as a reward for some service they rendered as serfs—the descendants of former favourites of the Czarinas, generously provided for at the time of their retirement, business men who accumulated fortunes by means of trickery and theft, or officials whose prosperity was won by means of peculation—in short, all well-to-do people, who own property either through inheritance or as the result of their own

efforts. At the head of this group stands the Czar. The one cannot exist without the other. At the present time this party is affecting liberalism, as it is disgruntled at having been deprived of its right to employ unpaid peasant labour. It inveighs against the Czar, and demands a constitution. But do not be afraid of these people. They and the Czar are indissolubly bound together, and the link that joins them is property. The party of property-owners knows quite well that all popular revolutionary movements are directed against property, and that is why the moment any insurrection threatens they will rally round their natural representative, the Czar. They are the Czarist party.

From every point of view the present social system is false and insensate to the core, from its religion, to begin with, which commands belief in something that does not exist—God, the figment of a fevered brain; from the family, the social cell, which in none of its fundamentals can survive criticism, however superficial; from the lawfulness of trade, which is organized roguery; from the recognition by all as quite reasonable of a state of affairs in which the workers are thralls toiling for the benefit of the capitalist; down to woman, herself, who has been robbed of all political rights and placed on a level with the animals.

There is only one way out of this oppressive and appalling situation, which is throttling the men of to-day and stimulating their best powers only for fighting, and that is revolution; bloody, relentless revolution; revolution which will change the whole foundation of modern society, sparing nothing, and will exterminate all the supporters of the present state of affairs.

We do not dread this revolution, although we know that rivers of blood will flow, and that perhaps many innocent victims will be sacrificed. We see all this ahead, but we hail its advent notwithstanding. Every one of us is ready to sacrifice his own head, if only it will help to secure the end we have desired for such ages past.

Then, turning to address the adherents of the Czar, the author of the proclamation utters the following warning:

We merely warn you members of the Czarist party, and show you what is going to happen. But we shall say nothing about the chiefs round whom you rally—the Romanovs. For with them we shall settle accounts very differently. They will pay with their own hearts' blood for the misery of the people, for their despotism, and for their lack of understanding regarding the needs

of the age. As an expiatory sacrifice all the Romanovs will lose their heads. That is why we are only too pleased to see an increase in banishments and executions. Go on provoking the masses, stoke the furnace of the people's wrath, make the revolutionary party stand in constant fear of their lives; but remember that in so doing you are drawing the revolution nearer, and that vengeance will be all the sweeter the heavier your hand is now!

We have made a profound study of the history of Western civilization, and our investigations have not been without profit to ourselves. We shall be more consistent and determined than the wretched revolutionaries of 1848, more inexorable even than the great Terrorists of 1792; we shall recoil at nothing, not even if we are convinced that in order to overthrow the present system a torrent of blood threefold deeper than that shed by the Jacobins will have to flow.

The manifesto proclaims the dissolution of the existing system in Russia, and its replacement by a republican-federative union of the whole country, which was to be divided into agricultural communities. Each piece of land allotted to a member of the community was to remain in his hands for use only during a limited period of time, after which it was to be returned to the community for redistribution. The nationalization of factories and shops, as also the social education of children, are then discussed in great detail.

The proclamation insists that all the provinces of the Empire should be given the opportunity of deciding by vote whether they wished to join the republican-federative state of Russia, and the author points out that the federation of the whole country would be no easy matter, and with a prophetic eye plainly foresees *that the period of dictatorship and of centralized rule by a revolutionary Government could not fail to be of long duration.*

We are wholeheartedly convinced that the revolutionary party, which, if the movement succeeds, will be at the head of the Government, will have to retain the existing centralized political control of the country, though not the centralized administrative offices, in order, with the help of the former, to introduce other fundamental political and social changes in the shortest possible

space of time. *It will have to take the dictatorship into its own hands and stick at nothing.*

Further we read in this "Young Russia" proclamation:

> We demand the abolition of marriage, as being a most immoral practice, which has become impossible with the complete equality of the sexes. And for the same reason we demand the abolition of the family, because it hinders the development of mankind and because human evolution is impossible unless inheritance is done away with. We also demand the suppression, root and branch, of those headquarters of vice, the convents and monasteries, to which vagabonds, parasites, and loafers from all corners of the realm flock in order to spend their lives in greed and lechery.

And yet again we read in the "Young Russia" proclamation:

> *There will be no universal suffrage for the election of members of Parliament in emancipated Russia*, so that there can be no chance of the return of any adherents of the *ancien régime*. The French National Assembly of 1848 proved clearly enough that owing to the non-interference of the revolutionary Government in the election the revolution was overthrown, as Louis Napoleon was elected Emperor.

The revolutionary committee, in whose name this proclamation was published, added, moreover, that it relied for its success on the peasantry, especially the Orthodox and members of the army, and above all on the youth of the nation, who were exhorted to hold themselves in readiness for revolt.

> The day is about to dawn when we shall unfurl the great banner of the future, the red banner, and with a loud shout of "Long live the social-democratic Russian Republic!" we shall march to the Winter Palace to put its inmates to death. Possibly our cause can be won only through the extirpation of the Imperial family and the death of a few hundred people; but it may also be—and this latter alternative is the more probable—that the whole of the Czarist party will stand before the Emperor as one man to defend him, and then everything will turn on whether the Czarist party survives or not.
>
> If they should, then with complete self-assurance and confident

in our strength and in the people's sympathy with our Cause, and above all in the glorious future of Russia, *whose mission is to be the first to realize the great Cause of Socialism*, we shall raise the unanimous cry "Out with the axes!" And we shall hew the Czarist party down—hew them down without mercy, just as they had no mercy for us. Hew them down in the streets and public squares, if the low rabble dare to show their faces there; hew them down in their homes, hew them down in the narrow alleys of the provinces, hew them down in the broad thoroughfares of the great cities, and hew them down in the country and the villages!

Remember that he who is not with us is against us, but he who is against us is our enemy, and one should exterminate one's enemies by every means in one's power.

Such is the tone and such are the principles of the "first Bolshevik document," which was published at a time when no one had yet heard of communism, Leninism, and Bolshevism.

Regarded from this standpoint, it is indeed a prophetic document, for the leaders of the revolution of October 1917, fifty-five years after its publication, adopted its principles almost without modification.

But whereas during the interval great spiritual progress was made among the peoples of Western Europe, everything in Russia remained at a standstill, even the views and methods of the Russian revolutionaries.

III

History proves that in countries with solid and unchanging traditions revolutions do not last or sink very deep. In England, for instance, which is *par excellence* based on traditions, a revolution aiming at changing the social and political system from top to toe is impossible. And the same applies to Germany, as the Spartacist insurrection has shown.

France, where there have been many revolutions, one after the other, has always returned very quickly to the old channels of social life, which are hedged in by the right of

property on the one hand, and the respect for civil rights on the other.

This is due to the fact that in all ranks of society a crisis always stimulates the people to defend tradition. The reasons for this defence of tradition are various—the object is always the same.

The power of tradition, and the understanding that some links with the past are necessary—a past built up by men who have frequently been distinguished and have sacrificed body and soul for their native land—was proved with extraordinary force in Hungary, when, at the time of Bela Kun's revolution, the country saw itself threatened with ruin. The people's thoughts turned in a flash, as it were, to the one task of restoring the monarchy.

Young Poland, exhausted and devastated, its land impoverished by the War, was able, owing to the stimulus of tradition, to fight the Red Army. In Poland, as in other countries, a large proportion of the population joyfully acclaimed the advent of Bolshevism, with its ideology of absolute freedom. But when it came to fighting the poison disseminated by the communists the political and religious traditions made common cause. The former, the result of long years of hostility toward the Russian oppressor, called forth a storm of indignation when in 1920 Russia, with banners flying, advanced against Poland, spreading arson and murder right and left. It even carried away the socialists, who manfully defended their native land; while the Church, whose roots lay deep in the soul of the people, feeling itself menaced by the anti-religious reforms of the Russian communists, induced all classes of society to take up arms.

I think these examples will suffice to prove my claim that tradition affords a solid safeguard and protection against revolutionary upheavals.

And yet Russia . . .

The Russian people have no traditions capable of welding them together, not even the apparently universal tradition known as 'patriotism.' Indeed, the Soviets fought a determined campaign against this psychological 'national'

tradition, for they believed that this was one way of suppressing the counter-revolutionary movement, and of consolidating the ideas of the International.

The insurrections against recruiting during the War, the wholesale desertions from the front line, the cases of treachery and misconduct at a time when the country was in the throes of an armed struggle for existence, the loathing of the War on the part of the peasants, who constitute 80 per cent. of the population of this gigantic country, and the truculent 'local patriotism,' which was frequently limited to a small portion of a given community, are all examples of this.

Ever since the time of Peter the Great Russia has been divided into two radically different and hostile camps—the governing classes, supported by the landlords and capitalists, and the various strata of the masses.

The Greek Church was unable to play the part of either the Catholic or the Protestant Churches, both of which have always fought for their independence and become ever more and more militant, with spiritual and moral freedom as their ideological bases.

The Greek Church, on the other hand, ever since the days of Peter the Great, who seized the reins of both temporal and spiritual power, has become more and more a servant of the Government. In this way it lost its hold upon the people, and roused the hostility of the intellectual classes, who were only too well aware that the Greek Orthodox Church had not been capable of producing either a Gregory VII, a Richelieu, a Bossuet, a Fénelon, a Skarga, a Newman, or a Robertson. Indeed, these same classes remembered only the *agents provocateurs* and instruments of the Government—such as the priest Gapon ; the sullen and vindictive bishops, Makarius, Pitirim, and Hermogen ; and finally the magician and monk, Rasputin, who had sprung from its ranks.

The lethargy of the Greek Orthodox Church during periods of revolution is astounding. Even the most cultivated members of the clergy could not be induced to adopt a courageous attitude.

Never shall I forget a conversation I had with Ornacky, the famous preacher, and Prebendary of the Cathedral of Our Beloved Lady of Kazan, in Leningrad. Before the Revolution I heard him preach against the sectarians, and when, later on, in February 1918, I asked him for his views about the Bolsheviks, who had already snatched the reins of power in the capital, he replied: "I do not intend to oppose the Soviets, for it is written in Holy Scripture, "All power is of God." '

Tichon, the Patriarch of Moscow, was perhaps the only cleric to protest against the persecution of the Church in Soviet Russia, and even his opposition met with no response or support from the great mass of the people.

Apart from the governing classes and the well-to-do *intelligentzia*, there was no one who loved Russia and thought of her future, for everybody was exclusively concerned about class interests.

And as for the Russian people themselves . . .

The Russian author Chaadaev, in his *Philosophic Letters*, traces the troubles of Russia not to its form of government, but to the state of its civilization. He writes:

> In Western Europe the ideas of duty, justice, law, and order are evolved from the facts of existence, and are a necessary foundation to society. This is the atmosphere of Western Europe, and it makes European philosophy something very much more than history or psychology. What can take the place of all this in our country?

Russia possesses nothing but the colossal sensual strength of its people, illumined by no ray of the spirit—barbarity which conceals nothing either inspired or apocalyptic.

The autocracy of the Czar stood out like a dam against this brute force and that of Bolshevism, the liberator of an element devoid of the wings of the spirit, lacking any regulator, such as will.

Many writers have already endeavoured to demonstrate the barbarous character of the Russian people, by pointing to the lack of well-defined aspirations among the masses, the vagueness of their ideology, the haughty, arbitrary, and

irrational nature of the Government, the cringing servility of the masses, their foolish imitative instincts, their family life, their unaccountable and monstrous thirst for revolutions, their cruelty, and their taste for æsthetics and sectarianism.

Barbarians know of no restraint except force and the ban of fear. And when they no longer feel this restraint they wield their axes with savage fury, without stopping to think whether their actions do harm or good. They feel they must strike down something—and their axes fall, because they have neither the knowledge nor the will-power to stay their uplifted arm.

The Government of St Petersburg, which dammed up this inexhaustible strength of the Russian people, nevertheless imprudently fostered their lust for destruction by endeavouring to vent the surplus stored-up energy of the masses in other directions.

This led to wars, such as the war in the Caucasus, in the Asiatic provinces of Russia, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. Thus the barbaric strength of the people was directed against the enemies of the Government, against Orthodox and sectarians alike, against the Jews, the Poles, the Tartars, the Chinese (in 1900 three thousand Chinese, with their wives and children, were thrown into the water and drowned at Blagovyeschensk, on the Amur), and even against the Liberal intellectuals, the students, the officials of the Imperial Duma (the assassination of Herzenstein and Jollos), the doctors, and the schoolmasters.

The revolutionaries, for their part, directed the crude blind force against members of the Government and officials, against Popes, landowners, manufacturers, and skilled artisans, who were branded as "the servants of Capital."

Thus the tendency to express the elementary force in an illicit manner was fed in a variety of different ways, and it was decked out with the most gorgeous and attractive euphemisms.

At last the tragic moment drew near, the thunder growled in the remotest corners of the vast empire, and the people were roused. Arms were thrust into the hands of these

barbarians, and they were flung into the vortex of the World War.

Had the War ended in prompt victory the old state of affairs would have endured for yet a while longer—until such time as the accumulators of the people's pent-up energy had become overcharged. But the War dragged on interminably, and the authorities were obliged to reinforce the Army with hundreds of thousands of avowed revolutionaries, who were only too glad to hide themselves in the grey and gloomy ranks of the combatants. Events at the Front turned out unfavourable to the Government; there were threats of catastrophes in the firing-line, and when they actually occurred they led to catastrophes at home. Plague, pestilence, and famine and the lack of indispensable commodities, the failure of harvests, and economic crises caused by shortage of labour led to general disillusionment, disgust, weariness, and exhaustion.

At this juncture Lenin and his confederates appeared upon the scene with the manifesto filched from the authors of the "Young Russia" proclamation of 1862. This proclamation was not only eminently adapted to the circumstances, but it was also given certain additional finishing touches, which promised the millions of disillusioned barbarians reforms they could more readily understand.

The hour of the Bolshevik revolution, of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the moment for the establishment of the "Union of Socialistic Soviet Federative Republics," was at hand!

The Government of Nicholas II, in which Rasputin, the debauchee monk and erstwhile horse-thief, played the part of dictator; the attitude of the Duma, which robbed the Czar, in whom all the opposing forces were centred, of his throne; Kerenski's famous Army Order No. 1, directed against the State; and the miserable economic and moral condition of Russia—all these elements combined to create an environment eminently favourable to the formation of a "new Russia," under the sceptre of a demagogue theatrically disguised in the cloak of a "dictatorship of the proletariat."

IV

Lenin, this demagogue of genius and born dictator, knew the Russian people much better than the Imperial Government had done, better even than the leaders of the revolutionary party of the Narodniki, or than the Socialist-Mensheviks, the professors and writers. He knew perfectly well the kind of new world in which he must begin his work.

A new world? . . .

Lenin turned his attention to the peasants and workers. The former composed 80 per cent. of the entire population and of the Army, which was fighting on the various fronts in the World War.

Lenin's power seemed a mystery to everyone—it was almost mystic. He alone knew its secret.

He saw that this vast mass of people possessed no coherence, no exalted ideals, their one thought being to do the least possible amount of work and to eat the greatest possible amount of food.

Lenin also knew that even the best of harvests did not lead to any rise in the standard of living among the peasants. The richest peasant used wooden spoons and ate from a common tureen with his family and labourers. He seldom washed, was satisfied with home produce, and had no thought for the education of his children except under pressure from the police. Moreover, he felt no desire whatever for spiritual sustenance, and was full of superstition and utterly inexplicable longings.

Obviously the reforms offered by a demagogue to such a man must surpass anything that even Stenka Razin, the daring highwayman and leader of a rising in the seventeenth century, had openly dared to suggest. And Stenka Razin had maintained that he was a loyal subject of the Czar. There was yet another incident in the history of his country that Lenin bore in mind, the occasion when Bolotnikov, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, under the rule of the Czar Vasily Šujski, thundered forth the slogan "The land of the Boyars for the peasants!" thus setting the minds

VLADIMIR ILITCH LENIN

of thinking men in Russia in a ferment, which rapidly spread throughout the country.

Lenin, who was a demagogue of daring, did not hesitate to repeat both Bolotnikov's cry and that of the authors of the famous proclamation of "Young Russia." He issued a proclamation declaring the War at an end, and on his own authority gave the peasant masses permission "to seize what had been stolen from them"—that is to say, to lay violent hands on the estates, forests, and goods and chattels of the landlords.

Swarms of armed peasants proceeded to leave the Army and hurried home with their rifles and bayonets, often conveying machine-guns, hand-grenades, and even light field-guns back with them.

It was a diabolically clever move on Lenin's part, though it gave rise to considerable perturbation in the minds of his immediate supporters. But he knew only too well that the gloomy, disorganized mass of peasants, devoid of any intellectual support, would lose all courage at the smallest sign of determined resistance on the part of the landowners and the *intelligentzia*, and would shrink from proceeding to violence and rapine. Lenin's object was straightway to fill the numerically most powerful class of Russian society with joy by giving them a glorious gift which had been the object of their dreams and aspirations for centuries, and thus lure this powerful section of the population unreservedly over to his side. But before this could be done the peasants had to be supplied with arms and leaders. And it was the soldiers returning from the Front, and hardened to war, who became the leaders of the peasant revolution, and supplied the masses with all that was required in the way of weapons.

It took little more than a fortnight for Russia to be overrun by large and small detachments of the "Green Army," as the peasant forces were called. The blood of landlords, nobles, and landowning intellectuals flowed in torrents. The rich proprietors of vast acres and the owners of small estates, no larger than a peasant's holding, died the same death; their property was taken from them, their cattle slaughtered or

driven away, and their seigniorial manors, with all their "superfluous baubles"—libraries, picture galleries, statuary, and electrical apparatus—were burned to the ground.

Lenin knew that it was imperative to destroy the Czarist party root and branch. And he was certain of success; for he knew his people, and staked on the deep-rooted cruelty of the Russian peasants when once their elemental, barbaric lust for destruction was let loose, and they were certain of not being punished.

As I do not wish to be accused of slandering the Russian people, I will give a few facts taken from *Lenin and the Russian Peasant*, a book written by that ardent friend and bard of Bolshevism, the famous Russian author, Maxim Gorki.

He tells us that in the years 1918 and 1919 the peasants of the Don and Ural districts forced dynamite charges into the rectums of their enemies and then blew their unfortunate victims to atoms. Men were buried alive head downward in the ground, and the executioners watched their writhings until they died. The Cossacks of Baikal used their prisoners as dummies for instructing boys in the use of the sword. In the district of Tambow a large number of people were crucified by having their left arm and left leg nailed to a tree, and the crowd watched the agonies of the martyrs subjected to this strange form of crucifixion. In some places the bellies of the victims were opened, and one end of their bowels was nailed to a tree or a telegraph-post; they were then beaten or stoned to make them run, while the spectators roared with delight at the sight of the intestines being gradually unwound.

Is there any need for me to give further horrible details from Maxim Gorki's book, or to add my own experiences between October 1917 and July 1918 throughout the length and breadth of that gigantic raging monster of a country—Russia?

For the Western European I am afraid my descriptions would be too horrible, sinister, and nauseating. And even Gorki, wild and uncontrolled Russian though he is, probably felt this too, and that is why, with the hypocritical calm of

the poet, he endeavours to ascribe the cruelty of his race to the influence of alcohol and the reading of a certain book, very popular among the peasants, describing the tortures suffered by the holy martyrs. I myself, however, am of opinion that this cruelty is due to the Mongolian blood in the Russian, whom a good many Russian scholars do not regard as a Slav at all.

When once their lust for destruction had been let loose Lenin had no reason to fear that the Russian people would stop at half-measures. He knew that they would murder anyone whom the agitators chose to point out, and that they would destroy everything, for destruction is in their very bones.

The Russian fights with a lofty courage and a supreme contempt for his own life, for he sets but little store by his dark, dreary, and wretched existence, more particularly as he knows that every man killed makes life 'easier' for the survivors.

The above-mentioned book by Gorki, which, vivid though it is, is unfortunately but little known, gives the following account of the opinion of a Bolshevik officer, hailing from the peasant class, regarding the spirit of destruction :

> Civil war—nonsense! Let me say it quite frankly—it is easy to wage war in Russia. There are crowds of us, and we live a wretched life. Burn a village down?—what matter? Would it not be burned down some day or other in the ordinary course of events?

Lenin had picked out all the psychological trump cards in advance, when he exhorted the peasants to pillage and murder. And he quickly reached his goal. The land was ravaged, and the supporters of the old system, the land-owners, were either murdered and ruined or were obliged to flee abroad, condemned to the terrible fate of homeless refugees.

The next blow to be delivered was against the faithful ally of the Czars, the Church.

Gorki tries to prove that the attitude of the Russian people toward religion is one of scepticism and complete ignorance.

And it is difficult to deny the justice of this contention. It is proved by the existence of the innumerable sects which are breaking up the organization of the Byzantine Church, and by the ease with which the pious fall into trances, under the influence of revelation, the Apocrypha, occultism, and the most lurid superstitions inspired by an ancient paganism not to be eradicated from the Russian soul, all uncritically accepted.

In this connexion I should like to cite a characteristic fact which I described, while I was still in Russia, in a short story entitled *In Perun's Glen*. In the year 1880, in the district of Pskov, my nurse used to take me every Thursday to a decayed old tree-trunk, and make me repeat after her certain prayers to Perun. And I know for certain that numbers of peasants in the Volga, Siberia, and the Ural districts began to return to the 'old gods' during the period of religious persecution in Soviet Russia.

The Popes, who were almost always officials and not moral shepherds of the people, and were distinguished by no lofty spiritual qualities or outstanding virtue, exploited, denounced, and oppressed the peasants, and were heartily detested by them.

Lenin also was only too well aware of this, and did not hesitate to declare war against God—"the greatest superstition of all." And though the peasantry may not have given him their wholehearted support, they nevertheless maintained a perfectly passive attitude. The destruction and desecration of monasteries honoured for centuries, like the Lavra of Kiev, the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, and the Triucko-Sergeevsky monastery, aroused no indignation, and the profanation and burning of the relics and bones of saints provoked no anti-Soviet disturbances or remonstrations. All these 'sacred things' had suddenly lost their charm and were forgotten. No one protected them, although the peasants were only too ready to snatch up their rifles and axes when, for instance, the commissars came demanding extra taxation in the form of corn and cattle, as frequently happened during the war with Poland and with General Wrangel, and is still going on to-day.

The clergy were terrified, and with disgraceful servility refrained from raising any protest; the voice of one honest man, the Patriarch Tichon, alone rang out.

Next to the landowners and the Church, as supporters of conservatism, came the women, important connecting-links in all families.

The family must be destroyed.

This presented no very great difficulty to Lenin.

The woman in the family of the peasant was a slave, and even Gorki shows that nowhere in the world was she beaten more often and more unmercifully than in Russia. "Love thy wife as thine own soul, but shake her like a pear-tree," says a Russian proverb. Another adds: "Beat thy wife carefully; go and listen to find out whether she still breathes, and if she stirs, it means that she wants more beating." "Twice in life has woman some value: when you take her into your house, and when you carry her out to bury her." "There is no law for either women or cattle." "The more a woman is beaten, the better the soup will be."

In these circumstances can it be wondered at that, at the first hint of reform in the direction of granting equal rights to women, and their release from the tyranny of their brutal husbands, they should unanimously have sided with Lenin? Unchecked immorality, simplified divorce, and sensual indulgence, which reached unheard-of lengths during the civil war, finally destroyed the family.

The fathers pillaged the homes of the landowners; the mothers on their own initiative followed suit, abandoning themselves to the wildest dissipation; the children, left to the mercy of fate, formed themselves into wandering bands, living by plunder and rapine, and, falling victims to every kind of vice, sank lower and lower. Wandering from place to place in search of food, and partly under the influence of the resuscitated instincts of their nomadic Mongolian ancestors, they spread plague and pestilence over all the country, and, as we know, these hordes of homeless, sick, depraved, and criminal children often developed into a veritable menace. Eventually the peasant communities began to welcome them with a hail of shot, and the authorities sent

detachments of the Red Army, of the Cheka, or of the G.P.U.[1] to disperse them.

Thus the three bulwarks which had defended the throne and the *ancien régime* fell into the dust—the class of the large landowners, the Church, and the family.

A fourth bulwark still remained—capitalism, represented by the banks, industry, and commerce.

Lenin soon discovered a way of dealing with this.

The Soviet guards sequestrated the funds deposited with the banks and ransacked the warehouses. The manufacturers, who were held in such odium by the workers, together with their engineers and heads of departments, were either thrown into prison or murdered; and the workmen took over the industries, which are only now beginning to rise from the ruins with the help of German capitalists and experts.

By means of this anarchical policy Lenin transformed Czarist Russia into a fluid mass, which, as time went on, would certainly have developed into the state dreamt of by certain paradoxical Russian ideologists—*a naked world, and on it a naked humanity.*

Lenin was anxious for this state of affairs to spread all over the world, so that Russia might be the last to suffer, or might possibly escape the extreme consequences altogether.

What the daring dictator thought of the details of the process will probably remain a riddle for all time.

Suffice it that he required this fluid mass of people, the transformed remnants of the empire of the Romanovs, to enable him with impunity to deal a decisive and shattering blow against the remnants of the old political and social order.

With cowardly precipitancy, and under the veil of secrecy, in circumstances both sordid and criminal, Nicholas II and his whole family were murdered in Ekaterinburg, while other members of the dynasty were done away with in Alapaevsk, Perm, and Leningrad.

[1] A new institution which took the place of the egregious and bloody Cheka.

V

Thus ended the first stage of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," as the slogan had it, or the dictatorship of a numerically small Communist Party, which was the reality.

It should not be forgotten that this first period closed while a civil war was still raging. Generals Kaledin, Kornilov, Denikin, Judenitch, Wrangel, Miller, Kolchak, Dutov, Semenov, and Baron von Ungern-Sternberg were still engaged in a stubborn fight with the new rulers, against whom even the anarchists turned, under the leadership of Solntchev, Gordin, and Cherni.

The dictators were consequently compelled to create a body of reliable troops, wholeheartedly devoted to their cause, as the sullen, primitive, cruel, savage, and soulless masses might readily go over to Lenin's enemies if the latter proved themselves possessed of greater foresight, skill, and energy.

The dictators therefore filled the ranks of their army with all the most resolute and relentless enemies of Czarist Russia—Jewish, Polish, and Lett socialists, who were domiciled in the towns of Russia; while to deal with the Czech movement against the Soviets Hungarian prisoners of war were mobilized and formed into two splendidly trained divisions under the command of the Hungarian Varga and the German Müller.

Meanwhile every nerve was strained to strengthen the Communist Party, and for this purpose innumerable emissaries were sent out to discover all who professed radical views among the officers and the rank and file of the late Army and among the workers.

All these forces were intended for the fight with the counter-revolution. For the policing of home districts flying punitive detachments were formed, under the orders of the Cheka. They consisted chiefly of criminals liberated from gaol and the riff-raff of the Chinese labour battalions, who, during the War and under the Government of Nicholas II, had been recruited for the building of trenches and strategic highways.

The dictators vied with the counter-revolutionaries in cruelty and destructive frenzy. The work of destruction, so dear and familiar to the heart of the Russian peasant, finally turned against the work of the intellectuals—that small handful of men between whom and the ideals and aspirations of the masses there was a great gulf fixed.

They were dangerous enemies for the hypocritical leaders of the " dictatorship of the proletariat," much more dangerous to the latter than to the reactionary Government of the Czar.

The Bolsheviks had taken as their model the system of the Imperial Ochrana (the political secret police). And they now employed *agents provocateurs* and the *pogrom* in precisely the same way as their predecessors had done, meeting with but little difficulty, since the mass of the people, as numbers of leading Russian writers like Chekhov, Gorki, and Tolstoi have pointed out, had not the smallest confidence in the intellectuals, and often adopted a hostile attitude toward them.

The Russian peasant has from time immemorial regarded all civilized innovations as unnecessary, ridiculous, and often dangerous playthings. He therefore thoroughly enjoyed destroying railway lines, and proceeded to steal telegraph wires, break down the banks of irrigation canals, pollute reservoirs, tear the upholstery from railway carriages, and unscrew the bulbs of electric lamps, to the accompaniment of such remarks as Maxim Gorki quotes in his book:

> We must rid the earth of all educated people, and then we, the dull and stupid, will have an easier time, otherwise they will drive us to perdition.

As a result of such views and beliefs, the infamous campaign against scholars, teachers, doctors, officials, and engineers was inaugurated.

And thus these enemies, who stood in the way of communism, were also swept away, and, wholly incomprehensible as it may seem, Jews, Poles, Letts, Hungarians, and Germans, who should have known how to value educa-

tion, science, and expert knowledge, took part in this *pogrom* of the intellectual classes. How are we to explain this?

We can only assume that Lenin, clever and crafty dictator that he was, succeeded in convincing the communists of non-Russian nationality of the necessity for exterminating the native intellectuals, and that he made them various important promises with regard to the fate of their own countries. Otherwise it is impossible to understand the bloody actions of such gifted men as Trotski and Martov (Jews), Suchanov-Gimmer (German), Dzierzyński (Pole), Peters (Lett), and Varga (Hungarian), even if we regard them as men with morbid minds. But I readily acknowledge that all this is mere conjecture on my part, uncorroborated by facts.

Owing to the continued state of anarchy and to the prolongation of the civil war, the economic state of Russia went from bad to worse. The gigantic resources of the country were exhausted; the principal supply centres were shifted from place to place, from the Ukraine to Siberia, from the Volga to the Central Government district. The normal activity of the agricultural communities and the few factories that were still working were constantly threatened by the armies engaged in civil war along the various fronts and the counter-revolutionary upheavals which burst out all over the country.

The spectre of famine began to loom before the Kremlin, where the group of dictators led by Lenin were keeping watch.

And it became more and more evident every day that the period of destruction must cease with all possible speed, and productive work be undertaken.

Any other nation but the savage, untutored people of Russia would have recognized at this juncture that the knell of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" had tolled, that the masses had been used only as cannon-fodder in the overthrow of conservatism and Czarism, and that a period of terrible slavery and oppression lay ahead.

In his works Lenin has given the best description of this

new period of oppression. Among the fundamental principles on which the power of the Union of Socialistic Soviet Federative Republics relies we find the following:

"Everything not formally allowed is forbidden."

This is the basic principle of Soviet justice, and is diametrically opposed to every conception of legality existing among mankind.

"The source and creator of all laws is the State."

"The power of the State is above all a symbol of coercion." [1]

"Dictatorship is a power which relies on force; it is limited by no law, and is subject to no rules to direct it." [2]

Such Draconian laws could exist only under the banner of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the hypnotic illusion that everything was being done for the whole people and by the wish of the whole people. But to support this falsehood and to hypnotize the masses in this way men of iron courage were necessary.

Such a man was Lenin—and Lenin alone.

He possessed the gift of divining at any moment the vague desires and longings animating the masses, and was able to analyse their wishes and respond by some deed, forcing himself to the decision demanded of him. And thus Lenin enslaved the mutinous peasants, drunk with blood, yoking the workers to a working-day of from ten to twelve hours, building up a mighty army, and forcing it to fight, despite its exhaustion after the War.

Nobody pointed out, nobody remembered, that the first promises made by communism had been the guarantee of eternal peace, whereas now new wars were constantly breaking out somewhere or other.

True, they were chiefly civil wars, and, as everyone knows, there is a Russian saying: "Ramp and roar enough inside your own house, and the neighbours will be frightened of you."

[1] Hurwitz, *The Fundamental Principles of the Soviet Constitution* (Moscow, 1928, pp. 15, 23, 27).

[2] Art. I of the Civil Code.

The disastrous campaign against Poland was the first event that sobered the Russian people. It was a war in which the Poles saved Europe from the flood of communism—a war which the Bolsheviks described as a struggle with the "military *bourgeoisie* of Poland." (Viewed in the proper light and estimated at its true worth, this war should have made Germany the devoted ally of Poland, whom she now regards with such an unfriendly eye, for the red flag would at this moment be waving over Berlin, and Hindenburg and Ludendorff and all who dreamt of war with Poland would have perished in torrents of blood, if at that time the Red Army had crossed the German frontier.)

As soon as the dictators had broken the will of the peasants and the industrial masses they set to work to build up a new "great and indivisible Russia"—that is to say, they embarked upon a task which the Czar and his conservative Government had tried with unremitting zeal to accomplish.

The right of self-determination of small nations was denied, and the dozen or so independent republics, which the Soviet Government had proclaimed in sensational manifestos, were swiftly suppressed and subjected to the rule of a larger community.

Even the Imperial wars of conquest were not forgotten, and Outer Mongolia was invaded and annexed to the Union of Socialistic Republics of Russia, an object which the Romanovs had never succeeded in attaining.

A similar policy was adopted toward China, by turning the civil war to account and establishing relations with Sun-Yat-Sen, the revolutionary dictator of the South.

The war with Poland also belongs to the radically 'Imperialist' policy of Russia's proletarian Government.

These undertakings, however, so seriously impaired the economic resources of the State that hurried efforts had to be made to remedy matters.

Whereupon all the landowners, manufacturers, engineers, chemists, and other 'experts' (specialists, professionals, etc.), who but a moment previously had been persecuted, but whose help was required for increasing the productivity

of the soil and the output of the factories, were once again unearthed, and every effort was made to win them over with promises. This was tantamount to betraying the proletariat, but a fresh slogan was promulgated to deceive the people: "The *bourgeoisie*, the servant of the proletariat!"

A holy war was declared against the capitalists of the whole world, but at the same time State loans were raised and undertakings handed over for exploitation to *bourgeois* foreigners on terms amounting to the abandonment of the State monopoly.

This too might also have been regarded as—a betrayal!

But no! It was interpreted merely as "a withdrawal of capital from abroad, in order to help in the emancipation of fellow-workers in Western Europe"—a manœuvre, a momentary period of relaxation, which would lead to an increase in the strength of Russia.

Thus those who composed the credulous, simple-minded Russian proletariat were deceived, and still continued to believe in their own 'dictatorship.'

Commerce too had to be protected, and again this seemed like—treachery. Commercial treaties were drawn up with *bourgeois* Governments, and a whole series of concessions made over which, for home consumption, there floated the deceptive device: "We are acting thus so that we may the more easily pierce the heart of the enemy and stand by our oppressed fellows abroad."

Incidentally, however, it is here that the Soviet authorities were perhaps most honest toward their own people; for despite all their commercial treaties and apparently friendly relations and solemn promises, they nevertheless, with true Mongolian-cum-Byzantine cunning and deceit, continued to carry on a policy of revolutionary agitation among the working classes and the troops and in the colonies of all the European Powers.

It was necessary for the Soviet authorities to make plans for forming a picked body of men to become the future leaders of the Communist Party, and to carry on the good work in Russia. And these leaders had to be possessed of no meagre ability! For we must remember that,



LENIN'S DEATH-MASK

although the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was established, the "governing and all-powerful masses" sent to the V.C.I.K.[1] and other representative assemblies only such members as met with the approval of the Government. Any attempt at insubordination in this respect was undertaken at the risk of incarceration in the terrible dungeons of the Cheka or of the G.P.U., or of court-martial proceedings at the hands of the Punitive Department!

The rearing of political supporters among the rising generation proved the most difficult task of all. The Soviet schools, with their wretched achievements, can produce a fresh contingent of politically educated workers only in the course of time, while the associations or clubs of the *Komsomolcen*[2] are far more apt to rear political spies, capable of denouncing even their own parents, than seriously trained champions of the cause.

It is this state of affairs which accounts for the fact that all the highest posts are still held by veterans of the first period of the communist revolution, and there is no sign of the advent of conspicuous new talent to take their place.

Lenin possessed the faculty of regulating and co-ordinating the thoughts and activities of his workers; but ever since his death disorganization and disunion have spread with ever-increasing rapidity through the ranks of the People's Commissars and the Communist Party itself.

One faction, with the exiled Trotski at its head, constitutes the Opposition, which to-day is quite powerless; and the other is led by Stalin, who as Lenin's heir holds the dictatorial powers in his own hands.

What is the real difference between these two bodies? In my opinion it lies merely in the fact that one section, that of Stalin and Rykov, in spite of marked differences of opinion concerning the means to be employed, is trying to found a settled State of landowning peasants, whose enrichment the leaders view with perfect equanimity, while the other, led by Trotski, is still dreaming of the proletarian world-revolution, and aims at keeping Russia in a fluid,

[1] The Soviet Parliament. [2] Communist and Socialist Youth.

revolutionary, and desperate condition, with the view of hurling millions of barbarians at the psychological moment on the unsuspecting *bourgeoisie* of Europe.

If I might be allowed to indulge in prophecy, I should say that a conflict is bound to occur between the 'State' section and the 'international' section of the Communist Party. The one is supported by the peasants and a large proportion of the Red Army, the other by the workers and the G.P.U. department.

Sooner or later the victory will be won by the section of the party which has the peasants behind it, and toward which the men actually in power to-day are inclining.

VI

It is impossible within the compass of an essay to deal with all the aspects of a phenomenon so fantastic and stupendous as the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia.

The fact nevertheless remains that the peasants, wearied and intoxicated by the expression of their elemental powers, are beginning to think for themselves, and to set aside the collective reasoning of the village community, the primitive and ancient *mir*.

The sociologist Le Bon has shown that a crowd of people, however cultivated, always possesses a lower grade of intelligence than the individuals composing it.

Fully two hundred years before Le Bon the following saw showed that the Russian peasant had already arrived at this conclusion: "The peasant by himself is shrewd, but the *mir* is stupid."

The rural population has remembered this wise doctrine of their ancestors, and it will give the deathblow to the dictatorship of the proletariat and its dictators.

Sensational, catchy, grandiloquent, or base slogans no longer carry weight with the people. Only the industrial masses, so long and so painstakingly reared under the hypnotic influence of 'programmes,' socialist catechisms, and social 'credos,' are still liable to become intoxicated by such methods, for their eyes are sealed to reality, they are

barred from all access to true knowledge, although this knowledge alone can radically change the face of the world, and, as a matter of fact, is actually doing so.

If the peasants were organized, if they had both leaders and arms, they could soon shake off the yoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But as for centuries they have been accustomed to an attitude of terrified humility toward every Government, they are patiently biding their time to wage a war upon which they would not hesitate to enter, particularly if they were driven to do so. Meanwhile they too are weary of a war which has been unending throughout the vast territory of Russia. So they wait in silence. But various ideas are taking shape in their minds, one of which, I think, is extremely instructive, and is mentioned by Maxim Gorki in his book *Lenin and the Russian Peasant.*

The peasantry cannot abide the industrial workers, and despise them as leaders. "When once we are at the helm," they say,

> we shall so arrange matters as to make industrial strikes impossible. We shall build extremely small factories, which will employ at the most a hundred workmen, and we shall distribute them all over the country, at such long distances from each other that it will be impossible for the workers to come to an understanding with each other, to form numerically strong unions, or to foment risings and strikes! We shall soon settle matters with them!

The industrial workers are fully aware of this, and consequently support that section of the Communist Party which is trying to suppress those elements among the peasantry who are waking up, thinking for themselves, and anxious to determine their own destiny.

All this indubitably points to a breach between the two powers at no very distant date. If the peasants win, permanent peace and order will be established in a country which has so long been in the throes of revolutionary paroxysms.

If, however, the international section gains the upper hand—a consummation which would mean the end of Russia—then, as in the time of the Variags, Russia will find

herself compelled to plead vehemently with outstretched arms for help, order, and a proper Government.

Nevertheless, a careful examination of conditions in Russia points inevitably to the conclusion that the victory will most probably be on the side of the peasants.

But in this case the positive aspects of the Bolshevik and communist experiment will be revealed in their full significance.

What then has the dictatorship of the proletariat taught us?

In the first instance, that submerged social classes and downtrodden and oppressed people are always filled with an ardent longing for freedom, comfort, and knowledge. Kings, Parliaments, statesmen, capitalists, and scientific men must never lose sight of this.

Once again we have seen that an uneducated mass of gloomy-minded people cannot be led by reason, but only by emotion. We have also seen that they are prone to swift changes of mood, that they believe in miracles, worship quack remedies and oft-repeated slogans—no matter how inane—and treasure them in their memories.

We have convinced ourselves that revolutionary demagogues can foment revolt only when the evolution and life of a people are not following normal lines, but are being subjected to economic and political crises, in which case war is always the best ally of revolution and political disintegration.

We have seen that national and religious traditions provide the best defence against revolution, for which reason Governments should take care to strengthen sound historic traditions, and the Church should carefully investigate the spiritual needs of the people, and draw near to them, showing a sympathetic understanding of their thoughts, their doubts, and their aspirations.

Finally we have learned that revolutionary Russia has sown the *seeds of emancipation*. And this seed will never perish; no one will ever succeed in exterminating it, and any efforts on the part of the reactionaries to arrest this expansion of freedom will be quite fruitless. The fight for freedom must

be directed by skilful hands along the path of evolution, so that changes in the social order may be brought about as painlessly and swiftly as possible.

We must not shut our eyes to the fact that the reforms inaugurated by the October Revolution in Russia have introduced a revolutionary spirit into the social *psyche* of the whole world. The advent of a new era in thought and ethics has long been foreseen by great thinkers, and the Russian Revolution has reduced these expectations to a particular though not exactly a mathematical formula. The practical result of the revolution was the downfall of a mighty nation, but the real problems it had to solve still remain unsettled.

In conclusion let me point to one important and extremely instructive fact.

The Russian Revolution produced in Lenin a real and typical *Man of Will*, the sort of man who is capable of determining the fate of a country and a people.

He possessed an unbending will and perfect courage.

Now it is the bounden duty of Governments to seek out such men and give them every chance of developing with safety until such time as an event of supreme importance provides them with scope for the practical exercise of their valuable gifts.

Our age is sick with a wasting disease, and dreads all responsibility.

That is why we are shy of men of will and courage, and are frightened of them. That is why we have so few men of outstanding merit, who rise above the grey uniformity of everyday standards. That is why nations, like individuals, are so ready to conceal themselves behind the backs of Parliaments, congresses, leagues, and parties, instead of acting openly, with vizor raised—a method which would undoubtedly win support far more quickly than miles of protocols and the resolutions of vast official assemblies, all equally colourless and tiresome, to which one is often tempted to apply the words of the peasant in Gorki's book: "The peasant by himself is shrewd, but the *mir* is stupid."

These are the positive aspects of that notorious experiment known as the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In addition to this it has proved beyond all doubt the absurdity of the misleading formula, "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."

Liberty developed into a tyranny over life, property, faith, ethics, family, the Press, civil and human rights—in short, over everything which a *bourgeois* Government of to-day, however reactionary, would never have dared to touch.

Equality in proletarian Russia developed into the rule of one million communists over 147 million other inhabitants of the country. Even the fundamental meaning of the idea of social equality did not survive criticism, for the stronger, more enterprising, courageous, and intelligent among the population, whatever their calling in life, in the end regained possession of the better, higher, and most coveted places.

Fraternity turned out to be no more than a mirage, and developed into a struggle not only between the various peoples of Russia, but also between the classes and between the peasants and the proletariat. And this struggle, assuming the cruel form of a vendetta, developed into a constant threat of war against neighbouring states.

The proletariat is not ready to take the helm of government into its own hands, be those hands never so honest, or however useful the work they have performed for humanity. Strength and energy alone can achieve only destruction; but for constructive work knowledge, accurate and all-embracing, is necessary—such knowledge as is required in every sphere of industry. The proletariat must tread the long and thorny path of general as well as of specialized education. Then only will it be qualified to undertake the government of peoples and states. But irony of Fate! By that time it will have lost the ideals of the present-day proletariat; for constructive, not destructive, work will have become its mission in life, and evolutionary progress will be seen to be, as it always is, hostile to revolutionary progress—that leap in the dark.

Perhaps this accounts for the fact that sympathizers with Russian communism—whether they are members of the

English Labour Party, or German working men, or the subtle intellectuals of France—say so little about the impressions they have received on their visits to the "Soviet Paradise," or else, in order to avoid thorny problems, indulge in long-winded dissertations on the theoretical aspects of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or, finally, with a bitter smile, honestly confess their disappointment.

It is his sense of justice, his healthy rationalism, and his need of a primitive, or, rather, a modernized, ethic that makes the citizen of Western Europe who sympathizes with the philosophy of Bolshevism and communism feel so thoroughly embarrassed about it.

The reality, which is so profoundly different from the theory, has a distressing, depressing, and terrifying effect.

The terrible spectacle of Russia in ruins, her moral and physical sufferings, the outbreak of low and savage passions which she has witnessed, the cruel and barbarous treatment she has endured, the oppression and lack of justice which became the basis of the Soviet civil law, famine, poverty, and degradation, the demoralization of the rising generation, the civil war, and the despairing conviction that she will never be able to find a way out of the morass created by the dictatorship of the proletariat, must impress the Western European in this way.

But it is not only the representative of civilized Europe and America who feels this. Even the Russian peasants who remained in the ranks of the Army, and were the first to raise the banner of revolution, are already beginning to see that they have nothing in common with the proletariat.

The proletariat of the present day lives in a world of dreams built up of this world's goods on which they would like to lay hands; the peasants, however, as the producers of these goods, are ready to defend them with the last drop of their blood, to stifle any uprising, and to ensure for themselves for as long as possible that measure of peace which is necessary for their work.

Finally, what does the educated Englishman, American, German, or Frenchman, who has been bred in an atmosphere of culture and justice, think and feel?

Professor Charles Sarolea, of the University of Edinburgh, in the preface to his book *Impressions of Soviet Russia*, says:

> It would be passing strange, indeed, if the British people, who are even now embarking for the first time on a fateful socialist adventure, failed to be interested in the most far-reaching, the most instructive, and the most tragic socialist experiment which has ever been tried in the history of civilized humanity.

And Professor Sarolea closes his book with the following prophecy:

> Even as in the material sense Russia will soon become once again the granary of the European continent, so in a political and moral sense Russia is likely to prove, in a not distant future, the mainstay of European law and order and the most uncompromising enemy of all collectivist impostures.

The great French writer Georg Duhamel closes his somewhat bitter and ironical account of his visit to Soviet Russia with the desperate confession that, despite all his sympathy with this extraordinary country, he never once felt comfortable there, and for the simple reason that he constantly felt himself in the clutches of some terrible force. He had an intuition that sinister and revolting things were happening every day, every hour, and every minute, round the magnificent hotel which the hospitable Soviet Government had placed at the disposal of the influential author and sympathizer with their doctrines.

And now let us hear what Maxim Gorki, the Soviet poet and darling of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has to say about the future of the Russian people:

> The revolution which was set in motion by a small group of intellectuals and a few thousand working men trained by them has ploughed so deeply with its steel share into the hearts of the Russian masses that there is not the slightest doubt that the peasantry will never be able to return to their old manner of life.
>
> The semi-barbarians, the dull and stupid, and the gloomy peasants of the villages—all blood-curdling creatures will disappear, and a new race of educated, clear-sighted, and industrious citizens will step into their places.
>
> I do not believe [he adds] that this new people will be a very

pleasant or sympathetic race, but they will be energetic and suspicious—indifferent to everything that does not directly subserve their needs. They will not cudgel their brains over Einstein's theories; they will be incapable of appreciating Shakespeare or Leonardo da Vinci; but they will unhesitatingly spend money on Steinach's experiments, and they will have no difficulty in seeing the importance of electrification, the value of scientifically trained agriculturists, the necessity of tractors, good doctors, and roads built in the modern style. They will develop an excellent memory for history, whereby the Russian peasant, recollecting the painful past immediately behind him, and the first years of fresh constructive work, will look with grave suspicion and perhaps genuine hostility on the intellectuals and the industrial workers, both of whom have been responsible for so much confusion and unrest.

In the imagination of the Russian communists and of the creator of the dictatorship of the proletariat, ten thousand leagues of " naked earth " have been laid bare, revealing the " naked man," who is to send forth to the whole of mankind those rays of Light and Truth which have dawned in his Eastern home.

Such a dream melts away like a mist; but, no matter how absurd the imaginary vapourings of madmen may be, reality and the relentless logic of facts can transform these blurred shapes into the concrete bodily forms of a new world, just as the fair forms of the planets, all subject to natural law, mighty, beautiful, and glorious, were evolved out of cosmic mist.

INFLUENCE OF POST-WAR THOUGHT ON HUNGARY

BARON JULIUS WLASSICS

(President of the Hungarian House of Magnates. For many years President of the Supreme Court of Hungary, and formerly a Minister. An authority on public law.)

THE object of this essay is to show what effect post-War ideas have had on the public and social life of Hungary.

I

In the first place I would beg to remind my readers that in the early days after the World War it became almost the fashion in Europe to say that the Parliamentary system was bankrupt, particularly as far as the two extreme wings of the political world, the parties of the Right and of the Left, were concerned. On the Right there loomed the menace of a personal dictatorship, and on the Left that of a class dictatorship. At a time when, for political reasons, everybody was speaking of a crisis in Parliamentarianism, the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* seized the opportunity to invite leading Parliamentary figures to express in its columns their opinion concerning the present and future of the system. This journal even approached me, and I readily acceded to its request, elaborating my standpoint, which was entirely in keeping with the spirit of Hungary's historical constitution. I confessed that my faith in the system of Parliamentary government was unshaken, although I certainly made no attempt to conceal the difficulties with which Parliaments based on universal suffrage have to contend, particularly at the present moment.

The replies which reached the well-known German newspaper were as interesting as they were instructive.

They revealed the views of the Presidents of the German

Reichstag, the French Chamber of Deputies, the Spanish National Assembly, the Danish Folketing, the Swiss National Council, the Lettish Sejm, the Finnish National Assembly, the Czecho-Slovakian House of Representatives, the Turkish National Assembly, the Austrian National Council, the Danzig Volkstag, and the Diets of Prussia, Saxony, and Brandenburg respectively.

After reading the replies I feel I may safely say that although these gentlemen made no attempt to conceal the difficulties with which the present-day system of Parliamentary government has to contend, the general consensus of opinion among them amounts to a justification of it.

Take, for instance, the opinion of Monsieur Buisson, the President of the French Chamber of Deputies:

> In discussing the present crisis in Parliamentarianism cause and effect have been confounded. The cause lies in the War, which led to a general overthrow of all moral, spiritual, and material values, and, particularly since the year 1919, a state of crisis has existed in all departments of life. In the great awakening that followed problems arose which no one could possibly have foreseen. The disturbances in the economic life of the people, the collapse of paper currencies, and the breaking up of the social order constituted upheavals in the lives of all nations such as former generations could never have regarded as possible. But the fault did not lie with Parliaments. On the contrary, the representatives elected by the mass of the people felt the blows affecting the national life even more acutely than the best bureaucracy. But the working programme of Parliaments must naturally be modified so as to meet the infinitely greater demands made upon it by the present requirements of State.

I am glad to be able to say that in numerous published essays and articles, as also in my opening speech in the Upper House, I called attention to the necessity of transferring the weight of all serious detailed work to departmental committees consisting of capable and willing members, while plenary sittings might be devoted to great displays of oratory and to the task of determining the leading lines of policy. But I also emphasized the fact that what *has to be said* is not identical with what *ought to be discussed.*

Mr Snowden, the English politician, bewailed the fact that the functions of modern Governments now cover such a vast field that the House of Commons is no longer capable of exercising the necessary control, and suggested that English self-governing bodies should be strengthened so as to release the Government from duties which, in any case, are much more efficiently fulfilled and much more effectively controlled by independent bodies than by Parliament, which is now so seriously overburdened. Hansen, the President of the Folketing, vigorously defended the Parliamentary system of government. It was his belief that when once an intelligent and thoughtful people had arrived at this system after long constitutional struggles they could never acquiesce in a dictatorship. Parliamentary government must be perfected, but certainly not abolished. Maillefer, the President of the Swiss Federal Assembly, categorically declared that democracy was the only possible political *régime* for Switzerland. If Switzerland were to give it up, she would go to pieces and lose her autonomy. Democracy was the only practical form of government for Switzerland. It was in keeping with the national character, and a necessary condition of the country's survival. Rataj, the Marshal of the Polish Sejm, raised his voice in favour of a necessary limitation of Parliamentary power. Parliament, he thought, ought not to constitute a ruling body; moreover, he regarded the crisis in Parliamentary government as purely temporary, since its real power lay in the instinctive desire of man to control his own fate. The Presidents of the Parliaments of Lettland and Finland pointed to various defects in the Parliamentary government of the day, but argued vigorously in defence of the system as such. The President of the Austrian National Council expressed the view that even the worst Parliamentary *régime* was preferable to a State in which there was no Parliament. And the President of the Prussian Diet, though lamenting the infantile disorders of the Parliamentary system of Germany, nevertheless maintained that these ailments could never succeed in undermining the solid structure of the institution.

In discussing the modern State, and particularly the crisis in Parliamentary government, people frequently omit to give due weight to the important fact that the duties which now devolve upon the modern State are far wider in range than those which the State was called upon to shoulder in former times. The State of the past, based on authority and ruled by the police, has been transformed into a State founded on industry and organization. It is perfectly plain that the modern State can no longer apply the old methods. The modern tractor has taken the place of the antiquated horse-plough, and on the same principle the Parliamentary system of to-day can fulfil its mission only if it can contrive effectively to control the vastly extended range of duties imposed upon the modern State, and if, despite the multifariousness of its activities, it can establish that form of concentration which will constitute the essential prerequisite of all successful administration along the lines of Parliamentary government. And this justifies the slogan "The rationalization of Parliamentary work!" constantly vociferated in German treatises on the subject.

There need, therefore, be no cause for surprise to find that the careful sifting of the political situation has led to "Crisis in Parliamentary government!" becoming a favourite cry not among journalists alone, but also in political treatises discussing all kinds of plans of reform. Among these proposed reforms we have certainly met many a wise, as well as many an impossible suggestion, and it is my humble opinion that what we must guard against is the danger of going to extremes, either in the direction of the Left or of the Right. On the Right we are threatened by a personal dictatorship, while on the Left lies the menace of a collective or Soviet dictatorship. But personal dictatorship should not be allowed to constitute the basic principle in the organization of a State. There may be occasions, such as certainly have existed from time to time, when a supremely superior personality, in whom the genius of a people stands revealed, gathers all the reins of power in his hands, and, at a moment of extreme danger, renders invaluable service to his country, always on his own responsibility. But dictatorship as a

permanent basis to the organization of the State is utterly impossible.

Much more dangerous than personal dictatorship, however, is the dictatorship of syndicates, which aims at the subjection of whole classes, and the practical horrors of which, in the form of Bolshevism, we Hungarians have learned to know by personal experience. As long as the evolution of modern statecraft has nothing better to offer, we must abide by the Parliamentary system, while straining every nerve to rid it of the defects which at present mar it. It should be reformed to meet the requirements of the modern State in such a way that no tittle of constitutional or personal freedom is sacrificed in the process, and so that the State, in fulfilling its duties, never forces the weak to give way to the strong. Furthermore, Parliament should draw up for itself a scheme of work which would enable it to perform one of its most important duties—the effective control of the Parliamentary system.

We Hungarians cling tenaciously to the Parliamentary system, which is in keeping with the spirit and history of our constitution. This constitution, which we have inherited from our forefathers, is not a mere imitation of the English constitution; it is not the creation of armchair philosophers, nor the product of a feudal or patrimonial system; neither is it a gift graciously and superciliously accorded by a monarch or a sovereign. Every other nation whose constitution provides for a legislative body consisting of two chambers has borrowed it either directly or indirectly from England. Esmein, the famous French authority on constitutional law, proves conclusively in his famous work on the subject that this is not true of the Hungarian two-chamber system, which was evolved independently in the course of her history. When, therefore, in the period after the War we introduced fresh reforms in the Upper House it was not merely with the desire of remaining faithful to historical tradition. Guided by the example of other countries, we also perfected the traditional system by embodying principles authorized by the general consensus of scientific opinion. Our legislature preserved the elective principle in the con-

NIKOLAUS HORTHY

stitution of the Upper House. Except for a small proportion of its members, who were specially nominated, the decision as to who should be sent to the Upper House lies in the hands of the various economic, legal, and scientific groups in the nation. The elective principle was even extended to those families whose members belong by hereditary right to the Upper House. On the whole, it may be said that our Upper House embraces all those elements in the nation whose co-operation in the task of legislation is indispensable.

The constitution of our Upper House has aroused lively interest even beyond our frontiers, and among the writers who make a speciality of dealing with the subject of Parliamentary reform there are some who already see in the constitution of the Hungarian Upper House the new type to be adopted in any scheme for the reform of the system. It may truthfully be said that the quality of the debates in our Upper House, whether in committee or in plenary session, is always up to the level demanded by the situation. The speakers are, as a rule, supreme authorities on the questions standing on the agenda for the day, while the debates consist of a businesslike discussion of leading lines of policy, and are free from irresponsible or impassioned exaggerations. The floor of the Upper House may even be used for the expression of the most drastic criticism, without provoking a storm of contention between the two Houses. The Upper House is not concerned with hindering the work of the legislature for the sake of a few unessential modifications. Its principal function is to act as a check upon exaggerated measures mooted in the Lower House.

I should like to point out that, in the creation of our Upper House, we did not allow ourselves to be led astray in the direction of either of the two extremes referred to above. Our post-War reforms were not the expression of any doctrinal system, but a non-revolutionary reconstruction of our constitution, carried out on practical evolutionary lines in a manner consonant with the spirit of our historical traditions.

II

To turn to a question which greatly agitated public opinion in Europe after the War—the possibility of settling international disputes by means of arbitration—we may with a clean conscience point to Hungary's part in the negotiations. Not only did we support the Kellogg Pact, in the firm hope of thereby securing Hungary's rights by judicial means; not only did we readily acknowledge the necessity for international arbitration on the basis of reciprocity, in accordance with the statutes of the permanent International Arbitration Court of The Hague; but, in regard to the dispute over the Hungarian optants, we, as representing the standpoint of the Hungarian Government, also made the question of the independence and inviolability of the International Court of Arbitration one of world-wide interest. Indeed, this developed into a question of such vast importance that, at the present moment, it is no longer merely a matter of settling the simple dispute between the Transylvanian optants and the Rumanian State, but of deciding whether the International Court of Arbitration is to rest on a solid foundation or to be the sport of political caprice. It is impossible on the one hand to trumpet forth the idea of arbitration as a means of securing the peace of the world, and on the other to make the principle of international arbitration the sport of powerful influence.

It is impossible to proclaim that the institution of international arbitration is the world's salvation against warlike developments, and at the same time to allow that other institution, which was also called into being to guarantee universal peace—the League of Nations—to think itself justified in interfering in a dispute already engaged, and by ignoring the terms of written treaties to paralyse the working of the regular and traditional method of the inquiry. To the Hungarian representatives fell the lofty duty of raising the case of optants to the plane of a universal problem and laying it before the judgment-seat of the whole world. If such a thing as an independent international court still exists, and if it is our aim that nations should feel in duty

bound to bring the disputes that arise between them before international courts, we must respect the independence of these courts and bow to their decisions. They must be upheld as inviolable, and above all the independence of their rulings must not be hurled down from its lofty pedestal by powerful influences, owing to the fact that those concerned lose themselves in the labyrinth of differences between victors and vanquished. Any impartial observer will acknowledge that the work done by Hungarians during the last few years, both in speech and in writing, for securing the firm establishment of an independent international court deserves recognition.

III

I should feel guilty of a lack of candour were I to conceal the fact that during the years that have elapsed since the World War the mind of Hungary has been obsessed by the memory of the many grave injustices which she has suffered owing to the tangle of misrepresentations which led to the Peace Treaty of Trianon—a treaty which hangs like a millstone about the soul of the Hungarian people. The leading international authorities should not forget that when we were compelled to sign the Treaty of Trianon two decisive factors were at work. The first was Article 19 of the League of Nations Pact, which left open a legal loophole for the modification of the Peace Treaty, and the second was Millerand's covering note, which provided for a correction of the frontiers fixed by the Treaty. Founding our hopes for the future on these two comforting considerations, we have since been most zealous and persevering in our endeavours to induce the leading international authorities to understand what is at stake for Hungary in this matter. We have done all in our power to convince them that the Treaty of Trianon, which was the creation of excessive haste, superficiality, and a misunderstanding of the true situation, represents one of the grossest injustices and most serious mistakes in history, and to bring them to see that the loss of two-thirds of our territory, and the fact that millions of our Hungarian brethren are now under foreign rule, make us,

who always have been and still are the champions of Western culture and civilization, unable to fulfil our historic mission in the basin of the Danube. We are suffering bitterly under the weight of this terrible injustice, and it is only to be expected that we should leave no stone unturned to arouse sympathy for the intolerable nature of our burden, and be filled with the deepest gratitude to all those who have begun to perceive that in this matter of redressing the injustice of Trianon not only are the interests of Hungary at stake, but also the peace of conscience of the whole world; while it would also be a means of correcting a fault due to over-hastiness and superficiality. This idea constitutes the pole round which all Hungarian political thought now turns, and every subject of Hungary is inspired by this longing for a revision of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon.

We address our cry for help to the whole of the civilized world, because even under the crushing weight of the consciousness of our terrible mutilation we have not lost faith in humanity's love of right nor in the power of conscience. We still cherish a confident hope that, in this question of life and death for Hungary, the means of subsistence, cruelly filched away from her by the Peace Treaty, will be restored to our country. The possibility of revision fires the heart of every Hungarian, and in every Hungarian soul there lurks a feeling of indignation at the treatment that his country has received. The Treaty is utterly opposed to justice and the cause of culture, and the cruelties it inflicts have to be borne by the minorities in various countries, among which there are millions of Hungarians.

When we behold the great civilized States of the world acquiescing in this work of national extirpation, although they have pledged themselves under international guarantees to protect the rights of minorities, we almost lose heart altogether. In condemning the Hungarian minorities to cultural isolation and in not even permitting Hungarian literary productions to cross their frontiers our persecutors are acting not only in contravention of treaties, but also with utter disregard for human rights. After the conclusion of peace the very States who extended their frontiers at the

expense of our country exercised an intellectual boycott against us, despite the fact that they were in duty bound by their treaties to grant cultural freedom to minorities. So complete is this intellectual boycott that as recently as the year 1928 the Succession States did not allow even purely scientific journals in the Hungarian language to cross their frontiers.

We are surrounded by States which have grown rich at our expense, who are arming against us, and in their propaganda constantly trying to represent us as the element threatening to create disorder. And yet all we want is that by international and legitimate methods—not by violence, but by a sane grasp of those factors that can help us—the dead weight of the Trianon injustice shall be removed from our nation, which was not responsible for the War, which for centuries has been the staunch supporter of Western culture and civilization, and which is conscious of unswerving loyalty to the great mission history has handed down to her. It would be well for the leading nations to learn to know us better. The greatest mistakes have been made because to those outside our frontiers we have remained an unknown land. How many among the cultivated classes in foreign countries are aware of the fact that two-thirds of our territory has been taken from us? When they are told about it they assert with perfect truth that while they had certainly heard that "some rounding off of frontiers" had been effected, they did not know that whole masses of living Hungarians had been handed over to foreign States. How grateful we should be if the responsible statesmen in the countries directly interested would regard the rectification of the frontiers as a primary and fundamental condition of future peace! Ever since the World War our thoughts have centred round this matter of a revision of the Treaty, and it seems to us quite inconceivable that the rights of Hungary should be trampled underfoot a moment longer if the competent foreign authorities will but study the Hungarian question in a spirit of earnest and impartial inquiry.

MUSSOLINI AND THE DICTATORSHIP IN ITALY[1]

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THE Italian race, with its thirty centuries of political association, has a history incomparably longer, more coherent, and richer in civil experience than that of any other people in the world. A mixture of epic and tragedy, it recounts the most glorious and epoch-making events mankind has experienced or contemplated, together with the greatest tribulations that a nation has endured for centuries: astonishing successes followed by disasters that appear irreparable, the gradual pompous decadence of weariness and despair, side by side with incomparable beauties. That the Italian people has been able to sustain such varied and violent vicissitudes of fortune and yet remain youthful and vigorous is primarily due to the fact that the preservation of its energies is bound up with its spiritual life; thus during the centuries of the barbarian invasions in the Middle Ages and throughout the years of foreign domination in modern times the Italian people has been able to maintain, if not its national, at least its ethnical dignity, as embodied in the most noble productions of the mind.

Such a resistance of a character historically and preponderantly spiritual has bequeathed to the Italians a legacy of high and sustained culture, which on the one hand serves as a guarantee of the sanity and reliability of their standard in dealings with other nations, and on the other hand explains, justifies, documents, and legitimizes every aspect of the national life. And, in fact, everything

[1] This article is translated by Miss Kathleen Gladstone Davies.

that happens in Italy happens as the result of an ancient historical antecedent, and is never in any way sudden or unexpected, although it may appear to be so, but has its origins and antecedents, its causes, motives, analogies, and confirmations even in the most remote ages. And, indeed, it is for this reason that the history of Italy, from the foundation of Rome to the present day, contains a greater number of what theorists call "typical events" than the history of any other nation.

The originality of Fascism consists in its Italianism. It has been a revolution in so far as it has represented a resurrection. Through its influence Italy desires, for the first time, to exist as Italy, independently of any universal doctrinal conception which is foreign to her national genius. The spiritual legacy bequeathed to us by our historical tradition has found its leaven in Fascism, and has been transformed anew into bread for our spirits, which were hungering for reconstitution. It is precisely for this reason that Fascism has found such easy and certain acceptance among the young men; being as yet uncontaminated by political soporifics, they felt it to be completely consonant with the dictates of the national conscience, which may be more or less primitive according to the education of the individual, but which is certainly extremely sensitive and clear-sighted in its instinctive sense of historical consistency. This is what constitutes the humanity of Fascism, a doctrine frankly Italian in the land of individualism, where a political theory can never prove entirely satisfactory unless it is conceived in the image and likeness of man.

Although it is not my present intention even to outline the history of the Italian people, I am obliged to note a few essential points. In the fifteenth century, when France, England, and Spain formed themselves into compact states by consolidating the consciousness of individual nationality that had resulted from the break-up of the Roman Empire, Italy was unable to follow their example. This was due to special political conditions, caused by the existence in the peninsula of too many over-powerful states, and to the fact that very soon, at the end of the century, Italy became the

theatre of European war and the bone of contention between the Great Powers. Moreover, Italian culture in the humanistic and Renaissance periods fell into the generous and poetic error of maintaining that whatever came into existence after the Middle Ages must appertain to the universal Roman Empire. For the Roman Empire and Catholicism represent the two greatest universalities, moral, cultural, judicial, or political, in the annals of history; and it may well be that the Italians, living in the land which had bequeathed these systems to the world, judged a movement as vigorous as the Renaissance too great and fertile to resolve itself in a purely national reconstitution, believing that it should comprehend and radiate from itself the culture of the then known world.

Only in the next century did they realize that all this was no more than a literary fancy; but it was too late, for already the Great Powers had profited by their illusion, and had subjected the peninsula to a servitude that was to endure through three centuries of shame and misery. Perhaps this same illusion, in a degraded form, is responsible for the fact that for half a century, from the achievement of unity to the outbreak of the World War, all those doctrines of universalism in which the concept of Italy was merged into every kind of theoretical entity had such a vogue among us, as though our country had no importance other than as a medium for the demonstration of these dogmas in the world.

The humanistic and Renaissance periods were succeeded by three centuries of servitude, during which the word Italy was expunged from the geography and politics of Europe. But already in the seventeenth century there was a revival of national activity; the movement was both spiritual and cultural, and sought to restore the autonomy of our political thought by means of tradition.

The French Revolution interrupted this process, but afterward the formation of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy and the participation of the Italians in Bonaparte's campaigns created anew the conception of a united nation, and established the basis of a revived military tradition. After 1815 the Italian problem became a European one; it

aroused the enthusiasm of all classes in Italy, and assumed the most varied forms by identifying itself with relics and revivals of the most recondite phases of our complicated history. For, so far as an objective analysis is concerned, the history of the Risorgimento has still to be written. Apart from the fact that from time immemorial all our political problems have been impregnated by our culture, it must be remembered that each of our cities represented not only an entity of general historical value, but a vast sum of the most varied political experience, including democracy and despotism, monarchy and oligarchy, the commune and the *signoria*, feudalism, both lay and ecclesiastical, and other *régimes* as well, with the result that all those memories rose up from the depths of the past and presented themselves to the minds of the patriots as problems or propositions, particularisms or generalizations. Roughly speaking, however, one may say that the Risorgimento resulted from the union of two main streams—one on the Right represented by the philosopher Gioberti and the statesman Cavour, and one on the Left personified by the apostle Mazzini and the leader Garibaldi.

The conflicting elements were reconciled by the monarchy, which was a synthesis of both parties, and Victor Emmanuel founded a new Italian state based on the most ancient and at the same time the most recent national tradition. This tradition had been partly absorbed in the constitution sanctioned by Charles Albert, which was fashioned on the English-Napoleonic model, common to almost all new states in the nineteenth century. Unity having been achieved, however, the political parties in Italy allowed themselves to be influenced by apparent analogies, of a purely dialectical nature, with parties in other countries, and abandoned the national tradition, which should have risen up and inspired the development of the State.

From 1870 onward our politicians, who were suffering from a kind of spiritual indolence, contented themselves with appropriating and plagiarizing the dialectics of foreign parties; they imported liberalism into Italy, together with masonic democracy, socialism, reform, and many other

formulas and systems which were neither in the Italian tradition nor of Italian origin, and which were not informed with a national content nor adapted to the problems of a civilization so ancient and complicated as our own. For although Italy is in her infancy as a state, as a nation she is the oldest in Europe; and there is, of necessity, a great difference between introducing a custom or a political system into Italy and introducing the same custom or system into Chile or the Argentine Republic, or into any new country which is obliged to accept its customs and its political system ready-made in order that it may utilize them in the evolution of a cultural and political tradition later on. This is what has happened in the United States, where the original constitution, based on the European model, has been gradually modified in accordance with the spiritual and practical needs of a great people which was becoming increasingly alive to the national character of its problems.

In all the Italian parties, on the contrary, dogmatic value was accorded only to a few premises of universal value, of which the conception of the nation was at best a function. Thus, setting aside communism, and in many respects socialism also (both of which deny the country theoretically, considering it at most as a survival in the transition toward the "sun of the future"), democracy subordinates the country to the conception of humanity; the popular party places before the idea of country that of a white International; humanitarianism exalts fraternity, equality, and philanthropy above country; and liberalism values liberty more highly. All these formulas, especially when they are adopted by parties which busy themselves with politics for the sake of politics, have in common a so-called miraculous or thaumaturgic quality, by which the adoption of their principal theoretical postulate is claimed to give rise automatically to all the most beneficial and practical consequences. Liberalism, for example, may have its own economic, fiscal, and educational programme, but when it becomes pure politics it withdraws itself from any realistic consideration of contingent problems, and insists on de-

manding the actuation of its central theoretical principle, as if this were about to give rise to immediate universal felicity.

In none of these parties, therefore (and there were no others among us, except a small guard of republicans—a kind of romantic survival of the Risorgimento), did the country or the nation precede their own supreme doctrinal abstractions; besides which, not only did none of these parties derive from a national historical tradition, but not one of them was, by formation or development, characteristically Italian.

Now it is just and legitimate that there should be French democrats and English liberals, even if in theory these doctrines set humanity and liberty respectively before the individual country, because these doctrinal universalities are corrected at home and abroad by the national pride in the character of the autonomy which these theories produce, and consequently in the instrument of penetration and power which it represents. But Italians who are democrats in the French fashion or liberals in the English fashion reveal at least a lack of dignity in so far as the necessary originality and nationality of their political convictions are concerned. When it is a question of technical or practical matters, like a surgical operation or the construction of bridges, the universal criterion may be allowed to have a certain value, because here the functions involved are almost zoological, but in political matters, which are affairs of the spirit, a man demands the devotion of his whole being, with all its component characteristics and requisites, amongst which the national requisite must be, and cannot but be, pre-eminent, dominant, and supreme.

All these doctrines, however, had in common the fascination, simplicity, and facility appertaining to any dialectic or rhetoric of easy and universal comprehension. On the negative side each commanded a real or imaginary adversary—obscurantism of the *bourgeoisie*, capitalism or reaction, oppression or superstition—which in the event of any polemics offered the most flattering and seductive prospect of a successful debate and the exercise of a carefully prepared oratory, oscillating between the dawn and martyrdom

and sunset and the redemption. On the positive side each of these parties established itself on promises, taking care never to make demands on the masses. None of them proposed to demand a sacrifice of the people, but all wished to present the mirage of a future felicity composed as a rule of antithetical terms, such as idleness and well-being, liberty and the State, equality and production, and so forth.

I do not intend to offer the least criticism of the intrinsic content of any of these doctrines, but merely to point out to what a state of degeneracy they had sunk in Italy. So much so that, either because they had certain characteristics in common or because they were of necessity logically and chronologically interdependent, they ended by forming one single system, which, starting from a narrow liberalism, led directly to Bolshevism. And this was so because the process was not even temporarily checked by any interference on the part of Italy, reduced as she now was to an inferior category and regarded as the mere function of some vague but infinitely more important abstraction. In addition to all this the more enlightened spirits, who were free from all danger of political compromise, began to ask themselves with sarcastic curiosity how it could be possible that in Italy, in the birthplace of Roman law and Catholicism, in the nation which for thirty centuries had filled the world with beauty and courage and glory, with strength and faith and ideas, in Italy, the land of saints and leaders, of poets and artists and Popes and lawyers, no purely Italian politic had yet been evolved. Is it indeed necessary—they asked themselves—in the country of Dante and Leonardo, of Machiavelli and Columbus, of Galileo and St Francis, of Innocent III and Michelangelo, of Vico and Cicero, of Volta and Rossini and Julius Cæsar and Napoleon, to go begging political doctrines from all the peoples of the earth, and to borrow them from the imperialistic nations for whom they constitute a powerful instrument of influence? Do our three millenniums of culture and civilization offer us nothing which we have made by ourselves for ourselves? And the certainty that this was so inspired all those who had

no desire to profit by politics with a profound and sorrowful uneasiness.

This uneasiness expressed itself in very different ways, giving rise to manifestations which might be direct or indirect, meditated or impromptu, political or cultural, theoretical or practical, but which almost always originated outside of Parliament. The politics of the new Italy had produced one great statesman only—Francesco Crispi. He alone had understood what a nation like our own owes to itself, and had tried to turn his knowledge to account. He stood alone, opposed by those parties who were incapable of perceiving Italy as a great end in itself, and by those who had formed a humble, servile conception of their country, and he died misunderstood by the greater part of the Italian people. His memory is revered by an Italy which is developing according to his dearest hopes, and with him is honoured another great figure, the enthusiastic and passionate journalist and man of letters, Alfredo Oriani, who was similarly isolated and misunderstood, and who endeavoured in melancholy times to restore to the nation the dignity to which its history entitled it. Crispi and Oriani died in the bitter consciousness of failure. The first, who belonged to an earlier generation, wished Italy to keep alive and turn to her advantage the spirit of the revolution, from which he himself had emerged; but Oriani understood that only a new generation could regenerate Italy and enable her to regain her former greatness.

After the achievement of national unity and the fall of the Right, which had governed from 1848 to 1876, earning for itself the merit of having created all the legislation of the new State, the political life of Italy unfolded itself in a series of events which were either humiliating, painful, or completely tragic. The Congress of Berlin left us empty-handed; we lost the opportunity of combining with England in Egypt; Tunis was occupied by the French; our hesitating colonial policy was marked by two defeats at Dogali and Adua, which filled with bitterness the few people who believed in Italian expansion. Cholera, earthquakes, and scandals affecting the credit of the banks rendered

permanent the state of atrophy to which Italy seemed condemned; there was a confused revolt in Sicily and Lunigiana, and a few years later, in 1898, almost every part of the country was in a state of siege, and bloodshed was common. Finally, in 1900, King Humbert was assassinated, and all these events seemed to indicate that Italy was corrupt, degenerate, and utterly incapable of existing.

After 1900 a radical policy was inaugurated under the new *régime*, and great political, economic, and social concessions were made to the extremists at the expense of a great loss of dignity to the State. Such concessions, by means of which a spurious tranquillity was so dearly bought, were not granted freely and generously as the natural fulfilment of its obligations on the part of a just and clement authority, but were roughly extorted from it as reluctant, grudging recognitions of the rights of the masses. The liberal State was no more than the executor of the desire which was most noisily expressed and the claim which was urged in the most threatening fashion. The only national episode worthy of note during the whole of the socialistic period, until the outbreak of the World War, was the conquest of Lybia, and this was conducted without sufficient resolution and was at the mercy of every fluctuation of policy. Shortly after the concession of universal suffrage denoted the high-water mark of Italian liberty, for in addition to freedom of the Press and freedom of association and assembly, which had been sanctioned by the constitution and was interpreted even more liberally than the spirit of the law provided, the people had now won universal suffrage, with votes for the illiterate and an extended social legislation; all of which was highly incompatible with the traditional circumstances, the logical and political needs, the economic inequalities, and the co-ordination of all the practical and spiritual elements of the national life.

And yet it was precisely in this period, from 1900 onward, that the spiritual malaise of a small number of the Italian *intelligentzia* found its most profound and energetic expression. Giosuè Carducci, Giovanni Pascoli, and Gabriele

d'Annunzio—the three great poets of the new Italy—were by now wholly obsessed by the dream of an imperial nation. Carducci and Pascoli had undergone spiritual crises which obliged them to abandon their previous convictions based on democracy, freemasonry, and the doctrines of Victor Hugo in the one case, and on humanistic socialism in the other. D'Annunzio had begun writing his vigorous national poetry as early as 1891, when he produced the first of the *Naval Odes*. In his later work, which was, in a sense, political as well as artistic, he wavered between utopian visions of Italy, which might differ completely from one another provided they differed also from the reality; and in this he proved himself a true poet, because he gave artistic expression to the growing discontent which beset all the best minds in Italy.

The more studious and intelligent of the younger generation also expressed with increasing frankness their preference for those doctrines and systems which were inspired by individualism, energy, and the recognition of the rights of whatever is truly superior. Thus they applauded Nietzsche, Gobineau, James, Bergson, Blondel, Maurras, and all those philosophers who corroborated their theories or propounded similar ones, for they themselves were in revolt against the vulgar, levelling influence of positivism, and wished to proclaim the truth of those doctrines which recognized the possibility of a superior spiritual autonomy. At the same time Vilfredo Pareto, the greatest sociologist in Italy, was engaged in the composition and publication of a critique of incomparable brilliance and erudition, directed against the socialist system. And here and there, in cities and universities and inns, in books and newspapers and reviews, young men began to cry out against the theories which were so dogmatically pronounced, against the idols which were never discussed, against the bogus intellectual reputations, and, above all, against the scientific, philological, philosophical, and literary impostures which, owing to the blind obsequiousness with which foreign importations were encouraged and received, had gained complete control of official intellectual

circles. They discovered that some of the great intellectual leaders had merely echoed the pronouncements of Italian scholars. Others had occupied themselves with useless inanities, or owed their reputation to originality of such a worthless kind that they were hardly justified in coming to Italy in order to proclaim their theories as the supreme canons of science and art.

The educated youth of Italy became European by means of a merciless revision of values, which intensified its convictions regarding the desirability of its own reaction and the absolute need for an autonomy of national thought. It also confirmed its belief in the complete perfection of our genius, culture, and civilization as compared with that of any other race.

Even in the ranks of the extremists the more enthusiastic and thoughtful young men had discovered their ideal in syndicalism, and had repudiated the sordid materialism of socialism. Georges Sorel was more popular in Italy than in the rest of the world, including his own country, France. Official socialism was deeply compromised from both an electoral and Parliamentary point of view. Moreover, it was too befouled with present transactions and too pregnant with future accommodations to appear attractive to young men in whom subversion was only a desire for independence and regeneration, who wished to work and fight for an end at once concrete and ideal, and who hated all that was indeterminate and materialistic in the degenerate socialism of Italy. These young men desired, above all things, to *understand*, for they believed that only understanding would enable them to realize an ideal which should be neither vague, utopian, nor opportunist, but well-defined, practical, and sincere.

Another important element of Italian life in the pre-War period was represented by irredentism. Trent, Trieste, Gorizia, Zara, and the lands adjacent to these cities were in the hands of Austria, and the tradition of the Risorgimento urged their recovery by Italy. But with the exception of the socialists all the extremists, including radicals, republicans, and the more violent democrats, included irredentism

in their programme for various reasons, among which the liberation of these territories was certainly not the most important. Their real purpose was to perpetuate in irredentism the Garibaldian romanticism of the Risorgimento. This doctrine was of such recent origin that it could not fail to rouse a sympathetic echo in the hearts of democrats, panting with emulation, but it was too antiquated and rhetorical to be included seriously in the foreign policy of a Great Power. Besides this, irredentism was useful to the extremists because it enabled them to embarrass the Government, which was committed at this time to the Triple Alliance. It also served them as propaganda against the dynasty, which, of necessity, appeared subservient to the tyrannical empires, through lust of power.

Lastly this kind of irredentism served to endear democracy to public opinion in France, which had its allies in these parties. The integral problem of irredentism, on the contrary, was adopted as the basis of its programme by another group of young men, called the Nationalists. They were dissatisfied with the undignified and almost servile manner in which Italian politics were conducted, and they wished to remedy such abuses and raise Italy to her former dignity and greatness. The party included journalists, men of letters, clerks, and students, who had joined together and begun to discuss and express their ideas. They met at Florence, and later at Rome, where, in 1908, they founded the National Association and shortly after began a weekly newspaper. The Nationalists were the first to break with the whole class of petty politicians and to declare themselves, in defiance of ridicule, to be anti-socialist and anti-democratic. They were also the first to recognize the national value of Catholicism, at the very time that the anti-clerical faction, blinded by sectarian prejudice, repudiated this great institution, which represented the chief historical glory of the Italian people, and was, moreover, a serious problem not to be ignored or discussed with the abuse and vulgarity common to demagogues. Finally the Nationalists were the first to elaborate for the Italian people, both in their daily polemics and in their patient work of

construction, the fundamental ideas of the State, the country, and the nation.

The ever-increasing desire for national autonomy found a final and audacious expression in Futurism, a movement which typified the general longing for liberty, and was more important at the time for its dynamic qualities than for any tangible results. It was a brilliant and energetic manifestation, eloquent of the exasperation and weariness of the Italian people, who had grown tired of empty formulas, beaten tracks, exoticism, vulgarity, snobbery, and inefficiency. The Futurists rushed headlong into the struggle, armed with all the exaggerations of their programme; but the violence of their polemics could not obscure the fact that they were inspired by a profound intuition of the spiritual poverty of Italy, and that they represented yet another affirmation of the need for complete national independence, as opposed to all universal ideas.

I repeat, all this was no more than insurrectionary literature, directed against a spiritual tyranny; but although it was not yet action in the true and efficacious sense of the word, this literary movement prepared the way for the most splendid results. And, in fact, scarcely did the sanguinary, mysterious, and terrifying World War blaze forth in the European heavens than all who had participated in the exaltation and travail of these literary crises and resurrections drew together in a common recognition. They realized that for Italy the War was a decisive and beneficial necessity, and after the first moment of hesitating amazement they took up a unanimous and resolute stand, expressing their views in newspapers, speeches, and casual propaganda. Later, as their courage increased, they harangued the people in the streets. The laborious preparation of fifteen years of struggle found its justification during the ten months of Italian neutrality, and was valued at its true worth by the recognizant and regenerated nation. The young men who hitherto seemed to have cared only for ostentatious æsthetic innovations now wished to give a proof of their profound faith by participating in the War; and, for the first time,

MUSSOLINI DELIVERS A SPEECH

they had their way. On May 24 Italy arose and unsheathed the sword of Rome.

Benito Mussolini had taken cognizance of the earlier movements in the course of an agitated and chequered existence; he now threw in his lot with all those who demanded this final proof of Italy. Anything was better than cowardice and inertia, and the history and destinies of his country were too glorious to be outweighed by sordid calculations of profit.

Mussolini was ardently in favour of intervention. It was as though a sudden access of self-knowledge obliged him to reveal himself to his countrymen, offering them, as an example, a gift and a stimulus, this enthusiastic conviction which summed up the experience and emotion of a lifetime. As the youth of Italy was led by many paths to one end, so all the conflicting phases of Mussolini's past life were suddenly co-ordinated, justified, and illuminated by the tragic vision of Italy awaiting her supreme and fatal destiny; and in that moment it seemed to this journalist on the threshold of fame that he had existed only to arrive at this decisive issue. And he enlisted as a soldier.

The history of the Italian war does not fall within the scope of this work. Whoever knows the facts accurately and judges them impartially understands what a valuable and decisive contribution Italy made to the victory. The young intellectuals of Italy had enlisted as volunteers; they fought bravely and died heroically. Moreover, even in the army, which constituted the heart of the nation, a few men of every rank, who were by now inured to the fatigues and dangers of war, and who had grown impatient of the devitalizing existence of life in the trenches, joined together in small groups, which the Supreme Command speedily constituted into assaulting parties.

These were the "Brave Ones," and they afforded a fine example of the traditional Italian courage. They purchased the privilege of a less stringent discipline with the honour of taking part only in the dangerous enterprises, and they were all consecrated to death, though the death was beautiful and glorious. The army received its

propaganda through those newspapers which favoured intervention; but too often they spoke of ideas which were unfamiliar to the mind of the Italian soldier, and the "Brave Ones" realized by an intuitive impulse that it was necessary to speak only of Italy. They were inspired by a sublime and primitive realism to direct their courage and energy toward the accomplishment of immediate, individual ends. They felt the need of differentiating themselves from the rest of the army, exceeding the requirements of duty in the interests of honour, offering themselves not merely as a sacrifice to victory, but as an example to the nation.

Italy won the War. If nowadays we happen to glance at some newspaper of the years preceding the World War we are astonished to discover what a profound difference exists between the Italy of that time and the Italy of to-day. Then we laboured with a wretched, petty, provincial policy, compounded of concessions and servility, of tittle-tattle and rhetoric, of miseries and weakness. Italy spoke the echo of a political jargon, and behind her words there sounded no authority of European value, such as results from one of those world-shaking events which epitomize in sorrow and in blood, but also in the most virile self-affirmation, a whole epoch of laborious spiritual travail. To-day the voice of Italy has this authority because she has fought and won the War, and also because all the profound and efficacious spirits who desired war have found in Fascism the logical resolution of their development.

But first other trials, perhaps as arduous, had to be overcome, even while the most seditious forces, actuated by revenge, sought to regain such an ascendancy in Italy as would have sunk her even lower than she had fallen in the saddest days of our history, and abolished all the hopes which the wonderful resurrection had inspired, and all the realities which it had taught men to achieve.

The Italian people received the news of the Austrian defeat at Vittorio Veneto with joyful enthusiasm, but the greater part of the nation was more gladdened by the prospect of peace than by the consciousness of having

achieved a great victory. The Italians, in general, were sensible of a great relief, because the colossal tragedy which had cost so much money and involved so much suffering and bloodshed had at last come to an end; but they seemed unable to appreciate the great national, political, and moral triumph which the victory represented. And yet the victory of Vittorio Veneto had been a great victory. In June 1918 the army had made an obstinate and successful stand on the Piave; this was followed by a counter-attack, which was effected only four months later in October of the same year, and this notable success had been the first indication of, and indeed the decisive factor in, the Allied victory.

Italy, however, seemed more keenly alive to the solace of peace than to the joy of victory; and, without referring to more remote causes, this fact may be explained by a consideration of the way in which internal politics had been conducted during the War. Ever since 1914 many elements in the State had shown themselves opposed to the policy of Italian intervention. Amongst those who denounced war were the pacifists, actuated by a ridiculous humanitarianism; the neutrals, inspired by a dream, peculiar to themselves, of the advantage that Italy would ultimately derive from a prolongation of the conflict; and the pro-Germans, impelled by interest, education, and political convictions. There were also those who in the interests of their party dreaded an Italy rendered more powerful by victory, socialists dreaming of the international solidarity of the proletariat, men corrupted by adverse propaganda—in a word, all those cowards, common to all countries of the world, who are afraid even to see a gun fired off. Moreover, many of these people were concerned for their own private interest, which a war would certainly jeopardize.

Now, when a country is at war it should not deal gently with anyone, for war implies necessarily the suspension of all immunities. The army must feel that the nation is united behind it, not merely to encourage, but also to judge its actions. It must be certain that any weakness will be

censured, and any achievement praised and exalted. And when the honour of the nation and the lives of its soldiers are at stake the Government should strike mercilessly at whatever may in any way threaten the unity of the country thus committed to a trial of which the issues are life and death. Instead of which, the Governments which held office during the War were guilty of weakness. They allowed freedom of speech to those who had no faith in the War, they sanctioned the publication of newspapers belonging to men who hoped for defeat, and they allowed pessimists to air their doubts. The officers at the Front had two enemies to contend with, and the enemy in front was less formidable than the enemy at their backs; for the first was at least brave and fought fairly, while the second was deceitful, tenacious, and beyond all reach of chastisement.

Nevertheless the army had succeeded in opposing the enemy in front as well as the enemy who laid snares for it behind its back. Indeed, most of the soldiers consoled themselves for the discomforts and miseries of war with the thought that in the hour of victory (for nobody at the Front envisaged any other issue to the struggle) they, who were inspired by the new national spirit which the War had excited, and conscious of their services to their country, would give a new direction to the destinies of Italy, and, sweeping aside all the old formulas and ancient compromises, inaugurate at last the powerful unitarian policy which Italy had been waiting for since the end of the Risorgimento.

The relationship between officers and men was, almost always, a friendly one, but the fact that this was so was in no way prejudicial to discipline. Officers and soldiers were exposed to the same hardships and dangers; they fraternized in death, and the soldier was made to understand what undeniable and incomparable results are obtained by subordination and organization. In the hour of victory the Italian people would benefit by this great lesson, and the memory of the War would help to destroy class feeling between the *bourgeoisie* and the proletariat, since their service in the army in these years would engender among

the citizens a feeling of solidarity and of mutual affection and esteem which would outweigh all other differences.

To this must be added the fact that for more than four years the youth of Italy had been removed from politics. Indeed, the majority of the combatants were so young that they had not received the baptism of any party. Trained by war for war, their only allegiance was to Italy; thus they were exempt from the party obligations which hitherto had reduced every citizen to a mere elector. And because they were unversed in political dialectics they would bring a new spirit into Italy, and this spirit would be incompatible with the technical verbiage of the old parties, inasmuch as the high-sounding catchwords of civilization—'justice,' 'right,' and 'liberty'—which had constituted the specious propaganda of war, had no real significance for the combatants, who knew that the Italians had fought solely for the victory of Italy.

After the Armistice the defeatists of every faction realized that they had failed; all their anticipations had been belied by the magnitude and completeness of the victory. And even the political group composed of many of those who had been in favour of war but had not been able to guide it in accordance with public opinion were afraid that the great electoral body of the combatants might repudiate their political formulas and slip out of their grasp. For these it was necessary that, at whatever cost, everything should return as it was before, that the old parties should be reconstituted, bolstered up by a little martial rhetoric, and that the political caste that had been dominant hitherto should conserve its power by means of the theoretical schemes, electoral devices, personalities, and particularisms of pre-War methods of government. It was a question of regaining control of five million electors who were also soldiers, and who might, if they were left to themselves, pronounce a word fatal to any one of these parties—a word born of their martyrdom and their sacrifice, and inspired by their conscience and their ideals, the word 'Italy.'

The possibility, however vague, of such a return to the

past restored a modicum of courage to the defeatists. Moreover, the inauguration of the conference which had met at Paris for the purpose of drawing up the peace treaty soon made it clear to the Italians that their contribution to the common cause would not be rated at its true value, and that Italy would be defrauded of the legitimate fruits of victory. In fact, ever since the end of 1917 some mad spirits had started a campaign in Italy with the object of ensuring that at the peace we should renounce the greater part of the territories which we had entered the War to gain, and even this movement had escaped the vengeance of the Government, with the result that it combined with the activities of the defeatists and the pretensions of the old parties bent on remaining in power to transform the spirit of victory into a sense of gloomy and despairing disappointment.

In short, everyone perceived that Italy would be sacrificed at the Paris Conference, and this fact, while it deprived its adherents of all argument for maintaining the ideal and practical values of the victory, enabled their opponents to point out that, after all, they had not hesitated to sacrifice 650,000 lives, to burden the country with a million mutilated men, and to spend one hundred and fifty milliards of the sadly limited national riches merely to obtain these miserable results. In spite of the victory, the defeatists dreamed only of being able to say that they were right in the end, and that if there had been no war all these ills would have been avoided.

The result was that the Socialist Party, which with unpardonable stupidity had been allowed to preserve its numbers, its revenue, and its organization intact during the War, now had a splendid opportunity of exploiting all the miseries which a war inevitably occasions. The tears of mothers, widows, and orphans, the sufferings of the maimed, the general rise in prices, and the beginning of the debasement of our coinage all offered good matter for argument to those who wished to draw attention to the horrors of war, attributing to themselves the monopoly of the happiness, tranquillity, and well-being of the people. In

the face of all these facts it was easy enough for such persons to remark in accents of gentle, regretful disappointment that if the people had listened to its legitimate leaders —that is, to the leaders of the extremists—all this suffering would have been avoided.

For now a new factor was introduced which made men almost vie with one another in deprecating the War; and this was accompanied by a general evasion of the responsibility for intervention, so that it seemed that most of the members of the dominant political class wished to excuse themselves for having dragged Italy to the shambles. In a very short time, in fact, the extremism, which had never been checked or restrained, had reached its final excesses, and after passing through the most varied phases, each one more violent than the last, had given rise to the formation among us of a powerful and far-reaching Communist Party. The Russian Revolution had put these theories into practice; it had passed rapidly through the same stages, and had culminated in Bolshevism, which exercised its fascination of dissolution over a whole world exhausted by war and the aftermath of war. Lenin was regarded as the new Messiah of a world dominated by egotism and injustice, and men went so far as to believe that if the War had been necessary to the accomplishment of such a redemption it had been a diabolically providential event.

In a country like Italy, where so many strange historical conditions had prevailed, in addition to those already mentioned, the Lenin myth was bound to shine out and conquer the masses. It was furthered most of all by the extremists, who, disregarding the experience of Kerenski, flattered themselves that they would be able to turn the new propaganda to their own exclusive advantage. All the defeatists assisted in the enterprise with a certain complacency, since, merely to be able to say that they had been right, no matter when, they were content (not having obtained defeat in the War) to be those who had at least prophesied a revolution. It was their secret belief that in the hour of triumph the Bolsheviks would treat them with veneration on account of their enlightened prophecy.

The political class which had held power for more than half a century, and which was preponderantly liberal and democratic, lacked the courage to oppose this violent new tendency, either on account of political prejudices or because it lacked the necessary courage, or, finally, because the whole of the existing political system was infected with Bolshevism, which was, in point of fact, the logical and inevitable consequence of liberalism pushed to its final conclusion, and the common denominator of all the social theories of the nineteenth century.

But it was the approach of the election which polarized the whole of the political class toward Bolshevism, and won it the flattery and adulation of the generality. In Italy the legislative powers of Parliament extend over a period of five years, and the last election had been held in 1913. During the War the Chamber had been prorogued for a year by special statute, and so the new elections were due to take place in 1919. All those who had a seat to maintain or a candidature to contest were sensible of the necessity of capturing the sympathies of their constituents by representing the War as a tragic fatality, for which they were in no way responsible, but which they had been obliged to endure because they were misled by illusions and afflicted with a blindness which human energy alone could not cure. But they promised the people better times and sweeping reforms to compensate them for all that they suffered, and they even went to the length of denying the hardships which the other social classes had endured on account of the War.

In short, all the values of the War seemed to be swept away in this insane outburst of terror. The wicked exploitation of past and present misfortunes, the timidity of the middle classes, who were prepared to make the most shameful concessions, the frenzy occasioned by the election, the evil issue of the peace, the depression induced by the campaign of renunciation, the excessive stimulation of people incited against all discipline and social distinctions, the gratified cynicism of the defeatists, the gravity of the economic conditions, the reprehensible weakness of the

Government, the effect of subversive propaganda, which had been allowed to proceed unchecked through cowardice and doctrinal obstinacy, the very reality of the sufferings which resulted from the War and were not mitigated by the pride of victory—all came to a climax in the early months of 1919, spreading far and wide throughout Italy a foreboding of imminent disaster. The parties of the old Chamber were divided into two categories: on the one hand a democratic-liberal party created by Giolitti, the progenitor of the Legislature; on the other a fairly large nucleus of socialists, a group of reformers, a radical group, and a few republicans, and on the Right a group of liberals, some catholics, and an advance guard of nationalists. During the War all these groups, with the exception of the socialists, had supported the Government, but for the most part without conviction. Indeed, in May 1915, when it had seemed for a moment that Giolitti would predominate in Parliament, three hundred deputies of this same Chamber had called on him at his house and left him their visiting-cards in token of their devotion, fidelity, and solidarity. These men, elected in 1913 under the auspices of Giolitti, were prepared in 1919 to commit any action, however base, provided it would keep them afloat, and to make any and every concession to the electors in order to keep themselves and their parties in power.

But meanwhile another event had occurred—to wit, the formation of a new party, the 'Popular' party, which was destined to alter profoundly the composition of the electorate. Don Luigi Sturzo was a clever Sicilian priest and a bold and cunning intriguer, who knew what he wanted and understood how to get it. He formed a so-called 'Popular' party, which, by enlisting the aid of the most humble members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, had succeeded most conspicuously in penetrating to the country districts, where communist and socialistic propaganda was seldom conducted with any real efficacy. The programme which it presented to the proletariat was inspired by a rather elementary mixture of Christianity and democracy, bordering on communism, but with certain additional characteristics

which endowed it with a strange fanatical power. When it was a question of higher polemics, before the other parties and in the cities, the 'Popular' party played on a certain obscurity of programme which rendered it invulnerable, because if anyone accused it of being subversive it took refuge in the alibi of Catholicism, and if a Catholic coherency were demanded of it, it proclaimed its essential unorthodoxy. The important point, however, is that the attitude of the 'Popular' party with regard to agrarian property exercised a great influence over the rural masses, and this was largely due to the fact that the clergy were in great part recruited from the peasant classes. Besides which the new party claimed meritoriousness in the eyes of the supreme ecclesiastical hierarchies, inasmuch as it constituted a tangible and therefore powerful diversion from the modernist tendencies which had so greatly troubled the pontificate of Pius X.

In the midst of the misery and confusion of the months immediately succeeding the Armistice the soldiers had been obscurely aware of the necessity of remaining united and preserving to Italy the values of war, but this survival of idealism lacked all practical co-ordination. Associations, reunions, societies, and groups were, in fact, formed, either of a local character or based on the spirit of comradeship which men were endeavouring to keep alive, or for the purpose of giving assistance and so forth. All these organizations, however, lacked a profound and unifying content, which alone could inform them with the national value which they should have represented. Moreover, in view of the imminence of elections, many of them were electoral organs, and were given over to the interest of party politics, thus losing the character of martial nobility which should have been their peculiar attribute. And meanwhile the first of the demobilized classes were returning home from the Front, and nobody received them with the hymns of praise which belong to a victorious army. Those soldiers who during forty-two months of war had rendered Italy the incomparable service of creating for her a new strength and a new military tradition, who had emerged victorious

from the most terrible war in history by exercising the finest qualities of the Italian race, had now returned to the great towns and humble villages and found everywhere, instead of triumphal arches and the laurels of victory, a sullen hostility to war and a gloomy indifference so far as they themselves were concerned. The demobilization of the army was not a circumstance of pride and joy and exaltation, on account of the duty accomplished, the honour attained, and the victory achieved, but a cold, impersonal, bureaucratic, and administrative fact, of which the only manifestation was the cold and inevitably tardy issue of the civilian outfit and the demobilization gratuity. On his return the soldier was invariably greeted by someone who instilled into his mind the subtle poison of miserable certainties and bitter anticipations, pointing out to him the residue of sorrow and misery left over from the War—mothers, widows, and orphans weeping, houses in ruins and lands untilled, and on the other hand the new rich, the non-combatants, the profiteers of every kind emboldened by the security of their fortunes. Meanwhile pensions and allowances were not promptly paid, and institutions for assisting the families of the fallen, the combatants, and those who had been wounded or decorated were very tardily promoted.

Everything, in short, tended to efface all memory and record of the glorious victory. It seemed that the Italians wished to forget all about the War as quickly as possible, as though it had been an unjustifiable and fleeting madness. They saw only the evil aspects of the conflict, and were incapable of appreciating its sublime and almost epical grandeur. They were frankly ashamed of having taken part in it, of having fought, and of having emerged victorious. And then in the heart of the people there shaped itself a tremendous, implacable, and terrifying question, fraught with menace and despair, and the nerve-racking expectation of a reply which it seemed could only be given by the madness of revolt and destruction: Why?

The question was answered by Benito Mussolini.

In the face of such unbridled disorder everyone who

believed in the divine reality of the nation felt that it was no good trusting any longer in party formulas (especially as none of the Italian parties were doctrinally of national origin), and concluded that no theory could avert the disaster which was about to overwhelm Italy. On the other hand, the criticism born of the spiritual malaise mentioned in the first part of this essay had demonstrated the necessity of inaugurating a mode of thought that should be exclusively and vigorously national. But for the moment there was no such system, and the most important thing was to save Italy by continuing the conflict. The discredit of every political formula and the absolute necessity of the struggle made everyone wish for a man who would assume power and guide the insurrection, because all alike were filled with an irresistible longing to obey. In the midst of doctrinal confusion and material violence everyone condemned liberty and impersonality, seeking anxiously for a discipline and a man who would impose it.

It would be superfluous to recapitulate here the history of our revolution, which lasted from the day of victory to the day of the march on Rome. The points which are essential to the purpose of the present essay are the historical and doctrinal antecedents of Fascism and the immediate causes of the revolution in so far as we have already described them. But it is also essential to know that the revolution was not purely destructive; indeed, it created a new State and a new political doctrine of the "thing in itself," which could not be understood without a knowledge of the conditions from which it took its rise; finally, it brought to light a "Man type" who to-day is renowned in the world no longer as a revolutionary, but as the leader of a nation.

Virgil, who is our first national poet, defined Italy as "*magna parens virum*," and in fact Italy has been in all times the country of the individual, of man exemplary as such; not merely as a man of genius, nor as a hero in Carlyle's sense of the word, nor as a "representative man" in the Emersonian significance of the term, but rather man as a type, as a perfect human product existing in his own right.

Benito Mussolini is one of the most complex of such types which the Italian race has produced; his exact counterpart is to be found only in Napoleon Bonaparte and the tyrants of the Renaissance. The comparison between Bonaparte and the *condottieri* has already been made by Hippolyte Taine, but certain points escaped his judgment which can easily be comprehended if the figure of the Duce is brought into the comparison.

At the end of the Middle Ages, between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Empire was reduced to a mere name, and the great universal idea which it had represented had become an idle judicial and doctrinal formula. The Papacy, which had passed through the crises of the Avignonian exile and the Schism, was declining as a political institution, and the terrifying shadow of the Reformation was appearing on the horizon. Feudalism, embittered and void of authority, represented nothing but the defence of a vain legitimism, which could no longer maintain the justness or necessity of its power, although it had been a profoundly moral influence in the preceding centuries. The municipalities destroyed themselves in struggles and factions, and, rent into parties and families, degenerated into the most sterile democracy. Philosophy was no more than scholastic formalism, dogmatic crystallizations, and the vain play of words and syllogisms. Mankind, in fine, was increasingly suffocated in this struggle between words and passions, between ideological nebulosities on the one hand, which no theoretical force could dissipate, and bestial violence on the other, which no legitimate power could dominate, since neither the Papacy, nor the Empire, nor feudalism, nor the municipality was sufficiently strong to impose its own proper discipline.

Intuitive, instinctive, implicit, the problem of mankind asserted itself, and the cultural Renaissance of antiquity discovered in this disjointed society the example of vicissitudes and revolutions in which men appeared as the exemplary types of humanity. This word, understood in the precise significance which is at the root of our humanism, meant human superiority, and implied man with all the requisites which make him the masterpiece of God, and

which alone appeared to justify the existence of the municipality, the principality, the Empire, and all the forms, in short, of political society. The formulas had become inhuman and even anti-human, and it seemed that man alone —that is to say, the physical and spiritual organism of man— could save society from the tremendous confusion in which it was involved. Men wished to be guided and ruled by one made in their own image and likeness, because they could no longer trust anything that was not human; they desired not only superiority, but human superiority.

It was thus that the tyrants arose. In the midst of all these meaningless survivals the tyrant asserted himself with the force of a prestige at once military and revolutionary. Supported by the people, he bestowed on them the gift of his powerful humanity. In the individual he stirred up the man, bringing into play not only the intellect, with its traditions, memories, reasoning powers, and formulas, but the entire personality. For men longed ardently to obey, but felt now that they could offer obedience only to that which they could understand—that is, to one of themselves who would be able to justify his claim to command.

The explanation of Napoleon's fortune is identical. Between the vain nostalgia for legitimism, the ruined hopes of the Revolution, and the endless nuances of opinion to which these two extremes gave rise after the 9th Thermidor France had grown weary of logomachy, and wished only to obey some secure, realistic, and integral power. The monarchy was not sufficient, nor the Republic, nor the old aristocrats, nor the new demagogues, nor even the hybrid forms which sought to reconcile all these things, for all these things were no more than words, formulas and dialectics, and what was needed was a man who would offer a guarantee to his fellow-men by interpreting and fulfilling their needs in accordance with his own solid humanity, in which everyone might recognize not a pre-ordered system conceived by the reason alone, but an ample elementary analogy of feeling and thought.

And similar to this is the position which under an

historico-political, dynamic, and even mechanical aspect Mussolini has assumed in Italy to-day. From the moment that Kant declared that nothing of what is perceived in space is a "thing in itself," and that therefore the "thing in itself" is unknown and unknowable to us, the entire succeeding century—which may well be called the Kantian century, since even the opposing arguments were inspired by the Kantian doctrine—seemed gradually obsessed by the desire to get away from the "thing in itself." Harmony overwhelmed melody, philology tried to kill literature, method acquired more importance than its subject, and art became independent of its argument. In every way, in short, humanity began to depend on purely formal and exterior values, annihilating all realistic contact between its own thought and the world.

A political explanation of the agnosticism of the past century may be discovered by analysing the electoral system. According to this system, in fact, a candidate is not asked what qualifications he believes himself to possess in order to *be* a member of Parliament, but every candidate has to exert all the qualifications which are necessary to *become* a member of Parliament, and the possession of the latter generally precludes altogether the possession of the former. For in order to dominate a body of electors a man must possess oratorical powers, a capacity for intrigue, a rudimentary aptitude for organization, and an ascendancy over the masses—all qualities which, as a rule, are lacking in the thinker, or even in the man who has merely devoted himself to the development of some serious activity.

It follows from this that the body of politicians becomes not the servant of an idea, but the instrument of abstract dogmatic formulas. And under cover of such formulas interest and egotism—the interest of ranks and parties and the egotism of individuals and parties—gain the upper hand, and the State disintegrates in particularism and atomism. In another place I have had occasion to criticize the liberal State; it is sufficient here to remark that in Italy the whole course of recent history has given the lie to the highly optimistic liberal and democratic belief in the automatic

virtue of ideas and the inevitable propensity of mankind toward the good.

For the liberal democratic *régime* suppressed all spiritual values which might have enabled intelligent men to see evil in what appeared to be good. Indeed, if every end to which man tends is good (an idea which leads to the identification of the good with that which is) it might have been supposed that there would be enlightened spirits who, according to the liberal conception, would guide men by means of their own peculiar standard of values. But democratic liberalism lacked all psychological experience, so that man left to himself, after the automatic influence of the ideologists had failed, lapsed into the most sordid materialism. Thus the formulas of parties removed men ever farther from reality, wrapping them ever more closely in dense clouds of words which were no longer intelligible except as party ensigns and the banners of electoral ambitions. And the "thing in itself"? And the true interests of the people? And the participation of the people in the solution of its own problems? And the value of man as a moral, judicial, and historical entity? All this had vanished. According to democracy, one man is as good as another, for the thing that matters is the ideology, which must remain intact. But when the consequences of all this brought Italy to the verge of ruin the man who had been invoked and longed for appeared, and this man was Benito Mussolini, who, like Napoleon and the tyrants of the Renaissance, was destined to rehabilitate the supreme values of humanity, breathing with the powerful breath of a liberator on the turbid clouds which surrounded Italy.

But the Duce is much more than the exemplar of the Renaissance tyrant. The tyrants lacked the vision which would have made them something more than adventurers of genius. As it was, each one tried to turn his state into a work of art for his own subtle enjoyment, regarding it as a district to be exploited for the gratification of his pleasures, with the result that politics were reduced to a technique, based upon an æsthetic.

This was understood by Machiavelli, who elevated their

technique to the dignity of science and art, magnifying their humanity in *The Prince*, in which he expressed his belief in the necessity of a national militia, thereby implying his conviction that Italy should act for herself. And three centuries later Giuseppe Mazzini preached the same doctrine in order to awaken the nascent national conscience. Nor is the Duce merely another Napoleon. Bonaparte lacked a vigorous and inspiring sentiment, which would have given point and flavour to the whole of his gigantic achievement. He was neither sufficiently Italian nor sufficiently French for his powerful humanity to bear lasting fruit. Perhaps if he had founded the Empire at Rome instead of at Paris the Roman Empire would have reappeared on the earth. But his genius, being devoid of a national content, found no people to sympathize with it and serve it; France recognized him as *the* man, but did not feel that he was spiritually entitled to be her first fellow-citizen.

Mussolini, on the contrary, is indeed the man, in the Messianic sense, which I have already expounded, but he is also the exemplary Italian in whom the people finds its complete representative. Moreover, he is the creator of a national system, teleologically animated by a concrete idea clearly determined in space and time—the profoundly human conception of the nation. During the strange vicissitudes of his life he has been a workman, a journalist, an elementary school teacher, and a soldier, so that he has enriched himself with incomparable experiences. If one reads what he wrote before 1922, the year of his accession to power, one discovers the most flagrant contradictions and the most unbelievable inconsistencies. And yet contradictions and inconsistencies resolve themselves most marvellously into harmonious and co-ordinated expressions of one single resolute will, for they merely reveal the malaise previously mentioned, which troubled all the young men of Italy in the first quarter of the century, and represent tumultuous rebellions against the much more flagrant contradictions and inconsistencies which characterized the whole of our public life.

The truest and most essential consistency is that which

as the result of such a test appears in the man himself, in his nature, and in the type which he represents. Viewed in this light, the life of the Duce is so assured and undeviating that it appears as brilliant and inflexible as a sword-blade. What is the importance of a programme or a battle, of one theory or another, if it is the man who must affirm himself, the man and his rebellion, and the mysterious end to which he consciously tends? Herein are the essential humanity and consistency, especially in an ambience of words and ideas that have reached the stage of decomposition. Moreover, the nation which is to embody itself in his perfected humanity expects all this to be so. It expects the man who undergoes such vicissitudes to become increasingly refined in the process, acquiring cunning in manifold contacts and contests, tempering his spirit in ice and fire, and hazarding his very reason in order to render himself more agile and expert in face of the reality which he is destined to dominate. The dominion of the Duce is thus assured, not as a dictatorship which may signify mere authority and force and be necessary at certain times in all countries, but as a medium of creation, guaranteed on the part of the ruler not only by his passionate nationality, but also by the keen intuition and comprehensive sensibility which he has acquired as the direct result of his tumultuous, varied, and apparently inconsistent existence.

Such an intrinsic, realistic, and human consistency reveals itself in the gigantic labour which the Duce has accomplished in these years during which he has governed independently of any hampering doctrinal preconceptions. And of a like nature were the men of the Risorgimento, and principally Giuseppe Mazzini, who during his apostleship of half a century and in a hundred volumes of writings said all that it was possible to say, without troubling about the contradictions in which he might find himself involved, having for his sole aim the unity, liberty, and independence of Italy, and creating in himself the perfect type of animator and inspirer. On the other hand, it is a fact well worthy of note that Italian philosophy is characteristically practical, and is even applied, so that from Leonardo to Machiavelli,

MUSSOLINI ON PARADE

from Galileo to Vico, from Telesio to Bruno, from Rosmini to Gioberti, the type of the true philosopher and entirely speculative genius has never flourished in Italy, but every thinker seems to have wished to make philosophy serve some concrete end, to adapt it to a living reality, and to render it a means, not an end in itself.

No theoretical doctrine, therefore, has impregnated the programme which Mussolini has evolved. Above all things, he has availed himself of the past and all the realities which it has produced, such as the nation, the family, and capital. None of these things are denied by him, because he recognizes their fundamental possibilities. The unshakable premises of his policy have been, firstly, the conception of the nation and Italy (with all that her thirty centuries of history represent in tradition and reality) as something which necessarily takes precedence of any other spiritual and political entity—a belief which entails the exclusion of all universalities whatsoever from the programme of public endeavour; secondly, the monarchy regarded as a personal dynastic continuity, indispensable to the national unity; thirdly, Catholicism, confirmed as the religion of the State, recognized as the pride of Rome because it is the greatest institution in the world, and admitted as a spiritual force because it perpetuates the highest and most perfect moral law. Having postulated these premises, it is scarcely necessary to indicate the foreign policy of Mussolini, which is summed up in a single precept: to maintain everywhere and at all times the dignity of Italy. A glance at the map of Europe suffices to show the privileged position Italy enjoys on account of the multiplicity of her contacts. In fact, the distance between the western extremity of Italy and the Atlantic is the same as the distance between the eastern extremity and Asia Minor, and the distance between the northern extremity and the Baltic equals the distance between the southern extremity and the Sahara. This illustration of the central position of our peninsula provides the explanation of a great part of our history, even up to the most recent times, and promotes consideration of the necessity for a keen, vigilant, and severely dignified foreign policy.

The nation, the monarchy, and Catholicism are therefore the premises. In order to make them appear vital and capable of logical development the Duce has encouraged the propagation and affirmation of an austere and powerful morality. In so far as such delicate matters can be made the subject of laws, institutions, and propaganda, the Legislature, the Government, and the Fascisti have accomplished it. The regulation of amusements, alcoholism, and blasphemy, the tutelage of the family, the adoption of political demography for the purpose of augmenting the population, checking emigration, repopulating country districts, and protecting maternity and infancy, are a few of the things which have been the subject of laws and provisions, and, what is much more important, have actually been put into force.

With the advent of Fascism Italy has passed from the political phase and entered on the resolutely national period of her existence. And therefore there is only one party among us, the Fascist party, which is so called—although the word implies the existence of other political groups—for the same reason that the Fascist *régime* is still called a revolution—namely, to indicate in the one and the other the dynamic nature of their activity. No other parties exist any longer in the public life of Italy, just as there are no longer any secret associations, such as freemasonry, which in Italy was never more than an incubator of intrigue, an outlet for influences harmful to the autonomy of the State, and a pernicious inversion of the social order. There remains therefore only the Fascist party, for all those party compromises which constituted the sole motivating impulse of Parliamentary and local existence have gradually been eliminated; so far as any consideration of the national reality was concerned these parties produced the effect of many lenses placed one above the other, which, instead of magnifying objects and making them more readily visible, produce nothing but confusion, whereas a single lens enables one to see the object more clearly. The problems of the nation are studied in the same way, through the single-minded consideration of the supreme national interest, without any

reference to the application or exposition of any ideology whatsoever. For Fascism is essentially the absolute realism which tries to discover the "thing in itself" in every argument.

And it seems to me that for such a purpose the sonorous words, liberty, equality, fraternity, which constituted the synthetic trinomial of the so-called immortal principles of '89 no longer have any value, for I believe them to be supplanted by three other words of a higher, purer, and more noble significance—to wit, responsibility, discipline, and hierarchy—which encourage a man to employ all his intrinsic faculties in an efficacious participation in the national life. The State is, for Fascism, an exclusive entity, identified with the nation. Nothing can exist in opposition to the State or outside of the State. And so, potentially, every citizen is first a *balilla*; then an *avanguardista*; and finally a Fascist, a soldier in the National Militia (for the nation is also a military organization), and the member of a syndicate. The legislation of the syndicates has stripped capital and labour of their respective egotisms, elevating and ennobling them until they have become the supreme interests of production—that is to say, of the nation. The workman's ticket and the laws relating to obligatory arbitration, which entail the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs, have restored the relationships between capital and labour to the sphere of humanity and logic, suppressing the class warfare which throughout a century seemed to be the congenital fatality of human society, and which had resolved itself into open hostility toward the State and the nation. In this case also the nation became the supreme arbiter of moral action.

Under the Fascist *régime* the powers of the State are exercised first of all by the King, the head of the State, who together with the dynasty is the personal symbol of the unity and continuity of the nation, and whom Fascism has raised far higher in the veneration of the people than any of the preceding *régimes*. Then there is the Government, the head of which has functions and powers of Chancellor; and Parliament, composed of the Senate and a Corporate Chamber elected by the legally reconstituted corporations.

In addition to these there is the Grand Council, a restricted assembly which represents the depository of the spiritual continuity of the *régime* and is composed of members of the Government, the members of the directorate of the party, and the heads of the economic confederations and other Fascisti hierarchies. This constitutional novelty represents the resurrection of an institution which in the past was formed by all the millennial *régimes* of Italian history, and which is called the Roman Senate, the Grand Council of Venice, the Consistory or Conclave of Cardinals, etc. As in the case of this, its final manifestation, the institution is independent of all genealogical disabilities, and comprises in itself all the true values and all the authentic interpreters of the *régime*.

Here again the human element reappears to take the place of the formula, for the Grand Council is not the custodian of an intangible doctrinal palladium, nor an academy of pedantic wordmongers, but a council of men who are animated by a single disinterested passion, and who are bound not merely to preserve the Fascist tradition (that is to say, its agile dynamism), but also to apply it to the most diverse contingencies, not in accordance with the interpretation of a dogma, but in accordance with the purest and most integral national humanity. And this quality emerges even more clearly in the laws which Fascism has evolved for the discipline of those men who are charged with the functions of government and administration (the head of the Government, the prefects, the mayors of the municipalities, etc.), who are relieved altogether of any obligation either directly or indirectly electoral and consecrated to the fulfilment of their most human and noble responsibility.

The old parties indulged in apocryphal invocations of new times and sweeping reforms, and it must be admitted that both these things have been achieved, though in a manner which differs rather from the original invocation. This, however, is the one point on which the politicians of the pre-War period may be said to have been right; but they were so devoid of imagination that they did not know or guess that a tremendous realistic event like the War was

bound to abolish all the modes of thought relating to substance, and more particularly to form, that had been in force hitherto. For the War had shown that men and not ideas operate in the world, and that in order to operate it is necessary to arrive at a concrete end in an energetic, direct, efficient, and exclusive manner.

Indeed, one of the greatest forces which Mussolini has succeeded in infusing into Fascism is intransigence, and this is perhaps the only formal element (it is also a dynamic element) which enters into our system. In fact, the more Fascism extended itself in the national conscience, the more intransigent it became. One would have expected the contrary to occur; the growing numbers of supporters should, it seems, have produced an amplification of the fundamental doctrines in order to admit of the inclusion of a greater number of opinions, interests, and ideals. Similarly, the more bitter the opposition which Fascism aroused during the revolution, and afterward when it became the Government, the more concessions it should apparently have made in order to pacify its opponents. But if it had done this Fascism would have been no more than a common democracy, which counts heads without weighing them, whereas, guided by the strong hand of the Duce, it has proceeded on its way with increasing courage and rigour, dominating its opponents, and, what is still more difficult, dominating its supporters also.

All this has been accomplished by the realistic resurrection of man. A Government should offer its subjects an ideal at once so ample and so limited that they can recognize and understand it. The brotherhood of man, the universal solidarity, the infinite and affected passivity of the humanitarian ideal, do not possess this elementary character. The national idea, on the contrary, is human, dynamic, and creative, and generates a moral adherence which men feel to be immediate, accessible, and legitimate. A Government should also ensure the well-being of the people, and this is a simple and arduous reality. But there is no need for such well-being to be coloured by a doctrinal vision which makes it no more than a means for the actuation

of a politico-philosophical project relating to the good of the entire human species. If this happens the people will adopt only the catastrophic and utilitarian dynamism of such a project, for no other purpose except the satisfaction of its needs. Fascism, on the contrary, makes the well-being of the people not only the end, but also the chief function of the national ideal, incorporating it with this ideal and ennobling it in such a way that it loses the purely materialistic character which otherwise would degrade it. Fascism does not wish to govern a race of brutalized slaves, but a nation of citizens, conscious of their rights and also of their obligations. And so if democracy means the total participation of the people in the life of the country and the solicitude of the governing class for the material and spiritual well-being of the people, no *régime* has ever been more democratic than Fascism.

To the solution of these enormous problems, therefore, the Duce brings the purest and most acute perceptive powers, a sensibility increasingly disinterested and comprehensive, and a complete freedom from theoretical preconceptions and cerebral commitments and formulas. He governs and legislates with the whole of his personality—that is to say, with logic and sentiment, with will and imagination, with experience and passion, with intellect and taste, expounding in his creation that marvellous historical and æsthetic sense to which all honour is due if the new Italian State appears to-day as harmonious and solemn as an ancient temple, which derives its beauty from its very necessity. And the Italians obey the Duce with joy, and have willingly remitted to him their constitutional liberties, because they feel that these things represent a useless power when they have complete faith in the excellence of the work accomplished by the man who governs them. Without such faith and obedience, and without the personal and secret action of one superior individual, the recent reconciliation between the Church and the State (which is an historical event of such incalculable importance that it could have been effected only by a powerful Government) would never have been possible.

CARDINAL GASPARRI AND MUSSOLINI

It is true that Mussolini is a dictator. But he is not the kind of dictator who uses his power solely to uphold a system of public order from which first the State and then he himself derives profit, nor a Cola di Rienzi who cherishes dreams which neither he himself nor the age in which he lives in can realize. The Duce is a leader, but he is also the creator and inspirer of a political system which is the most nearly perfect, because the most harmoniously Italian, of all those which Italy has experimented with since the achievement of unity. He is not a casual ruler, who owes his elevation to fortune, but an interpreter of the ideal aspirations and material needs of a great people.

Italy experimented with liberalism in the reign of Victor Emmanuel II (1849–78), with democracy in the reign of Humbert I (1878–1900), with socialism in the first part of the reign of Victor Emmanuel III, and from the end of the War till the march on Rome she was on the verge of Bolshevism. Afterward Fascism appeared, which is the first national system in our history. It is also purely dynamic, and resulted from the long and elaborate process which I have tried to explain in the first part of this essay. Fascism grew up out of the War, and in the second part of this essay I have tried to show that it was the necessary consequence of the War, which may be regarded technically as intrinsic dynamism limited to the military event, but representing in its spiritual aspect the most powerful regenerative impulse which the Italian people had experienced for centuries. The reader will perhaps have caught a glimpse also of the way in which Fascism links up with the historical Italian tradition extending from the Risorgimento to the most remote ages. Fascism, in short, has restored man to Italian society, in which it seemed previously that only the fool could exist, and together with man it has brought back the realistic vision of the "thing in itself." It has not been an improvisation, nor a tyranny renewed through lust of power, nor a merely destructive revolution, nor a reaction in favour of a class or a party, but the redemption of a people restored to the consciousness of its destiny.

THE DICTATORSHIP IN SPAIN[1]

COUNT DE ROMANONES

(Leader of the Spanish Liberals. Home Secretary and three times Prime Minister. Remained in Spain under the dictatorship, but was in constant opposition to Primo de Rivera.)

I HAVE always written with the fixed purpose of being sincere, and I believe I have succeeded in this purpose. When I now start thinking and writing about the dictatorship I am more than ever anxious to express myself with absolute sincerity. But the reader will understand that I cannot do this as fully as I should wish. In the first place, frankness is checked by the fact that I have to speak of my own country's affairs to a foreign audience, and this imposes on me restrictions and qualifications; not that I want to hide or veil the truth, but because, outside their natural frame, not all such observations might be exactly and faithfully interpreted. And I am also checked by my residence in Spain, under a dictatorial *régime*, and by the fact that my own thought does not coincide either with the opinions or the principles by which that Government is inspired. Subject as I am to it in my person and my interests, my liberty of expression and of criticism is bound by narrower limits than usual. And in saying this I am already pointing out one of the basic characteristics of dictatorial power wherever it exists, and consequently of that which holds sway in Spain; and in this fact appears one of the reasons—perhaps the most important one—of my nonconformity.

Dictatorship. In Spain we use this word to designate the actual Government, but we use it as a matter of form, because, strictly speaking, the *régime* is not a dictatorship. It is nowise similar to that inaugurated in Greece by General Pangalos, or to that actually exercised in Portugal

[1] This article is translated by Mr J. R. Carey.

by General Carmona. In those dictatorships, which are genuinely such, there is one man, and only one, who assumes all power, without submitting his decisions to the approbation of anyone on a higher political plane or allowing his personality to be overshadowed by any other personality in the country where he rules as dictator. Again, our dictatorship is unlike that of Italy. Mussolini, though nominally subject to the King, assumes in fact all authority, not by virtue of the royal confidence, but as the head of an organized political force—the Fascist militia—which not only dominates the State, but declares itself the only legal State and the only permanent power over everything and everybody. In this way Mussolini, the delegate of that militia, the incarnation and synthesis of all the powers of the State, has created in Italy a situation which recalls that of the Mikado, whose powers have for a long time lain dormant in Japan.

Nothing of this exists in Spain. Here General Primo de Rivera, holding the office of Prime Minister (President of the Council of Ministers), has above him, legally rather than practically, the King.[1] He governs with the confidence of the King, who conferred the office on him, and with the *presumed* confidence of the country. Not only does he adopt his decisions in the name of the King, but he submits those of any importance to his sign manual. It is a fact, and the dictator himself proclaims it, that the most solid of the national forces are well affected toward the King. At any moment they would follow his inspirations, and would lend him their resolute support in order to carry out his decisions should anyone attempt to resist them. The political force known as the Patriotic Union is not a militia after the Fascist model, and far from being the basic support and the source of the strength of General Primo de Rivera, it is an inorganic conglomerate, created by the General from his seat of power, by means of the direct action of the Civil Governors of the provinces; its vital force is General Primo de Rivera himself, and it will live just as long as he remains in power.

[1] See Postscript, p. 270.

The Government *régime* in Spain, then, is not a dictatorship, but an absolute monarchy, since with the exercise of power by the monarch, through the Council of Ministers named by him, the control of Parliament and the Press has been removed, the first being eliminated and the second subjected to a censorship. Likewise there has disappeared the limitation imposed on legislation which was previously approved by Parliament and then sanctioned by the Crown, because to-day legislative functions are assumed entirely by the King and his Government, without the participation of any other organism in the country. Furthermore, the Government, by means of the royal sign manual, has given itself faculties for proceeding outside the laws in such circumstances as it deems exceptional, creating for a concrete case and a precise moment the norm to which it pleases to adjust its conduct. Yet again, the same Government has assumed to itself the right of non-fulfilment of the judgments of the courts in cases of conflict between the decisions of the administration and private individuals when the judicial verdict has been favourable to the latter.

There is not, then, in Spain a dictatorial *régime* properly so called—that is to say, a dictatorship exercised by General Primo de Rivera implying the submission to him of all other political powers. What does exist is a *régime* of monarchical government, identical in substance to that of the last kings of the house of Austria in Spain, without the limitations then imposed on absolute power by social circumstances, the lesser efficiency of the State, and the existence of strong consultative bodies.

This *régime*, which, in accordance with custom and for the sake of brevity, we shall call a dictatorship, implied from the first moment of its installation, September 13, 1923, the annulment of the Constitutional Law of the Spanish monarchy, promulgated in 1876, and the destruction of the political parties hitherto existing. An event of such magnitude was not brought about in a moment. It was the work of complex and powerful causes in operation for a number of years. These causes were in great part analogous to those existing in other countries, and producing with

greater or less intensity similar effects, as is shown either by the political phenomena which have appeared in these countries (the process being more advanced among the Southern peoples of Europe) or by the language adopted by some portions of public opinion, particularly on the extreme Right, even in countries like England and France, where the Parliamentary *régime* inherited from the nineteenth century still continues on a solid basis.

The first of these causes is a social phenomenon, and consequently lies deeper than mere politics, which are themselves in turn the effect of economic causes touching the very roots of society. The change consisted in this: the constant and rapid growth in numbers, political power, efficiency, and organization of the working classes, and the proportional decline in numbers, vigour, and cohesion of the middle classes, either because some portion of these last, growing wealthy, have entered the ranks of the upper *bourgeoisie*, or because the greater portion, becoming poor, have taken their place among the proletariat, and identified themselves in feelings, aspirations, and ideals with the organized labour element. Hence the lower middle class, which in Spain as in all countries formed the body and the nerves of the liberal parties, has been split in two, a portion of it going over to the conservatives and the other portion falling within the orbit of the socialist, or at least the labour, movement. These are the causes of the weakness and the progressive exhaustion of liberal parties in Spain, as elsewhere, and of the creation of a social state in which the harmonious evolutionary process of liberalism has weakened and given place to violent tendencies and to the possibility of collision between the conservative elements, threatened and rendered anxious by working-class demands, and proletarian elements, who, encouraged to-day by what has happened in Russia, and distrustful of the practical efficacy of social reforms, preach direct action for the conquest of political power. In this way communist propaganda has blossomed into the dictatorship.

This social evolution manifested itself during latter years in an intensified workers' agitation, which in Spain

caused serious injury in all economic activities, and gave rise to constant difficulties to the Parliamentary Governments, which, both by reason of the nature of the system—one of balance and mutual agreement—and on account of the weakening of the parties supporting them, proved unable to stand up to these agitations and to keep them in check. All this served to create among those social elements who took no direct part in politics a state of alarm, of disgust with and aversion from the constitutional Governments and political parties. It made them believe, on mistaken grounds, that the impotence of these Governments to restore complete social order in the country was due not to the ample causes I have mentioned, nor to a powerful and inevitable social evolution, whose motive forces lie deep in contemporary civilization, but to the personal incapacity of the politicians who assumed power. This was a short-sighted, superficial outlook on affairs, due to lack of observation of social and political phenomena, but quite understandable as being the interpretation which costs least mental effort. This kind of imputation and this reaction on the part of the elements who felt themselves injured or alarmed by social unrest have not been exclusive to Spain. The same language and the same ideas with regard to the Parliamentary system and constitutional politicians are found everywhere to-day, and are used by both extreme Right and extreme Left in countries like France and England, where the history of Parliamentarianism is so long and so glorious.

The ruinous progress of these social agitations, the continuous attack on constitutional organisms, and the insufficient support offered to those organisms, not only by public opinion, but also by those institutions which might most efficaciously assist them, initiated the decomposition of the political system and the general discredit of the Parliamentary *régime*. Consequently the breaking up of political parties, the cinematographic succession of ministries, the obstructionist work of certain minorities, the violence of Press criticism, and, finally, the opposition of the army to constitutional Governments and political parties—an opposition which bordered on indiscipline—deprived the

governing body of power and authority at the precise moment when it most needed them.

All this resulted in insuperable difficulties for the Governments and in a weakening of their powers of direction. Faced with the complexities of the social movement rendered more acute by the Great War, constitutional government suffered as a political organism from positive impotence due to the causes I have just enumerated. Parallel with the decrease in the possible efficacy of Governments there was an increase in the acuteness and difficulty of the problems raised by the actual circumstances of our country. These were mainly three:

(*a*) The war in Morocco, by this time chronic, in which we had suffered serious reverses. Responsibility for these lay not in the deficiencies of the army, which was quite capable of subjugating the Kabilas of the Rif, fierce enemies as they were, nor in the irresolution of Governments whose earnest wish it was to terminate this war, thus removing the menace that hung over the mothers of Spain and lightening the financial burden which such a war entailed, but in the actual state of public agitation and the attitude, determinedly hostile to any military action in Morocco, which was shown by elements of the extreme Left and by many of the Spanish middle class. Against these it was impossible for the will and the opinion of a Parliamentary Government to prevail when unassisted by the confidence and support of other elements—especially the army itself—opposed to such an agitation.

(*b*) The Budget deficit, a problem insoluble except by the strengthening of public contributions by an increase in taxation, a measure beyond the reach of a Parliamentary Government which was not supported by the unwavering confidence of national opinion.

(*c*) The extreme forms of social agitation, which displayed themselves in towns like Barcelona by numerous and repeated syndicalist outrages, but which had less serious echoes in most other Spanish towns; outrages against which Governments struggled during the years of syndicalist supremacy without being able to extirpate them, though

it cannot be doubted that this struggle paved the way for the final extinction of this odious outburst of crime.

All this made dissatisfaction more widespread, and inspired fear in the well-to-do and middle classes; not personal fear, but fear as to social stability. The wealthy classes, and those not wealthy whose interests were bound up with them, or who were in need of the stabilization of social order for the exercise of their economic or intellectual activities, dreaded lest, with the progress of agitation on one side and of weakness on the other, the social edifice would crumble, to be followed by decomposition and, at no distant date, anarchy. Such a state of affairs was without reason prophesied by the pessimists and by those interested in the advent of a new political situation. A portion of the clergy —so influential in some sections of our population—joined these trumpeters of alarm. The fires were fed by social and political outcasts and by those fishers in troubled waters who were numerous in every country after the War. Hate was concentrated on the political elements, who were made to stand all the blame for such a condition of affairs. Barcelona was a suitable centre for these ferments of hatred, because it was there that the greatest number of syndicalist crimes had been committed, and because its middle classes, hostile for many years previously to the national political parties, had continued preaching and longing for the destruction of these parties and the political *régime* of Spain, in the belief that they would thus favour their aspirations toward autonomy. The Barcelona garrison, very numerous by reason of the importance of that town, had gradually become steeped in such ideas. At the head of that garrison was General Primo de Rivera, a man of whose qualities I shall later offer a sketch. Outstanding among them are force of decision and a definite vocation for politics, which enabled him, then and afterward, to endow his most important actions with a character of improvisation and unpremeditation, though actually they were neither improvised nor unpremeditated. Not only are they dictated by adequate forethought, but he knows how to ensure for them in advance the assent and support that are necessary to their

GENERAL PRIMO DE RIVERA

success. General Primo de Rivera, when everything was ready, notified the Government of his state of revolt. The Government being faced with such an outstanding personality as the Captain-General of Catalonia, and with those military elements which were lending him their decided support, it fell to the King to choose between one and the other, by granting the Government the faculties, necessary under the constitutional *régime*, for the restoration of discipline, or by refusing them. The King chose the latter course. From that moment the bloodless revolution triumphed. General Primo de Rivera was two days later invested with the office of President of the Council of Ministers, and began the exercise of absolute power, which still lasts.

General Primo de Rivera is far from being a commonplace figure, and in the five years during which he has occupied the position conferred on him by the King, though not exempt from great errors and mistakes, which this is not the place to enumerate, he has revealed qualifications which it would be puerile to deny. He is intelligent, quick to comprehend, spontaneous in speech, with all that liveliness of address characteristic of his native Andalusia. He is capable of hard work, is a man of decision, quick to take a resolution, and ambitious to leave his mark and his name in Spanish history. Mentally his level is that of the Spanish man in the street, from whose ideas and feelings he does not separate himself, so that a great many of the Spanish people, though certainly not the majority, feel that he is their faithful and pleasing interpreter. In the sum total of his qualities he is greatly superior to all the other military men who might possibly succeed him under the present *régime*. Endowed with acute political sense, he manœuvres within the complex and changing atmosphere of public life with a skill not generally found in the soldier, but rather in the specialized, professional politician—that is to say, in those accustomed to struggle among the stormy seas of a system based on public opinion and Parliamentarianism.

At first he had the tact to assert that he would retain power for only a short period, indicating three months as the duration of the abnormal condition then being imposed upon

the country. This was tactful because it kept resentment in suspense, toned down reaction, and tranquillized men's minds by inviting them to await events. Since then he has granted to himself, presumably with the consent of the King, repeated renewals of his term of office, which he will continue to prolong indefinitely. The dictator has not failed on frequent occasions to use violent and insulting language against representative men of the former *régime*, downright attacks which, apart from other more fundamental reasons, brought about their separation from him.

In more recent times, in the midst of these harsh judgments, there is becoming apparent in General Primo de Rivera some slight desire for cordial relations and reconciliation, but this is not possible. Those of us who place above every other consideration our loyalty to the Parliamentary system and constitutional legality would rather lay down our lives than come to terms with dictatorship.

Five years have now passed. Public feeling, inclined at the beginning to be favourable to the new *régime*, has undergone a change. In my opinion—and I believe it is unprejudiced—dissatisfaction and discontent are to-day widespread over the great part of Spanish opinion. It is difficult to measure the extent and intensity of that dissatisfaction, because it cannot be exteriorized either in the Press, on the platform, or by any other method of expressing the general feeling. The Government affirms the contrary. This is the practice, and perhaps the duty, of Governments as long as they remain in power. But I am firmly convinced that the Government is mistaken, and that in Spain the majority of people are opposed to it. They would see with pleasure the end of this *régime*, and would welcome the revival of the system of judicial guarantees and relative liberty for the citizen.

The principal cause of public discontent is the increase in the burden of taxation. The Exchequer, the county councils, and the municipalities have increased taxes and imposts in such a way that the country lies crushed beneath them. And this excess of taxation has been specially ill-conceived in that, following the traditional methods in

Spain, it has made demands which are prejudicial to the free exercise of productive activity. It has made the situation more difficult for the wealth-producing classes, and almost desperate for the lower middle classes, with their small industries and trades, so that by reason of the gravity and permanency of the crisis they are rapidly swelling the ranks of the proletariat.

Add to this the excesses of a policy of intervention in economic affairs which reaches the extreme of prohibiting the establishment of new manufactures and the extension and improvement of existing ones; the formation of numerous trusts and monopolies; the multiplication of restrictions based on the protection of the worker; and the successive burdens which this social policy imposes on the employer. Furthermore, all those Spaniards who are not completely divorced from the intellectual life are thwarted in the desire to express their thoughts freely, to enjoy that security—much preferable to the patriarchal tolerance of Governments—which judicial guarantees of citizenship afford, and finally to take their share in the direction and administration of their own country. They desire this as free citizens, as legal persons, as men fully conscious of their social dignity, and protest against the government and administration being confined, by the supposed acquiescence of the country and the express delegation of the Crown, to a minority which, whatever its intentions and its desires, has shown no more proof of capacity than the rest of the citizens, and has no better right to rule and govern.

I do not wish to minimize the successes obtained by the dictatorship during the last five years. These successes correspond exactly to the causes which originated this form of government; causes which suggested to many the necessity for the assumption of governing power by a strong authority, inasmuch as the constitutional weakness of previous Governments prevented their solving the problems raised. This strong authority was formed with the moral support of the classes enumerated above, and its exercise of power has resulted, as was natural, in the solution of their problems —this is what we understand by the successes of the

dictatorship. These were, in the first place, the suppression of syndicalist crimes and the reduction of labour agitation resulting in strikes. Secondly, the conclusion of the war in Morocco, by means of energetic military action in combination with France, and carried into effect with self-sacrifice and heroism, which the country gratefully acknowledges, by all the ranks of the army operating in Africa. Finally, the wiping out of the Budget deficit by the simple and well-known expedient of increasing taxes, without introducing into taxation any of those fundamental and essential reforms easily accessible to a dictatorial power, and furthermore by means of the financial fallacy implied in adding to the ordinary Budget an extraordinary one, to which is transferred expenditure which has no title to be called extraordinary.

These successes have been made possible, in the first place, as has been said, by a greater display of strength in the organ of government; and furthermore because General Primo de Rivera, as must be admitted, has realized more than the previous rulers the extent of the passivity of public opinion in Spain, and has also penetrated deeper into the psychology of the King. These are teachings which can be of great value for the future.

The main failure, to my mind, is in the economic and fiscal order. This is not apparent in all its intensity because at the same time as the results of the errors are produced their force is counteracted in great part by the efficacious development of national wealth brought about in three ways —by the social peace obtained, thanks to the vigorous action of the authorities; by certain concentrations of productive activity beneficial for the moment, though harmful later on; and by the undertaking of numerous public works through national or local credit, which if a present benefit are a mortgage on the future.

I dare not include among the successes or failures anything affecting the problem of Catalonia. In that region there has existed for centuries a deep-rooted aspiration toward autonomy. Has this been extinguished, as the Government affirms, or reduced to an insignificant sectional sentiment? Or, as others maintain, has the spiritual divorce

between Catalonia and the rest of Spain, though pushed underground to-day, been in reality made absolute? And in the first case, is the triumph of uniformity and of assimilation to Castile a happy event or an error? Is national unity, which all Governments ought not merely to defend but increase, better brought about by uniformity of laws or by cordiality of sentiment? Should political and administrative decrees adapt themselves to economic and social differences, or should they override these until they are wiped out? These are problems which still remain unsolved. I shall not attempt to say that they have been solved by the dictatorship either for good or evil.

I am opposed to the dictatorship for all those reasons which impel thereunto a man of liberal sentiment and convictions, but furthermore because it represents an unnecessary break of continuity in the life of Spain. It has created a *régime* of absolute monarchy, for which it will be hard to find a successor, because for its existence it requires a mentality similar to that of General Primo de Rivera, who, perhaps unconsciously, has carried out an exclusively personal work. The succession must be entrusted to social forces organized for political purposes, and such are nonexistent. The Patriotic Union is not such a body; it is merely a personal following, more or less numerous and enthusiastic, of General Primo de Rivera. Both one and the other are like those shooting stars in which the nucleus is accompanied by a cloud of cosmic dust, extended through space, the nucleus being General Primo de Rivera, and the cosmic dust the Patriotic Union. When the former dies out the latter will be dispersed. A political party capable of exercising power is not created by the official gazette. Parties which take their rise from the official gazette are created by the vital heat that the possession of the gazette produces. When that heat is lacking the parties die from cold. The Patriotic Union, then, in my opinion, is a nonentity. It is a mere following which might equally well attend on anyone who is in possession of power.

In the political order the dictatorship is exercised in such a way as to impede the organization of social forces of

political expression. To be otherwise there would be need of a reasonable margin of liberty for the purpose of propaganda and elections, even though these elections were only for local organisms.

For a monarchist, as I am, there is another motive for aversion from the dictatorship—namely, that it inflicts grave damage, because it inevitably throws on the King all the responsibilities of the dictatorship. It is true that General Primo de Rivera very handsomely takes them on himself by uttering words and performing actions which some might think due to personal vanity, but which may be the result of loyalty to the throne. But to no purpose. The assumption of responsibility by ministers is part and parcel of the Parliamentary *régime*, itself derived from the national will, and the ministers being delegates of Parliament, when they assume responsibility for the King's acts the real accepter of responsibility is the nation, by means of its delegates. But under an absolute *régime* this cannot be, because the authority for the act emanates from the King. The initiative is legally and virtually his, and if the minister disapproves the King removes him and finds a substitute at will, without submitting the difference of opinion to Parliament or country. Hence, by virtue of that irrefragable and eternal logic which rules history and moulds the conscience of peoples, under absolute monarchy responsibilities are always assumed by the King. The voice which proclaims them remains for long silent, but some time or other it rises about the tumult of social rumours, and the nation then speaks to pronounce its judgment. And those responsibilities, implicitly assumed by the King, make the change of *régime* gradually more difficult in proportion to the passing of time.

What will be the way of escape from the present situation? General Primo de Rivera announces that by 1931 a constitution will be elaborated, with organic laws complementary to it and a body of political laws; that the constitution will be submitted to a national plebiscite, and when approved the power will be handed over to the conglomerate known as the Patriotic Union, a body which rejects the

name of political in order to style itself a League of Citizens—a mere question of nomenclature. Will this be the way out? I doubt it. But this belongs to the region of the problematic and the circumstantial. I merely assert that, in my opinion, the way out will not be found through a social upheaval; the Spanish people will not support it. One normal method would be the electoral renovation, even if by two stages, of the municipalities and the county councils, thus facilitating the organization of political forces genuinely sprung from the interests and the will of the country in such a way as to form nuclei of opposition to the Government—an opposition carried out with all the prudence demanded by the present delicate political situation. This opposition would in time call upon those forces to which the country would have given most support to succeed the present Government in the direction of the State. Those forces would not fail to allow a sufficient space of time to pass so as to permit the evolution of public affairs to reach a stage when, without danger to any class, Parliamentary elections could be held, in order that Parliament (Las Cortes) might draw up a new constitution for the monarchy, maturely considered, openly discussed, and approved in legal and Parliamentary fashion.

Be this the future or not, I myself feel neither pessimism nor discouragement. The Spanish people, as a race, has native energies and incalculable capacities for resistance, demonstrated in the worst crises of its history, and has at its disposition great and inexhaustible natural resources. With such elements, in the long run, all difficulties can be overcome. For that reason, without venturing much on prophecies as to the future, I am convinced that Spain will reconstitute and reorganize herself in normal fashion. She will come out of this crisis, and by force of that same determination which animates her to-day she will be in the future, as, in consideration of her history and her actual capacities, she deserves to be, an important and influential element in the fulfilment of the destinies of mankind.

Postscript

The dictatorship ended before General Primo de Rivera expected. He was powerless in face of the protests from all social classes against the spirit and procedure of his system and their refusal to submit any longer to a *régime* of silent inactivity. The public uneasiness, to the reality of which we previously directed attention, had by the beginning of the present year reached an alarming stage. The dictator and his followers, unwilling to admit this, continued their policy of privilege and violation of the laws, varied by the delights of a veritable orgy of spendthrift expenditure.

It was impossible for the situation to be prolonged further. The censorship was powerless to prevent criticism, which, as in all periods of duress, took the form of clandestine fly-sheets and brochures, or of excited discussions in academies and other centres of culture. These reached their climax in university circles, the holders of professorial chairs having specially suffered from the tyranny of the dictatorship. Nothing was now safe, nothing respected. Spain, with its great traditional resources, had been driven into liquidation as the result of a system which, as we now realize, was more cruel than we supposed, for more cruelty is involved in the suppression of legality and citizenship than in the shedding of blood and in material losses. At this moment, when the dictatorship found itself in an atmosphere of suspicion, without the moral authority or the force necessary to resist the attacks of the united front formed practically throughout the country, it sought to find support on the solid foundation of the moderating power—*i.e.*, the King. But this support too was withheld from it with a firmness that left no room for doubt, and the whole machinery of this political system came crashing to the ground.

We have not ceased to insist on this last point, and we here repeat it once again. The dictatorship has fallen by the act of the King, a free act of his will, though perhaps too long delayed. The King, exercising his sovereign authority, supported by all the representatives of culture and industry in Spain, who for six long years have suffered under the

dictatorial *régime*, has brought to an end this chapter of Spanish history in a dignified and democratic manner which will win him the sympathy of those whose feelings of resentment had, with just cause, been stirred up against the treatment they received from the dictatorship.

It is still difficult to pass complete judgment on the evils of the *régime* now disappeared. So many and varied were its aspects that it would require long and patient study to be able to deal with them all. But what must at once be urgently insisted upon is the evil effect the system has had on the social and political forces of Spain.

With the exception of its success in the pacification of Morocco, we find during the dictatorship no evidence of its tackling a problem with the firm determination of solving it in accordance with modern ideas. It had no clear vision of the realities, no thought for the future of Spain. It showed little skill in its handling of grave questions, seeking to escape the issues by an exaggerated optimism and indifference. From the start it had no roots in popular opinion, no support from democratic sentiment, and it died from the effects of that same silence which it had imposed upon those whom it considered as its subjects, whereas they were the free citizens of a country, for the time being muzzled and bound by force.

The supreme audacity of the dictatorship was the persecution to which it subjected outstanding figures of the intellectual life of Spain. The banishment and imprisonment of such men definitely lost for it the remnants of goodwill that it had retained. Its ironical and depreciatory references to the capacity of important elements in the universities made clear its own low intellectual level and gave occasion to a European protest, made manifest in a Press campaign in the columns of important journals. The banishment of Unamuno and his removal from his chair in Salamanca was possibly the greatest error made by the dictatorship, and certainly the greatest blot on the country's good name. Consequently the protest was not merely internal, but, extending to foreign countries, produced something like an international boycott.

In the motley exhibition of mistakes and stupidities which the dictatorship offers to posterity we must not forget its tenacity in persecuting and assailing all those who would not lend themselves to its machinations. Its only method for the solution of problems was the employment of force. The majority of its servants were ill-prepared to exercise any function of government. They boasted of their non-political character at the very time when they were building up the worst form of politics, based on extra-legal authority and bearing the stamp of intense and bitter personal feeling. The result was the creation of political 'bosses' in the provinces, who, by their interference in the town councils, obstructed sound local administration.

The dictatorship styled itself a *régime* of law and order, and proclaimed that its purpose was to give new vigour to the springs of morality. By sowing the seeds of disorder it brought disturbance not only on the civil population and into the homes of many distinguished and honourable individuals, but into the army itself, by causing internal dissension and discord, which made themselves felt outside. In the moral order it so upset the ethical basis of all State polity that Spain has never passed through such a period of financial instability; a fact made clear by the official statement recently issued by the present Minister of Finance. It is there plainly shown that whatever sources of credit the system boasted of possessing were a mere fiction set up in order to make possible the continuance of a costly and showy existence.

We are willing to believe that the burden of the true state of affairs was, during the past few months, turning General Primo de Rivera's thoughts in the direction of a withdrawal from power. But these sentimental crises were of short duration. They were not met with encouragement by his followers, who, far from pointing out to the dictator in its stark truth the impossible position in which he had placed himself, contributed by their insincere optimism to strengthen the illusion in which he had lived since his entry into power.

Primo de Rivera was the victim of his own creation.

Both author and actor in the drama, he was yet unable to foresee the *dénouement*, which caught him unawares, as in the case of the most ingenuous hero of the classical theatre. He trusted too much to the fidelity of his friends and to the efficacy of the political machinery which he had set up. He had brought himself to believe that the Unión Patriótica was an organization adequately equipped for the assumption of the responsibilities of government. He lacked the historical sense and the political experience necessary to recognize that strong parties are not organized by an act of force, nor constituted by the assemblage of a handful of ambitious men, ready to swallow any political potion and to fit themselves into any political uniform. He did not realize that a nucleus of opinion, in order to be propagated, needs to be furnished with a programme—the basis of every political dogma—and that this programme must be supported and explained by men of proved mental and moral responsibility. And so the Patriotic Union crumbled away a few days after the fall of the dictatorship, no cohesive forces being found sufficient to hold it together.

The death of Primo de Rivera after the downfall of the dictatorship may be taken as a symbol of what the latter represented as an idealistic force. It appears first in a furtive way, without any inspiration from the nation's conscience; it continues at all times divorced from the mind and thought of the age, and it falls by one of those royal decrees of which it launched so many; but the decree in this case had the backing of public opinion. It was this agreement between the two sovereign powers which signed the death-warrant of the system, a death-warrant which was to become, a few days later, a tragic reality for the creator of the system. One and the other had reached such a stage of interpenetration that they became one and the same. The dictator was unable to survive the dictatorship. The system he left as an inheritance could not be administered by any of his allies, who may excel in audacity, but fall short of the skill required for leadership of any kind.

I am sincerely of opinion that Spain has entered upon a period of political redemption. The present Government

is advancing in normal fashion toward the re-establishment of laws and constitution. The elections of deputies to Congress must be an example of sincerity, so that the country may send to Parliament the men deemed most worthy of representing it with dignity. We must give to the world a proof of our political morality, thus wiping out the stain of our excessive submission during the six long years of the dictatorship.

Parliament must sit in judgment and issue its verdict on matters which are still under the protecting shadow of impunity. It must form itself into a tribunal of consciences and render its decisions with strict justice. Thus it will be the furnace in which the political future of Spain is to be forged, for from this great assessment of responsibilities those whose conduct has been untarnished will come forth strengthened, those whose guilt is established will succumb.

The country looks forward anxiously to the assembling of Parliament, so that judgment may be pronounced in the case that was opened with the beginning of the dictatorship. The judgment of Parliament must be in accord with the will of the people, which henceforward is inevitably bound to prevail. In this long period of exclusion the country has stored up experience and has strengthened its sense of citizenship. No one can again juggle with its problems or assume tutorship over its destinies. This Parliament must be the source from which the true historic consciousness of Spain will spring.

MADRID
April 1930

THE PROBLEM OF DICTATORSHIP AND TURKEY TO-DAY

KURT KOEHLER

(German journalist, friend of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, with a profound knowledge of Turkey.)

THE story of Turkey constitutes a strange phenomenon in the vicissitudes of nations which we briefly call history. Once upon a time a certain clan, hard pressed by neighbours in the east, moved forward in a westerly direction, crossed Persia, reached Mesopotamia, and entered the service of a kindred clan, the Seljukians, who, in the eleventh century, had established a mighty empire in Byzantine Asia Minor. After having fought successfully against the Byzantines they were invested by the Seljukian Sultan with lands in North-east Asia Minor adjoining his own territory. Toward the end of the thirteenth century this same clan, which was then called after Osman, its chief at the time, settled in this new territory, close to the place now called Yenischehr. It is estimated that the Osmanlis at this period numbered about 50,000. A century later they had already surrounded the ancient Byzantine Empire, and, after severe fighting and a prolonged siege, had moved their capital to Brusa, and thence to the town of Adrianople, which they had just captured. At the end of another century Constantinople, which for over a hundred years had resisted all attack, became the seat of the Osmanli Sultans, the great empire of the Serbians was overpowered, and the Christian Crusaders annihilated in battle. The empire of the Osmanlis now extended as far as Syria and Armenia; it included the territory of Osman's former masters, the Seljukian Turks, and had recovered from the severe setback its development had suffered through the devastating onslaught of Timur i Leng.

The following centuries brought further fabulous accessions of power to the Osmanlis. Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt bowed beneath the yoke of the Sultan Selim, surnamed the Strong, who in 1517 received the dignity of Caliph at the hands of the weak descendants of the Abbasid dynasty, and coupled it with the title of Emperor. Twelve years later Suleiman the Magnificent led the Turkish hosts for the first time as far as the walls of Vienna. His captains spread terror from Algiers to Tunis, as well as at sea and along the coast of Western Europe. Persia too felt the power of the Osmanlis, before whom the whole world quaked with fear.

But this was the last phase of a power which, with the exception of the rapidly formed and rapidly destroyed gigantic empires of Asia, had been equalled only by that of Rome. Slowly but surely stagnation and decadence set in. The empire of the Osmanlis had been built on conquest, not on the maintenance of conquered lands. And at a moment when, owing to the disappearance of its powerful Sultans and to the increasing strength of the European Powers, its further extension was arrested, warlike prowess alone proved insufficient as the foundation and mainstay of so gigantic an empire. When in 1683 the Turks appeared before Vienna for the second and last time it was clear to all who knew the Osman Empire that, even though the Turks might secure a transient success, Christendom no longer had anything to fear from this state, which was crippled by internal weakness. The following centuries witnessed a slow, fluctuating, but steady decline of the Osmanli power before the Christian states, with which Russia now became associated. A hundred years after their last great advance westward the Osmanlis were finally compelled to surrender the north coast of the Black Sea to the Russians, and were shortly confronted by a foe far more terrible than their armed enemies had been—the principle of nationality.

Even after their union with the Seljukians, and in spite of the vigour and driving force of their race, it is obvious from the modest numbers composing the ruling class of

the Turks that they were never in a position to absorb the population of the vast areas they had conquered. With the exception of Asia Minor, they were everywhere represented by more or less important minorities. They were the ruling, but not the naturally strongest, race, nor did they make any effort to become so. Their toleration, from both the religious and the racial point of view, toward the peoples whom they subjugated is remarkable, and stands out in conspicuous contrast to the attitude frequently adopted, in both the religious and social sphere, by many a European nation who regards itself as being much more highly civilized than the Turks. It is true that no one would claim that the Turks acted as the paternal custodians of the races subject to them, or that they were ever concerned with their 'uplift.' But they never prosecuted a systematic policy of absorption, and it was consequently inevitable that as soon as the idea of nationality reached consciousness among the subject peoples it should have acted as a high explosive within the walls of the Osman state.

It would certainly have been possible for the veteran hosts of the Sultans to suppress national uprisings and revolts. But the enemies of the Turks among the European Powers would not allow of this. Thus in every struggle in which the Sultan engaged with a section of his subjects the latter were supported by one or more of the Christian Powers, whom the Osman Empire had not the strength to resist.

Compared with the enormous advance made by the Powers of Europe, from the sixteenth century onward, the Turkish Empire remained backward. At the time when it came into being, expanded, and reached the summit of its prosperity Western Europe was economically and from the standpoint of organization only slightly superior to it. From its Byzantine heritage the victorious state acquired a valuable access of strength, but the Turk remained essentially a warrior and a conqueror. His love of tradition, his ruler spirit, and his religion prevented him either from energetically adapting himself to the progress of his opponents in all departments of national life, or from emulating it. The title of "the Sick Man of Europe," which in the

nineteenth century was given to the Ottoman Empire while it was still capable of resistance, was inspired by the deficiencies in its organization to which we have just referred. There is no doubt that in some respects the title was justified. The growth of the spirit of nationality among its subject peoples gave rise to grave internal trouble, which was only aggravated by the lack of any active move in the direction of progress. Nevertheless, like all catch-phrases, the title "the Sick Man of Europe" embodied all the dangers of a too sweeping generalization and an obscurantist point of view. Two factors were habitually slurred over: in the first place, the influence of the foreign doctors—that is to say, the European Powers themselves—who not only diagnosed the malady of the man on the Bosporus and arrogated to themselves the right and the duty of prescribing for him, but also took care to see that he should not be cured, ensuring, on the contrary, that his disease should always be turned to account for some purpose of their own; and, secondly, the fact that it was not the Turkish people but the Turkish Empire that was sick.

Various attempts at reforming Turkey have been undertaken since the beginning of the nineteenth century. But none of them ever succeeded in producing a general and lasting effect. Nevertheless they were not altogether vain, and we shall be able to show that they exerted a profound influence upon the determination of future developments. When in 1876 Abdul Hamid II ascended the throne of the Sultan-Caliphs, and immediately rescinded the Turkish constitution, which had only just been secured through the efforts of the Reform Party, and proceeded for a generation to rule his country as an absolute monarch, with nothing to limit his will, the first period in the evolution of Turkish reform came to an end. Until that time all reforms had been introduced by the Sultans themselves. Subsequently they were merely tolerated by them, and finally they were forced upon them against their will. With the exception of the last phase, which ended with the dethronement and assassination of Sultan Abdul Aziz, the movement had progressed along legitimate lines, and it

would have been interesting to see what the development of Turkey would have been if Sultan Abdul Hamid, who was certainly one of the most able and clear-sighted rulers of his line, had constituted himself the leader of the Reform movement. But by refusing to do so, and furthermore by suppressing every reform with a determination and a rigour which shrank at nothing, and by banishing or executing the representatives of the Reform movement, with the object of keeping both his people and his State in their old rut, and thus making them once more dependent upon himself, he destroyed all possibility of peaceful and organized progress. Thenceforward there was bound to be conflict between the Old and the New, a conflict which could end only in the annihilation of one of the two parties.

The visitor to Constantinople who enters a Turkish palace or a wealthy private house is bound to notice that in both external design and internal appointments the taste displayed is reminiscent of a style closely resembling that of the July Monarchy in France. At the same time anyone making a careful study of the French spoken in the Levant will find that it is full of words and phrases which sound somewhat antiquated in the ears of the Frenchman of to-day. Furthermore, if it is remembered that shortly after the fall of Louis-Philippe the Galata Serai, an entirely French *lycée*, was founded in Constantinople—even to-day, in spite of all the reforms that have been introduced into Turkey, it still remains an important bulwark of French culture—it seems quite clear that French influence played an exceptionally important part about the middle of the nineteenth century. Ever since Francis I, in his life-and-death struggle with Charles V, took the step, at that time regarded as almost inconceivable, of forming an alliance with the foe of Christendom, and Louis XIV acclaimed the last advance of the Turks on Vienna, whereby he hoped to secure his 'reunions,' French influence in Constantinople, although possibly not paramount, has always been considerable, and after periods of decline has invariably made fresh headway. In the nineteenth century it enjoyed a temporary revival under Napoleon I, and rose to its most

brilliant heights in the time of Napoleon III. The fact that France was regarded as the protector of the Christians in the Near East, and the memory of the Crimean War, render further explanation superfluous.

And this French influence played a leading part in the political development of Turkey. The English Constitution, over which progressive Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had raved enthusiastically, was not the model to which the Turks paid homage, nor did they turn to Young America, the pioneer of the new democracy. It was France which constituted the ideal of the Turkish reformers, and it was the ideas of French liberalism that inspired the "Young Turks" in the second half of the nineteenth century. Paris became the refuge of the victims of Abdul Hamid's tyranny. And in Paris these refugees, who witnessed the great conflict which at the beginning of the twentieth century led to the separation of Church and State, established relations with their political sympathizers in Turkey. Among the latter was Mustapha Kemal.

During 1908–9 the struggle between the Young Turks and Abdul Hamid came to an end, and tyranny was overthrown. The road to a new age lay open, or at least so it appeared, and Turks and members of the subject races fell with cries of delight on each other's necks in the streets of Constantinople. The brotherhood of all the peoples united under the Crescent, together with civil freedom, seemed to have been at last secured.

But ten years later the leaders of the rebellion fled from the country in German torpedo-boats, and not a single one of the men prominently connected with the overthrow of Abdul Hamid died a natural death. Christian and even Mohammedan foreigners in Turkey severed themselves from the country as early as the Balkan War, and in the World War numbers of them left their rulers in the lurch. Far from enjoying civil freedom, the Turks were forced to bow before every arbitrary whim on the part of their opponents, who set to work to compass the complete destruction of the Osman Empire.

It would take us too far afield to examine in this essay the means whereby this catastrophe was consummated. Regarded purely from the historical point of view the Young Turk episode constitutes a short but important transition, a beginning and an end. The leaders of the party which stood for "Unity and Progress"—such men as Mehemet Shevket Pasha, Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, Jemal Pasha, and their colleagues—succeeded in compassing the downfall of tyranny and in awaking forces which were destined to become effective. But their failure consisted in their inability to concentrate all these new forces and direct them toward a grand goal. They lacked the instinct for what was possible and necessary. The ideas which animated the minds of the Young Turk patriots, though worthy and in some respects even magnificent, were in practice mutually conflicting and exclusive. Possibly in less troublous times they might have succeeded in co-ordinating their aims and have risen to the magnitude of their task. But the utter failure of the Young Turk foreign policy made this impossible. After ten years of power and almost as long a period of costly wars the catastrophe supervened.

Mustapha Kemal, who, as a General Staff officer, had played a leading part in the march of the Macedonian army on Constantinople for the purpose of deposing Abdul Hamid, exercised very little, if any, appreciable political power at that time, which constituted the period during which his genius was developed. He spent this time in military and historical studies. As military *attaché* in Sofia, and as the guest of the Government at the French manœuvres, he enlarged his horizon on the subject of foreign politics. Proving his worth in Tripoli and in the latter stages of the Balkan War, he won for himself an extremely distinguished reputation in the army. He assumed a critical attitude toward the policy of the Young Turks and disapproved of Turkey's entrance into the World War. Rising step by step during the latter to the rank of Commander of an Army Corps and Adjutant-General to the Sultan, he added fresh lustre to the glorious page of Turkish military history.

When, on October 30, 1918, the Armistice of Mudros

was signed, by which Turkey capitulated to the Entente, he returned to Constantinople. The hour had come for him to fulfil his mission. In the spring of 1919 he was appointed by the Government of the Sultan to the post of Inspector of the Third Military Command in Eastern Anatolia, where he was entrusted with the task of restoring order and reducing the army to a peace footing. The powers with which he was invested were extensive, and he himself declares that the Government was far from clear concerning the importance of the measures taken. In conjunction with a few trusted friends, among whom we must mention above all that supremely gifted general and politician Jewad Pasha, it was Mustapha Kemal himself who had managed to procure his own appointment and to determine the extent of his authority.

On May 9, 1919, he landed at Samsun with his carefully selected staff, and this day marks the opening chapter in the history of New Turkey.

In attempting to form a clear idea of the personality of the creator of New Turkey we find ourselves confronted by that medley of conflicting qualities which invariably characterize the personality of a great historical leader—so much so, indeed, that they might almost be said to be inseparable from the great geniuses among men of action. I refer to the combination of a powerful idealism with an equally powerful sense of reality. The idealism that characterized Mustapha Kemal, which fired his powerful will, and enabled him to accomplish his stupendous task, consists in his love of his people and of his native land. Nowhere in his speeches and writings are such magnificent sentiments to be found as in those passages where he speaks of the dignity of his country, extolling her greatness and exhorting the Turkish people to secure or to recover an honourable place for themselves among the nations of the world. Never, even in the darkest hour, is there any sign of hesitation or thought of compromise in his attitude. This supreme confidence in his own country, to which the great national leader feels himself much more irrevocably bound than do most of his contemporaries, is another

characteristic which history teaches us as being common to all great men. But in Mustapha Kemal it shines with peculiar radiance, since it came to light during a period of the most profound national humiliation. Mortally exhausted by ten years of almost incessant war, Turkey lay prostrate. Her allies in the World War, torn by party strife, were bowing to the dictates of the victors, in whom the power of the world was vested. Entente battleships were lying at anchor in Constantinople. Important parts of Anatolia were occupied by Entente troops. A network of agents, garrisons, and control-stations had been thrown over the land, while the Greeks had just set foot on the west coast of Asia Minor, with the object of founding a new and greater Greece in fulfilment of a dream of Greek expansion at least three thousand five hundred years old. At the Sultan's Court in Constantinople the most contemptible weakness prevailed, though confusion reigned not only here, but also in patriotic circles. Plans of salvation, often of the most fantastic kind, were formed in various political centres. But not one of them relied on the country's native strength alone; all reckoned on the sympathy of one or the other of the Entente Powers, and prepared to make more or less important sacrifices in order to be allowed to eke out a humble existence.

At this juncture Mustapha Kemal flung down the gauntlet. Turkey was to be free, free from tutelage in any shape or form, whether political, military, economic, or cultural; that is to say, not only were the stringent rules laid down by her victors to go by the board, but those bonds which for centuries had shackled Turkey and hindered her free development were to be loosed. In the sphere of economics there were the capitulations, which stood in the way of any natural development of Turkey's economic life; in the sphere of internal politics the interference of foreign Powers with Turkey's population problems, the question of minorities, and religious matters; and in the cultural sphere the neglect of education, which until that time had been in the hands of foreign schools, and much else besides.

Such a programme at such an hour in the nation's history

seemed daring, almost mad, and many of Mustapha Kemal's contemporaries, particularly the men who filled the seats of power in Constantinople, took that view. He was therefore recalled, and when he refused to obey the summons, resigning his Government duties and his post as Adjutant-General to the Sultan, they indicted him and condemned him to death.

But Mustapha Kemal had not been deceived. As a man not yet forty at the time, in whose breast the heart of Young Turkey beat, he knew better than the old statesmen in Constantinople that in the ten years that had just elapsed the Turks had become conscious of their nationality. And he was aware that this feeling needed only the right man to come forward as the deliverer in order to translate itself into heroic deeds—deeds of which we have been given sufficient proof in the sequel—and shortly afterward he made the proud boast that a nation united and resolved to defend its dignity and its existence to the last breath will always be in a position to force foreign foes, intent upon assailing its rights, to abandon their fell designs. Nor was he deceived regarding the apparently formidable power of these external enemies. With unparalleled clear-sightedness he perceived their divergent interests, discovered the gaps in their seemingly united front, and with balanced and resolute energy made the most of his knowledge. We cannot in this essay undertake to describe his foreign policy, in the prosecution of which he had the support of a congenial colleague in the person of Ismet Pasha, the present President of the Council of Ministers, the victorious leader of the Turkish Army of the West, and the brilliant diplomatic victor at the Lausanne Peace Conference. Turkey's present political position among the Powers of the world, which is the outcome of it, is more eloquent than any detailed description could possibly be.

It is of course true that Mustapha Kemal's lofty national ideals could not be realized without sacrifices. Sacrifices had to be made both of ideals and of desires and conceptions which had been the growth of centuries, which the soul of Turkey had learned to love, and which to some

PRESIDENT MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA

extent were part and parcel of her being. As we have seen above, it was conquest and not the maintenance of conquered territory which was the essence of the old Turkish Empire. The pride of a conquering race, conscious of its warlike prowess and of never having suffered enslavement, lived in the descendants of those Turks who, sword in hand, had once fought their way from Central Asia to the very gates of Vienna. Mustapha Kemal, himself a soldier at heart, overcame this feeling. Deliberately bowing before the realities that confronted him, he declared himself resolutely opposed to any extension of his country beyond the national boundaries of Turkey, definitely renouncing as utopian all idea of an Islamic or Pan-Turkish policy. The Turks, he maintained, were no longer to think of ruling foreign peoples, but high and low must alike serve their country and keep to their own sphere. Far too much Turkish blood had already been spilt for the sake of countries which, as far as Turkey was concerned, had been only a source of weakness, and not of strength. And here Mustapha Kemal showed that he had learned the lesson taught by the history of the nineteenth century, in which, as we have seen, the awakening of national feeling among the subject races of Turkey dealt her the most serious blow she had ever received. And inasmuch as Mustapha Kemal unhesitatingly recognized the principle of nationality, he had the right to claim it for his own people. At the same time he changed the mainspring of Turkish action from the fundamental idea of conquest to that of self-preservation and vigorous inner growth.

But another problem immediately arose, closely connected with that to which we have just referred—the problem of the Caliphate. We pointed out above that Sultan Selim the Strong assumed the title and combined the dignity of Caliph, the Protector of Islam, with that of Sultan. At the time when he did this the Turkish Empire had almost reached the zenith of its glory, and was once more about to gather beneath its sceptre all the countries to whom the followers of the Prophet owed allegiance. Nay, more, it was on the point of subjugating even further areas

to the rule of the Crescent. The Sultan's assumption of the title of Caliph at this juncture was not only a *nobile officium*, but also a shrewd piece of policy, whereby the ruler of this rapidly rising state acquired sanctity and status in the eyes of his conquered subjects. Sultan Selim was ready to be the Protector of Islam, and was, moreover, in a position to justify his assumption of the title.

But four hundred years later the situation was very different. Partly through their own exertions and partly through the efforts of the European Powers, great Mohammedan countries had been severed from the rule of the Sultan, territories in which there were millions of Mohammedans—such as India, for instance—having fallen under the dominion of Christian Powers. It was no longer possible on the basis of his actual power for the Sultan-Caliph to be the Protector of Islam, and the World War, together with the failure that followed the proclamation of a Holy War, had shown that no practical advantage for Turkey was associated with the Caliphate. This did not alter the fact, however, that, as Caliph, the Sultan of Turkey was often called upon to deal with matters wholly alien to Turkish interests, and the Turkish people had single-handed to bear the burden of an institution the scope of which transcended the limits of their state, and called for nothing but sacrifice on their part. In these circumstances this dignity finally became an anomaly in a country which, as we have seen, was based purely on the principle of nationality. The Caliphate, therefore, had to be sacrificed.

The practical organization of Turkey as a national state and her recognition as such by the rest of the world was but the first step. The great question was on what lines would this free national state frame its existence, and how would it develop? In the decision taken by Mustapha Kemal in this matter I fancy the primary influence to be discerned is that of the tradition laid down by those Turkish Reformers who, as I have already mentioned, had found their spiritual home in France ever since the middle of the nineteenth century.

The new Turkish state, as fashioned and still developing under the guidance of Mustapha Kemal, is a democratic republic, based upon the broad masses of the population. Universal suffrage and the one-chamber system, whereby Turkey harks back to the French Revolution, form the foundation of this democracy. The Chamber, the great National Assembly, is the all-powerful representative of the sovereign people, the only source of authority, from which all other powers of State emanate. It is a purely secular democracy. A severe and rigorous separation of the State and all its institutions, including above all those dealing with education, from religion, which in the old days exercised a powerful influence over public and private life, was carried out in the early days of the Turkish Republic. The abolition of the Sultanate was a necessary corollary to the events already described. The Turkish Sultanate, owing to its previous history and its association with the Caliphate, but mainly as a result of the type of man it had in the last decades of its existence placed at the head of the State, was an institution for which there was no longer any room in New Turkey. The possibility of coming to terms with the Sultanate, perhaps on the lines of establishing a constitutional monarchy, was not to be contemplated, in the first place for the reason already stated, and for a further reason, which I shall set forth below.

If we examine the Turkey of to-day in all its present manifestations, we are confronted with the following picture. Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha has been President of the Republic since its foundation, a fresh vote having kept him in office after the expiry of his first term. By virtue of his position he is entitled to nominate the President of the Council of Ministers, who in turn forms his own Cabinet. The National Assembly passes a vote of confidence in the whole Cabinet as soon as it presents itself before the Chamber. The President of the Republic may, if he chooses, act as President at the Council of Ministers. The only organized political party which dominates the National Assembly is the People's Republican Party. The President of this party is Mustapha Kemal. He compiles the lists of

candidates for election to the National Assembly, and these candidates are as a rule unanimously elected by the people, with the result that Mustapha Kemal's nomination of a candidate is practically equivalent to his election. Finally, Mustapha Kemal is the *generalissimo* of all the fighting forces of Turkey.

In view of the posts he fills, Mustapha Kemal wields a power greater than that enjoyed by any crowned head or any of the many dictators who have sprung up in modern times. And in these circumstances it is small wonder that some have maintained that the new Turkish Government is merely a continuation of the old absolute rule of the Sultan, a continuation with different aims, but in its essentials not very different from the old. The fact that at present democracy in the form of Parliamentary absolutism has in many countries been replaced by a dictatorship very naturally leads to the conclusion that Mustapha Kemal's rule of Turkey falls in the latter category. And it must be admitted without further ado that the Turkish leader with his untiring industry and creative power makes unstinted use of the powers at his disposal. But his government is, in its origin, development, and intentions, wholly distinct from the above-mentioned dictatorships. In the first place, there was never any real or fundamental opposition to absolute government in Turkey. The absolutism of the rule of the Sultans was proportionate to the strength of character of the individual monarch, and compared with the absolutism of an Abdul Hamid the present Turkish Government appears exceptionally liberal. Even the Government of the Young Turks—that is to say, of their leaders, who introduced a constitution and the bicameral system—was absolute in practice. If, therefore, Mustapha Kemal had wished to retain the absolutist system, he could have made his campaign against the feeble and degenerate rule of the Sultan a mere make-believe, a temporary expedient, and after the victory over the Greeks and the Entente he could have come to an understanding with it, just as after the defeat of Abdul Hamid the Young Turks had done in the case of his successor.

But it was precisely Mustapha Kemal's complete repudia-

tion of the fundamental principles of the old *régime* that made anything in the nature of a compromise impossible. When he began his work his first act was to invoke the spirit of his people. In the people and the people alone does he recognize the strength and the right to save the State and to build it up anew. Every one of his manifestos points to them as the source of all hope for an honourable and happy future. One of his severest charges against the Government of the Sultan was that, after the Armistice, it failed to convoke the dissolved Chamber of Deputies again at the right time, for no treaty of peace should ever have been signed and no obligations entered into without the co-operation of the chosen representatives of the nation. And it was largely for similar reasons that he was opposed to the view held by many, that Turkey could be saved from annihilation only with the help of a foreign Power consenting to accept a mandate over her. To all such proposals his reply was "Turkey can be saved only by herself!" and the fact that salvation could not fall from heaven, but was entirely dependent upon the unspent forces of the people, was always a certainty in the mind of this great man, in whom, as in none other, the soul of his nation was incarnate. The lessons of history, the unhappy experience Turkey had endured not only under her former system, but also in her dealings with foreign Powers, and his love of his people, with whom he feels united in body and soul, were the factors which, from the very beginning, made him turn to his people and seek their support and co-operation.

The preliminary congress of the Eastern provinces in Erzerum, in the summer of 1919, and the first National Congress in Siw, in the early autumn of the same year, led, immediately after the forcible dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies by the Entente in Constantinople, to the summoning of the Great National Assembly in Angora, the opening of which on April 23, 1920, constitutes the first triumph in the history of New Turkey.

Here we find Mustapha Kemal ever intent on keeping in touch with the nation, and not losing sympathy with it. In his proclamation, and more directly in his speeches and

addresses, he appeals to the people, to the individual and to groups, inspiring them and asking for their co-operation. His love and inexhaustible confidence, his impatience to reach his goal, forced him in the early days to adopt measures which, in the existing situation, proved premature and had to be rescinded. The method of forming the Cabinet—to mention only one instance—is a case in point. This task was originally left to the Great National Assembly, but as a result of the latter's dissensions it had to be transferred to the President. And it is precisely such examples, which, regarded from the historical standpoint, might appear in the light of striving after dictatorial powers, that unmistakably point to the democratic nature of Mustapha Kemal's ideals. How difficult was their realization becomes abundantly clear to anyone who cares to make a study of recent Turkish history.

Let us bear in mind what the situation was for Mustapha Kemal and his most devoted adherents when he set out to perform his work of national salvation. On all sides a struggle had to be entered upon—against the Entente and its champions, the Greeks, who were anxious to partition Turkey; against the Sultan's Government in Constantinople, which with weak obstinacy was persisting in the unhappy policy of the past, and could not or would not see that an appeal to the people, to the innate strength and dignity of the nation, was the only means of salvation; against the great mass of the half-hearted, the waverers, and the visionaries; and finally against their own supporters—a fight which grew fiercer every day—who, though ready and willing to sacrifice blood and treasure for the national cause, were for the most part unable to follow the leader's flights of imagination, and tried to effect a compromise between past and present, when to Mustapha Kemal any such compromise seemed impossible. In his great speech of October 1927 Mustapha Kemal declared that the whole process of development through which he had guided his country had been clearly outlined in his mind before he set to work, but that in the early days it had been impossible to make the whole of his programme public, or even to hint at it. He advanced step by

PRESIDENT KEMAL PASHA WITH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

step, always dealing with what lay immediately to hand, waiting ever on the alert until the opportunity arose for further progress, when, with strength renewed and irresistible might, he would push on and on. Every victory, however, was won at the cost of friends, who left him on the way or in the middle of the conflict, and often became his most embittered opponents. This was the case up to the time of the violent struggles of 1924–25 and of the attempt upon his life in Smyrna.

Mustapha Kemal had conquered his external foes, and was on the point of overcoming the last obstacles standing in the way of his work of innovation when, by abolishing the Caliphate, closing the priest-run schools, and prohibiting the use of the fez, he wounded the feelings of his adversaries by thus attacking all they held most sacred, and made their position untenable.

There is a further point that should not be forgotten. While it is true that Mustapha Kemal loved his people and felt that trust in them which, as we have seen, enabled him to dare anything, almost the impossible, for their sakes, yet he would not be the experienced historian or the great practical politician he is if he had not on occasion doubted whether the great mass of his fellow-countrymen in 1919, and even later, were ready for self-government. It was impossible for a people who for centuries had been kept in close spiritual and material subjection, and whose upper classes had only just been aroused from their lethargy, immediately to steer their course through almost insuperable difficulties and find their own salvation. All that Mustapha Kemal looked for in his people was sound popular instinct, the lofty inborn virtues of a virile pride, the will to be free, the readiness for self-sacrifice, and the vigour of a nation that was sound at heart. On such foundations, which, luckily for himself and his people, proved solid and durable even in times of the greatest difficulty, he proceeded to build, and is continuing to do so with unremitting effort, supported by colleagues who have faced the ordeal by fire, men like Dr Refik, who was Minister of Health for many years, Machmud Essad, the reformer of the Turkish legal

system, Fethi and Tewfik Rushdi, able Foreign Ministers, and other supremely gifted men.

Mustapha Kemal in his speeches has often shown that he is fully aware of the nature of his task. He regards it as obvious that, in times of serious conflict, only the will of the born leader should prevail, that mere numbers can never reach quick decisions in a crisis when conditions change from one moment to the next; they cannot keep the great goal sufficiently steadily in view, nor are they able to wrestle with the outstanding problems and solve them. Armed with this conviction, which is common to every man gifted for leadership, he always finds fresh strength to fight in the forefront of the battle.

But even more instructive is the belief expressed by him that "every great and promising movement must find its source in the depths of a people's soul, the original spring of all strength and greatness, and any attempt at ruling from above alone is doomed to failure." But it frequently happens that a nation is not sufficiently advanced to formulate and carry out its own wishes, and it is accordingly necessary to have to hand cultivated, capable, and resolute men in whom the heart of the people pulsates, and who are capable of taking over the leadership and acting as the executors of the people's will. It is this which, in our opinion, constitutes the key to the understanding of 'Kemalism.' For although Mustapha Kemal does not regard his leadership as an end in itself, but merely as an outward and visible sign of his unity with his people and a proof of his obligations toward them, he is conscious of its reality and of the fact that he has been temporarily entrusted with a mission by his country.

In view of what has been said, the student of Mustapha Kemal's personality and work will ask himself whether a man so essentially modern in spirit as the Turkish leader can possibly pursue with conviction a political ideal which experience has proved to be no longer uncontested, and which seems in many respects to have been superseded. But such an inquirer should bear in mind what has already been said regarding the influence of Western democratic

ideas on the Turkish reformers. And we would also beg to remind him that, regarded from the historical point of view, the crisis from which Western democracy is for the moment suffering is the necessary reaction to a system which at first fulfilled a lofty mission, but, having accomplished it, has begun to reveal its darker aspects, as is inevitable in the case of every system that has had its day. It then becomes desirable either to abolish it or to introduce reforms, and this invariably occurs in either a radical or a mild form, redounding to either the advantage or disadvantage of the nations concerned, according to the circumstances and the capacity of those at the helm.

In Turkey such considerations as those which preoccupy Western Europe are quite fruitless. It would be no exaggeration to say that at the time when Mustapha Kemal set to work the mental and political development of the masses in Turkey was on a level with that of the people of Western Europe in the middle of the eighteenth century. A mentally alert upper class existed, especially in Constantinople; but the common people lived in the old rut, labouring under various constraints. A few elementary concepts—as, for instance, love of their country and a consciousness of nationality—had taken root in their minds and hearts, and certain aims were cherished; but their realization was prevented by a total inability to grasp the ways and means thereto, an utter lack of clear thinking and unprejudiced opinion, and absence of the material means and a united will.

Nevertheless, below the surface the movement existed precisely as Mustapha Kemal describes it in the words quoted above. The great task he set himself was to clear the path for this movement, to give it free rein and a goal to aim at. The Turkish people are called upon to cover in the space of a few years or decades the road which the people of Western Europe took a century and a half to traverse. In every department of life barriers have to be overthrown and forces let loose. Mustapha Kemal knows that this is possible only by means of the most

thoroughgoing democratization of the nation, a democratization which not only grants rights but also imposes duties, and above all the conscious co-operation of every individual in securing the common weal. The awakening of the people and the unchaining of their powers is the fundamental idea of 'Kemalism.' This constitutes Mustapha Kemal's mission when once external freedom has been secured. He alone can carry it out; it cannot be achieved by a people only slowly becoming conscious of its duties and still standing in sore need of education.

Take, for example, his economic policy. Here, in the form of guarantees, subsidies, and the taking over of shares, we find active participation on the part of the Government in industrial undertakings. But these methods have nothing in common with State socialism; they are more in the nature of educational measures calculated to encourage and support those who lack capital, and to lead the industrial community, which is still unaccustomed to taking the initiative, to self-reliant action. And a similar policy is followed by the Turkish Government in all the spiritual and material departments of the nation's life.

Whether this wholesale democratization will prove advantageous to the Turkey of the future is a question which need not concern the present leaders of the nation. All that matters for the present, and for the immediate future, is to secure the *blessings* of democracy for the country. Later on, perhaps, another generation will be confronted with other problems. That they will solve them satisfactorily is the confident belief inculcated upon his people by Mustapha Kemal, who in this is guided by the same principle as led Bismarck to pronounce his famous dictum that as soon as Germany was set in the saddle she would be able to ride. And for the fulfilment of this task Mustapha Kemal has given the Turks the best possible equipment—love of their country and pride in their nationality.

To sum up—there exists in the Turkey of to-day a State leadership of extraordinary power, the strength of which is enhanced by the incalculable moral power and energy of Mustapha Kemal's personality. The present *régime* may

be regarded as a dictatorship, but it is, as it were, an involuntary dictatorship, or, to use a paradox, it is a dictatorship to abolish dictatorships of the ordinary kind. Its aim and object is to make itself superfluous and to become merged in the will and self-government of an efficient, cultivated, conscious, and free people.

JOSEF PILSUDSKI

JULJUSZ KADEN-BANDROWSKI

(The most important Polish writer of the day. An intimate friend of Pilsudski, with whom he fought during the Great War in the Polish Legion. Now literary adviser to the Government.)

AT the head of this page I have written "Josef Pilsudski."

The Christian name and the surname together amount to some dozen letters. Yet the name of this man has for many years appeared again and again in the telegrams quoted in the Press throughout the world, whenever life in Eastern Europe pulsates with undue violence.

In putting that Christian name and surname at the head of this page, however, I—once a soldier and modest comrade in arms in this man's camp—visualize first and foremost, not a formula for his deeds, not a mere synthesis of his character, but a glorious vision of all the results of his influence. And I am caught up by the onward rush of the great stream and borne along, as if I were once again immersed in the heroic and inspiring legend which in Poland people call—Josef Pilsudski.

Whether this legend bears upon it the hallmark of immortal greatness, whether it corresponds to the ideal beloved of mankind to-day, I really cannot say. Possibly all that has been endured and accomplished here on the Vistula under the *ægis* of this extraordinary man and his doings is still too fresh. Possibly I myself am not competent to grasp all that has happened, for in the torrent of events I was merely an insignificant ripple.

At the mention of the name of Josef Pilsudski—and there is no department of the nation's life in which this name does not pulsate with vital power—a series of pictures rises before my eyes, as it were a chain of glorious scenes, in the contemplation of which I quiver with pride and delight.

I see the Pilsudski of the year 1912 standing in the vast hall of the House of Representatives at Cracow, hurling down his steely words from the red rostrum upon the serried rows of heads almost petrified with horror.

I see him in Cracow, on the hundredth anniversary of Prince Josef Poniatowski's death, at the head of his troops, his volunteer riflemen, climbing the hill to the royal palace, while the crowd, pale with fear, retreated from his path, convinced that he was playing a sacrilegious game with the laws of the past.

I see him in the World War, with his brigade of volunteers, wedged in between hundreds of foreign units, and engaged in what appeared to be a hopeless struggle for honour, endeavouring to make our death as costly as possible to the enemy. I also see him in that other war, immersed in affairs of State, confronted with the task of making the most difficult decisions, again and again throwing all his achievements, the fruit of his life-work, into the balance. For a quarter of a century it has stood constantly before us—this face on which the purest Polish traditions are chiselled, on which plays a strange smile peculiar to Poland, a smile that masters the danger of truth.

The danger of truth—this most severe test of all greatness. . . .

A man may be equal to dreams and legends, he may compel others to noble tasks of love, yet not be a match for this last menacing danger, this most difficult of all final things, which apart from love and legend is so often lacking in history, this residue of character and fate, of fact and destiny—the danger of truth.

But with a smile Pilsudski overcame that danger.

Is this really a sign of greatness? But how, I ask, shall we ever be able to determine the marks of greatness in life, seeing that greatness always marches ahead of its contemporaries, and always has its abiding place in the future, while the generations of that same future already have in them the desire for other goals, for other new truths?

On this matter I do not think it is exact science that will shed the greatest wisdom and light, but the love and

hatred aroused in the hearts of men by the journey of a great man through the world. The surging flood of feeling alone can illumine a certain form with its most peculiar brilliance. And for this reason I am glad, in writing this essay about Josef Pilsudski, not to be obliged to trouble my head with the venerable lie commonly known as objectivity. I am glad to be spared the task of anticipating and valuing the contours of distant landscapes, or of working out the chemical constituents of greatness. I do not believe in such complicated calculations.

I am also glad that, as I am dealing with the matter quite subjectively, I shall not be suspected of speaking in the name of the people, the country, the party, or any other such entity. For in these circumstances there would be need for circumspection and care. In the name of such abstractions people split hairs in their discussion and boards of gentlemen, duly authorized by certificates and seals, negotiate at a long green table. How fortunate am I, therefore, to be able to express views which have no other authority than my own conviction, my most intimate feelings and raptures, and my most personal joys!

Rapture, joy—that is to say, suppressed tears. I discovered this long ago when, as the delegate of our youthful patriots, I attended the great meeting of the party in Cracow in 1912.

It is a well-known fact that great meetings of this description have their traditional ritual, and when the gathering happened to be a socialistic one—this was more particularly true before the War—one of the supreme moments in the ritual was when the battle-cry "War on war!" was raised.

During a lull in the middle of the most beautiful part of this ritual, after the flowing pæan sounding the idea of universal love among men had died away, a bent and bowed man—as bent as a hawk about to swoop on its prey—suddenly stepped on to the rostrum.

I have always been inclined—and possibly this is one of the surest signs of talent in the plain man—to be defiant in my attitude toward generally accepted values and persons.

Pilsudski's appearance on the rostrum of the party con-

gress was the signal for the hall packed with delegates to be hushed in silence, and from the platform to the farthest corner a cold shudder of gravity passed through the assembly.

Even at that time I had already heard a good deal about Pilsudski, but I had never seen him. The silence that fell on the hall—what impression did it make on the young man I then was, who believed he had only to raise his voice in order to point out new paths to the world?

It only increased my defiance. . . . I looked impudently up at the rostrum, stared hard into the depths beneath the man's shaggy eyebrows, into the light of his steely eyes. And then—I confess it—the attitude I had maintained up to that moment collapsed, as though I had been transported to another age, to a world of different dimensions. As I gazed at Pilsudski's face I felt I had known it a long while; it seemed reminiscent of a great bygone age—the only real, true, and uncontested expression of courage and self-sacrifice, and as such I proceeded to welcome it. It appeared in the light of the most exalted image of what we should like to become; and what we, in decadent days of yore, we moderns, already were in the dreams of our past.

In every country and among every nation some such fundamentally typical face may be found, eloquent of the people and race in which it has come to life. Let anthropologists measure the angles and establish the uniformity of the type. We, as simple human beings, feel the presence of this type in our history, and constantly meet it at critical moments in our lives, when we stand at the crossroads, borne down beneath the weight of our destiny.

In Poland this type is characterized by a high forehead with gleaming temples, broad and sloping—the slope of which Nietzsche boasted so proudly. The steep wall of brow seems to be supported by the bushy eyebrows that meet, and in the shadow of which shine eyes full of steely lights. Their expression of haughty indifference seems unchanging, almost tangible. And yet in moments of emotion this indifference vanishes, melted away, as it were, by an inner furnace. A soft, almost roseate gleam of

kindness shines now and again in the pupils, though this happens but seldom, and then seemingly at the cost of some pains, and for a moment obliterates the steely lights which erstwhile filled the eyes. The tightly drawn skin of the cheeks, merging into the infinitely delicate moulding of the nose, is reminiscent of the polished parts of some noble old weapon of war. In a word, it might be compared to the beautiful outline of an instrument of precision wrought in some old and precious metal.

His voice was cold and deep, full of suppressed passion, vented in a series of harsh and simple sentences. Experts declare that Pilsudski is no orator. I incline to the opinion that it is not worth his while to be an orator. His maxims are always stiff and brief, and the truths he utters always transcend the bounds of the discussion with his listener. And that is why when he is making a speech he invariably appears to be talking above the heads of his audience, to a third party who is not present but who is nevertheless the most important factor in the whole proceeding.

When I look into this face, which I regard as a formula or a fundamental type, and hear the short, simple sentences I cannot help feeling that I, like all the delegates and politicians in the hall, am, as it were, slipping out of my own hands. We were discussing the question of "War on war"—without being aware of the danger of truth.

But this man perceives the danger of truth. In the year 1912, without being in possession of any of the facts known to those at the head of affairs, he was already aware that war was looming on the horizon, that it would drag all the nations of the world into its vortex, and that all those who were unarmed for the conflict would sink to the rank of slaves, and perhaps be paid a few paltry coppers for their blood, but never gain a due measure of political freedom by means of it.

The people who listened horror-struck to Pilsudski's words in 1912 were bowed down beneath the weight of over a century of abortive insurrections, that had filled them with alarm and left them with ever less and less freedom. We had all grown up in this state of bondage and become

MARSHAL JOSEF PILSUDSKI

adapted to it, so much so that the continual process of differentiating between our own values and those forced upon us by the superior power of foreigners was already beginning to exhaust the endurance of generations. But we were still capable of striking a bargain for the price of bread, or for a more respectable form of humiliation; we were still prepared, in the hidden recesses of our hearts, to repeat the romantic lines of our poet-prophets. Nevertheless we one and all felt that between the romanticism of words and the realism of deeds there was a great gulf fixed.

Pilsudski pointed out this gulf to us; he showed us that "War on war," the slave's attempt to soar to the heights of universal brotherhood, could not fail to be a lie, a piece of hypocrisy, a lamentable weakness, and a subterfuge to secure safety in the midst of stronger and mightier rivals.

O shame! thou frailest of the idealist's ignominies!

Had any other man than Pilsudski told us from the public platform what he told us that day, he would have been swept from the rostrum by the wave of indignation that would have surged through the hall. He would have been accused of hostility to the ideals of the future, and of an idle scorn of the demands of the past.

Pilsudski, however, was the first man in Poland to embark upon the great task of building up the ideals of the future. And if it is possible for us now once again to speak of fulfilling the legacy of tradition, he it was who, addressing us in 1912, had long since executed the will of the past.

How strange is the fate of events such as this! They seem to be led by a simple logic which unites whole generations in the same dream. In this connexion I would point to the great romantic poetry of Poland, which, as long as our life lay crushed beneath the burden of appalling defeats, had to play the part of surrogate. What could not be achieved by force was accomplished by poetry through the memories it kept alive. And it managed to survive above the shattered ideal of the struggle, until a man of action appeared who unearthed the emblems of war from his country's vaults, and brandished them once again before the eyes of the world.

The noblest incarnation of the romantic poetry to which I refer was the great poet and itinerant preacher of European freedom Adam Mickiewicz, who appeared about the middle of the nineteenth century. After having experienced countless transformations and consecrations of the spirit, he returned to his original starting-point when, as the founder of the Legion of National Defenders of Freedom, he lay dying in Constantinople.

From the earliest years of his activities as a young man Pilsudski too ranged himself by the side of such soldiers of freedom as Mickiewicz.

Like the latter the descendant of an old family from the borderland of Poland, he organized the first League of Youth.

From his very first appearance on the stage of action he showed himself possessed of those most precious of all gifts, which enabled him to proclaim the new order while drawing his strength from the soil of great traditions. He had the gift of seeing things concretely in historical order; he was also endowed with a mighty will, strong enough to serve not one life alone but whole generations, and he was filled with the enthusiasm which springs from such a will and such a sense of reality.

Will, realism, and enthusiasm, which have always been characteristic of the active and energetic politician, are precisely the three qualities which, from the very beginning, as it were, presided over all Pilsudski's actions. For when in praise of such a man we say that he is endowed with will, realism, and enthusiasm, it amounts to maintaining in the harsh terms of experience and history that he is devoted heart and soul to the cause of the people.

But when I say "devoted heart and soul to the cause of the people" the reader will picture merely that normal state of struggle and effort which he is accustomed to find in the conditions of Western European society. Devoted heart and soul to the cause of the people, in the conditions then existing under the Russian Empire, implied that such a man never had a home, that he wandered about unceasingly from place to place, hunted like an animal, that he could never stop for two consecutive nights under

the same roof, that he had to travel inordinate distances by train in order to break the trail, and finally filled even the hearts of those nearest and dearest to him with terror, owing to the fact that any help afforded to the fugitive exposed those who gave it to the risk of a long term of exile.

To be devoted heart and soul to the cause of the people in those days under the Russian Empire amounted to much the same as being outlawed in the Middle Ages.

Pilsudski's triumphant activities throughout this period have never yet been surpassed by any leader of labour. He was inspired by mad courage, ability, self-sacrifice, and talent.

After five years of exile in Siberia for having joined a League of Youth, and after terrible hardships and struggles, during which he was under the constant supervision of the *gendarmerie*, Pilsudski, on returning to his native land, immediately reorganized his propaganda in the cause of freedom. He set up a secret printing-press, which, owing to the constant threat of prosecution, was carried in parts from place to place, and he printed his own articles himself on primitive presses. It was thus that the journal called *Robotnik* (*The Worker*) came into existence, and with the help of one or two of his most devoted adherents he distributed it all over the country.

The *Robotnik* was at that time the only herald of freedom in Poland. People tore it eagerly from one another's hands, although to be found in possession of a copy of it involved a term of four years' banishment.

In 1900 Pilsudski was seized by the Czar's *gendarmerie*. They were filled with pride and delight at having captured the only man in the whole of the Russian Empire, an area covering a sixth of the entire surface of the globe, who did not acknowledge the existence of the censorship.

In spite of the exhaustion resulting from his superhuman labours, this editor, however, defended himself by having recourse to his last weapon—feigned madness.

But in what did this madness, which was actually certified by the psychiatrists of the period, consist? The prisoner

dared, in the presence of the authorities, to speak and act like a free man!

In those days this constituted quite sufficient proof of madness and insanity. At his examination Pilsudski refused to speak Russian, wrote only in Polish, and declined to recognize the laws of bondage.

And thus the curtain rose upon a drama which was really worthy of the greatest tragedians—openly proclaimed truth was taken for indisputable evidence of madness!

With the object of subjecting him to a more searching examination the authorities moved Pilsudski to St Petersburg.

The prisoner escaped, and after a wonderful period of journalistic work he entered, during the Russo-Japanese War, upon a second period—that of his first attempt at open warfare.

Pilsudski was the first man in Poland, the first within the frontiers of the Russian Empire, to abandon the tactics of strikes and other such elementary manifestations, which always ended in a massacre of the people.

For the Asiatic virtue of patience he substituted the principle of warfare.

In 1904 he himself opened the conflict in the open streets of Polish towns.

It was a terrible fight, compared with which the conditions of the worst war constitute comfort. A fight without reserves, without the spiritual solemnity of the uniform, without the means of creating *esprit de corps* among the fighters, without any possibility of turning back, without any chance of manœuvring for position. It was a fight with a foe who sought to scatter the ranks of the combatants by resorting to the most subtle methods of provocation.

Moreover, in addition to all the dangers threatened by the enemy, it was a fight with the soul of his own people.

To-day every political camp connected with the past whitewashes these events, and obliterates all trace of them. But at that time both the Right and the Left wing of the political parties in Poland objected to Pilsudski's action.

In opposing it the Nationalists and the Social Democrats alike raised the question of the economic self-sufficiency of Poland, using the hackneyed old argument of the Eastern markets, repeated *ad nauseam* in those days.

The exponents of the theory argued that it was impossible for Poland to be self-supporting, that she would be cutting herself off from expansion eastward, and refusing the life-task of an 'organizer' of Russia.

In disguises of this description did the Nationalists serve up the ideal of quietism and a full stomach.

Poland was not to stand in the way of the world-revolution—that is, the revolution of all the various peoples of Russia. She was not to give precedence to nationalist ideals, but was to sacrifice them on the altar of the Russian Revolution.

In disguises of this description did the orthodox Socialists serve up the ideal of reducing the types between the Amur and the Warta to one common level.

But Pilsudski contrived to pierce through these dangers of truth.

Carried away by his appeals and the spirit of his enthusiasm, the whole of that part of Poland which lay under the Russian yoke flared up into war. The finest human material was destroyed in this terrific clash between enthusiastic lovers of liberty and the besotted obstinacy of the satrapy. Men fell whose names are enshrined in the noblest legend of self-sacrifice, and the exhausted movement, overpowered by superior force, perished in its own blood.

At this juncture it seemed as though we were confronted by a decisive defeat. But the leader's enthusiastic spirit converted this 'defeat' into an agitation for a new, grander, and mightier effort. He allowed no one time to brood over losses, but contrived to concentrate upon those factors in the course of the struggle best calculated to improve his methods and make them more perfect and effective. Looking beyond defeat, he succeeded in discovering new, loftier, and more certain ways and means for securing victory in the future.

After having rekindled the idea of war in the breasts of the working masses, and carried the youth of Poland with him—for it must be remembered that, as a protest against the Russianizing Czarist schools, the latter had been leaving the country to seek education in the schools and colleges of the West—Pilsudski began to train new fighters in the form of assault detachments in the military schools he had secretly founded.

But for the effective prosecution of this new scheme he considered it necessary deliberately to terminate the militant workmen's movement, although he could not prevail upon himself to allow it to decline and die out of its own accord. Therefore, as befitted a leader, he set the movement a goal—a goal worthy of a man of unbounded energy, who by the power of his will could lend form and colour to events, define their character, and decide the interpretation to be put upon them by public opinion and history. In order to make it clear that it was he himself who was bringing the movement to a close, and not force of circumstances, he carried out the brilliant terrorist *coup* of Bezdamy. He felt he must close the episode with a victory, and he also wished to prevent any diminution in the militant zeal of his followers.

It was only after he had proved that the party was in a position to undertake further fighting, if it should prove necessary, that he suppressed the organization of the militant movement.

Again and again, at every decisive moment, we find this man inspired by the glorious and lofty courage to break up or suppress one form of his effective work in order to turn to another which was to prove superior.

After the suppression of the militant labour movement Pilsudski devoted his energies to placing the entire nation on a war footing, a task in which he felt that he had not only the well-tried working masses behind him, but in which he was also supported by the devotion of all the radical youth of Poland.

The military schools which he now began to organize in the Galicia of that day (1908–9), as well as, secretly, in the

former Russian areas, proved not only excellent nurseries for the future Polish army, but also the invincible nucleus of the future democratic Polish Republic.

But, with his deep understanding of the masses, Pilsudski clearly perceived that the technique of work of this kind must either be made comprehensible to the whole people or else illumined by the powerful light of poetry. Such insight is well-nigh incredible! And yet Pilsudski, the convict, the printer, the hawker of the *Robotnik*, the fighter and socialist, this same Pilsudski, by his moral courage and the material resources secured by his action at Bezdamy, met with astonishing success in raising the literature of radical independence to a higher level and placing it on a flourishing footing. In Cracow he established the publishing business known as "Ksiazka" ("The Book"), where the most illustrious Polish poets and authors, men like Zeromski, Sieroszewski, Danilowski, Miciński, and the whole body of youthful patriots met together.

Scarcely more than 10,000 men, who, with no weapons, money, or military cohesion to speak of, passed through Pilsudski's military-civilian schools—such were the forces at the head of which he entered into the World War.

Every man of us knows what that war was, and there is certainly nobody in the whole of Europe to-day who can think of it without horror. But any European country that met with success or failure in the storm that burst over the whole continent, and now weeps over the consequences of that bloody tragedy, should remember, if the discussion should turn upon Poland, that we were living in bondage, in conditions much worse than those of war. If others risked their lives for their cause, it should not be forgotten that the world of that day regarded *us* as mere pawns in the game—live pawns, it is true, but mere will-less pawns in a fiendish game.

On the Polish side the game was opened by Pilsudski, who threw as a stake into the scales of the contest the honour of his detachments of volunteer riflemen. It was a precious and exceedingly high stake, though, at the same time,

insignificant enough in such a deadly game which involved activity in three directions—against Russia, against Austria, and against Germany.

In addition to these three there was yet a fourth—the laziness, ill-will, and lack of faith of his own countrymen.

Poland of that day, terrified of Pilsudski, as a socialist and a liberator of the masses, did everything in its power to entangle the leader in a network of petty restraints and to force him to agree to his country's coming to terms with one or other of the belligerent Powers. The majority of the political leaders in the Galicia of that day wanted to have Pilsudski's legions placed under the command of the Austrian staff. The politicians of the former Russian area of Poland placed them under the ban arising from their doctrine of the lucrativeness of the "Eastern markets," while the politicians of Greater Poland passed over Pilsudski's martial achievements in deadly silence.

The whole movement of Polish irredentism, which had become articulate in the legions, would, as it were, have been left hanging in mid-air if Pilsudski himself had not filled the gap to overflowing with his glorious faith and enthusiasm. In those days of battle he was the only banner the legions had, the only guarantee or hope possessed by either his troops or the Cause.

Single-handed he assumed the responsibility toward history, tradition, and life.

And the responsibility was heavy indeed. As an ally of the Central Powers against Russia, he suffered severe losses in the front-line fighting, which he carried on with the inspired frenzy characteristic of the Polish soldiers, and famous throughout Europe. But he had not sufficient reserves to make good his losses. In every great battle he found himself confronted by the possibility of seeing his army annihilated.

Moreover, while loyally taking his share of front-line fighting, he was obliged at the same time to wage a political war against his military allies.

The whole of his achievements in this respect constitute

a masterpiece of courage and inventiveness. While he was fighting against Russia on the side of Austria and Germany he succeeded in creating in the areas of Poland occupied by the Central Powers a huge military conspiracy (P.O.W.—the Polish Military Organization), which was an offshoot of the legions, and a sort of political and defensive re-insurance of their exploits.

As Austria played out her trump cards and Russia sank more deeply into the mire he strove ever more indefatigably to win the last decisive move in the game—that against Germany. He started about 1916–17, when Germany flung the ace of Polish independence into the scales of international politics.

But in this decisive move of the game Pilsudski, who was Poland's highest card, had, together with the legions, who formed the necessary nucleus of the future defence of the country—three brigades of infantry, two cavalry regiments, and a regiment of artillery—fallen into the hands of the Germans, and been placed under the supervision of the German divisions in the occupied territory.

And now began the last decisive encounter of faith in freedom with the overpowering might of the German Empire—with the power of a great State of historical traditions. At this juncture, in secret conferences and negotiations, Pilsudski was offered the chance of creating a great Polish army.

The danger of truth lay hid in promises of might and strength. But Pilsudski always contrived to see through this danger, and just as in the revolution of 1905–7 he staked himself and his life-work on a single throw of the dice, so now he declined to accept these promises, because it would have meant forcing his legions to take an oath of allegiance to Germany. This he resolutely refused to do, preferring to destroy the military body he had created with so much pains; and he allowed himself to be incarcerated in a German prison at Magdeburg.

As Pilsudski entered the portals of this prison the bitter cup of the Polish campaign for freedom was filled to the brim. He had endured exile in Siberia, and for many

years had been subjected to the supervision of Austrian spies, and now he was confronted by his last ordeal—imprisonment in a German fortress.

But he knew that his imprisonment at Magdeburg would prove an example and a source of patience and fortitude to his disciples. And when in November 1918 the collapse of the German front began, these disciples, who were members of a vast military conspiracy, and the only active and organized body in Eastern Europe at the time, dashed out from the subterranean retreats where as conspirators they had lain in hiding, and by completely cowing the army of occupation took possession of the country.

Then suddenly the Germans themselves opened the prison gates for Pilsudski; for at that time he was the most important and possibly the only guarantee of law and order not only in the case of Poland herself, but also in regard to the movements and events which were taking place on Polish territory. For Pilsudski was then more or less in a position either to render valuable assistance in the pacification of Eastern Europe, and alleviate the lot of millions of prisoners of war who had remained on both sides of the Front, or to make the former task infinitely more difficult and the lot of the latter more terrible.

In November 1918 the supreme power was nominally transferred from the Regency Council (the governing body in Poland, formed with the approval of the Central Powers) and placed in Pilsudski's hands. But in reality each of the areas into which the three Powers had partitioned Poland set up some sort of improvised local authority. They were, however, quickly overthrown through excess of party passion.

Each of the three divisions of Poland was anxious to push its own party saviour to the head of affairs in the country. Moreover, the economic interests of each particular province had to be reckoned with, as well as the leaven of primitive radicalism which was working on the masses exhausted by the War. The situation was also complicated by the presence of millions of prisoners of war marching from east to west and west to east, by the existence of war

booty strewn all over the land, and finally by the crowds of soldiers streaming back from all fronts.

At this moment Pilsudski was the sole leader of the wonderful band of disciples he had created in his great and historical school of patriotism—men who had followed him through revolution, prison, and the heat of battle, and into Austrian, German, and Russian gaols—the Guards of Polish Freedom!

But without the inspiration of their leader even these Guards would have proved incapable of coping with the problems confronting the head of affairs in Poland at that time.

Pilsudski was now faced by two tasks—he had to create frontiers for his country and arrange for their protection, and he had to provide the State with a legal fountainhead of authority.

To define frontiers and protect them he required the army. Even in his first command, exercised over the wretched nucleus of the Polish army (November 1918), Pilsudski had proved himself to be wonderfully gifted in this sphere. He saw at once that an army raised under the conditions existing at that particular period of history could not be founded on beaten troops, or on units who, though still unbeaten, had spent years in trench warfare. For trench warfare, as such, in a sense implies that the enemy has not succeeded in discovering the means of gaining a decisive victory and has been faced for years by the deadlock of position-warfare.

As a believer in the classic military principle that the first condition of war is movement, Pilsudski had dispatched his detachments one after another to the Front when they were still barely trained, to the despair of the various 'professional' generals who had formerly been in the service of the Emperor; but it was a very good policy as far as the army itself was concerned. Far removed from the scandalous farce of party conflict, a natural selection of men and methods was made in the fiery ordeal of battle, which turned this army into a first-rate school for the future citizens of the mother-country that had to be won back.

And Pilsudski's terrific struggle to create a legal source of power in Poland proves how necessary such a school was. The parties and the party cliques were at that time still contemplating summoning a sort of National Council, on which, ignoring the large mass of the people, representatives elected by the various parties should sit.

It was to constitute a sort of Assembly and supreme Mafia of every kind of party.

The whole of the Right—if a degenerate party that distorted national watchwords can be called the Right—worked with all the means at their disposal, unscrupulous demagogy, attempts to assassinate Pilsudski, conspiracies in the army, and the formation of coteries among the generals, for the formation of this National Council and the discrediting of Pilsudski's proposals for the summoning of the Sejm on the basis of universal, including female, suffrage.

The Right dreaded the choice of the people. Pilsudski believed in it. It was the first great struggle for democracy in independent Poland. Pilsudski took up his position as a democrat and a European of the twentieth century against the decadent defenders of the old Szlachta tradition, the rule of blue blood and of caste.

And he won the contest. Throughout the length and breadth of the Republic the people poured into the ballot-rooms.

As one of the military men of the district adjoining the Marshal's, I had the opportunity of witnessing how Pilsudski spent his time at this juncture.

In a day or two the election would be over. The Marshal, usually cheerful, charming, and at his ease, even at the most terrible moments at the Front, was gloomy and taciturn at our common board. He took no notice of those about him, and, lost in thought, would suddenly step up to the window of the Belvedere Palace.

In front of this window stretched the snow-covered park, and in the distance the misty breadths of the Mazevian Plain were visible.

"Will they vote?" he asked himself aloud again and again, staring anxiously out into the azure mist of the fields.

MARSHAL PILSUDSKI AND HIS DAUGHTER

He was living through the noblest and most tragic hours it was possible for such a mighty man of power to endure. Capable though he was of grasping everything in his own mailed fist, he had deliberately handed over the reins to the people, and could not help trembling as he wondered whether they would take them up or let them fall in the mud.

This first and most courageous democrat of modern Poland certainly had no idea at that time that the cultivation of democratic faith in the people was just as laborious and painful a process as the wresting of victory by one side or the other at the Front.

Pilsudski's political achievements during the next few years—between 1918 and 1920—are among the most difficult in the whole of his stormy and strenuous existence. For during this period the leader had to concentrate most of his attention on questions connected with the War. But as the work in the Sejm increased and became more complicated Pilsudski perceived ever more clearly that the young Parliament, with its sprinkling of old professional politicians drawn from the Parliaments of the partitioning Powers, had a great deal to learn before it could cope adequately with the real business of State.

It is a significant phenomenon in the history of modern democracies that this young Parliament, summoned to its task through the initiative of Pilsudski, displayed almost passionate zeal in opposing its political sponsor. The uncontrollable jealousy of ambitious nobodies poisoned the atmosphere of the Sejm, which, whether in the matter of framing the constitution, voting supplies, or any other business of State, was clearly animated only by a desire to thwart the creative spirit of the leader.

This period in Polish history is still awaiting its Balzac, who would have to possess the satirical insight of a Soltykov-Ščedrin.

Pilsudski deliberately tolerated the obstructiveness of the group that grew daily stronger and more spiteful, because he believed this to be the best method of helping forward the necessary and almost biological process of building up the

national consciousness. Consequently, for the time being, he devoted himself chiefly to the problem of settling the frontiers of the new state. He was the most influential Polish politician to confront the Big Four, and also the highest army officer in the war against the Bolsheviks.

It would be a difficult task to give a history of this war and describe all the details of the struggle. But I would fain emphasize and call attention to the outstanding features of this phenomenon which, still misunderstood by Europe, is known in history as the "Polish-Bolshevik War." And, incidentally, I should like to refer to one peculiarity about it which, owing to the course of events, is apt to be overlooked, and that is that nobody on either side can either remember or say precisely when this war really broke out.

For as far as those formalities are concerned which consist in an exchange of notes, a definite declaration from either side, and the departure of diplomatic representatives, it had no beginning at all, but suddenly broke out with the violence of an elemental force, at the first clash between the troops crossing No-man's-land—that is to say, marching through the areas which had not yet succeeded in developing any organic state life.

This war, which the fighting units on both sides regarded as the most obvious of historical necessities, was not a matter of a conflict between two divergent views concerning economics, but merely a renewal of the deadly struggle between the two traditionally hostile cosmogonies of Poland and Russia—the right of young countries to develop along individual national lines on the one hand, and the Cæsarian doctrine of the universal levelling of individual differences on the other.

The absurdities of a skilfully organized propaganda often succeeded in making Europe believe that it was the Bolshevik troops who marched into the field to the stirring battle-cries of Marathon and Salamis, and who were the champions of a superior ideology, while the ill-omened shadow of Xerxes hovered over the arms of Poland.

It was only when it came to mortal combat and Pilsudski made his magnificent assaults on Dvinsk and Kiev, and

the brilliance of natural freedom began to shine wherever he marched through the land with his troops, that the world perceived which were the bayonets that flashed forth the fire of truth, and which were the guns that roared out a more ominous thunder.

At last, when the Bolsheviks marched on Warsaw, Europe became aware that in this war it was not a matter of vindicating this or that right, or securing this or that social reform, but that the great biological instinct of rapine, the primitive lust of conquest, was involved, and lay concealed beneath the trite slogans of an imperfectly conceived plan of social reform.

Thanks to Pilsudski's genius, peace was restored to Europe in the year 1920. He had been faced not only by the possible destruction of Poland, but also by another terrible danger, all the more terrible because the troops of Western Europe at that time (as was clearly shown by engagement after engagement between the armies of the Coalition and the troops of Soviet Russia) found themselves quite helpless and utterly incapable of resisting the new weapons forged out of the paper propaganda of the Soviet army.

Western Europe was threatened by the unique and extraordinary paradox of various races, peoples, clans, and nations united under one banner—from the Yakoots, Tshuktchis, Tcheremites, and Caspian Tartars, to the Russianized people of the Ukraine—creating a disturbance on the Warta and pressing toward Hungary and Bohemia, possibly with the object of nipping the young German Republic in the bud, or urging it, from fear of its opposite, once more along the road to military Cæsarism.

In short, everything that had been won for mankind in the World War by the sacrifice of 10,000,000 men—the securing of freedom for the peoples of Europe—seemed about to be once again trampled underfoot by the illiterate hordes of the Revolution.

But Pilsudski conquered the enemy, routing him by one or two masterful strokes, decimating the Bolshevik corps and divisions, annihilating them in two great battles on the

Vistula and the Memel, and thus winning a victory which cannot be regarded as less important in the history of Europe than the triumph scored by Sobieski near Vienna in the seventeenth century.

This is an opportune moment to attempt an analysis of the peculiarities of Pilsudski's military genius.

I had the opportunity of watching the first Marshal of Poland for many years when he acted as Commander-in-Chief, and I confess that in my opinion his military work can be compared only with one other kind of activity—that of conscious artistic creation.

Pilsudski conceives and harbours in his mind all the plans of his military operations, just as an artist carries the outline of a great artistic creation and develops it in his mind.

He postpones the execution of a plan until it is completely worked out, and he has grasped the whole action with the entire force of his personality, and, so to speak, with all the tentacles of his versatile mind. And in this work he rejects all formulas, all infallible recipes for success, and all theories. The only way I can put it is that he remains face to face with the fundamental demands of the military situation.

I take it that, like a creative artist at his work, he sets aside all the petty facts and data he has collected so conscientiously, covers them up, and concentrates entirely on the intuitive process of trying to foresee up to a point the deepest psychological grounds for both his own and the enemy's operations.

This is an exceedingly trying business, demanding an almost superhuman degree of patience. In many respects it is eccentric, and yet it is characterized by the most accurate feats of memory.

It is a task in which everything combines to produce the sum total of force necessary for victory—the number of railway wagons, the quantity of oats, the number of rifles, guns, men, aeroplanes, and even the nature of the roads and of the country and the morale of the people.

But these calculations have always a deep and significant

justification, for they involve questions of life and death; losses have to be judged by the sentiments of the civilian, not by the standard of a general's calculations. And this justification plays the part in Pilsudski's work that economy of words plays in that of a writer of genius. It makes for higher forms of expression, and imposes the loftiest moral standard upon the manner in which the action is conceived.

Thanks to this method of procedure Pilsudski's plans have the effect of being original and unexpected. The enemy can never forestall them (there is no such thing as the duplication of a real personality); they are simple, they are of a kind to be most easily carried out in the circumstances, and they are most sparing of life.

In carrying out his plan of campaign at the Front Pilsudski possessed the most valuable of assets—the true charm of the leader. This implies almost superhuman patience, the suppression of all personal ambition, and a wise suspicion of everything stiff and mechanical in conducting the movements of large bodies of men. In regard to the men themselves it implies an attitude of retiring modesty—no shouting, no hectoring orders, no highfalutin phrases, but, on the contrary, a stern and sympathetic understanding of the burdens borne by the common soldier.

And this he secretly managed to reveal to the great mass of the army.

I was often in a position to watch Pilsudski at such moments. Detachments of troops which he had never seen before and which he was inspecting for the first time would march past him with deafening and enthusiastic cheers.

How did he contrive to win such extraordinary popularity? I think it was through his deep insight into the true nature of warfare. Yes, through overcoming the danger of truth! Pilsudski believes in the greatness of all that is anonymously achieved by the common soldier; he sets these achievements above all else in war, and makes his plans accordingly.

The soldier has an infallible instinct for such things; he scents them in all the orders that are issued, down to the most insignificant detail in the campaign. And it is from

this attitude on the part of his leader, which might almost be called lyric, that he draws his faith in the inevitable necessity of his own feats ; and he does this all the more readily seeing that in Pilsudski's strategy even more than in his political actions the most precious and most human characteristic of the realistic man is displayed—O startling fact!—wit and humour!

Pilsudski's strategy and tactics are not entirely directed against the enemy; he is waging a fight against routine, against the mechanization of the craft of war and the mechanization of the art of life.

A fight with routine, with mechanization, with prejudice! A fight with fundamental principles generally taken for granted.

The genial humour of the plan is always transmitted to its execution—it must be so communicated. Hence the army fighting under Pilsudski is always a cheerful army.

The great cavalry raids, the advance of the infantry division to a point far behind the enemy's rear (the action against Vilna), the unusual wheeling of four divisions in the great battle of Warsaw in the attack from the direction of Demblin, the masterly enveloping movements and surprise attacks in the heavy fighting on the Memel—these were all blows and buffets levelled at the petrifaction of the craft of war. They prove the wonderful humour of a man who inspired those who carried out this craft with pride in having mastered a new experimental truth.

But in life nothing is more costly to one's dignity than humour. In Poland it meant for Pilsudski many years of terrible struggle against the forbidding hydra of the hereditary Szlachta ochlocracy, which rampaged through the capital and the country at a time when, after the long period of fighting at the Front, success in political life demanded the complete co-ordination of all the nation's forces.

At this juncture Pilsudski was supported by the so-called democratic Left, which was animated by great ideas of reform, while against him he had the Right, which regarded every political problem merely as an excuse for fighting him.

Pilsudski had only to lift his finger to put an end to this

conflict; as the victorious leader, the supreme power was in his hands. Anyone who accuses him of aiming at the dictatorship must be oblivious of the fact that at that moment there was probably not a single democrat in the whole of Europe who had such a decisive majority behind him in his native land and made such little use of it to overcome certain psychological obstacles.

If democracy is fundamentally concerned with purity and loyalty, Pilsudski, perhaps to the eternal credit of his name, but to the great detriment of his country, began precisely at this juncture to renounce even his own sphere of power.

Though he was at once head of the State and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, he nevertheless refused to accept the office of President of the Republic. Confronted by the storms which raged ever more fiercely in the political and social world, he stepped of his own accord into the shade, in order to make it possible for the decisive game between the Left and the Right to be played out to the advantage of the soul of his people.

This game was played in the Sejm, and definitely ended with the election of Pilsudski's successor to the position of head of the State. Narutowicz, an ex-Minister, was Pilsudski's candidate, and was elected by the majority of the Left and the minorities of the National Party. But at that very moment the Right, which exercised most of the cheap demagogic influence of the day, was joined by a fresh recruit in the person of a fanatic who made an attempt on the life of the President.

Pilsudski was for the time being employed in restricting the sphere of his activities. As soon as the first necessary measures had been passed for ensuring the safety of the State he insisted on waiting for the usual reaction on the part of the people to take place. But it did not take place. This interval must have constituted one of the most terrible periods that Poland's great reformer ever lived through after his country had been freed. He was obliged to look on while the mob from the backwoods, the political party fiends, the marauders, who had always escaped the perils of war,

carried off the victory, and while the Left, with their position undermined by the alleged Cæsarist intentions of the leader, began to wobble, disintegrate, and yield to the pressure of the marauders.

Whereupon (1923) Pilsudski retired from public life into the peace of his family circle and devoted himself to his work on the theory of war. His three years' absence from the Government put the political life of Poland into a condition which could only be called menacing. The Sejm had become the arena for every kind of intrigue and jobbery by party and Mafia magnates, and the fluctuating relations between the parties constituted a gigantic and insensate traffic in compromises.

An egregious rule by party picklocks was inaugurated, and party prestige was put above the common weal. These picklocks broke with all principle, destroying the whole system of government by forming a coalition between the Right and the Left characterized by utter confusion and impotence.

The historian who will one day have to investigate these matters and write an account of these times will be forced to regard these party picklocks as chiefly responsible for the battles fought in May 1926 between Pilsudski and the party oligarchy. But the pedant will introduce legal details and addenda into the labyrinth of clauses, and split hairs in deciding whether the fighting was necessary or not.

The great mass of the people, however, is of the opinion—with which I heartily concur—that with the reappearance of Pilsudski, threatening, magnificent, and indignant, on the Poniatowski Bridge over the Vistula in May 1926 a terrific struggle began, in which he set out to fight for the freedom of the people's soul against the reactionary forces of generations of bondage.

He was opposed by Stanislaw Wojciechowski, the President of the Republic. Thus, on the one side, with his phantom clauses, his formulas, and strange freaks of casuistry, stood the President, who had become adapted to party compromise and the folly of standardized personalities, while on the other was a man of history, a man born of the

sufferings of the people, the noblest scion of struggle and desire. There stood the great law of life, facing the formulas of pettiness, the spring of power confronting the recipe for impotence, the man of destiny *versus* the professional politician, the hero *versus* the juggler, truth *versus* demagogy.

At that moment the danger of truth was terrible. It threatened to expose the national army to the menace of a civil war.

But Pilsudski did not allow himself to be daunted by this danger of truth. As soon as the first shots were fired by the party time-servers he took up the gauntlet and fought the fight to a finish in two days; and these two days saved the Polish people many a long year of misery and petty strife.

But for those days of May the Polish people would never have been restored to the ranks of the free nations of Western Europe. It was only during those days, so memorable and terrible for Poland, that the last vestiges of centuries of bondage were swept away. And it was only in keeping with the normal current of events that settlement with the foreign foe should be followed to some extent by order at home.

Pilsudski liberated not only the body but also the soul of Poland. His period of government since the year 1926 has been not merely a period of personal rule, but has also led to a development of normal conditions in a nation enjoying Western culture framed on the principles of a healthy democracy. We might enumerate a number of reforms carried through during this period in Poland in the domain of labour, law, social welfare, and public administration. But it is not our object to adduce proofs of our contention here. We prefer to contemplate the man himself, his features, gestures, and deeds, standing out against the background of the history of his people and of the distracted and tormented continent of Europe.

Pilsudski is one of those rare and mighty men of Europe who have mastered and understood the practical lesson of the World War, which has taught us that a comity of free

nations should develop into a single united international family inspired by mutual love and respect.

Pilsudski in the midst of the Polish people! His figure is the embodiment of greatness, grace, and heroism, combined with simplicity. The virtue of centuries of magnificent examples has become lyric in his life; he needs no pomp or office or decorations on his breast! The fame of his all-conquering power of truth and love is sufficient!

DICTATORSHIP IN YUGO-SLAVIA

HERMANN WENDEL

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I

THE placarding of the walls of Belgrade on the morning of January 6, 1929, with King Alexander Karadjordjević's proclamation to his people announcing his abolition of the constitution and his dismissal of the Skupština constituted a regular *coup d'état*. For the constitution of June 28, 1921, duly sworn and established, had created a single constitutional monarchy of the kingdoms of Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, and the King had no legal power beyond that bestowed upon him by the constitution. In his learned work *The Constitutional Law of the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia* Professor Slobodan Jovanović shows that the King has no historical rights other than those bestowed by the constitution, and none whatever over the constitution itself, and that he possesses no power which the constitution cannot take away from him or whereby he can override the constitution. The Act creating the kingdom of Yugo-Slavia deliberately avoided giving the sovereign the title of head of the State, and limited his power in every sphere, whether in the domain of legislation, administration, or law. The legislative power was vested in the King in conjunction with the Skupština. The King exercised his administrative powers through the Ministers responsible to the Skupština in accordance with the constitution, while justice was administered through the Courts in the name of the King, but on the basis of the established code. Thus no loophole was left for independent, irresponsible, or arbitrary action on the part of the King.

Nor as Commander-in-Chief of the Army was the King allowed greater freedom by the constitution. Responsibility for his actions in this department fell on the shoulders of the Minister for War, who was answerable to the Skupština; the King did not even enjoy the right of posting troops for home duty. "For the maintenance of domestic peace," reads Article 123 of the constitution, "the Army can be employed only at the request of the existing civil authorities." Slobodan Jovanović interprets this clause as meaning that the King, although he is Commander-in-Chief, cannot decide whether or to what extent the Army should be used for the maintenance of domestic peace, but that this power is vested in the competent civil authorities. Nevertheless, the actual power of the King as Commander-in-Chief went beyond the authority vested in him by the constitution. The fact that while officials had to swear obedience to the laws officers and soldiers had to swear allegiance only to the King placed the Army in a peculiar position toward the sovereign. The official had a certain right to test the legality of the orders given him, but the soldier had not. He received his orders in the name of the King, and was obliged to carry them out unconditionally.

And thus the fact that the King was fully aware that he had at his back the only power in the State which was equipped for fighting provided him with the opportunity and the courage to declare null and void those clauses which had been the creation of the elected representatives of the people. To have a clean slate, he obliterated the table of laws with his sword.

How, from the historical, political, and psychological point of view, was this *coup d'état* brought about?

II

The kingdom of Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia is very far from being merely an artificial creation on the part of the Entente. As in the case of the unification of Italy and Germany two generations ago, so too behind the welding of Yugo-Slavia into a single state loomed the "brazen

KING ALEXANDER OF YUGO-SLAVIA

necessity of history." For all the Slavs settled between the source of the Isonzo and the walls of Constantinople, between the Danube and the Adriatic, should naturally belong to one nation. Seeing that the languages of these various branches of the race merge imperceptibly into one another, if the stars had not been against them they would certainly have evolved a uniform written language, unprejudiced by differences of dialect, and used everywhere between Trieste and the Black Sea; instead of which the unfortunate history of Yugo-Slavia led to the formation of ethnic entities, the Slovenes, the Croats, the Serbians, and the Bulgarians, with three distinct languages, Slovene, Serbo-Croatian, and Bulgarian, and two alphabets, the Latin and the Cyrillic.

First and foremost among the historical adversities which befell the Southern Slavs was their subjection to five hundred years of Turkish rule. When the avalanche of Osmanli conquest submerged the Balkan peninsula, stifling its national existence, the Southern Slavs, who in the Middle Ages had shone before the eyes of the world through the medium of the great Serbian, Bulgarian, Croatian, and Bosnian empires, disappeared from the purview of history. While Bulgarians and Serbians were exploited and deprived of all their rights and privileges by the ruling Turkish caste, Croats and Slovenes voluntarily placed themselves under the house of Hapsburg, as the predestined protectors of the West against the Crescent. As Turkey ceased to be a menace to Europe at the time of the French Revolution, the hearth from which ideas of national freedom spread over the whole world, the great unrest among the peoples of Yugo-Slavia naturally broke out at the dawn of the nineteenth century. The Serbian war of liberation of 1804–13 under Karadjordje, the foundation of the principality of Serbia by Miloš Obrenović, and, even more important, the formation of the Illyrian provinces by Napoleon I in 1830, the Illyrian movement which started in Croatia in the thirties and forties, with the object of uniting all the Southern Slavs from Carinthia to the Pontus into one cultural whole, the Southern Slav rising of the year 1848, and above all the

defensive war of the Serbs and Croats against the Magyars, followed by the bold national policy of the Serbian prince Mihailo Obrenović, the indefatigable work of emancipation of the Croat bishop Strossmayer, the Omladina movement of the sixties, and the successful resistance of the Slovenes to the Teutonizing efforts of the following decade, form a series of links in the chain of events. Though the primary object of each nation was to secure breathing space and elbow-room for itself, yet the seed of the Yugo-Slavian idea lay hid below the surface.

The Yugo-Slavian idea was essentially democratic. In politics it represented the self-determination of oppressed nations, while in the social sphere it stood for the wholesale emancipation of the peasants. Under the Osman Empire, as well as under the rule of the Hapsburgs in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slovenia, and the Vojvodina, the survival of a medieval conception of property and labour made the peasants nothing more than landless tenant-farmers of the great landowners, while Serbia and Bulgaria, which had been independent states since 1878, were flourishing as classic lands of freedom and small peasant-holders. This fact was one of the fundamental causes of unrest in Yugo-Slavia, and came to a head in the twentieth century, when the violent change of dynasty in Serbia and the formation of the Serbo-Croatian League in Croatia may be charged to the account of democracy.

But the realization of Yugo-Slavian hopes of freedom and unity which grew ever stronger and more passionate, especially among the younger generation of university men in Belgrade and Agram, Laibach and Serajevo, was prevented by the egoism of three great Powers—Turkey, who in the twentieth century still laid claim to large areas of Yugo-Slavian territory, Austria-Hungary, who had numbers of Yugo-Slavian subjects under her rule, and did not regard the furtherance of their unification as being in her interests, and Russia, who, casting sidelong glances at Constantinople, considered the Balkan Slavs heaven-sent cannon-fodder for her future consumption. Acting on the principle of *divide et impera*, Vienna and St Petersburg were bound to foster

discord in Yugo-Slavia, and when Serbs and Croats broke each other's heads in Agram, or when, as in 1885, Bulgars and Serbs tore each other to pieces in a wicked, fratricidal war, the primary responsibility always lay at the door of Hapsburg or Romanov intrigue.

It was necessary for the three empires which at every turn prevented Yugo-Slavia from rising to a position of independence to be destroyed before ideals long cherished and tenderly fostered could be realized, and their doom was compassed during the epoch-making period of war between 1912 and 1918 which shook even the Balkans to the roots. And from the ashes of Turkey in Europe, Czarist Russia, and the empire of the Hapsburgs there rose, in the late autumn of 1918, the phœnix represented by the double-headed eagle of the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

But the fact that the transference of the ideal of Yugo-Slavian unity from the realm of dreams to the world of reality could not have been accomplished without an imperialistic war between the Great Powers, constituted an accident of birth in the history of the new state which led to difficulties not confined to her foreign relations. For many of the internal conflicts which paved the way to the dictatorship were the direct outcome of the way in which the Yugo-Slavian state came into being.

III

The fact that the great dividing line between East and West, between Rome and Byzantium, runs through Yugo-Slavia leads to the clash within its borders of all kinds of creeds and cultures. Out of a population of slightly over twelve millions 46·6 per cent. belong to the Orthodox, 39·4 per cent. to the Roman Catholic, and 11·2 per cent. to the Islamic faiths. Both the Latin and the German civilizations have set up their bastions here, as have also Greek and Mussulman cultures. Laibach is one of the most devoutly Catholic of Christian cities. Orthodox Belgrade reveals by its very outlines that it is a town possessed of hardly any

churches, while in Mostar the muezzin rings more fanatically to prayer and the Mohammedan women steal along the streets more heavily veiled than anywhere in Central Asia. In many parts of Slovenia and Croatia industry on a grand scale has produced a modern proletariat working to the roar of machines and the steaming of retorts, while in the mountain solitudes of Montenegro, where capital is represented by a herd of goats, there are still vestiges of the clan system which existed thousands of years ago.

But what was determining the development which for the time being has been arrested by the dictatorship was not so much the contrast between Croats and Serbs as between Srbijanci—Serbians inhabiting the former kingdom of Serbia—and Prečani—'Outlanders,' or the inhabitants of what was formerly Austro-Hungarian territory. The fact that the Serbians have been subjected to five hundred years of Turkish rule has left an indelible mark upon them, while the kindred Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes who have lived for centuries under the sway of the Archdukes have not escaped intact either. The former have a strong, often fatal, dash of Orientalism in their veins, while the latter are animated by somewhat too blind a faith in Western Europe as the only source of salvation. The former, as the descendants of generations of a *raja* people living in a nondescript untutored mass under the Crescent, developed a species of primitive feeling for democracy in their hearts, though it does not always find expression in politics. The latter formed their political concepts in a State which was at least semi-absolute and semi-feudal, and consequently learned to value an orderly, wholesome, and quite un-Turkish form of government, particularly in Cisleithan territory. And if the Yugo-Slavs, who were formerly under the rule of Austria and accustomed to the civilized environment of Central Europe, stand, as a rule, on a higher social and cultural plane than do the Serbians, whose world of ideas is still frequently patriarchal, it is nevertheless true that the nationalism of the Serbians since they developed into an independent unified state is stronger and faced with fewer problems. As for any understanding they may have of

each other, they shrug their shoulders and say of one another, "They are different from us!" "Austrian!" exclaims the Serbian when, after rubbing shoulders for ten years with him in the Yugo-Slav State, he is confronted by something odd in the 'Outlander,' and in similar circumstances the latter spits out the no less contemptuous epithet of "Balkan!"

This conflict was accentuated to an alarming degree, as on either side of the line of demarcation between the Srbijanci and the Prečani different views were held regarding the forces which built up the composite State. A wholehearted Serbian chauvinist celebrated September 30, 1916, as the birthday of the SHS Kingdom,[1] for on that day the Serbs on the Salonika front captured the fortified peak of Kajmakčalan from the Bulgars and won an important strategic and moral victory. Many considered that the taking of Kajmakčalan constituted the turning-point of the whole campaign. The very name shone with symbolic brilliance for them, for without it there would have been no kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The others categorically refused to accept the Kajmakčalan ideology. They not only pointed to the sacrifices that they too had made during the World War—for the best among them, denounced as traitors, had languished in the dungeons or met their deaths on the gallows of the Dual Monarchy, while not a few had fought as volunteers under the Serbian flag—but they also expressed their disapproval of the Prussian doctrine which had the effrontery to place the idea of power above the power of ideas. The 'Outlander' regarded the gradual development of the Yugo-Slav idea through the centuries as the essential point, for without it the new form of state would be an empty husk, without it there would be no kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

Opinions regarding the ideal form of state were also equally irreconcilable. Serbia had always been either a principality or a kingdom, but in any case a centralized

[1] The letters SHS stand for Srba, Hrvata, Slovenaca = Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.—TRANSLATOR.

state. The districts which were freed from the Turkish yoke in 1878 and 1912 had acquiesced in their annexation to Serbia without demur. It was not unnatural, therefore, that the Serbians should regard the accession of territory of 1918 as accretions to the Serbian state, although the circumstances were utterly different. The 'Outlander,' on the other hand, had regarded the slogan of self-determination during the Hapsburgian days as a weapon of defence against the lust of oppression on the part of Vienna and Budapest, while the inhabitants of the kingdom of Croatia-Slovenia in particular had enjoyed a certain measure of self-government, and, brandishing the clauses of the Croat constitution as their standard and pleading the right to autonomy within their historical frontiers, had repulsed the assaults of those who wanted to Magyarize them. The political traditions of the very decades during which the Serbians had developed a centralized Government had turned the Croats into federalists. The Croat Peasant Party, under Stefan Radić, which in the elections in Croatia and Slovenia had registered the greatest number of votes and won most seats, put such a strain on the federal bow that ever since October 28, 1918, the great day of their emancipation from the Hapsburg yoke, they have regarded Croatia as an independent state in a position to negotiate with Serbia as Power to Power regarding their unification into a single country. Without going to such extreme lengths, the plan for a constitution drawn up by the National Club of Croatia, which represented the feeling of the cultivated classes, was also in favour of the 'historic' subdivision of the state into six large provinces—Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina and Slovenia, with independent national Governments, Parliaments, Budgets, etc. The plan of government outlined by the first Yugo-Slav Prime Minister, the Serbian Stojan Protić, in which he suggested that the state should be divided into ten large areas with extensive self-governing powers, showed some attempt at reaching a compromise. But the scheme which was ultimately presented to the Constituent Assembly, and was the work of Nikola Pašić, ignored the "historic

frontiers," and divided the state into thirty-three departments, whose self-governing powers were no greater than those of a Prussian province.

The cries of "*Hie Zentralismus!*" and "*Hie Föderalismus!*" were very far from representing merely the pale theories and intangible ideas of rival schools of thought; extremely concrete interests lay hidden behind them. The question as to where the commercial seaport of Yugo-Slavia should be established was already creating division between the parties. A large section of the Serbians, incapable of learning a new lesson so quickly, were standing as they had done in 1912, with their faces toward the Ægean, intent on regarding the Greek port of Salonika in the Yugo-Slav free zone as the natural port and *entrepôt* for their country. The Southern Slavs of the former Hapsburg territories, on the other hand, turned to the Adriatic, counting on a brisk increase of commerce through the systematic development of the Dalmatian harbours. But the mere act of surveying the coastline gave rise to disagreements between the two camps. The ardently nationalistic Serbians wanted the line connecting the capital with the Adriatic to run mainly through Serbian territory and debouch at the inconvenient and out-of-the-way town of Cattaro, while their opponents on the former Austro-Hungarian side of the Save and the Drina considered that Spalate would be the port of the future as soon as the country behind it had been opened up. While the adherents of each of the two parties hoped to score some economic advantage for themselves by arranging the state in accordance with their own ideas, the Serbians also claimed the right to be the leading party in the new state on the score of the great sacrifices Serbia had made in the World War, and supported the system of centralism, as best calculated to attain this ideal. A similar aspiration led the United Christian Socialist Party in the Yugo-Slav Club to couple Dalmatia with Bosnia in their proposed division of the state into six provinces, which would have resulted in half the self-governing area containing a majority of Catholics, while among the Croats there were believers in the 'good old times' who under the plea of "historic

frontiers" and autonomy hoped to take the edge off the agrarian reforms.

In the Constituent Assembly the parties did not confront each other with the same ideals as they did a few years later. The Slovene Catholics fought shoulder to shoulder with the Croats against centralism, while the Serbs of the former Austrian provinces supported the Serbians in their fight for centralization. Thus history was forced to record with no little astonishment that the two men who in 1928 had led the struggle against the Vidovdan constitution and drawn the eyes of all Europe upon them were in the end chiefly responsible for its establishment—Svetozar Bribičević in an active sense, for as leader of the former Hapsburgian Serbians he had been more fanatically in favour of centralization than the radical Serbians; Stefan Radić in a passive sense, because as leader of the Croat Peasant Party he had hopelessly weakened the opposition by the boycott of Parliament. But through the irony of history the work of framing the constitution reached a successful termination only through the co-operation of the Bosnian Mohammedans—that is to say, with the assistance of those very Beys and feudal exploiters of Yugo-Slav farm-slaves against whom the struggle for freedom and unity in Yugo-Slavia had been chiefly directed. When the 419 members were put to the vote, 161, to show that they protested on principle, refrained from voting. They were the members of the Croat Peasant Party, the Croat National Club, the Christian Socialist Party, and the Communists. Of the 258 who voted 35 were against, while of the 223 who voted in favour 184 were Serbians, 18 Moslems, 11 Slovenes, and 10 Croats; in other words, two-thirds of the Slovenes in the Assembly which passed the constitution and almost nine-tenths of the Croats rejected the work of July 28, 1921. The National minorities—Germans, Magyars, Rumanians, and Italians—constituting one-tenth of the population, were excluded from the right of voting for the Constituent Assembly because they had advanced the plea that they were entitled to exercise the privilege of option in favour of a foreign state.

IV

The display made before the eyes of the world by Yugo-Slav Parliamentarianism prior to the meeting of the Constituent Assembly was depressing in the extreme, for as the holding of a general election before the final settlement of the country's frontiers was regarded as being out of the question, the people were temporarily represented by the members of the pre-War Parliaments—the Serbian and Montenegrin Skupštinas and the various Diets of the Danubian monarchy, some of which had been elected by extremely antiquated methods, and were by no means representative of the new age. The dismal failure of this sham Parliament, which spent its whole time in brawls and squabbles and in staggering between one Government crisis and another, can be explained only by the fact that the fresh enthusiasm of the electoral masses did not stand behind these representatives of a bygone age. But even when the newly elected Constituent Assembly was given an opportunity of showing its powers Parliamentarianism once more proved a broken reed.

The ultimate reason lay in the economic and social backwardness of the country. The important classes of modern society, for the settlement of whose conflicting interests Parliament is the recognized medium of discussion and compromise, were at first only vaguely differentiated in the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as well as in the other Balkan states. In the place of a firmly rooted *bourgeois* class there was only a newly formed unco-ordinated and acquisitive body of civilians eager for power. As regards weight and numbers the working classes were exceedingly weak, and owing to their inability to read, which prevented them from studying newspapers and pamphlets, the vast majority of the people who belonged to the peasant class found themselves relegated to the fringe of politics. Thus on the one hand there was democracy diluted by the element of the illiterate, and on the other Parliamentarianism enfeebled by lack of political tradition

and experience, and these imparted its peculiar character to the whole of the public life of Yugo-Slavia.

Furthermore this state of affairs meant that every Government was able by means of corruption and terrorization to tamper with the popular vote and to lay an axe at the roots of any true Parliamentarianism. "Free voting," declared the *Narodna Odbrana*, the organ of the Nationalist Party, "is a term which nobody to-day any longer believes in." This led to the formation of innumerable small parties incapable of exercising any driving power, and for whose separate existence there was no real justification. At the election of 1923 no fewer than 32 different political parties presented their candidates to the electors. This turned the Skupština into a mill which revolved but did not grind. In the Parliament elected in 1925 only 832 out of 2029 questions put in the course of two years were answered, of 144 interpolations only 16 were answered, of 49 Bills presented by the Government only 7 were passed, and out of 60 put forward by the people's representatives only 1. As the parties could as a rule be distinguished from each other only by their colours and their leaders, and not by their principles or their programmes, the Governments were formed by every possible permutation and combination, and as every ministry during its short career was concerned only about keeping its vacillating supporters together, political life was stripped of every vestige of dignity. To tack before the wind, to live from hand to mouth, to display gutter smartness in the discussion of lofty questions, constituted the highest ambition of a Yugo-Slav Cabinet.

It is true that the external relations of Yugo-Slavia, which were always exposed to so many changes of atmosphere, prevented a normal development of internal conditions. When the Vojvodina, inhabited by Yugo-Slavs and hundreds of thousands of Magyars, was handed over to the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes the lust for revenge on the part of Hungary was all the stronger seeing that after a short interlude of Soviet republicanism the old ruler caste had once more swung itself into the saddle in

Budapest. Another disquieting neighbour remained in the form of Albania, whose attitude was problematic and who when the frontiers had been defined had also handed over hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants to the kingdom of Yugo-Slavia. While in the case of Bulgaria every year that passed provided ever fresh proof of the mistake made in 1918 by the Great Powers in refusing to countenance the union of all four Yugo-Slav stocks under one rule. Had Bulgaria formed an integral part of Yugo-Slavia not only would most of the external menaces of the SHS monarchy have been reduced to a minimum, but the majority of its internal difficulties would not have developed into such terrible evils. As things are, however, Macedonia has become a festering sore in the body of the Balkans. From being an ethnic and philological link between two neighbours related by ties of blood, and serving as a bridge between Serbs and Bulgarians, it became a dividing wall as soon as the chauvinists in Belgrade claimed the Macedonian Slavs as Serbs and the chauvinists in Sofia claimed them as Bulgars. Moreover, the revolutionary organization in Macedonia, which was supported by Bulgaria and had its headquarters in that country, repeatedly exploited the economic and social misery (which was partly the result of centuries of Turkish rule, partly the outcome of the years of war between 1912 and 1918, and also to a certain extent due to government by an incapable and mercenary bureaucracy) to rouse the population by means of raids and bomb outrages. Another source of danger to the new state lay in the strained relations between Yugo-Slavia and its Hungarian, Albanian, and Bulgarian neighbours, owing to the attitude adopted by Italian imperialism, which not only cast longing eyes at the coast of Yugo-Slavia, but also regarded the kingdom of Karadjordjević as in any case the chief barrier in the way of Italian expansion in the Balkans. Ever since Mussolini took up the reins of power in Rome the mine-galleries of the Fascist encircling movement have been in evidence throughout the states adjoining Yugo-Slavia, and the Government in Belgrade was obliged to face the failure of all its endeavours to come to a tolerable

understanding when the Treaty of Tirana, of November 1926, openly constituted Albania a strategical district and a line-of-communication area for Italy. The fact that Yugo-Slavia was a member of the Little Entente was but small consolation in this dilemma, for it served a purpose only against Hungary and a restoration of the Hapsburgs.

If the pressure of foreign politics was largely responsible for confusion at home, the results of the Government's activities were also far from inspiring. Far-reaching agrarian reforms, the abolition of the medieval system of land tenure and an alteration in the status of the peasant, the breaking up of the large estates and the conversion of the landless serfs and workers into small-holders, had been advanced before the tribunal of history as the social justification for the founding of the Yugo-Slav state. When in December 1923 Dr Simonović, the minister entrusted with the task of agrarian reform, addressed the Financial Committee of the Chamber upon the necessity of abolishing the last vestiges of feudalism and of creating a social structure for the country similar to that of pre-War Serbia, and introduced into the fray the agrarian proletariat which for five hundred years had lived not only in political but also in economic serfdom and were now to be given the minimum means of existence, he showed himself an ardent supporter of the lofty historical mission consisting of the union of the Southern Slavs to which the social revolution was to lead. The distribution of an aggregate of 1,020,398 acres among 233,141 families seemed a good beginning, but the corruption of the political cliques had become so widespread that the purchaser of a penny stamp at the post-office was better served if he belonged to the same political party as the man who sold it to him, and similarly the grand and equitable idea of agrarian reform was so twisted and distorted by all manner of petty party interests that not social considerations but national and political intrigues determined the assignment of land. Those who could be relied upon to vote for a particular party were rewarded with land and estates, while the settlement of the twenty to thirty thousand volunteers belonging to the Yugo-Slav areas of

the Danubian monarchy who had fought under the Serbian flag on the Salonika front constitutes a very sorry chapter. Many of them did not even know where to begin on their little plots of land, and either left them, let them, or sold them, with the result that the agrarian reforms merely defeated their own object.

The fundamental economic and social problems of the new state had been so badly handled that those who were suffering from the mismanagement of affairs did not cease to bewail the never-ending condition of economic chaos, and declared that the rabid party greed of the politicians and the apathy of the authorities were mainly responsible. As soon as the new state had been formed there were demands for the establishment of national industries and for independence from the foreigner, and a mushroom growth of factories and industries sprang up which could not possibly survive. The collapse of many of them served only to accentuate the economic crisis, which was a natural aftermath of the War, and which, with its cessation of output and shortage of money and of labour, endures to this day. In the annual report of the Agram Chamber of Commerce and Industry for 1927 we read:

> The establishment of our economic system on a thoroughly sound basis can be accomplished only by close co-operation between the Government and the leaders of industry and commerce. But although economic problems are of paramount importance in our public life and everybody is aware that on their solution the whole welfare of the country depends, they are either entirely shelved or regarded only from the narrow standpoint of private or party interests. Our Parliament is still chiefly concerned with party politics alone, with the result that economic questions are forced into the background, and even when such questions appear on the agenda for the day their settlement is repeatedly postponed.

While the adverse balance of trade (except for three years) pointed to the hopeless confusion of the economic situation, the increase in emigration provided an even more eloquent indictment of the Government. After 1918 it was hoped that the hundreds of thousands of Southern Slavs who had possessed no weapon against the Hapsburg yoke in

Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia, or against the Turkish yoke in Macedonia, except that of emigration, would flock back to their homes. And, as a matter of fact, in the course of time 65,365 of them did find their way back. But on the other hand 114,227 malcontents have quite recently shaken the dust of Yugo-Slavia from their feet and gone out into the world. Of those who thus returned to their native land 8,949 fell to Croatia-Slavonia, which areas, however, lost 40,690 by emigration!

V

The carelessness with which economic problems were treated was equalled only by the blind disregard for the Croatian question, though to call it the Croatian question is to make it appear far too simple, and thus place it in a false light. The problem came to be regarded as Croatian merely because Stefan Radić, the leader of the strongest Croatian party, resolutely insisted on beating the big drum for the securing of political rights for his own people, whereas both the hostile camps into which Yugo-Slavia was divided before the establishment of the dictatorship numbered Slovenes and Serbians as well as Croats among their members. The Government majorities of the two last 'Parliamentary' Cabinets of Vukičević and Korošec were not composed chiefly of supporters in the former kingdom of Serbia, for in 1927 the four parties of which these majorities were formed—the Radicals, the Democrats, the Moslems, and the Christian Socialists—had, out of the total of votes, scored 65 per cent. in Slovenia, over 54 per cent. in the Vojvodina, over 44 per cent. in Bosnia and Herzegovina, over 34 per cent. in Dalmatia, and over 16 per cent. even in Croatia.

Thus it was less a matter of racial antagonism than of a struggle for power in which the centralism of the Vidovdan constitution favoured a small group of professional politicians in Belgrade. As ever since 1903 they had, by means of the Radical Party, ruled just as despotically over the Parliament in Serbia as did the Jacobin Club in France

in 1793, they had remained Greater Serbians at heart during the World War, with no more understanding of the needs of Yugo-Slavia than the Greater Prussian Party had once had for the rest of Germany. The object they pursued in the War was to round off the state by adding to it all those areas inhabited by majorities of Orthodox Serbians—that is to say, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and portions of the Vojvodina. But when from the ruins of the Hapsburg empire there arose instead a Southern Slav nation complete but for Bulgaria the petrified brains of these confirmed Epimetheans did not find it so easy to change their ideal of what the state should be. The aged Pašić, a Cavour *malgré lui*, who used to speak of the "trinomial Serbian people," shed tears of sorrow in private at the thought that the Serbians should be coupled with the Croats and Slovenes, who were so odious in his eyes. His party colleague, Protić, although far more clear-sighted, regarded it as a misfortune that the Croats should have been included, and wrathfully suggested that the non-Serbian districts should be amputated at the first sign of discontent. Even Vukičević, the last Radical Prime Minister, displayed a sadly unhistorical understanding of the new state which had been created by a voluntary union of the several branches of the Serbian family when he declared that the year 1918 had "extended the frontiers of Serbia as far as Subotica."

And as these people of little understanding regarded the new state as nothing more than an enlarged Serbia, they endeavoured to enforce their claims to power, as they had succeeded in doing in the smaller kingdom of Serbia before the War. The result was that in the Army there was not a single 'Outlander' of the rank of General and only one high official in the Diplomatic Service, while in the Civil Service, out of the thirty-three District Lieutenants, or Prefects, there were only three Croats. But what weighed most heavily on the private individual was the incidence of taxation. As no adjustment of the financial laws between the former kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand and the former Austro-Hungarian provinces on the

other was made until the end of 1928, the 'Outlander' was for years much more heavily taxed than the Serbian. While direct levies, taxes, and duties amounted to 91 dinars per head in Serbia and Montenegro, in Croatia they totalled 164, in Slovenia 279, and in the Vojvodina 293 dinars! Shortly before the bloody outrage of June 20, 1928, Juraj Demetrović, one of the most fervent Yugo-Slav Nationalists, proved in the Skupština that in 1927 every citizen should have contributed 142 dinars in taxation, but that the inhabitants of Serbia and Montenegro paid only 95, with the result that the 'Outlanders' paid half a milliard more in taxation than they would have done if the Serbian standard had been applied to all. He also reckoned that for the first nine years after the formation of the new state Serbia and Montenegro paid a milliard and a half dinars less and the areas on the former Austro-Hungarian side of the Save and the Drina a round four milliards more in taxation than would have been the case if the burden had been evenly distributed. And if we examine the subsidies paid in various parts of the country to universities we find the same state of affairs, while of the new roads laid down at public expense we find that close on 700 miles fell to Serbia and Montenegro, and only 125 to other parts of the country. This provided quite sufficient proof to the Prečani of the stepmotherly treatment they were receiving in their native country.

The bitterness of the 'Outlanders' fostered by this contemptuous treatment was only increased by the obstinacy with which most of the parties at the helm consistently ignored the existence of a Croatian problem. According to the constitution all citizens of the state had equal rights —so what was the grievance? If the Croats became too obstreperous, argued those in power, they might, if the worst came to the worst, be punished in the same way as the Communists had been who in 1920 and 1921, when they were beginning to make matters uncomfortable by their outrages, were suppressed by brute force. But the situation was made more complicated and critical by the fact that it was precisely the Croatian Peasant Party which

owing to its numerical strength turned the scales in favour of the Opposition. Stefan Radić, their idolized leader, presented a strange combination of twentieth-century ideas and antiquated beliefs. In his heart of hearts, notwithstanding all his efforts to pay homage to the taste of the age by the use of current catchwords, he belonged to an Epimethean ideology. For he was constantly rousing the dull class-instinct of the country bumpkin against the town-dweller.

He regarded the fertile plains and valleys of the country as producers and the towns as consumers, and among the urban parasites he classed the industrial worker, for whom a working day of sixteen hours did not seem too much. Confirmed romanticist that he was, he expected to find the cure for all the innumerable social evils in the revival of the Zadruga—the old patriarchal peasant home, which had been hopelessly destroyed by individualistic economic influences. The fact that this man, who was a mass of contradictions, was unquestioningly followed by the Croatian peasants was primarily due to their lack of political education. Under the Hapsburgs—at all events until the electoral reforms of 1908—they had been to all intents and purposes excluded from the suffrage, and consequently from political life. Thus they enthusiastically accepted the guidance of Radić without testing it; nay, they were utterly incapable of testing it, for the simple reason that he was the first to show any concern about their cares, their needs, and their sufferings. This unhesitating readiness on the part of his peasant supporters to follow him through thick and thin constituted the tragedy of Radić's life, for it enabled him to throw caution to the winds, and, regardless of the wise old art of recognizing the bounds of possibility, to yield to every impulse of his unreasoning temper and pursue his erratic policy unhindered. For, however mad the tactics he adopted, he could never meet with opposition on the part of the peasants. He might sulk like Achilles in his tent and hold back his myrmidons from the Parliamentary arena; or make vain attempts to rouse active sympathy among the English Liberals or the Russian Bolsheviks for the Croatian

question; or he might change from a republican to a monarchist, as he did in 1925; or in a single night become a supporter instead of an opponent of the State; or hand in hand with Pašić, whom a moment ago he had been madly reviling, he might enact a moving political scene; or by his uncontrollable outbursts in the Belgrade Cabinet force his colleagues to regard him as an undesirable member of the coalition; or, finally, he might with flying colours go over to the Opposition camp.

Stubborn resistance on every side made the Skupština in 1928, more than ever before, a sort of arena for the wildest and most contemptible struggles. It was now quite unable to get through any business whatsoever. While gaping lacunæ were visible in every department of legislation, and were crying aloud to be filled, only 209 Bills were passed in ten years. Its incapacity for work and the increasing wildness of its sessions gradually as if of malice prepense destroyed what little respect the representative assembly still enjoyed at the hands of the masses. Sentence of death had already been pronounced on this sham Parliamentarianism before the pent-up feelings of irritation it aroused at last found expression in a series of revolver-shots fired on June 20 by the Montenegrin Puniša Račić, a member of the Government majority. He killed Paul Radić and Dr Basariček, two Opposition members, and severely wounded several others, among them Stefan Radić himself. But from that day forward there yawned between the two camps a bloody grave which could never be bridged. Those in power stupidly and stubbornly refused to recognize the true nature of the crisis. Instead of immediately resigning and silently leaving to a completely new and impartial Government the task of dissolving the Skupština and holding a free election, the Vukičević Cabinet once again tried to be smart over grave issues. It lingered on much too long, and even when it eventually resigned it was only to be resuscitated as the Korošec Cabinet, which was exasperatingly like its predecessor.

This sham struggle at a moment when events had taken place which made reconciliation impossible raised to

boiling-point the indignation of the two parties who constituted the nucleus of the Opposition—Radić's Croatian Peasant Party and Pribičević's Independent Democrats. And when Radić, whose impressionable and impulsive nature would have responded to any efforts to reach a settlement, died as the direct result of his wound, all possibility of an understanding was at an end. The Opposition had turned its back on the Skupština, the situation had reached a deadlock, and the electorate had shown itself incapable of fulfilling the historic task of imbuing the young State with a modern spirit. The foreign journalists who discussed the matter with the leaders of the peasants' democratic coalition, and particularly with Dr Vladke Maček, Radić's successor, gained the impression that, except for the union secured by the person of the sovereign, they refused to recognize any connexion between Croats and Serbians. "We Croats," declared Dr Maček at a meeting at Križevci, "will never take part in any Skupština in Belgrade, however constituted, nor will we co-operate with it, for in this composite state we wish to be represented not as a party, but as a people." And shortly afterward he repeated that never again, even as the result of free voting, would the Croats return to a Parliament in Belgrade.

At this crisis, affecting not only affairs of State, but, what was even worse, cutting at the root of the very idea of the State, that other power, which had carefully been nursing its strength and awaiting its opportunity, came upon the scene.

VI

The more irrevocably Parliament cut the ground from under its own feet, the more the parties split up—in fact, the more obvious it became that the electorate had failed as a foundation for the State—the stronger, according to a very simple law, became "that other constitutional factor," the King, and the more frequently did irresponsible elements begin to stir behind the scenes.

Under the last two Obrenovićs, Milan and Alexander, *coups d'état*, unconstitutional Governments, and more or less

disguised dictatorships had been of no rare occurrence in Serbia, but when Karadjordjević ascended the throne all this came to an end. King Alexander had received a democratic heritage, for his father, Peter, as heir apparent had translated John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*, while his loyalty to the constitution and his reserve made him a model of a constitutional monarch. His son too ascended the throne with a bow to both democracy and Parliamentarianism. On the other hand, after 1903 the civil authorities had to defend themselves against the ambition of the Army officers, who, on June 10, paved the way to the throne for Karadjordjević, and wanted to take over the Government of the country. Shortly before the outbreak of the World War it almost came to open conflict between the members of the secret league of officers—the "League of Union or Death" or, as it was popularly known, "The Black Hand"—and Pašić's Government. The fact that in 1917 the Radicals had had Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, nicknamed Apis, the heart and soul of the organization, shot by order of court martial in Salonika was but an echo of this bitter struggle for power in the State.

As there was no lack of precedent for *coups d'état* and attempts at establishing a military dictatorship, Yugo-Slav Parliamentarianism had from the beginning been disturbed by echoes of other forms of government. The fact that even before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly the Government had been busy with innumerable decrees and edicts for which there was no need of Parliamentary sanction had undermined the whole idea of democracy, and when the Skupština failed to accomplish anything the shadow of personal rule fell ever more menacingly across its benches. Even when the previous representative assembly had been working fairly efficiently there had been hints that the higher grade officers who had once thrown in their lot with the Radicals against the "League of Union or Death," and who were popularly known as "The White Hand," were trying to influence the Prince Regent and heir apparent against the con-

stitution. Protić was persecuted by rumours to the effect that, in view of the perpetual paralysis of Parliament, he was aiming at a dictatorship supported by the Opposition, and even later, owing to various Parliamentary difficulties, voices were raised in favour of a "clean-handed dictatorship." But as long as old Pašić was alive all who dallied with the idea of dictatorship were obliged to keep their mouths shut. This versatile and able man had in the course of a long career gradually become petrified into a rank reactionary. He had shaken off all traces of his student days in Zürich, when he had felt Bakunin's hand on his shoulder and heard him say, "This man is a born revolutionary!" All he retained to his dying day was a rooted objection to all uncontrolled and irresponsible suggestions regarding alternative systems of government. Hardly had his eyes closed, however, when the elements bent on abolishing Parliament came more boldly to the front. The way in which the Radical Uzunović shortly afterward formed a Cabinet without even consulting his own party amounted to a breach of Parliamentary conventions, while in the same year his successor and party colleague, Vukičević, was widely regarded as an instrument of irresponsible agents who were planning the overthrow of Parliamentarianism. In an electioneering speech of September 1927 Nastas Petrović, the Independent Radical and an ex-minister, who was in a position to know, declared that a storm was brewing behind the mountains, meaning that one or two persons in power were aiming at establishing a dictatorship; and when after the election Vukičević's Government sprang up, as it were, through a trapdoor, its supporters hailed it as a Cabinet prepared to defend the Parliamentary system against the designs of those who were aiming at a dictatorship. Here again there was no smoke without fire.

Although Alexander Karadjordjević may have been inspired by the ambition not to go down to history as King Log—*le roi règne, mais il ne gouverne pas*—he must have heard warning voices in his soul which he silenced before he could brace himself to the deed of January 6,

1929. But the hopeless confusion of the situation, the flat refusal of the revolutionary parties to allow any revision of the constitution in favour of the 'Outlanders,' and the declaration of the Croat Peasant Party that they were prepared, on a free vote, to cut themselves adrift from Belgrade, led him to favour what appeared to be the only alternative, which was recommended to him not only by the generals, but also secretly by party leaders like the Radical Dr Srškić, the Democrat Marinković, and perhaps even the Christian Socialist leader, Dr Korošec. He may also have been partly influenced in his decision by the fact that the incessant state of turmoil at home weakened his country in its foreign relations and actually challenged Italy to acts of encroachment in her desire to get a footing in the Balkans. But possibly the deciding factor was the attitude of the two Opposition parties, who were waving the banner of resolute democracy before the eyes of Europe. As early as the beginning of the year 1928 Stefan Radić, at an audience with the King, had whispered in his Majesty's ear: "A General! The sword alone can be trusted!" And when after June 20 the coalition raised a banner with the ominous device "The People and the King," Pribičević and Dr Maček, who had been summoned to Belgrade at the New Year, advised Karadjordjević to assume the initiative and put an end to the crisis by the "formation of an unpolitical Government" on non-Parliamentary lines. "The gravediggers of democracy and Parliamentarianism," the Marburg Socialist paper declared immediately after the *coup d'état*, "the gravediggers of the sovereignty of the people are to-day called Dr Maček and Svetozar Pribičević!"

VII

When on January 6 the dictatorship presented its visiting-card it was evident that it had no wish to be confused with any similar contemporary institution in Europe. The King in his manifesto to the people appealed to the tradition followed by his father, and declared that Parliamentarianism was his ideal, while a few days later he

GENERAL ŽIVKOVIĆ

assured the correspondent of the *Matin* that he had no intention of introducing absolute rule into his country, but, on the contrary, was far more anxious in due course to establish a genuine Parliamentary and democratic system through the channel of elections lawfully held. Similarly Pera Živković, the Prime Minister of the dictatorship, who was a General of the Guards, assured the correspondent of an English newspaper in most unequivocal terms that the action of January 6 entailed no change of system in the sense of introducing absolutism or Fascism, and protested that as soon as the present *régime* had accomplished its task Yugo-Slavia would return to Parliamentarianism. And in all official announcements the dictatorship was described as purely temporary.

As the King's manifesto clearly and succinctly proclaimed, its object was to save the national unity of the State, which was threatened. As the union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes constituted a sort of revolution, and the dismemberment of this Yugo-Slav unity would have social and political consequences of a counter-revolutionary nature, the new Government in Belgrade was actually in a position to claim that it was a dictatorship for the safeguarding of the revolution—that is to say, a revolutionary dictatorship. But this would have been true only if it had had behind it the classes which had shown themselves most passionately devoted to the idea of union—namely, the socialists and the convinced democrats. But quite apart from their disapproval of the principle of dictatorship, these parties constituted too small a group in the country to be capable of creating and maintaining a dictatorship.

In any case the *régime* established on January 6 had no connexion with Fascism either. It is true that there were movements in Yugo-Slavia with ideals and methods somewhat similar to those of the Italian Fascio—such, for instance, as the "Organization of Yugo-Slav Nationalists," or the Orjuna, who supported the Yugo-Slav idea, and the "League of Serbian Nationalist Youth," or Srnao, who stood for the idea of a Greater Serbia. But, in the first place, these two old parties, the Orjuna and the Srnao respectively, resembled

the Independent Democrats and the Radicals too closely. Secondly, in spite of their zealous tub-thumping, they had far too little influence on public life, and thirdly, like the Hanao, a similar body organized on military lines and forming the uniformed assault detachment of the intransigent Croat Party, they fell to pieces during the first months of the dictatorship.

Thus there was really no political body or party which could be regarded as constituting the backbone of the dictatorship. Those who were responsible for its establishment were few in number—the King, a few members of the corps of officers, and one or two politicians. It is not the "White Hand" which rules Yugo-Slavia to-day, for the group of officers designated by that title possess no such solid organization as that of the "Black Hand," and moreover they do not unanimously support Živković. Least of all, however, is Karadjordjević a puppet in the hands of his generals. An extremely active force in politics, the King might justifiably say to Jules Sauerwein, "Whether I succeed or fail in my task, it is my own person that is at stake." The Crown is not dependent upon Pera Živković; still less can he decide its fate, for although the new Prime Minister, as Commandant of the Royal Guard, has all manner of powers behind him, there are two other generals in Belgrade, each of whom enjoys his own peculiar measure of authority—Zečević, the Commandant of the Belgrade garrison, and Kostić, the head of the Officers' Training School. If the worst came to the worst, the King could easily play one against the other, and hold one in check by means of the third, as the three men are far from being united.

But it was not only because it had the infantry, cavalry, and artillery at its back that the dictatorship conquered without striking a blow. It emerged triumphant because the party leaders felt too weak, because the masses had no wish to raise a finger in defence of the old caricature of a Parliament, and, furthermore, because of all the factors in public life it was the Crown that inspired most confidence, many regarding it as the one solid institution rising above

the Parliamentary vortex. And thus a state of affairs arose similar to that existing in the monarchies of the eighteenth century, in which enlightened absolutism set about forming the world in its own image, or resembling Czarist Russia, where all the power emanated from one despotic ruler. In certain respects the new system also had something in common with the ideology of Kajmakčalan; for the Crown and the Army, who regarded themselves as responsible for the foundation of the SHS State,[1] rose up to save it from destruction.

VIII

The acknowledged aim of the new *régime* was to put an end to political strife, and thus soothe the turbulent passions of the country and create a cleaner atmosphere. After which, by purifying the administration and freeing it from the taint of politics, it hoped to make the wheels of State run smoothly once again, and finally secure closer unity and proper adjustments between the various divisions of the country, so that a united Yugo-Slav nation might be born of the stocks which had hitherto been at loggerheads. A Government programme of March 21 laid down point by point with minute detail the reforms it proposed to introduce.

But the only item in this programme which has been successfully carried out without a hitch is the suppression of politics. The Skupština, as well as the provincial committees and borough councils, have been suppressed and replaced by duly appointed officials. A similar fate has overtaken the political parties, quite regardless of whether certain of their more distinguished members, like the powerful Dr Srškić, the democrat Marinković, and Dr Korošec, of the Christian Socialist Party, happened to be among the chief supporters of the dictatorship Government or not. It was understood that the new *régime* recognized no parties, but only citizens with equal rights. But it also refuses to recognize such a thing as public opinion, and has closed the

[1] See p. 329, *ante*.

safety-valve of criticism. Draconian laws for the safety of the State protect the dictatorship from the faintest breath of contradiction. Any attempt at revolt is severely punished, and in spite of the *captatio benevolentiæ* of a political amnesty summary arrests and political trials multiply day by day. One of the first consequences is that the Press has become flat and dull; it may say only what the dictatorship approves. Many newspapers have been suppressed, while others have 'voluntarily' suspended publication, since they lost all meaning when their mouths were closed. But although the new *régime* may be most anxious to be regarded merely as a stepping-stone to a new democracy and a new Parliamentarianism, no Fascist dictatorship or absolutist system has ever succeeded in the long run in suppressing so many civil liberties.

Nevertheless the dictatorship cannot be accused of inertia. With the help of a Legislative Council of seventeen members, chosen by itself, and an Economic Council, the Živković ministry week by week promulgates new decrees, laws, and ordinances mainly concerned with simplifying and cheapening the machinery of government. By amalgamating the ministries of Agrarian Reform and Agriculture, of Education and Justice, Health and Social Reform, the Post Office and the Transport Department, the number of ministers has been reduced from sixteen to twelve, while in certain Government departments antiquated offices and sinecures, such as that of General Director, have been abolished. Many officials were summarily dismissed and others kept on only provided they worked to a strict schedule. The old friendly parties that used to meet over a cup of Turkish coffee, frequently forming dangerous bridges of intimacy between a Government official and the public, were done away with. Dusty piles of documents were suddenly examined and classified. In fact, it was quite clear to all that the administration was functioning. District governors were transferred to different areas in order that they might no longer be subjected to the influence of the cliques and coteries of their old environment. This also had the effect of releasing the administration from all

political bias, while the prosecution for corruption of 739 officials in Macedonia alone put a wholesome fear of the new broom into their colleagues.

Various legislative changes were also introduced. A new penal code was drawn up and became operative throughout the country, as well as fresh regulations for the procedure in both criminal and civil trials, all of which reforms breathed the spirit of the twentieth century. In other fields adjustment was more difficult. In order to impose an equal burden of taxation on all citizens, a land-register, hitherto unknown in the countries concerned, will have to be compiled for Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, and this work will take years to accomplish.

But during the six months that the cavalry general Živković has been cheerfully trampling on the constitution and popular representation what has been done for the adjustment of the inner spiritual relations of the three branches of the nation, for the true welding of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes? It was not without good reason that the Government programme of March 21 maintained complete silence regarding the future organization of the state, as well as regarding the relations of Serbs and Croats. Truth to tell, even the name Yugo-Slavia has not yet ousted the long-winded appellation of the kingdom as that of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which in itself constituted a mockery of national unity. The four Croats in the Cabinet are not recognized in wider Croatian circles as representatives of the people, and the fact that the King has spoken of the "common ideal of the unity of the Yugo-Slav race" and General Živković of "this our Yugo-Slav state," and that he has proposed a toast to the "Yugo-Slav kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" merely proves that the regulations for the safety of the realm hold the threat of punishment over the head of anyone who even dares to cast doubt upon the ethnic unity of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

IX

Just as a downpour of rain in summer brings the worms to the surface of the soil, so after the suppression of the constitution reactionaries of all kinds began to show their heads. Voices were raised in favour of a bicameral system, the abolition of proportional representation, and even the suppression of universal suffrage. The Germans in Slovenia, who, not without justification, regarded themselves as an oppressed minority, could find nothing better to do than to agitate, through the medium of their Cilli journal, for the abolition of universal suffrage—that is to say, for political oppression. A more direct attack was made by the industrial magnates, who in a series of pressing petitions to the Prime Minister demanded a speedy reform of the social laws, which were merely unsuitable and emaciated copies of the measures adopted by States more highly developed economically and enjoying superior material conditions. Although the trade unions were given opportunities of making their standpoint clear in a series of exhaustive discussions with the employers in the presence of a Government representative, the new regulations regarding the hours of work in commercial and industrial concerns make havoc of the eight-hour day, while the prolongation of the Rent Restriction Act only until November 1, and the recent attack on the independent control of sick-benefit funds point in the same direction.

Even the policy with regard to agrarian reform shows a tendency to yield to influences which before the advent of the dictatorship had been practically silenced. If the social right of existence of the Yugo-Slav state depends upon the abolition of feudalism and the breaking up of the large estates, the new *régime* could not have served the idea of unity better than by unreservedly carrying out the agrarian reforms, of which such an inadequate beginning had been made. But to the joy of all those who opposed the confiscation of large estates, the Agram Professor, Dr Frangeš, was appointed Minister for Agrarian Reform, although from

his attitude toward the problem it would have been more correct to call him Minister against Agrarian Reform. His Croatian fellow-countryman and colleague, Dr Mažuranić, the head of the Board of Trade, who assisted in the research undertaken by a commission of experts appointed to examine the results of the reforms already introduced, came to the conclusion that it would be better to drop the whole scheme, and that as quickly as possible. As at the moment the majority in the dictatorship Cabinet was of a different opinion, he sent in his resignation at the end of July. But the fear of those interested in reform that a revision of the scheme is to be made in favour of the great landlords is well founded. The formation of the agrarian bank with special privileges affords no compensation for the shelving of agrarian reform, for although it lends necessitous peasants money at a low rate of interest, it nevertheless represents a species of internal forced loan. All those likely to be dependent on it had more or less large sums extorted from them for the capital of the bank, so that instead of the 300,000,000 estimated half a milliard of dinars was raised.

x

Although the dictatorship undertook to make all classes contented, dissatisfaction grows more rife every day. The capitalists complain because alterations in social legislation are proceeding too slowly, and the workers because any alterations should have been regarded as necessary. The opponents of centralism soon stifled their incipient cries of joy at the eventual loosening of the bonds when they recognized that the dictatorship Government meant the most drastic centralism, while the supporters of centralism frown because they are doubtful whether the new *régime* will do justice to their wishes. But the most embittered of all are the politicians, who although they represent the principle of democracy and Parliamentarianism were prepared to give their wholehearted support to an autocratic Government, provided it could be regarded as a short-lived

temporary expedient. But they soon learned that here, as everywhere else, dictatorship follows its own laws, that the sweet champagne of absolute power quickly rises to the head, and that nothing is so pleasant as the sensation of possessing unlimited wealth based on the exercise of political power with all the resources of a country behind one. Although the King had declared in the beginning that he would return to constitutional government as quickly as possible, it soon became apparent that the great scheme of reform could not be carried out in two or three years. Thus the dictatorship, which at first appeared tolerable, roused alarm on every side when it seemed likely to last for some considerable length of time. Whereas in its early days, by its happy handling of foreign policy, it won a good deal of favour, the situation has since changed very much to its disadvantage, and even impaired its authority in domestic affairs. Seldom have relations with Bulgaria been more strained than they are at the present moment.

Consequently, as early as May, Pribičević and Dr Maček, together with other reputable leaders of the Democrats and Radicals, agreed to force the King to proclaim the abolition of the dictatorship and the revival of Parliamentarianism. But the Government spies, whose name is legion, were on the alert. And when Pribičević went to Belgrade to make the final arrangements for this step, the former all-powerful minister was seized, and, in spite of being in a poor state of health at the time, was conveyed to Brus, a little hamlet in Central Serbia, where he was kept under arrest. Ever since then all who constitute a menace to the dictatorship feel that their movements are being watched, and woe betide him who kicks against the pricks!

But the real menace to the system does not lie in an outburst of discontent on the part of the masses, least of all in Croatia, where Radić knew only too well why he never succeeded in getting farther than mere revolutionary phrases. One emigration swallow, like Dr Pavelić, who is swaggering about in Sofia, does not make a summer. Serbia would be more likely to prove a volcano, but in view

of the strength of the armed forces to be faced even here, fatalism, which adapts itself to the inevitable, is no insignificant factor. As to the Communists, who have apparently received instructions from Moscow to increase their subterranean activities, Pera Živković has not much to fear from that direction either. On the other hand, the buttresses supporting the dictatorship might give way if a sufficiently large body of officers refused to obey. A serious division in their ranks was revealed in April, when over thirty generals were retired on half-pay, among them the influential Army commanders Smiljanić and Terzić, and even the Chief of the General Staff, Pešić. Each of these pensioners leaves a small focus of bitterness behind him in the Army, and from these small smouldering centres a great conflagration may one day burst forth. A second danger threatening the dictatorship is the financial crisis. The stabilization of the dinar, which forms an item on the programme of the new Government, can do nothing toward modifying the emptiness of the State coffers, and although French and English capital has recently been invested in one or two industries, the international money-market, with its huge fructifying loans, stands anxiously aloof. Last, but not least, the new system is merely awaiting a natural death from ossification as the result of its own unfruitfulness. Dictatorship is in its very essence always uncreative, because its roots do not reach down to the rich mother earth of the fresh political movements and ferments among the masses. All it can do is to modify the machinery of government; the organism of the State remains beyond its grasp. But dictatorship in Yugo-Slavia is more particularly at fault because the causes of the political crisis lay not in a redundancy but in a deficiency of democracy, not in Parliamentarianism as such, but in a false and counterfeit Parliamentarianism. Although its object, which is the preservation of the unity of the nation and the State, might be welcomed even from the European standpoint, it is not setting to work in the right way to achieve it.

But even if by a miracle it did achieve this end, the nation would remain for a whole generation oppressed by a feeling

of inferiority because it had been forced to secure its political ideal not through its own efforts, but with the help of other social forces—the Crown and the Army. When the body politic is sick, dictatorship is merely a quack remedy which runs cruelly counter to the political therapy of the twentieth century.

PART III

THE NATURE OF DICTATORSHIP

Otto Forst de Battaglia

(Author of an important history of French literature and of numerous works on Polish history. Leader of the Polish Catholics. In politics a Conservative.)

THE distinguished authorities who have contributed essays to this book have examined the problem of dictatorship from almost every standpoint. Some have emphasized particular aspects which had a general application, others have selected a distinguished personality from some particular nation who incorporated in his person the highest achievements of a particular concrete form of dictatorship. And now it devolves upon me to sum up the results of their investigations and to attempt to outline the nature of dictatorship as it stands out before the tribunal of history from among the various other systems of government known to us.

I am confronted at the outset by the difficulty presented by the word itself, which is far from connoting a single definite and invariable concept. Now used as a term of abuse and anon as a term of praise in the conflict of political opinions, dictatorship to one man means something very different from what it does to another. It is like the Tower of Babel. Therefore we must first of all decide *what is meant by dictatorship.*

There are a number of definitions from which to choose, but not one of them is satisfactory, not even that supplied by a man who should be in a position to know and which is almost convincing in its clarity—Lenin's definition: "Dictatorship is a form of government based directly upon force which owes allegiance to no law." If this were true, it might be objected that every despotism is a dictatorship, for the despot rules without regard for law, and he relies entirely on the force at his disposal. Nevertheless the Shah

of Persia and the negro prince in the jungle of Central Africa are neither of them dictators. Why? Because their power is rooted in the ideology of those who have to bow down to it and tolerate it, and not upon the mere fact of its existence. Such rulers enjoy a legal position; they have either inherited it or been elected by the chiefs of their tribe or been placed in it by some traditional and accepted method —the murder of the former ruler, for instance, or military conquest.

The first distinguishing sign of dictatorship is to be found in its origin. It is never established by means regarded as legal by the age and place in which it occurs. Those means of acquiring property which are prohibited by Roman law —*vi*, *clam*, *precario*—are in the realm of public life employed to prepare the way for the acquisition of that power whereby dictatorship invariably inaugurates its career. It seems essential to the nature of dictatorship that it should be founded on a violation of law, though its continued existence does not necessarily depend on a refusal to recognize law of any kind. Every dictatorship proceeds from a revolution or an upheaval, and for tactical or other domestic reasons it may prefer permanently to maintain a revolutionary complexion. But it may equally well constitute a bridge to a new period of law, or even regard its main object as being the establishment of a new law in the place of what had come to be regarded as antiquated.

Sign number two. In contradistinction to the democratic State, which on principle gives every one of its citizens a share in the government, a dictatorship is exercised by a ruler over fellow-creatures who are ruled. It is furthermore differentiated from the class States of antiquity and the Middle Ages, in which a portion of the inhabitants of a State were not citizens. Dictatorship is exercised by one or more citizens of a State who, as being directly connected with the State, are like the class rulers just mentioned, except that they impose their power on fellow-citizens who have been deprived of their rights as the result of revolution. In the class State of the past vast numbers of the inhabitants —metics, slaves, half-freedmen, serfs, and thralls—had no

direct connexion with the State, but their position was perfectly legal, and they did not regard it as unjust. Thus rulership over a number of people who are not citizens does not constitute the dictatorship of a privileged class.

Thirdly, those in possession of power, whether single individuals or a group of people, openly proclaim that they have assumed a privileged position of authority. This is an important characteristic of dictatorship. For many opponents of dictatorship pharisaically oppose this form of government as though it were impossible for individuals or groups to gain ascendancy and wield power in a strict democracy! The only difference is that whereas dictatorships openly acknowledge and even boast of their power, in democracies people are anxious to hide the fact that they possess any.

We would therefore define dictatorship as *a form of government in which one or many members of the State openly and in an orderly manner exercise over the whole community power gained by violence following on the breach of all previously recognized rights, and without those excluded from a share in the government giving their assent to it.*

This definition does not include various accompanying features of dictatorship, as their connexion with this form of government is more incidental than essential. As far as we have been able to ascertain, dictatorship presupposes the failure or disintegration of an older, outworn system; the innovation can flourish only on ruins; it is chaos and confusion that summon the Alexander of the moment to cut the Gordian knot with his sword. As a rule the old system goes bankrupt at a critical moment in the domestic and foreign relations of a country. It was thus that dictatorships came to be established in Russia, Turkey, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Yugo-Slavia. Only in certain South American States and to some extent in Portugal can dictatorship be differently interpreted as an almost constitutional institution. In the past also it was chaos and confusion at home and the incapacity of the accredited rulers that forced a dictator to the front. Napoleon, Cromwell, and the de Witts are examples of this.

Nor should we overlook the fact that although a dictatorship is invariably established as the result of an act of violence, nevertheless, paradoxical as it may seem, the necessity of having recourse to this act of violence may be provided for by law, or at all events by tradition. This was the case in Rome in the days of the Republic, when the dictator received his super-legal power from a legal body. It also occurred in the Middle Ages, in the civic leagues and orders of knighthood, and for the longest period of time in the so-called Polish Confederations, from which we may borrow a phrase applicable to all dictatorships—*qui non est nobiscum est contra nos*. Dictatorships tolerate no such thing as neutrality. The dictator either rules or is ruled.

The child of necessity, born in extraordinary circumstances, dictatorship has for its fundamental aim the creation of a new 'ordered' state of affairs. Originally a temporary expedient, it succeeded in attaining legality by systematically paving the way to permanence by means of legal methods—that permanence until the day of reckoning with which from time immemorial the *pouvoirs établis* have tried to defy the fate of all mortal things. Every revolution and every dictatorship is primarily an act of salvage which exercises violence for the last time after an epoch of chaos and anarchy with the object of inaugurating a Golden Age free from violence and expected to endure *in secula seculorum*. In this respect the possessors of power, whether in Rome, Moscow, Warsaw, Angora, Madrid, or Belgrade, are all alike, and they bear a further resemblance to each other in that the dominion of the privileged classes over the subjugated cannot fail to terminate owing to the gradual complete disappearance of the subjugated. The dictatorship of the proletariat will end in a society without class distinctions. In the Italy of the future there will be only Fascists. The Old Turks will tend to disappear from the face of the earth, while in Spain everyone will become a member of the Patriotic Union.

As, therefore, dictatorship is merely a transient rule of force—or tyranny, as its opponents call it—and paves the way to a new order and a new right, which it thereupon

endeavours energetically to protect against a repetition of the very procedure which brought the dictatorship itself into being, it is foolish to regard freedom from law as an essential sign of this form of government. On the contrary, as soon as they are in possession of power the new rulers proceed to promulgate fresh regulations, which they feel bound to observe. Has not even Russia been given a new legal code bestowing certain limited privileges on the exiled and oppressed? Only that ruler is above the law, *legibus solutus*, who has won omnipotence by legal means, not the dictator but the Oriental despot. And as a study of history shows, even the latter is more powerful in practice than by right of a political sanction which is nevertheless existent.

Bayonets may be used for several purposes. It may be possible for a while to vault skilfully over them. But domestic peace cannot be founded upon them, for no lasting power can be built up on naked brute force. Dictatorships are well aware of this, and consequently endeavour to fortify their position with the help of an attractive ideology, whereas democracies and other forms of government are in no way concerned about such matters.

Democracy and absolute monarchy can look back upon a long period of undisturbed possession. As *beati possidentes* they feel no need to apologize for their existence, any more than a doyen of high society feels oppressed by having to stand in a drawing-room. But dictators are *parvenus*. Although they may insolently flaunt their contempt of superior manners and classes, by so doing they merely conceal their fear of being regarded as uncertain of themselves and not self-sufficient. Their constant reference to their revolutionary origin, to the absence of law and the reign of force, are reminiscent of the peasant leader who, in a luxuriously appointed hotel, repeatedly calls attention during the intervals of champagne-drinking to the fact that he hails from the masses and despises luxury. A simultaneous though somewhat pathetic appeal to some sort of ideology is quite compatible with this. Democracy theoretically takes its stand on long-suffering papers and documents—constitutions in particular and learned doctrines

in general. In practice, however, it knows how to make common cause with privilege and sober reality. But dictatorship relies upon facts and fists, and for all its occasionally blatant materialism it is impregnated with a deep-rooted emotional idealism.

All great dictatorships have the qualities characteristic of religious sectarianism—enthusiastic idolization of the founder, the chief, and a devotion to a particular ritual or new ceremonies. They elect bodies from the ruling caste of the orthodox which are reminiscent of the religious orders, and they emulate the vows of unflinching obedience made by these to their superior, of poverty (or at least selflessness) and of chastity (or whatever new moral ideals the particular system may have exalted). We need point only to the severe rules and regulations of the Communists in Russia and of the Fascist militia in Italy.

Dictatorship is the product of extraordinary circumstances; it is subversive, and if force of circumstances should make it permanent it develops into a species of stabilized revolution, conceived, supported, and led by great men, always inspired by an attractive ideology, demanding sacrifice and postulating it as a duty on the part of its adherents. Indeed, to use a definition which is as good as any other, it is the creation and the form of government devised by the heroic or dynamic man, while democracy and the absolutist commonwealth State are the creations of the static man. This historical axiom may be supplemented by the sociological axiom that dictatorships proceed from classes characterized by heroic and dynamic qualities whose instincts incline them to upheavals—the army, the remnants of a chivalrous class, or the proletariat, while absolute monarchies and democracies spring from the *bourgeoisie*—commercial men, scholars, and great feudal lords—all of whom need peace and stable conditions.

It seems to me absurd to attribute pacifism chiefly to the working classes. A democracy consisting of a petty *bourgeoisie in potentia* which has something to lose but not much to gain (as in North America, England, and Switzerland) may also be in favour of it. It is those who

have nothing to lose and everything to gain who are in favour of revolution, whether they belong to the masses or the army.

The fact that dictators are frequently men drawn from the ranks of socialism or from the army or the aristocracy has never been sufficiently emphasized. The *bourgeoisie* have never produced a single dictator. To turn only to the greater Powers, we find that Lenin, Mussolini, and Pilsudski once belonged to the same Socialist Party; the first two were scions of impoverished aristocratic families, and all three were by temperament soldiers who won distinction by their lofty personal courage. These and other facts are more significant than any theoretical attempts at welding a proletariat permeated with domestic ideas, whom the evolutionary process has raised to material prosperity, with the democratic *bourgeoisie* to form a united body functioning as a whole. Similarly, in so far as it does not arise from material motives the enthusiasm of the *bourgeoisie* for power and authority appears artificial.

To the impatient reader all these considerations regarding the nature of dictatorship may possibly seem superfluous, or at least beside the point as compared with the question, "*Est-elle bonne, est-elle méchante?*" The natural instinct of man rebels against the separation of morality and politics, upheld by the professional politician. It demands a moral standard of judgment. I shall not conceal my own view, lest silence be interpreted as a confession of a lack of insight or as cowardice, though I must make the reservations inseparable from any expression of opinion on contemporary events. First and foremost I must insist that I am not concerned here with either praising or condemning dictatorship. From the historical or sociological point of view it is a phenomenon like any other. It is not monstrous or Satanic. It does not come down from heaven as a gift from the gods. Even democracy and absolute monarchy are neither absolutely salutary nor absolutely pernicious. To this extent I do not agree with either the advocates or the opponents of dictatorship. In practice the ultimate form and fate of an established system

depend on the men at the head of the Government. The age and the country also count. The same thing does not suit everybody, and whereas in one land dictatorship in certain circumstances might prove salutary, in another its effect would be disastrous.

Nothing is more difficult than to generalize in politics. One of the few definite lessons we can learn from the science of history, from which politics draws or should draw its knowledge, is that the process of evolution is in constant operation and opinions are continually changing. Those who suppose that nothing about them changes and that their own age is a standard for every other are as much the victims of illusion as the man who imagines he is sitting still when he is travelling in an express train. But for a few exceptional minds who know their history most men acquiesce in this illusion, which is comforting to their desire for stability and permanence. . . . "For heaven's sake remain as you are; you are so beautiful!"

Looked at in perspective all forms of government are like natural phenomena, as far removed from the pale of passionate approval or disapproval as a storm or a waterfall. A storm may clear the air and produce a glorious display of flowers, but it may also destroy the crops that man has planted with the sweat of his brow. To one person a waterfall is but a dramatic spectacle, to another it is a source of energy, while to others its roar and the obstacle it presents constitute a nuisance! But storms and waterfalls will appear where Nature pleases, and so will dictatorships.

Is there any purpose to be served by advancing general objections against a system founded on force? Anyone who would summarily condemn it overlooks the fact that it is not the form but the spirit, not the beginning but the end that counts. He forgets that force of some kind is essential to every system of government, and that it is only the creators of Utopias who fondly imagine that society can be built on a foundation of freedom. He forgets that even in democratic States one man rules over another, whereas under a dictatorship inequality is openly avowed. Finally, he forgets that the apparent continuity of the established

order, even when no revolution or sudden violent upheaval occurs, is broken by the changes inseparable from the lapse of time.

The resolute opponents of dictatorship may be answered in the same way as its resolute supporters. All the positive achievements of dictatorship can equally well be secured in the democratic or the absolutist State. In fact all that is required is to cease from regarding dictatorship as being either a divine or a devilish institution, and to bring it down to earth, showing what it has actually accomplished in the most varied departments of life. In so doing we shall substantiate what we propose to reply to those who are anxious to know what the moral value of this much discussed system of government is—*c'est selon*.

The most obvious achievements of dictatorship are seen in the service it renders to the external forms of power in the countries in which it has been established. A system based on force will naturally pay the utmost attention to the technical perfection of its main support. Thus, in the first place, it will attend to what, after all, constitute the *ultima ratio* in the case even of hereditary monarchs—arms and the army. In Russia, Italy, Spain, and Poland the victorious system has either created a modern well-disciplined army after its own military forces had been routed and disorganized by defeat, or it has formed a united and efficient weapon of war out of the ruined fragments of armed forces that happened to be at hand. Bolshevism sprang into being after Tannenberg, Gorlice, and the defeats suffered by Kerenski. It has succeeded in defending the nation against foreign invasion, it has ended the civil war in favour of the proletariat, and although it lost the campaign against Poland, it has maintained the frontiers of the Russian Empire intact. It is not for me to pass any moral comment on its actions! Its standards have carried Russian influence as far as Mongolia and Persia, and won back the Caucasus republics, which had declared their independence. The Italian army had its Caporetto. After the World War it was exposed to terrible onslaughts on the part of Bolshevik propaganda, and although its present

worth can be judged only by the wholehearted admiration of experts, we may safely assume that if it were put to the test the Italian army would undoubtedly distinguish itself. Out of the most wretched elements Pilsudski has created a mighty Polish army with which he won a war in 1920, and has been able successfully to defend Poland against the constant menace of two hostile neighbours. But for it, her safety would, in spite of all the treaties, still be a matter of the gravest doubt. Primo de Rivera came to the helm after the catastrophe of Morocco, bringing the interminable colonial war to a successful issue. But the fact that, unlike his colleagues in Russia, Italy, and Poland, he did not succeed in gathering the whole army about him, constitutes the Achilles' heel of his Government and its most serious menace. There is no need for me to expatiate at length on the military achievements of Mustapha Kemal and his Turks. For the army, dictatorship has always and everywhere been an advantage, as can be proved even by references to modern China and Mexico, while in the realm of history it is sufficient to mention the names of Cromwell, Carnot, and Napoleon. The few unimportant exceptions, such as Portugal, Greece, and Lithuania, are of no significance. For although in these countries dictatorships have plainly had but little effect on military conditions, the exception here proves the rule.

The second weapon in the hands of the State is its Civil Service, and here again, as far as the leading Powers are concerned, we can only applaud dictatorship. The improvement made in Italy by Fascism is amazing. It has introduced order and discipline, and created a single conscious will, which guides the whole administration of the country, thereby modifying to its own advantage a machine which was on the point of breaking down altogether. Corruption has vanished; punctuality, promptness, and cleanliness in every sense of the word give the foreign visitor a most pleasant surprise, particularly if he happens to be visiting Italy for the first time since, say, 1919 or 1920.

While real and substantial progress has been made in Italy, great improvements have also been introduced in

Russia, Poland, and Spain, countries which have never in the whole course of history been regarded as models of good government, so that the progress they have made in a relatively short space of time is all the more remarkable. I would refer the reader to the sober businesslike statements in Pemartin's book on the Spanish dictatorship. I can think of no such trustworthy account in the cases of Russia and Poland, for the partisan pamphlets for or against are not reliable. Nevertheless it is agreed that even the much-maligned Soviet bureaucracy has carried out quite a number of important administrative reforms. But in Russia, as in Poland, the initiative and energy of the central authorities frequently found themselves thwarted by the inefficiency of their subordinates, more particularly in the outlying provinces. (When I say Poland I do not mean those parts of it formerly ruled by Prussia, which were splendidly administered according to Western ideas, nor the tolerably well-administered portion once known as Galicia, where little has changed, but those districts of the 'Kingdom'—the eastern marches and Polish Lithuania—which are now doing all in their power to recover from the effects of Russian misrule.) Though it can hardly be measured by European standards, the change that has converted Turkey from a medieval country into a modern up-to-date commonwealth is also deserving of admiration. Here again we must be careful to judge relatively and to concentrate not upon the end in view, but on the progress actually achieved. Perhaps, however, one of the strongest arguments in favour of dictatorship as far as administration is concerned is provided by the Herculean labours which have enabled those who hold the reins of power in Yugo-Slavia to carry through their reforms in a few months. In fact, there is nothing whatever to show that the administration of a country suffers under a dictatorial system of government.

It is more difficult to express an opinion regarding dictatorship and economics. But wherever the power and influence of the Government can make themselves felt, as, for instance, in all matters of foreign exchange, everything seems to be in favour of dictatorship. Italy and Poland

stabilized their currencies after the establishment of the new system, when previously the lira and the zloty had been steadily depreciating. Even Spain, who has materially increased her gold reserve under the dictatorship, has been more or less successful in checking the depreciation of her currency, and if she has not achieved quite so much in this respect as Italy and Poland, it is because the new Government is not regarded by the rest of the world as being quite firmly established. Whereas figures tell a plain tale where rates of exchange are concerned, the subject of economic development presents a thorny problem which generally leads back to questions of principle, for the same figures are adduced in support of many different arguments. In Italy the economic situation has greatly improved, the growth of industry and commerce being beyond all doubt. Exports and the standard of living have risen, while production has increased both in quantity and quality. But as far as Poland and Spain are concerned, it is impossible to find any connexion between economic and constitutional changes, while with regard to Russia it is difficult to come to any conclusion, seeing that while the opponents of communism maintain that it has had a deleterious effect on economic conditions, its supporters are of the opposite opinion. Personally I am inclined to think that the matter should be judged from the point of view of the system itself, which from the beginning made the nationalization of the means of production its aim. And in this case it is impossible to deny that the rulers in the Kremlin have achieved substantial success.

Lastly let us turn to the domain of the spirit—art, literature, and science. Here the advocates of dictatorship have no easy brief to hold. But in common fairness it should be pointed out from the first that in a sphere where regulations, orders, and organization are of little avail, and where everything of importance depends upon the creative personality, State influence is more of an impediment than a help. As far as I can see, and disregarding for the moment the claims of the active campaign at present being conducted in favour of culture, art has benefited

from the new *régimes* only in Russia and Italy, mainly on account of the care for museums and the support and encouragement afforded to budding talent. In no case can positive harm be shown to have resulted from dictatorship, unless it be that impressionable natures feel uneasy under its pressure and find their creative efforts paralysed. In literature and science the verdict may be either for or against. To the extent to which poetic fancy and scientific research happen to favour those in power they are more zealously patronized than under other forms of government. But woe to authors or scientists whose ideas and achievements are in any way unfavourable to the Government. Thus in Russia, for instance, the flourishing branches of culture are economic history (in so far as it confirms Marxist theories), biology (in so far as it goes to prove that man has no soul), and the theatre, the cinema, literary criticism, and any form of writing as a channel for propaganda. Fascism in Italy gives wholehearted support to those whose views are acceptable to the Government. It has founded an Academy, it subsidizes universities, and is reforming education. But the expression of views hostile to the Government—particularly if they happen to be uttered by historians, political economists, constitutional lawyers, and philosophers—is punished, and those who hold them are well advised to keep silence. Literature bears the stamp of modernity; it is dynamic and anti-classical, and reveals the Janus-head of Fascism. In Italy, as in Russia, the revolution has produced important literary works. How many it has destroyed and stifled we do not know. In Spain the same principle applies—right thinking is encouraged, wrong thinking is punished, though in this case the comparative weakness of the rule of force is once again apparent—that is to say, there is active and open resistance in the higher educational institutions, of a kind that no one would dare to show in Italy or Russia. Moreover, in the latter countries, as both the students and the professors are at heart favourably disposed toward the dictatorship, it is hardly likely that opposition would be shown even if there was nothing to prevent it. In Poland

the dictatorship has exercised no influence on literature or science. The higher educational institutions are still free and unhampered, and in this sphere, as well as in that of art, it cannot be said that conditions are either better or worse than they were under the old democracy. But in the realm of elementary education dictatorship has many far-reaching reforms to its credit. This is true of Russia and Poland as well as of Italy and Spain. But on the whole it may be said that dictatorships have exercised no decisive influence over the realms of the spirit. Generally speaking, its positive achievements in the realm of popular education and the encouragement of those branches of science useful to the Government are counterbalanced by the obstacles and vexations it places in the way of free research.

To sum up: if we come to the conclusion that dictatorships have meant a positive gain for the countries in which they have been established, it must be borne in mind that we have hitherto considered the matter only from the standpoint of the interests of the State, the primary need of which is to be governed and to secure internal unity without overmuch regard for the individual. But if we turn to the citizen of the State for his opinion, we find that the trial of dictatorship is merely an episode in the everlasting dispute *individuum versus societatem*. All those objections, in themselves justifiable, which can be raised against dictatorship are, as a rule, just as applicable to the State as such, and to every community exercising compulsion. It is true that dictatorship means muzzling the individual. But every State muzzles the individual, or at least puts the eager eater on short commons. Thus between dictatorship, which means compulsion according to programme and conviction, and democracy, which necessitates a reluctant use of compulsion in the name of the majority, there are only shades of difference. The human mind, even in the case of thinkers of repute, when it is not directly familiar with historical criticism, generally fails to grasp, after two hundred years of democratic theory and one hundred of triumphant democratic practice, that obedience to the will of an actual or fictitious majority of citizens is in no way

more natural than obedience to one of many rulers or tyrants, whether the latter owe their position to the hereditary principle or to the exercise of legal or illegal methods. It is still influenced by the ghost of the *contrat social*, the alleged voluntary subordination of the individual to the *volonté générale*—an extremely useful piece of fiction in which we may acquiesce for practical purposes or from individual conviction, but which must not be postulated as an historical axiom or an eternally valid dogma.

Why should the individual adjust himself to his fellows and to their common body-politic or subject himself to authority? He does so only as the result of external compulsion, which overcomes his instinct to resist, or of compulsion from within, whether of a religious or philosophical or purely practical kind, which convinces him that his subjection serves a useful purpose. I do not therefore believe that, even from the standpoint of the individual, dictatorship in general is more open to criticism on principle than any other kind of force. Only those who regard every form of government as evil need feel logically called upon at all costs to refute dictatorship. The attitude of the rest toward dictatorship must depend purely on practical experience, and any such experience is certainly far more distressing for the individual than for the State.

Dictatorship exercises a very much more powerful sway over the human conscience than does democracy or absolutism, and the reason for this lies in the very essence of its constitution. A government which can make no claim to having received the consent of the people or to being established by any hallowed rite must do all in its power to make its ideology the only acceptable one, or at least the only one that is universally proclaimed, and thus, in so far as the older ideologies of democracy and its predecessor absolutism still make themselves felt, secure something in the nature of a *post facto* sanction, which in common parlance is known as confirmation, or, in the language of the theologian, consecration. This has the effect of obtaining the consent of the majority to events after they have happened, and of mooring the authority of the Government to the

solid ground of a new conception of right. In Russia, Italy, and Spain we have seen that when once the Parliaments belonging to the old *régime* had been dispersed, driven out, or wherever possible suppressed by means of hitherto accepted legal methods, it was only to make way for new representative bodies which, as they conformed more perfectly to the wishes of those in power, were immediately acclaimed as being the expression of the national will. And we shall probably see the same sequence of events in Poland. Furthermore, we can observe how the change in public opinion becomes an accomplished fact. Real power and success have always retained a certain glamour, and thus where a dictatorship has been set up and is firmly established the transformation takes place which makes the triumphant ideology accepted as their own by the vast majority. A victorious cause is pleasing not only to the gods, but also to the masses, and a difficulty overcome is approved by the Catos. . . .

But for the old ideals to yield to new and for the new to be defended against yet newer ones, the Government is bound to suppress heresy and particularly the teachers of heresy, the erring disciples. The individual sighs because his conscience pricks him at the suppression of every noble sentiment. Russia has persecuted scholars who diverged even by a hair's breadth from Marxian orthodoxy, and above all subjected to the most brutal treatment all who professed any kind of religious conviction. We also know the grievances of the Italian emigrants; Unamuno is a living witness to the conditions in Spain; and Nowaczyński, the Polish publicist, would be in a position to tell us whom adverse critics of the *régime* have to fear in Poland. In Hungary legal sentences such as that passed against Hatvany have attracted the attention of all Europe. Mustapha Kemal kept his executioner busy and provided plenty of work for his censor. Croatian autonomists, Bulgarian Radicals, Lithuanians belonging to Voldemaras' Opposition camp, and the opponents of Pangalos or Venizelos, would all have a tale of woe to tell; but the lamentations would soon cease if they were to come into

power and their persecutors were placed in the position of the oppressed.

The following are undoubtedly some of the disadvantages under which the individual labours in a dictatorial State—he may not speak if his speeches meet with the disapproval of the authorities, he is very often forced to speak when he would prefer to hold his tongue, he is obliged to consecrate a larger proportion of his individuality, his time, his work, and his income to the service of the State than he would under other systems, and, in addition to all these sacrifices, he may be called upon to make the further sacrifice of his intellect, the *sacrificio dell' intelletto*. What slavery! And the state of affairs becomes intolerable when the system demands even the sacrifice of his soul and his soul's salvation. The defenders of existing dictatorships will no doubt reply that these acts of self-denial are demanded partly on ethical grounds, in the interests of the whole community, that they are necessary for the achievement of a higher object, and that they are partly imaginary. To enter upon a discussion of all these contentions would serve no purpose, merely leading us into the charmed circle of metaphysics and to a consideration of the question of faith. The grievance of the man who feels he is deprived of the free exercise of conscience can never be altogether eliminated from this world.

But meanwhile we may and should ask ourselves who to-day pays any attention to the spiritual tortures endured by the oppressed in a democratic State? Has not every system been built up on the ruins of downtrodden convictions and fettered beliefs? The nobleman relieved of his feudal dues with little or no compensation, the monarch whose divine right has been denied, the citizen compelled to do military service, the man forced to pay taxes when he had previously been immune, are no less the victims of violence than the man who, having been free under a democracy to attend meetings and print what he liked in the papers, finds himself deprived of these privileges under a dictatorial Government. In short, Governments respect the rights of the individual only so long as there is no need to

rescind them, and only in so far as they do not happen to be prejudicial to the requirements of the State for the time being. The extent to which the happiness of the individual may be affected by these constraints depends upon the changes that may come over public opinion. Only those who are ignorant of history expect to find toleration exercised in all times and in all circumstances.

Having examined the effect of dictatorship on mankind in general as well as on the individual, let us now see how it manifests itself in different countries. Once more this is by no means an easy task. The advocates of the system will always maintain that it is in keeping with the national spirit, the opponents that it is hostile thereto. Nevertheless, it is always open to the onlooker to form an objective judgment by an appeal to history. M. Delaisi's profound observation that Europe could be divided into two halves by a line drawn from Bilbao to Kovno, on one side of which we should find dictatorship and the horse, and on the other democracy and the tractor, is truer than would appear at first sight. All we need beware of is the tendency to regard the use of the horse instead of the machine as denoting inferiority, a *capitis diminutio*. This division of Europe into two halves is also apt inasmuch as it makes the line run through the middle of France and Germany, and of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, thus constituting them a group standing, as it were, half-way between democracy and dictatorship, Switzerland being an enclave representing democracy and horse-power.

Throughout the south, south-east, and east of Europe dictatorship is everywhere established—openly in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugo-Slavia, Poland, Russia, and Lithuania; secretly in Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Rumania, and Albania, whose official representatives would protest *unisono* against the idea that they were ruling dictatorially. Until a relatively short time ago all these States were being ruled absolutely, even though in one or two of them, and particularly in Spain and Hungary, the upper classes had for centuries been struggling with the Crown for the granting of constitutional privileges. They are all essen-

tially agricultural communities in origin, industry and the exploitation of mineral wealth being of recent date and having been initiated by foreigners. Their peoples always have been and still are accustomed to being ruled and cling to the observance of a rather external form of religion which is traditional with them. Until quite recently their national peculiarities were preserved and there was a wide gulf between the immensely wealthy great landowners and a proletariat of extremely poor peasants. No regular *bourgeoisie* existed, though their place was partially filled by a class of non-national Jews and Levantines. Nowhere in these parts had modern democracy taken deep root, the mass of the people regarding both democracy and its achievements with complete indifference. Those who enjoyed the benefits of the constitution were professional politicians recruited partly from the old governing classes and partly from the ranks of successful *parvenus* who quickly denied their origin.

Western observers sitting at their baize-covered tables, and born and bred in communities with long-established democratic traditions, have no conception of what the rule of the sovereign people involves in these States of pseudo-Parliamentarianism. Occasionally, though rarely, their eyes are opened by a perusal of the newspapers, or when on the occasion of a chance visit to these countries they are horrified to discover the true state of affairs. In Spain the "Cacique," in Hungary the "Kortesch," controls all the votes. In Rumania, Hungary, and what used to be Galicia cordons of troops surround the building where the election of the people's representatives takes place, and only those are allowed to enter who have been supplied with the prearranged password. In certain parts of Russia the peasants write the name of the Czar on their voting cards, being of opinion that he is the only person worthy of being elected to Parliament; in other parts they refrain from voting altogether, for since all power springs from the devil they refuse to have anything to do with it. A candidate in the Carpathians will win the election by skilfully circulating the rumour, which is not denied, that he is the Crown

Prince Rudolf, and will not only give every peasant a cow and a piece of land, but will also massacre the Jews. In Rumania nine-tenths of the people will vote in favour of one party one day and six months later will vote in similar numbers for another; and are not most of the Onorevoli and the members of the Cortes and the Sejm merely the agents of syndicates who secure contracts for themselves and other people and represent purely local interests? Have the majority of the people, driven to the ballot-boxes by landowners, manufacturers, priests, and mayors, any knowledge of or desire for ruling according to the principles of Montesquieu, Benjamin Constant, and the theorists of the liberal States?

Volenti non fit injuria. It is for the opponents of dictatorship to prove that even if democratic principles were faithfully followed, the majority of those in enjoyment of the political franchise in the realms of the horse would not in the name of democracy and by the exercise of their vote voluntarily relinquish their rights in order to secure an orderly system of government. It is true that the advocates of dictatorship should also be called upon to show proof to the contrary, but we may quote in their favour another legal saw: *Qui tacet consentire videtur.*

The question is to what extent does this silent consent actually exist or can be proved to have existed by subsequent vociferous protestations of approval. That it actually exists is most plainly shown in the case of Italy. Here the opponents of Fascism are a politically dwindling minority who are fast becoming of no more importance than were the aristocratic *émigrés* of the French Revolution. The people are standing by Mussolini, and refuse to support that attitude of resistance—which in itself cannot fail to command respect—assumed on purely ideal grounds by an *élite* consisting of such men as Benedetto Croce and Guglielmo Ferrero. Moreover, the achievements of the Fascist Government are plain to all. But in the eyes of the historian dictatorship is a development of tyranny, of the Roman principate, of the medieval *podestà* States and of the rule of the *condottieri*, which are organically related to the character

of the Italian people, but meet with little sympathy in Anglo-Saxon or French democracies.

And if I now venture to maintain that even the Soviet *régime* is opposed only by a minority, and that its opponents also belong to the category of *émigrés*, I do not therefore wish to imply that the majority in Russia have expressed themselves *in favour* of it. Nevertheless, we cannot help regarding it as adequate for the Russian spirit, which is opposed to everything that savours of individual initiative and self-reliance. When a Polish author writing the history of Russia from the time of Alexander I gave his book the title of *From White Czardom to Red*, he cleverly put into a nutshell the fact that Czardom—that is to say, the arbitrary and absolute rule of a few—and obedience, which takes its root in the indifference and indolence of the masses, constitute the Russian form of government. Yesterday the Czar with his courtiers and Chynovniks constituted the authorities, and any insurrection against them was not only severely punished, but also strictly forbidden by the national religion—loyalty to the Orthodox Emperor, to the "*Czar pravoslavnij*." To-day the authorities are composed of the Commissars of various grades and the ruling class of the proletariat—that is to say, the pick of them, consisting of the organized communists, who exercise the same means of power but with the Marxian gospel as their orthodox faith.

Those who attempt to judge Bolshevism should remember that in Russia the care of the people has always been the concern of the privileged classes and that their rule was good. It was they who conferred happiness and public benefits on the *misera plebs contribuens*. And matters are very much the same now. The only pronounced difference is that economic inequalities have been abolished; for the political inequalities remain. Those in authority in the proletarian State fill the official posts and secure access to the higher educational institutions for their offspring. They enjoy privilege, honour, and influence, but money and its equivalent is at present more often to be found in other ranks of society. But a similar state of affairs has frequently existed in the past. Did not the Spartans boast of their

poverty in their own country and leave it to the metics, who had no share in the government, to enrich themselves? To turn once more to the achievements of Bolshevism, it is impossible, provided we bear in mind the object it set out to attain, to accord it anything but praise. The proletarian State has been established, and while the proletariat may not perhaps be financially so flourishing as of yore, they are certainly politically and otherwise in a much better position than they were before. The voice of opposition is ceasing to be heard, and ever wider circles of people are giving their wholehearted support to a system which, owing to their inability to resist, they were at first compelled to tolerate.

In Spain the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera ended by an act of the King. It is true that the late dictator was able to appeal to a tradition which was frequently revived in the nineteenth century. He swept away countless evils of Parliamentarianism. The two exhibitions in Barcelona and Seville revealed an extraordinary increase of prosperity, and large sections of the populace rallied to the Patriotic Union under Primo de Rivera. Nevertheless the system was menaced on all sides, though this seems to have been due less to the principle of dictatorship than to the person of the Dictator, who clearly lacked the authority of a Mussolini, a Mustapha Kemal, or a Lenin. On the other hand, he was much too much the incarnation of his system for the latter to be transferred, as it has been in Russia, to the shoulders of an impersonal group of State officials. General Berenguer is the successor of the late potentate. In the army, and especially in the universities, there are still innumerable smouldering centres of revolt.

In Poland Pilsudski stands firm as a rock, though this is certainly not due to the fact that the majority support his policy unconditionally, but because he can rely on the army and a formidable organization of War veterans, who are prepared to respond to the smallest sign from him. Meanwhile Parliament, the Sejm, has not yet laid down its arms. In it the Government party is in a minority which cannot carry on by legal methods without the help of other

factions. The fact that there are strong parties in existence besides the dictatorship, that the Press is free, and meetings may be held without let or hindrance, privileges of which Pilsudski's enemies make full use, differentiates the Polish *régime* from those established in Italy and Russia. But the outsider who would conclude from these signs that these latent dangers threaten a sudden change, as they do in Spain, would certainly be mistaken. The days of dictatorship in Warsaw are far from being numbered; on the contrary, it is in the throes of development, and is by no means exhausted. There is every prospect that the moment will come when, as the only real authority in the State, it will lay its foundations firmly on a revision of the constitution, which, as in the case of other dictatorships, will try to win public favour. Tradition is on its side; for, apart from the old Polish Confederations, we have only to call to mind Kościuszko and the dictatorships of the 1830 and 1863 rebellions. Only recently it has justified its existence by a ruthless purging of the army and the Government of all corruption, by a magnificent perfecting of the machinery of State and outstanding achievements in the realm of culture.

All impartial observers bear witness to the existence of similar qualities in the Yugo-Slavian system. One of its peculiar features is that the person of the King constitutes a connecting-link between the democratic constitutional forms which preceded and those which followed the dictatorship, that it unhesitatingly emphasizes its temporary character and thereby approaches a system based on legality, and that although its aims and general character constitute it a revolutionary dictatorship, the Dictator himself is a man who enjoys a legal position. Another peculiarity of the Yugo-Slavian system is that the Government stands for the preservation of the unity of the State, and for the reconciliation of branch antagonisms, whereas in other countries the main object of dictatorship has been the establishment of a new social point of view or a mere reform of government.

We find yet another type of dictatorship in Lithuania

and Portugal, where the system is obviously a rule of force such as we were familiar with before the World War, more especially in the republics of South America. In these two countries the sole purpose of the dictatorship is to maintain its existence with the object of keeping the present holders of power at the helm. Portugal offers an example of how an exceptional state of affairs gradually becomes the rule. Without coming to terms with the constitution, the military dictatorship has already established itself as the regular form of government, and while those in authority are to all intents and purposes dependent for support on the whim of the army the principle remains unaltered. There is no need to discuss the various South American free States which possess similar forms of government. Mexico is a country in which dictatorship is a permanent institution, while Lithuania bears a certain resemblance to it, inasmuch as Voldemaras has no programme but can have recourse only to an arbitrary appeal to arms.

The Turks and the Hungarians nominally enjoy a constitutional form of government which undeniably owes its origin to a patriotic call to arms. Nevertheless it is also difficult to deny that this origin makes itself felt to-day in an increasingly severe though possibly legal suppression of every subversive tendency. Turkey has found in Mustapha Kemal a genial and unscrupulous reformer, while Hungary has in Bethlén an experienced and skilful statesman, and these two men have led their respective countries, lacerated by the War and standing on the edge of the abyss, to a condition of new and flourishing prosperity, alive with conscious, clear-sighted workers. Whether, after all this has taken place, the two systems may still be regarded as dictatorships I feel it would be superfluous pedantry to discuss. In Angora and Budapest the upheaval has long since calmed down into a state of security and order. As for Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria, these countries have ever since the World War been under the rule of dictatorships in the sense that the present holders of power have been able to reckon in a way quite incomprehensible to Western nations on an amenable electorate, and conse-

quently obedient Parliaments, and also in the sense that their management of a nominal democracy reveals all the methods adopted by dictatorships based on force. Venizelos, Bratianu, and Manin are broad-minded men of genuine merit; others, like Stamboliski and Pangalos, have offered us the caricature of dictatorship, while I need make only a passing reference to Zogu, of Albania, who has converted his dictatorship into a monarchy.

To sum up: in none of the countries above mentioned has dictatorship met with sufficient opposition to be suppressed. In most of them it is flourishing up to the time of writing. Where it has disappeared it has done so by having been deliberately converted into a *régime* which those in power have established by means of violence. This was the case in Hungary particularly, where the violence used was really an antidote to another kind of violence, where the sword perished by the sword, and the way to legality was secured by outlawing the illegal system.

We have examined the most varied types of dictatorship—dictatorships of a class and of a superior man, strictly temporary dictatorships and dictatorships of unlimited duration. We have seen dictators, like Mussolini and Lenin, belonging to the category of great historical figures endowed with creative genius; others, like Pilsudski and Mustapha Kemal, who in their own countries exercise decisive power; as well as miniature tyrants, like Pangalos and Voldemaras. But despite superficial differences the underlying image remains the same. After violent upheavals or at the beginning of a new era for the State a power tolerated in silence or established through a triumphant defeat of the Opposition endeavours to reshape the life of the community, instead of seeking a mandate for its authority along the lines of fictitious popular support —that is to say, the support of the majority.

Is this radical cure suitable or even possible in the case of a second group of political entities, which can look back on an older democratic and Parliamentary tradition, and whose economic conditions are less primitive than those of the East and South? Does the shadow of dictatorship

hover over Central Europe, Germany, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, and France? These countries differ from those we have been examining inasmuch as their industrial life is very much more advanced, popular education is extended over a wider area, and the various ranks of society are more closely knit, while the masses are not so conscious of a feeling of inferiority and have more initiative. Moreover, religion and imponderabilia of all kinds place no external constraint on the exercise of intellectual alertness. France can look back on five generations of constitutional schooling, South and Western Germany on four, and North Germany, Austria, and Czecho-Slovakia on three. These countries can also look back on a Parliamentary tradition which has gradually left its impress on the whole nation and accustomed it to co-operate in the task of government. But for a few backward areas which were of little importance in their respective countries the people of these nations, even long before the World War, took a very real part in public life. It is true that the development of social life in these countries was quicker though less spontaneous and more self-organized than in purely agricultural countries. In the former it is difficult for a state of chaos to arise, and it does so only in extremely exceptional circumstances. But, as we have already pointed out, chaos and anarchy are the prime necessities and the forcing-ground for the violent intervention represented by dictatorship. But the historical associations for this are lacking in Germany and in Austria, which is historically related to Germany, as well as in Czecho-Slovakia. It is true that in France the tradition for this kind of intervention already exists, but it does not conjure up very cheerful memories in the hearts of the majority. There are certainly large circles in Germany that are emotionally and intellectually inspired by the cult of authority, but until recently this reverence was directed toward the hereditary dynasties and has only quite recently been turned toward the idea of a revolutionary dictator. In Austria and Czecho-Slovakia repugnance to dictatorship of any kind is almost unanimous.

Nevertheless, even though on historical, sociological, and psychological grounds the astute observer may regard dictatorship as alien to the countries of this 'middle group,' and a form of government which they would quickly overthrow, he cannot help noticing symptoms even in Central Europe and France which might inaugurate an era of force and have temporarily almost succeeded in doing so. Should there be such an increase of confusion as to disturb the orderly and peaceful working of society, then we should find that even in these countries the cry for a strong hand would be raised. At a moment of direst need Clemenceau seized the reins of power, and his dictatorship saved France. When Germany was faced with chaos and ruin we saw an attempt to set up a proletarian dictatorship in the Ruhr district, in Saxony, in the Vogtland, and in the Bavarian Soviet Republic, followed by the *coup d'état* of Kapp-Putsch and Hitler in Munich. Other similar plans were never carried out. But wherever party disputes paralysed Parliament, the threat of dictatorship appeared menacingly on the political horizon. In Czecho-Slovakia Gajda, the former Chief of the General Staff, seriously contemplated the idea of a Fascist upheaval. That in Austria many have harboured similar intentions is a fact known to all, though the secret in some cases has been well kept. And France at the time of her serious currency crisis in 1926 again turned eagerly to the remedy of a legal dictatorship, the Prime Minister, Poincaré, playing the part taken by Clemenceau during the World War. Even at the present moment the question of setting up a Fascist system in France is being discussed in a narrow but influential circle in that country.

The possibility of the establishment of a dictatorship in Germany is for the moment somewhat remote. In Czecho-Slovakia there is no chance of it whatever, in France it is extremely unlikely, while in Austria it is contingent upon some rapid change in the Parliamentary situation, and a sudden and unexpected crisis could alone bring about any such rapid change. I must leave the discussion of these possible eventualities to the prophets and to pessimists or

optimists, or those who see—red! All that can be said with certainty is that the complete failure of existing constitutional Governments can alone compass the doom of democracy.

In a third group of European Powers dictatorship cannot be contemplated even hypothetically. They are the countries with centuries of Parliamentary tradition behind them, where individual freedom has long been recognized, and where democratic culture and social legislation are most fully developed—England, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. With the exception of Belgium the World War left these countries almost untouched. Whatever crises those countries may have suffered, they have mastered them entirely single-handed and by means of the forces of order (the miners' strike in England!), and among their essential characteristics are the satisfactory co-operation between monarchy and socialistic Parliamentary majorities, and the respect of the masses for tradition and of the traditional powers for the masses. In countries such as these, where the various powers act harmoniously together, there is no room for government by force, and where distress is not nearly so widespread as in the rest of Europe there is no need for a form of government based on a continual state of distress. Where there is no pressing necessity there is no imperative law.

For it has been made abundantly clear to us that the kind of dictatorship, such as that of ancient Rome, which arises at a time when the country is on the verge of disaster can come into being only when a country feels its very existence threatened and, in order to save itself, proceeds to demolish the obstacles presented by dusty records and documents. And this it does by having recourse to the doctrine that might is right, against which we may curse and swear and hurl the imprecations of outraged morality, but which can be overcome only by the weapon of a yet greater might. And then those who have had the personal freedom they love torn from them cry out in pain, the student bewails the fetters put upon science, and the soft-

hearted bemoan oppression and bloodshed. But history mercilessly teaches us that even for society *primum vivere et deinde philosophari*—"you must live before you can philosophize"—is a true maxim, and that if man can be as a ravening wolf to his fellows, how much more so can the State be one to its citizens, first seeking its own nourishment, and if it fails to find it searching for victims on which to batten.

But gradually the system founded on violence will accommodate itself to new rules and regulations. In fact, after a time it will be bound to do so. For even a permanent revolution is a settled condition. The crises to which the body politic is exposed tend to die down, and what was originally a destructive upheaval develops into a state of stable order which becomes ever more sacred and hallowed as the schools and the Press, the handy weapons of every Government, untiringly proclaim its merits. Theoretically we may condemn violence, and with it dictatorship, or we may desire their perpetuation. But in practice it serves no purpose either to abolish or to perpetuate them. Crises are inevitable whether in the life of the individual or of the community. They must pass, however, otherwise their victim will perish.

But those who, instead of taking a profound view and trying to direct the course of events likely to lead to dictatorship, content themselves with giving vent to abuse and curses are like those who wax indignant at the febrifuges and operations by the more or less skilled application of which doctors undertake to cure their patients. Those who, on the other hand, regard violence as an infallible nostrum are like the fools who make useful drugs inoperative and noxious owing to abuse.

Although we may decline to recommend or even acknowledge dictatorship as a panacea, we nevertheless bow to the circumstances, limited though they may be by time and locality, which justify its existence and enable it to accomplish miracles. Herein dictatorship resembles high treason—a crime from which at first it is barely distinguishable—in that if it fails it constitutes a felony which is

severely punished, while its success is hailed as a highly patriotic and praiseworthy achievement.

The moment has come to give our final verdict, and we would delegate this duty to an imaginary bench of three members, consisting of a believer in the absolute power of the State, an uncompromising individualist, and an opportunist, the last-named being endowed with a deep understanding of the limitations of all political and historical beliefs. The verdict of the first would be as follows: "Dictatorship is based upon the sacred right of a community in times of need or at any other to demand a total surrender of their *egos* from its citizens." To which the second retorts, "In the name of the most sacred and imperishable rights of the individual, I protest!" But the epoch of the *liberum veto* has irrevocably passed. In Parliaments and in courts of law it is the majority that decides. Let us therefore turn to the third, who will have the casting vote. The opportunist, who prefers or preferred happy times to stirring times, who regards the sacredness of the rights of the State with the same scepticism as those of the individual—for intelligent men have at one time or another defended and upheld or refuted and annihilated both the one and the other—turns conciliatingly to his two disputing colleagues and says:

> We may leave the valuation of dictatorship with complete confidence to divine justice. But since dictatorship has accidentally been arraigned for us to pass judgment on it, it behoves us neither to condemn it blindly nor to praise it uncritically. Inasmuch as it formally breaks with law, it would be criminal for us to give everybody the right to do likewise by unreservedly expressing our approval of violence. But we have to remember that on occasion terrible situations have to be faced, when an irresistible compulsion to compel arises, a necessity to force, and after a fresh codification of the laws there is no possibility of punishing the perpetrators of the deed of violence. I declare the prisoner Not Guilty!

This, by a majority of two to one, would be the verdict. And democracy would bow to the opinion of that majority.

(Will the accused be given an ovation, or will the Press and the public wax indignant? We do not know! In Kipling's words, "That is another story!" But perhaps in years to come universal history will deliver its judgment on the case submitted to the appeal court of the world.)

In the present trial of dictatorship the verdict is:

"*Not guilty!*"

Postscript

Many months have elapsed since I wrote "The Nature of Dictatorship." But although the views I advanced in this essay have been in no way refuted by the history of our fast-moving age, and my fundamental argument remains unshaken, there have occurred certain changes of detail in regard to facts. Primo de Rivera has gone, but the Parliamentary system has not been restored, although the democratic and even the republican elements have strengthened. Pilsudski, on the other hand, has drawn the reins in tighter, and in doing so rests his authority on the last and ultimate argument of all kings and dictators. Mere episodes in the trial of dictatorship! The revolutionary changes now taking place in Germany, which during the last few months have assumed a surprising pace, are certainly worthy of the closest attention. Everything in that country seems to point to the approach with giant strides of a *régime* akin to Fascism. But the essential law, that dictatorships are the creation of necessity, is being demonstrated even in the case of Germany, and will be definitely proved there, unless some unforeseen turn of events, hardly likely now, should after all put an end to the present crisis. Meanwhile there are only two possible alternatives to be considered—a dictatorship of the Centre or of the Right. Once again in a big country democracy is in the throes of bankruptcy, and, as usual, its downfall goes hand in hand with that of the middle classes. Thus it is only in those countries in which the Parliamentary system has taken root for centuries, and which are also the home of the middle classes, the centres of comfort and wealth, that the freedom of the

individual and of State life—the most precious treasure of any community—maintains its unbroken strength. Nevertheless, outside the ranks of the well-to-do, even in these countries, there reign distress and want, which know no law, and are at the same time the root of the harshest laws—*quid detrimenti capiat res publica*. And it is in the atmosphere of distress and want that the trial of dictatorship comes into being, runs its course, and hastens on toward its fateful consummation.

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